49 George Court, 3 Shakleton Way, London E16 2XL. LON/00BB/HMG/2025/0641

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)

Case No LON/00BB/HMG/2025/0641

Between

Temitope Akin-Olugbemi.Applicant

Marlex Group Limited.Respondent

Before

Tribunal Judge N O’Brien

Members

Mr S Wheeler MCIEH

Represent Law. NRA 17635-RRO. for the Applicant

In person. Application for a rent repayment order by tenant for the Respondent

Date 20 April 2026

Property: London E16 2XL.

Type of application: Sections 40, 41, 43, & 44 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 Tribunal Judge N O’Brien

DECISION

(1) The Tribunal makes a rent repayment order against the Respondent in the total sum of £1,800.

(2) The Respondent must refund the fees paid by the Applicant in the sum of £341.

(3) The above sums are to be paid within 28 days of receipt of this determination. THE APPLICATION

[1]On 29 May 2025 the Tribunal received an application under s.41 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (the 2016 Act) for a Rent Repayment Order. The Applicant asserts that the Respondent committed an offence of having control of or managing an unlicenced property in multiple occupation that was required to be licensed pursuant to an additional licencing scheme but was not licenced.

[2]The Tribunal issued directions on 12 September 2025 and subsequently the Tribunal listed this matter for a hearing on 13 March 2026. BACKGROUND

[3]The premises consist of a 3-bedroom duplex apartment in a purpose-built modern block in the Royal Docks area in the London Borough of Newham. The Applicant rented Room 3 in that apartment from 14 May 2024 and February 2025 pursuant to an assured shorthold tenancy which commenced on 14 May 2024 between the Applicant as Tenant and the Respondent as Landlord. It is common ground that from the start of her period of occupation the Applicant shared the apartment with at least two and sometimes three unrelated other persons. The other occupants have played no part in these proceedings. It is also common ground that the Respondent did not own the apartment; it was leased from the leasehold owner, Follnix Ltd, pursuant to a ‘rent to rent’ type arrangement.

[4]The premises were located in a ward within the London Borough of Newham (LBN) which was subject to an additional licencing scheme which was introduced on 1 January 2023. This required all Houses in Multiple Occupation (HMOs), which are not otherwise subject to mandatory licencing, to be licenced pursuant to Part 2 of the Housing Act 2004 (the 2004 Act). It is common ground that the premises were required to be licenced and that the Respondent neither held nor had applied for a licence at any time when the Applicant occupied the property. THE HEARING

[5]The Applicant attended the hearing and was represented by Mr Khan of Represent Law. The Respondent was represented by its director Ms Marie Ema. At the start of the hearing we considered an application by Ms Ema to rely on a Respondent’s bundle that was sent to the tribunal 5 days before the hearing in breach of the Tribunal’s directions. As Mr Khan had no objection to it we permitted it to be admitted. We also considered whether to admit the Applicant’s second witness statement which was sent to the tribunal and the Respondent the day before the hearing. Ms Ema objected. As the directions provided that the Applicant could if she wished file a reply to the Respondent’s bundle, we considered that it would be fair to admit it in the light of the late filing of the Respondent’s bundle.

[6]The Tribunal was provided with a 156-page bundle prepared by the Applicant’s representatives for the hearing and a 65-page bundle prepared by the Respondent. In addition we considered the Applicant’s recent witness statement which exhibited a number of documents. Has an Offence been Committed?

[7]In order to make a rent repayment order against a person under s.40 of the 2016 Act the Tribunal has to be satisfied to the criminal standard (beyond all reasonable doubt) that the person has committed a relevant offence (s.43 of the 2016 Act). Ms Ema on behalf of the Respondent accepted that from the date that the Applicant commenced occupation of the premises, the premises were occupied by three or more persons forming more than one household who resided there as their main residence. She accepted that it was located in an area which was subject to an additional licencing scheme. She accepted consequently it required a licence by virtue of the additional licencing scheme operated by the LBN and was not licenced. The Respondent accepted that it let Room 3 to the Applicant and that it received the rent, albeit it was paid to Ms Ema directly. It was common ground that 3 other persons resided in the flat on 14 May 2024 when the Applicant first moved in, and that at least three persons resided there until 13 February 2025 when the number of occupants reduced to two.

[8]Ms Ema queried whether the Respondent company could be guilty of an offence when it did not own the property but merely rented it from the true owner. Section 72(1) of the 2004 Act provides; “(1) In this Act “person having control”, in relation to premises, means (unless the context otherwise requires) the person who receives the rack-rent of the premises (whether on his own account or as agent or trustee of another person), or who would so receive it if the premises were let at a rack-rent. (2) In subsection (1) “rack-rent” means a rent which is not less than two-thirds of the full net annual value of the premises. (3) In this Act “person managing” means, in relation to premises, the person who, being an owner or lessee of the premises– (a) receives (whether directly or through an agent or trustee) rents or other payments from– (i) in the case of a house in multiple occupation, persons who are in occupation as tenants or licensees of parts of the premises;

[9]We are satisfied that as the person who both received and was entitled to the rental payments from the occupants, that the Respondent was both controlling and managing the premises for the purposes of s72 of the 2004 Act. We note that the named tenant on the head lease was the Respondent. The Respondent has included in its bundle a second lease of the premises which commenced on 7 November 2025 which named Follnix Ltd as landlord and Ms Ema as tenant however in the course of the hearing she did not seek to argue that she was the person who was in control of or managing the premises at any material time. Consequently we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondent was a person in control of an unlicenced HMO throughout the relevant period. Reasonable Excuse

[10]It is a defence to proceedings under s.72(1) if the person had a reasonable excuse for being in control of or managing an unlicenced HMO (s.72(5) of the 2004 Act). Ms Ema’s position was that the Respondent had a reasonable excuse. She explained that the Respondent did not normally rent out units of accommodation on a room-by-room basis but that it’s business model was to lease entire premises and to let them out for short periods as serviced apartments either as corporate lets or through platforms such as AirBnB. It does not as a rule utilise any of the properties it leases as HMO accommodation. However in or about 2023 Ms Ema gave birth to a very premature baby who was kept in hospital for several months. She stated that a family member who she named as ‘Vivian’ resided in the premises from about January 2024 to assist her while her baby was in hospital. This meant that the premises could not be let out as an entire unit and so she decided to let the remaining rooms in the premises to individual tenants, including the living room which was utilised as a bedroom.

[11]The offence of having control of or managing an unlicensed HMO contrary to section 72(1) of the 2004 Act is a continuing offence which is committed by the person having control or managing the HMO on each day the relevant HMO remains unlicensed. To avoid liability for the offence the person concerned must therefore establish the defence of reasonable excuse for the whole of the period during which it is alleged to have been committed.

[12]We do not consider that the personal circumstances of a director can amount to a reasonable excuse for the company. In addition we note that by the time the Applicant moved into the premises there was no one called Vivian in occupation. We were referred to a number of emails sent to the four occupants of the property by the Respondent in 2024 and 2025 and none of the named recipients were called ‘Vivian’. Consequently we are not satisfied that the Respondent had a reasonable excuse for not having a licence. Quantifying the RRO

[13]The leading authority on the correct approach to quantifying a RRO is Acheampong v Roman [2022]. The Upper Tribunal established a four-stage approach which this Tribunal must adopt when assessing the amount of any order (at paragraph 20):a. Ascertain the whole of the rent for the relevant period

b. Subtract any element of that sum that represents payment for utilities that only benefited the tenant, for example gas, electricity and internet access. It is for the landlord to supply evidence of these, but if precise figures are not available an experienced tribunal is expected to make an informed estimate where appropriate.

c. Consider how serious this offence was, both compared to other types of offence in respect of which a rent repayment order may be made (and whose relative seriousness can be seen from the relevant maximum sentences on conviction) an compared to other examples of the same type of offence. What proportion of the rent (after deduction as above) is a fair reflection of the seriousness of this offence? That percentage of the total amount applied for is then the starting point (in the sense that term is used in criminal sentencing); it is the default penalty in the absence of any other factors but it may be higher or lower in light of the final step:

d. Consider whether any deduction from, or addition to, that figure should be made in the light of the other factors set out in section 44(4).”

[14]Section 44(4) of the 2016 Act provides; In determining the amount the tribunal must, in particular, take into account— (a)the conduct of the landlord and the tenant, (b)the financial circumstances of the landlord, and (c)whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which this Chapter applies.

[15]In Newell v Abbot

[2024] UKUT 181 (LC)

considered an appeal which has a number of similarities to the instant case. In that case the Upper Tribunal, having reviewed a number of recent authorities on the correct approach to quantification, observed at para 57; “This brief review of recent decisions of this Tribunal in appeals involving licencing offences illustrates that the level of rent repayment orders varies widely depending on the circumstances of the case. Awards of up to 85% or 90% of the rent paid (net of services) are not unknown but are not the norm. Factors which have tended to result in higher penalties include that the offence was committed deliberately or by a commercial landlord or an individual with a larger property portfolio or whether the tenants have been exposed to poor or dangerous conditions which have been prolonged by the failure to licence. Factors which tend to justify lower penalties include inadvertence on the part of the smaller landlord, property in good condition such that a licence would have been granted without one being required and mitigating factors which go some way to explaining the offence without excusing it such as the failure of a letting agent to warn of the need for a licence or personal incapacity due to poor health”

[16]In that case the Upper Tribunal noted that the landlord was not a professional landlord and that he had had committed the offence of controlling an unlicenced HMO through inadvertence rather than deliberately. The property was in reasonably good condition during the tenants’ occupation. It made a RRO equating to 60% of the net rent paid.

[17]Turning to the facts of this case; the Applicant did not specify the amount she was seeking as a rent repayment order in her application. She exhibited her bank statements which showed that she made the following payments to Ms Ema. 13 May 2024

£1592.31

29 May 2024

£900

1 July 2024

£900

5 August 2024

£3,600

14 February 2025

£900

[18]In the course of the hearing the Applicant told us that from about 1 August 2024 until the date she left the property she was in receipt of Universal Credit which paid the entirety of her rent. Section 44(3)(a) provides that the amount of a rent repayment order must not exceed the rent paid less any award of Universal Credit for the relevant period.

[19]Further the Applicant’s evidence was that her tenancy commenced on 14 May 2024 and that she commenced occupation on the same day being the day after she made the first rental payment. In addition the first payment represented rent paid in advance and a deposit. Section 41(2)a of the 2016 Act provides that a tenant may make an application for a rent repayment order only if at the time of the offence the premises were let to the tenant. This means that a rent repayment order can only be made in respect of rent that was paid at a time when(a) the landlord was committing the offence and

(b) the premises were let to the tenant. As the first payment was made by the Applicant before her tenancy commenced, it cannot be included as part of any rent repayment order calculation. Furthermore as the entirety of the Applicant’s rent was paid via the housing element of Universal Credit we cannot include any rental payments which were made after 1 August 2024. Consequently the maximum order we can make is £1,800.

[20]We bear in mind that, as in Newell v Hallett this is a licencing offence. We do not consider that this is a particularly serious offence and our starting point is a rent repayment order of 50% of the maximum.

[21]The next matter that we have to consider is the conduct of both the landlord and the tenant. Ms Ema makes no criticism of the Applicant’s conduct as a tenant. Unfortunately the Respondent’s conduct leading up to the end of the Applicant’s occupation of the premises was nothing short of appalling. It is common ground that there were disputes between the occupants of the premises. The Respondent told us that due to serious concerns about the behaviour of one of the occupants, the leaseholder of the premises terminated its lease of the premises. We were taken to a number of emails sent to the Respondent by the agent for its head landlord complaining about the behaviour of one of the occupants of the flat which had led to the police being called to the premises. The Respondent’s case is that its lease was terminated and from November 2024 it was coming under increasing pressure to deliver vacant possession of the premises to Follnex Ltd.

[22]The Applicant’s evidence was as at the beginning of February 2025 the premises were occupied by two other persons in addition to the Applicant, Victoria and Mistique. On or about 13 February 2025 a person called George who was known to the Applicant as an employee of the Respondent called to the property with 4 other men that she did not recognise. The Applicant, who was alone in the property at the time, called the police. The men rang the doorbell and then when the Applicant declined to open the door, they opened the front door with a key. They were unable to gain entry however because the front door had a security chain which they cut with a bolt cutter. They then attempted to force their way past the Applicant who was attempting to prevent them from opening the door by physically pushing against it however she was unable to stop them from entering and so she took refuge in her room. ‘George’ and the men who accompanied him then started to bag up the occupants’ belongings in black refuse sacks. At this stage the police attended and required George to leave. The Applicant was injured in the course of this altercation which she told us was utterly terrifying. Victoria and Mistique vacated the property at around this time. The Applicant vacated the property on or about 21 February 2025.

[23]Ms Ema did not challenge the Applicant’s version of events but sought to suggest that the persons who forced their way into the property did so on the instructions of Follnex Ltd or their agent. She pointed out that prior to this incident the Respondent had made an offer of alternative accommodation, with a rent-free period to the Applicant which she had not accepted. The Applicant was adamant that George was known to her as an employee of the Respondent. Furthermore we note that the Respondent has included an email in its bundle which it sent to the Applicant dated 17 February 2025 which states that the Respondent has noted her complaints and states ‘George has been reprimanded and sent elsewhere outside London so he will not be dealing with you anymore’. We find that George was an employee of the Respondent and was acting on the Respondent’s behalf when he forced entry into the premises.

[24]We consider that the Respondent’s conduct was so poor that a rent repayment order of 100% of the maximum is justified, notwithstanding the fact that this is a licencing offence. We therefore make a rent repayment order in the sum of £1,800.

[25]The Applicant has also requested an order that the Respondent do reimburse her hearing and application fees under rule 13(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-Tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013. As she has succeeded in her application we are satisfied that such an order is justified. Name Judge N O’Brien Date 20 April 2026 RIGHTS OF APPEAL

[1]If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the Regional office which has been dealing with the case.

[2]The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the Regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application.

[3]If the application is not made within the 28-day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28-day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit.

[4]The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e., give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking.