32 Angelina House, Goldsmith Road, London SE15 5UB LON/00BE/HMF/2024/0191

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)

Case No LON/00BE/HMF/2024/0191

Between

(1) Kamal Boulema (2) Luke Pietersen (3) Isabel John (4) Billy MarsdenApplicant

Hoppe-Foster Ventures LimitedRespondent

Before

Judge M Jones

Ms S Coughlin MCIEH

Brian Leacock, Justice for Tenants for the Applicant

Desmond Taylor, Landlords Defence Tenants’ application for a Rent for the Respondent

Date 11 March 2025

Property: London SE15 5UB (1) Kamal Boulema (2) Luke Pietersen

Type of application: Repayment Order under the Housing and Planning Act 2016 Judge M Jones

DECISION

2 Decisions of the tribunal(1) The Tribunal finds that a rent repayment order is not payable, and the Applicants’ applications are accordingly refused.

(2) The Tribunal is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondent landlord committed the alleged offence under section 40 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016.

(3) The Tribunal declines to order that the Applicants be reimbursed the fees paid on their application, and for the hearing Introduction

[1]By application dated 08 April 2024, the Applicant tenants applied for a rent repayment order (“RRO”) against the Respondent landlord under sections 40-44 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (“the 2016 Act”).

[2]Section 40 of the 2016 Act confers power on the First-Tier Tribunal to make a rent repayment order where a landlord has committed an offence to which the section applies. Such offences are specified in a table found in the section, which are committed by a landlord in relation to housing in England let by that landlord.

[3]The basis for the application is that it is alleged that the Respondent committed an offence of having control of, and/or managing, an unlicensed house in multiple occupation (“HMO”) which was required to be licensed, contrary to Part 2, section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”), which is an offence under section 40(3) of the 2016 Act.

[4]The subject property is a four-bedroom, two storey flat situated in the fourth and fifth floors of a purpose-built block. It is common ground that it was let by the Respondent to the Applicants, their occupation commencing on various dates in 2021, and ending on 14 September 2023.

[5]The Applicants sought rent repayment orders in the following sums, for the following periods:(i) Kamal Boulema - £7,560.00 for the period 15/9/22 – 14/9/23;

(ii) Luke Pieterson - £5,800.00 for the period 15/9/22 – 14/81/23;

(iii) Isabel John - £7,560.00 for the period 15/9/22 – 14/9/23; and 1 This is the date specified in the application, albeit that it is probably a typographical error. 3

(iv) Billy Marsden - £7,980.00 for the period 15/9/22 – 14/9/23.

[6]Directions in the matter were given on 30 August 2024 and amended twice thereafter. The parties submitted a variety of documents to the Tribunal, the Applicants’ main bundle numbering some 609 pages, and the Respondent’s being limited to an admirably brief 20 pages. These were augmented, amongst other documents, by responses by the London Borough of Southwark to the Applicants’ Freedom of Information Request, and by a specimen licence obtained by the Respondent from LB Southwark on 22 October 2018 in respect of a different property.

[7]The Tribunal did not inspect the property as it considered the documentation and information before it in the parties’ bundles enabled the Tribunal to proceed with this determination. Housing Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”)

[8]Part 2 of the 2004 Act relates to the designation of areas subject to additional licensing of HMOs. Section 72 specifies a number of offences in relation to the licensing thereof, and provides where relevant to this case: (1) A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing an HMO which is required to be licensed under this Part … but is not so licensed. (4) In proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (1) it is a defence that, at the material time- (b) an application for a licence had been duly made in respect of the house under section 63, and that ... application was still effective... (5) In proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (1) … it is a defence that he had a reasonable excuse … for having control of or managing the house in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (1) …, or for failing to comply with the condition .

[9]Section 63 of the 2004 Act is concerned with applications for licences. It provides: Applications for licences(1) An application for a licence must be made to the local housing authority. 4

(2) The application must be made in accordance with such requirements as the authority may specify.

(3) The authority may, in particular, require the application to be accompanied by a fee fixed by the authority.

(4) The power of the authority to specify requirements under this section is subject to any regulations made under subsection (5).

(5) The appropriate national authority may by regulations make provision about the making of applications under this section.

(6) Such regulations may, in particular— (a) specify the manner and form in which applications are to be made; (b) require the applicant to give copies of the application, or information about it, to particular persons; (c) specify the information which is to be supplied in connection with applications; (d) specify the maximum fees which are to be charged (whether by specifying amounts or methods for calculating amounts); (e) specify cases in which no fees are to be charged or fees are to be refunded. The Hearing

[10]Prior to the hearing, the Respondent’s representatives filed an application to strike out the application for an RRO, on the basis that the Respondent duly made a licence application in 2018 as confirmed by the local housing authority, and accordingly had a legal defence. By directions given by Judge Jones, that application was listed to be considered at the commencement of the hearing.

[11]The hearing of the application took place on Friday 14 February 2025. The parties were represented as above. The applicants Mr Boulema, Mr Pieterson and Mr Marsden attended, while Ms John was not in attendance, being overseas. Mr Jeroen Hoppe, a director of the Defendant, attended on its behalf. Each of the named persons gave evidence and was cross-examined. We are grateful to all for their evidence. 5

[12]Whilst the Tribunal makes it clear that it has read each party’s bundles, the Tribunal does not refer to every one of the documents in detail in this Decision, it being impractical and unnecessary to do so. Where the Tribunal does not refer to specific documents in this Decision, it should not be mistakenly assumed that the Tribunal has ignored or left them out of account.

[13]This Decision seeks to focus solely on the key issues. The omission to refer to or make findings about every statement or document mentioned is not a tacit acknowledgement of the accuracy or truth of statements made or documents received. Not all of the various matters mentioned in the bundles or at the hearing require any finding to be made for the purpose of deciding the relevant issues in this application. The Decision is made on the basis of the evidence and arguments the parties presented, as clarified by the Tribunal in the hearing, and is necessarily limited by the matters to which the Tribunal was referred.

[14]The hearing commenced with consideration of the Respondent’s strike-out application. Having heard submissions from Mr Taylor for the Respondent and Mr Leacock for the Applicants, we declined to grant that application on the basis that the documentary evidence relied upon by the Respondent appeared to the Tribunal to be equivocal, and it was not appropriate to strike the application out before a full hearing, and consideration of all available evidence. The Evidence

[15]It was common ground that the Property required a licence from the local housing authority for the period in issue. There was no dispute as to the periods each Applicant had occupied the Property as tenants, and no dispute as to the rent each had paid. The Applicants

[16]The three Applicants that attended each gave evidence and was cross examined. There were few items of controversy in their evidence, which disclosed very little by way of complaint against their landlord and the living conditions in the Property. There was a complaint of one or perhaps two instances where a workman was said to have entered using a key without first knocking, but given that this was to effect repair work specifically requested by the tenants, and where the Tribunal finds it more likely than not that any reputable workman would knock before entering, against the evidence from the occupier that he had been fast asleep prior to realising there was someone in the flat, we find nothing to criticise the Respondent for in that regard.

[17]Complaints that the Property appeared not to contain fire doors transpired, we find, to be incorrect, and the absence of a fire extinguisher 6 really takes matters no further forward in terms of the Respondent’s conduct where a fire blanket was present in the Property, the applicable regulations did not require an extinguisher to be present, and despite their expressed concerns none of the Applicants ever asked the Respondent to provide an extinguisher. Each witness confirmed that Mr Hoppe was generally responsive to any concerns or issues that they raised. The Respondent

[18]Mr Hoppe gave evidence for the Respondent. He confirmed the presence of fire doors in the Property, and we accept that evidence. He also confirmed that it contained a hard-wired, linked smoke detection system and emergency lighting, which went well beyond the minimum requirements of the applicable regulations. He explained the history of the Property, which had been fully refurbished around 2 years prior to commencement of the Applicants’ tenancies, and explained his own 21-year experience of property letting, his professional qualifications, and advice he had taken from an industry expert regarding licensing obligations. He currently manages around a dozen properties, of various descriptions. He was always responsive to complaints, albeit that a complaint of a merely dripping tap might not immediately warrant the expense of a call-out fee, while something more pressing would always be attended to swiftly. His own inquiries of the tradesman incident had engendered an explanation from the gentleman in issue that he had knocked on the door, but the sleeping occupier had simply not heard it. In summary, Mr Hoppe asserted that he was a conscientious landlord, who aimed to and did provide good quality accommodation to contented and safe tenants. As to these tenants, he had no complaints as to their conduct whilst living at the Property. The Central Issue – Licensing

[19]The above evidence was geared towards issues concerning allegations of conduct. Far more fundamental to the case, as it developed, is the Respondent’s central point that, through Mr Hoppe, it had applied for the appropriate licence in 2018 from LB Southwark, and had paid the applicable fee, which had been debited from its bank account. Due to some form of process or system error on the part of LB Southwark no physical licence had been generated. Upon this application for an RRO being made Mr Hoppe had investigated and taken the matter up with LB Southwark which, in summary, had rectified matters and confirmed that the licence was applied for in time, and the Respondent had indeed been appropriately licensed to let the Property as an HMO for the 5 year period from 14 December 2018, which included the entire period for which the Applicants were claiming. 7

[20]If correct, this would amount to a complete defence to the allegation, by virtue of s.72(4)(b) of the 2004 Act. It would or may also engage the ‘reasonable excuse’ defence under s.72(5). Respondent’s Evidence of the Application

[21]Mr Hoppe had assembled a bundle of evidence, which we considered carefully. He explained that LB Southwark in 2018 required applications for licenses to be submitted using an online portal. He had done so, and upon completing his submission he had received an email from the authority’s email address noreply@southwark.gov.uk, headed “Southwark Council Property Licensing – 1149379”, at 21.45 hrs on Friday 14 December 2018. That email attached a file entitled “Invoice1149379.pdf” and read, in part, as follows: “Dear Jereon Hoppe “Your application form is now complete for FLAT 32, ANGELINA HOUSE GOLDSMITH ROAD, LONDON, SE15 5UB. You need to pay the fee indicated on the attached invoice before we can process your application. “You can pay this fee online from your property licensing dashboard by clicking on the Pay & Submit button next to the address.”

[22]The next document was the invoice for licensing application fees for the address of the property, bearing the corresponding application reference 1149379. It is clearly in respect of HMO licensing fees due for the Property as a 4-bedroom HMO, in the total sum of £1,040, less a 20% accreditation discount, apparently applicable to landlords and agents in good standing with the authority. Applying the discount, the total sum payable on the application was £816.

[23]Next, Mr Hoppe produced in evidence a printed statement from his business’s current account, showing a debit in the sum of £816 in favour of LB Southwark. Although the entry was noted on the account on 18 December 2018, the statement specifically records that the transaction had taken place on 14 December, the day Mr Hoppe completed the license application and received the email, invoice and payment instructions. His oral evidence, which we accept, was that to the best of his recollection he had paid the fee more or less immediately he received the email and invoice, which is corroborated by the banking entry.

[24]Mr Hoppe told the Tribunal, which we again accept, that the Respondent company did not commence letting the Property until after the HMO application had been made and paid for. 8

[25]The Respondent did not, then, receive a licence in physical form from LB Southwark. An element of Mr Hoppe’s oral evidence which we considered most carefully was to the effect that he saw nothing unusual in that: he is familiar with licensing across several London boroughs, including Southwark, and in summary they can be plagued with inefficiency and delay, at least in part attributable to available resources as against very substantial quantities of licensing applications. He had made an application for a license from Lambeth in 2020 for which he was still awaiting a response in 2025, for example. Once more, we accept that evidence.

[26]As to Southwark’s practice on such applications, Mr Hoppe stated that licences were customarily granted for periods of 5 years: he provided a copy licence dated 22 October 2018 to illustrate the point. It was for this reason that he did not chase the matter up. LB Southwark’s Computer Systems

[27]There was evidence before us to the effect that between 2018 and 2023, LB Southwark’s licensing computer systems were changed, and a suggestion that quantities of records and other data were lost or destroyed in the process. That was explained in LB Southwark’s response to Justice for Tenants’ Freedom of Information Act request thus: “Please note “Due to a change in our systems, we are unable to provide any correspondence, in respect of the Landlord's attempted/ submitted application for a licence in 2018 as we no longer have access to it. We can only provide notes recorded on the current system showing the case officer checked the old database for an application. The Bridge was the system that took the application from the portal and uploaded it onto our database. We no longer have The Bridge and therefore cannot refer to it.”

[28]That, the Tribunal considers, is highly likely to underpin the contradictory nature of the evidence as it emerged, discussed below. The Applicants’ Investigations

[29]In the process of gathering evidence to enable it to advise its clients preparatory to the application being made, the organisation Justice for Tenants (“JFT”) wrote to LB Southwark on 5 October 2023 enquiring whether a licence existed currently and/or had existed historically in respect of the Property. 9

[30]The response, dated 9 October 2023 from an unidentified employee of LB Southwark was short and to the point: “No license past or present for that one.” This, as evidence obtained later demonstrated, was incorrect.

[31]This incorrect information substantially informed the application for the RRO that was then made. The Respondent’s Enquiries

[32]Upon the Application for an RRO being made, Mr Hoppe made enquiries of LB Southwark, corresponding principally with Ms Syeda Nahar, Unit Support Officer in the council’s Private Sector Housing Enforcement and Licensing department. He wrote on 9 September 2024 seeking information as to whether the licensing application he had made on 14 December 2008 (as he erroneously put the year in his email) was still pending in the system. Ms Nahar’s response was as follows: “Our system shows that no payment was recorded at the time of the application and the attached seems to confirm that payment had not been received at the time. ... If payment was made, kindly provide proof of this...”

[33]Mr Hoppe replied, forwarding a copy of the Respondent’s company bank statement showing the payment of £816 in favour of LB Southwark, on 14 December 2018.

[34]That proof of payment prompted Ms Nahar on 10 September to send Mr Hoppe an internet link by which he could re-apply for a licence, together with a ‘bypass’ code’ to enable submission of the application without paying. Once the new application was received, LB Southwark would offset the fees already paid against any new fees due.

[35]Mr Hoppe did as directed and resubmitted the application by 12 September 2024. In the interim Ms Nahar wrote again confirming that LB Southwark did not have the application he had previously submitted on file. Having received the (new) re-submitted application, LB Southwark deducted the sum of £816 from the current fee for an HMO licence of £1,300, so that there remained a balance of £484 due, which the Respondent paid.

[36]Mr Hoppe continued to chase the issue of the licence application made in 2018, under ref. 1149379, sending a copy of the invoice received from LB Southwark confirming that the application had been completed on 14/12/2018. Ms Nahar responded as follows, on 12 September 2024: 10 “Thank you for providing this proof of application, this confirms your application. I have added the document to your record as evidence that you have applied and paid for a licence in 2018. “This is compliant with your duty to licence for that period.” (emphasis added)

[37]This information formed the basis for the Respondent’s defence to the application. The Applicants’ Subsequent Enquiries

[38]Upon the Respondent articulating its defence, based upon the license application of 14 December 2018, JFT made further enquires of a Ms Emma Trott at LB Southwark on 24 October 2024, asking whether any record existed of the license application, payment and the period covered.

[39]After a chasing email, Richard Jenkins, Unit Support Officer wrote back on 29 October 2024 at 13.39 apologising for the delay, and stating that he had checked and could not see any record of an application being submitted on that date (14/12/2018), adding that Southwark only had a record of the licence from 2016 and the new application from this year, that is 2024. Quite why these enquiries had failed to turn up the confirmation of the application and payment from 14 December 2018 that had been sent to Ms Nahar and had enabled her to make the observations quoted in §36 of this decision, just one month earlier, is unexplained, and most regrettable.

[40]It is, however, clear to the Tribunal that, evidence of the application and payment having been provided, and Ms Nahar for LB Southwark having confirmed on 12 September 2024 that there existed evidence that the Respondent had applied and paid for a licence in 2018, which was compliant with the Respondent’s duty to licence for the period in question, the information provided to JFT by LB Southwark on 29 October 2024 was, again, incorrect. LB Southwark was self-evidently in possession of evidence of an application having been submitted in December 2018, by virtue of Mr Hoppe sending it to the council just one month previously.

[41]Mr Jenkins’ (incorrect) information was then augmented by a second email sent by LB Southwark on 29 October 2024, at 17.48 hrs from a Ms Emma Trott, Private Sector Housing Enforcement Service Manager. This read: “I have the following notes on file: 11 “File Update application 1149379 14/12/18 not integrated into APP on the Bridge – no payment made. This means an application was started, possibly not complete as it never came through the system (APP via the bridge) and no payment has been made. “13/10/20 11.29 AAC (this is the officers initials) Spoke to Mr Hoppe in regards to application started but not completed, he seem to think that he has received the licence, could not see any records advised he will need to log in and complete the application. “After this I have no record of an application being submitted, no payment received and no licence issued.”

[42]Ms Trott’s assertion that no payment was made is belied by Mr Hoppe’s evidence of such payment, as was then accepted by Ms Nahar in allowing the sum paid in 2018 as an offset against the larger fee due in 2024. Her statement that she had no record of an application being submitted was similarly belied by the evidence provided to the council by Mr Hoppe and its acceptance, leading to the confirmation that the license had been in place since December 2018. Quite why Ms Trott was unaware on 29 October of those matters, discussed, agreed and presumably recorded between 9 and 12 September is, again, unexplained. Evidence Relating to a Phone Call – 13/10/20

[43]This leaves the tantalising hint of a telephone conversation between an unidentified employee or agent of LB Southwark and Mr Hoppe on 13/10/20, advising him of some difficulty with the application and the need for it to be completed.

[44]Further evidence was provided by the Applicants in the form of a response by LB Southwark to a Freedom of Information Act request, obtained shortly before the hearing and disclosed to the Respondent. That stated, again incorrectly: “We do not hold any records of the Landlord’s attempted/submitted application for a licence in 2018 on our systems.”

[45]For the reasons explained above, even had the original application made in 2018 been lost or deleted, records of the same had clearly been provided to LB Southwark by Mr Hoppe in September 2024. The statement quoted was, accordingly, again incorrect, forming part of a concerning trend of repeatedly erroneous information provided by LB Southwark relating to the contents of its (apparently) extremely threadbare records.

[46]As to the asserted record of a telephone call, the FOI response stated: 12 “13/10/20 Telephone call made to applicant 11.29 An officer spoke to applicant in regards to application started but not completed, he seem to think that he has received the licence, could not see any records advised he will need to log in and complete the application.” (sic)

[47]Mr Hoppe’s evidence was that he had received no such telephone call. Indeed, as he explained, and as we find, council employees seldom or never call to discuss licensing issues: his professional life was, by contrast, marked by endless attempts to get hold of elusive individuals working for local authorities to try to resolve issues as they arose. Indeed, having completed the application and paid for it in December 2018, he would expect no phone call.

[48]Cross-examined by Mr Leacock for the applicants, it was put to Mr Hoppe that he had received a call on 13/10/2020 and had not logged back in to resolve his application. His response was “absolutely not”. The Parties’ Submissions

[49]As the evidence coalesced, it became clear that the central issue for determination before the Tribunal could consider making an RRO was the validity or otherwise of the licensing application asserted to have been made by the Respondent on 14 December 2018. This, if made, potentially engaged defences under ss.72(4) and (5) of the 20024 Act, viz. that an application for a licence had been duly made, and/or that the Respondent had a reasonable excuse for having control of or managing the Property in the absence of a licence.

[50]For the Applicants, Mr Leacock submitted that the evidence clearly disclosed that the Respondent had been notified by LB Southwark on 13 October 2020 that the application had not been completed and Mr Hoppe was advised to log in and complete it. Relying on the authority of the Upper Tribunal in Marigold v Wells

[2023] UKUT 33

LC, and in particular §47 of the judgment, Mr Leacock submitted that any reasonable excuse ceased when Mr Hoppe was informed the process had not been completed.

[51]Mr Leacock made a similar point in respect of the application itself, stating that it had not been ‘duly made’ under s.63 of the 2004 Act.

[52]Accordingly, Mr Leacock concluded, for the period in issue there had been no valid HMO licence, and the Tribunal should move to consider making an RRO.

[53]In response to questions from the Tribunal, Mr Leacock agreed that the Applicants’ entire case was predicated upon the evidence of the phone call, and agreed that the Tribunal needed to be satisfied beyond 13 reasonable doubt that it had occurred in such a fashion as to put Mr Hoppe or his co-director on notice of a problem with the application.

[54]For the Respondent, Mr Taylor contended that the evidence demonstrated that Mr Hoppe had made an application in 2018 on an online form that the responsive email from Southwark stated to be ‘complete’. He had paid the requisite fee. Where Southwark appeared to have lost or destroyed records, he referred to the first-tier Tribunal case of Hamptons International v LB Camden LON/00AG/HNA/2021/0005 and 0006, as persuasive but not binding authority for the proposition that the destruction of evidence made the case for the Respondent far stronger, where (he submitted) it was well-nigh impossible for the Applicants to prove the alleged offence was committed to the criminal standard of proof. The Tribunal’s Decision

[55]The Tribunal determines that the evidence adduced by the Applicants is insufficient to prove that an offence had been committed by the Respondent to the criminal standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt, otherwise phrased so as to make us satisfied so that we are sure. Reasons for the Tribunal’s Decision

[56]The Respondent was able to produce highly credible evidence that an application for a licence was made on 14 December 2018 on LB Southwark’s online platform. Upon completing the application a confirmatory email had been sent, attaching an invoice in the sum of £816, which sum we are satisfied was debited from the Respondent’s account on 14 December 2018.

[57]Upon the application for an RRO being made, the Respondent through its director Mr Hoppe, immediately engaged with LB Southwark, which upon receipt of evidence of the application and payment made in 2018 confirmed that this was compliant with the Respondent’s duty to licence for the period in issue, from December 2018.

[58]This must be contrasted with the evidence adduced on behalf of the Applicants, which (in summary) was reliant upon a woeful series of demonstrably inaccurate assertions from employees of LB Southwark, some named and some anonymous.

[59]All of this was hearsay: no representative of the council gave evidence as to the veracity of what seem to have been (put most charitably) extremely threadbare records, and the department providing information (we use the term advisedly) that seems to have been incapable of accessing the records held of communications with the Respondent in September 2024. 14

[60]The asserted telephone call of 13 October 2020 suffers by these deficiencies. Given the numerous inaccuracies in Southwark’s provision of information, the Tribunal has scrutinised this evidence with particular care. We note the differences in the account contained in the email of 29 October 2024, as against the FOI information provided, which appears to be an unnamed third party’s gloss and elaboration on what the former record states.

[61]Nowhere is the individual named who is alleged to have conversed with Mr Hoppe (who is not named in the FOI summary of the alleged conversation). There is no contemporaneous note of the alleged conversation, save (perhaps) the much-truncated text emailed on 29 October 2024. There is no record of the telephone number allegedly called.

[62]Against this, we accept Mr Hoppe’s evidence that council employees never call him in relation to licensing issues. Indeed, the Tribunal finds the assertion that an unnamed employee of LB Southwark would elect to call a director of the Respondent almost 2 years after an application had been made to advise of a problem with it somewhat surprising.

[63]We also accept Mr Hoppe’s evidence to the effect that had he been advised of a problem, he would swiftly have taken action to address it. We find him to be a property manager who addresses issues efficiently.

[64]Most fundamentally, we accept at face value the confirmation from LB Southwark quoted at §36, above. Cognisant of a problem, Mr Hoppe contacted LB Southwark and by 12 September 2024 it confirmed that his evidence of his application in December 2018 was satisfactory to prove that the council’s licensing requirements had been complied with in all particulars and at all times material to this application.

[65]This, we are satisfied, establishes the defence under s.72(4) of the 2004 Act, that an application for a licence was ‘duly made’ in accordance with s.63 thereof, on 14 December 2018.

[66]We are also satisfied that the circumstances amount to a ‘reasonable excuse’ under s.72(5).

[67]Further, the Applicants cannot prove to the criminal standard that an offence has been committed.

[68]Accordingly, the Tribunal holds that the alleged offence was not committed.

[69]Having made that determination, it would be unjust and inequitable to order the Respondent to reimburse the fees incurred by the Applicants in bringing their application. 15 Name: Judge Mark Jones Date: 11 March 2025 Rights of appeal By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have.(a) (A) If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case.

(b) (B) The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application.

(c) (C) If the application is not made within the 28-day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28-day time limit; the tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit.

(d) (D) The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking.

(e) (E) If the tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber).