Crown and Groves Mill, 474-479 London Road, CR4 4FY LON/00BA/LDC/2025/0624

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)

Case No LON/00BA/LDC/2025/0624

Between

Crown & Grove Management LimitedApplicant

Leaseholders of Crown and Groves MillRespondent

Before

Tribunal Judge Mohabir

Miss M Bygrave MRICS

Mr Irvine of Counsel for the Applicant

Did not attend and were not represented for the Respondent

Date 21 October 2025

Property: Crown and Groves Mill, 474-479 London Road, CR4 4FY

Type of application: To dispense with the requirement to consult lessees about major works section 20ZA of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985

DECISION

[1]Unless stated otherwise, the page references in square brackets in this decision are to the pages in the hearing bundle consisting of 262 pages.

[2]The Applicant seeks an order pursuant to s.20ZA of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 (“the Act”) for retrospective dispensation with the consultation requirements in respect of the supply and installation of a new insulated built up felt roofing system and remove the existing lead lined valley coverings, repair decking and coat with a garland dura-coat at the Crown and Groves Mill, 474-479 London Road, CR4 4FY (“the property”).

[2]The property is described as being a purpose built block consisting of 30 flats.

[3]The Applicant is the management company and a party to the residential leases. As the Tribunal understands it, the Applicant is obliged to carry out the repairing and maintaining obligations under the leases on behalf of the freeholder, Wallace Estates Limited. The Respondents are the long leaseholders of the residential flats in the building. It appears that the Applicant is a “tenant owned” company in so far as each of the leaseholders owns a share in it.

[4]The leaseholders were served with a Notice of Intention dated 30 July 2021 by the current managing agent, HML PM Limited (“HML”), to commence the statutory consultation process under section 20 of the Act in relation to the major works that are the subject matter of this application.

[5]For reasons unknown, the consultation process was not completed by HML. What then happened thereafter is set out variously in the witness statements of Selena Msnikosa and Kevin Jones, who are directors of the Applicant and David Flack who is a director of HML [216-225]. It is not intended to repeat the evidence in detail set out in the witness statements as this is self-evident.

[6]However, in short, in or around April 2023, the directors of the Applicant, through HML undertook a tendering process and received quotations from three different contractors in order to undertake a cost comparison. Having done so, it was decided to proceed with the tenders from two contractors, G Baker Roofing Limited and Opus Waterproofing Solutions Limited.

[7]The remaining two tenders were issued to the leaseholders. This was done through a leaseholders’ meeting and followed up by email correspondence between the attendees at the meeting to assess whether the leaseholders had any view on the final decision.

[8]This involved extensive email communication between the Applicant’s directors and leaseholders to address a number of questions regarding the specifications and pricing of the individual blocks. 3

[9]It was finally decided by the directors that the contractor, G Baker, would be instructed and begin as soon as possible in 2023 and subsequently the works were completed in June 2023. The costs of the works would be deducted from the reserve fund because any delay to collect funds from the leaseholders would invariably mean the global costs of the works would increase and thereby the financial burden on the leaseholders.

[10]In addition, the Applicant relied on the witness statement of Terrent Beggs who is a Chartered Construction Manager from the firm of SRVO Property Limited, who inspected the roofs in February 2022 and confirmed its deteriorating condition [226-228]. Mr Beggs was responsible for inspecting and confirming the condition of the existing roofs, coordinating third-party technical specialists, drafting the Specification and Schedule of Works, managing the competitive tender process and monitoring site progress and liaising with the appointed contractor and Langley Waterproofing Systems Ltd to achieve certified completion and issue of warranty documentation.

[11]By an application dated 15 January 2025, the Applicant applied seeking retrospective dispensation for the roof works carried out. On 28 March 2025, the Tribunal issued amended Directions requiring the Applicant to serve the Respondents with a copy of the application, which apparently was done. The Respondents were directed to respond to the application stating whether they objected to it in any way.

[12]Although the application initially named Faizah Qudsia Khan and Nasir Mahmood (Flat 18) as the Respondents to the application, they have not raised any objection. The leaseholders who variously did object are: Simone Cotterell (Flat 16) Sajith Bakeerathan (Flat 9) Marcello Tremonte and Ewelina Jarmoszuk (Flat 21) Jo Koerner (Flat 5) Giancarlo Lamari and Saoriko Matsumoto Paula Cox (Flat 3) Oliver Smart (Flat 26) Marek Florczak

[13]It should be noted is that all of the objections by the leaseholders above is in exactly the same terms verbatim. The inference to be drawn is that it was prepared by the same person or persons and endorsed by the other leaseholders who objected. The objections are dealt with in turn below. Relevant Law

[14]This is set out in the Appendix annexed hereto. Hearing

[15]The hearing took place on 6 October 2025. The Applicant was represented by Mr Irvine of Counsel. None of the Respondents or the 4 leaseholders who objected to the application attended or were represented. The Tribunal proceeded with the hearing in their absence because it was satisfied they had been served with a notice of the hearing by email on 31 Jul 2025.

[16]It should also be noted that, save for the objections made, none of the leaseholders had filed or served any evidence as directed. Therefore, the hearing proceeded with only the evidence of the Applicant before it. Decision The Objections

[17]The general basis of the objections made is:(a) the alleged complete lack of statutory consultation under section 20 of the Act prior to the works.

(b) Unreasonable delay in seeking dispensation, being over a year after the works were completed in 2023.

(d) Serious and lasting financial prejudice caused to leaseholders. The Amount in Question

[18]As the Tribunal’s directions make clear, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the quantum of the roof works in this application. If the lease holders wish to challenge this, they will have to make a separate application under section 27A of the Act. Complete Lack of Consultation or Notice

[19]This is a factually incorrect assertion. For the avoidance of doubt, the Tribunal finds that the Applicant did serve a Notice of Intention on or about 30 July 2021 and, to that extent, partial statutory consultation did take place. For the avoidance of doubt, the Tribunal also found that informal consultation had been carried out by the Applicant with the leaseholders by the publication regarding the specification and pricing for the roof works prior to the works commencing and the extensive discussion that followed by email to answer and questions raised by leaseholders. Complete Lack of Trust in HML

[20]This is not a relevant consideration in the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion in this application. It is a management complaint. 5 Impact on Reserve Funds and Long Term Cost Concerns

[21]The objecting leaseholders assert that, by utilising the reserve fund to pay for the roof works, the reserve fund has been reduced to almost zero. This has resulted in the reserve fund contribution demanded by the Applicant doubling, which has resulted in an increased financial burden on leaseholders.

[22]The Tribunal was satisfied that using the reserve fund to pay for the roof works has not caused the leaseholders financial prejudice. It is not suggested by any of them that the roof works or the scope of the works undertaken was unnecessary. The works had to be funded in one of two ways. It could be done by using the reserve fund, as was the case, or service charge demands to meet the cost could have been issued. Either way, the cost had to be met by the leaseholders. The Tribunal accepted the Applicant’s submission that any delay to collect funds from the leaseholders would invariably mean the global costs of the works would increase and thereby the financial burden on the leaseholders. It follows, that the Tribunal was satisfied the objecting leaseholders could not establish as a fact any financial prejudice. Expired Section 20 Notices and Prejudice to New Leaseholders

[23]As a matter of law, there is no time limit to the validity of the Notice of Intention dated 30 July 2021 and the submission in those terms is incorrect.

[24]As to the assertion that leaseholders who purchased after July 2021, no information was provided about who those leaseholders are, when they purchased their flats and to what extent it is said that they were denied the opportunity to be consulted thereby resulting in financial prejudice.

[25]Even if that assertion is correct, the Tribunal was satisfied that the alleged failure to consult did not result in financial prejudice because the leaseholders separately have the statutory protection afforded by section 19 of the Act to challenge the need, scope and cost of the roof works. The Relevant Legal Test: Daejan v Benson

[26]The arguments and or submissions set out here are simply a repeat of those already set out above and dealt with. Alleged Management Failures of HML

[27]This is not a relevant consideration in the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion in this application. These are management complaints. Damage to Estate Grounds

[28]The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to make any determination about this issue in this application. 6

[29]The relevant test to the applied in an application such as this has been set out in the Supreme Court decision in Daejan Investments Ltd v Benson & Ors

[2013] UKSC 14

where it was held that the purpose of the consultation requirements imposed by section 20 of the Act was to ensure that tenants were protected from paying for inappropriate works or paying more than was appropriate. In other words, a tenant should suffer no prejudice in this way.

[30]The issue before the Tribunal was whether dispensation should be granted in relation to the requirement to carry out statutory consultation with the leaseholders regarding the overall remedial fire detection works. The Tribunal is not concerned about the actual cost that has been incurred.

[31]The Tribunal granted the application for the following main reasons:(a) The Tribunal was satisfied that the Respondents could not establish as a fact at this time that they had suffered any financial prejudice about the necessity and scope of the roof works or utilising the reserve fund to pay for the works. They had not filed any evidence to this effect or at all.

(b) Whilst, on the Applicant’s own case, there had been delay in dealing with the roof repairs since the Notice of Intention was served, the Tribunal was unable to find that any such delay had resulted in financial prejudice to the leaseholders. On the contrary, the Tribunal was satisfied that on balance any further delay by the Applicant having to carry out statutory consultation would have resulted in the cost of the work increasing, which would cause the leaseholders financial prejudice.

(c) Importantly, the real prejudice to the Respondents would be in the cost of the work and they have the statutory protection of section 19 of the Act, which preserves their right to challenge the actual costs incurred by making a separate service charge application under section 27A of the Act.

[32]The Tribunal, therefore, concluded that the Respondents were not being prejudiced by the Applicant’s failure to consult, and the application was granted as sought.

[33]It should be noted that in granting this part of the application, the Tribunal makes no finding that the scope and cost of the repairs are reasonable. Name: Tribunal Judge Mohabir Date: 21 October 2025 7 Rights of appeal By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. If the application is not made within the 28-day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28-day time limit; the tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber). 8 Appendix of relevant legislation Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 (as amended) Section 20(1) Where this section applies to any qualifying works or qualifying long term agreement, the relevant contributions of tenants are limited in accordance with subsection (6) or (7) (or both) unless the consultation requirements have been either— (a) complied with in relation to the works or agreement, or (b) dispensed with in relation to the works or agreement by (or on appeal from) the appropriate tribunal .

(2) In this section “relevant contribution”, in relation to a tenant and any works or agreement, is the amount, which he may be required under the terms of his lease to contribute (by the payment of service charges) to relevant costs incurred on carrying out the works or under the agreement.

(3) This section applies to qualifying works if relevant costs incurred on carrying out the works exceed an appropriate amount.

(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide that this section applies to a qualifying long term agreement— (a) if relevant costs incurred under the agreement exceed an appropriate amount, or (b) if relevant costs incurred under the agreement during a period prescribed by the regulations exceed an appropriate amount.

(5) An appropriate amount is an amount set by regulations made by the Secretary of State; and the regulations may make provision for either or both of the following to be an appropriate amount— (a) an amount prescribed by, or determined in accordance with, the regulations, and (b) an amount which results in the relevant contribution of any one or more tenants being an amount prescribed by, or determined in accordance with, the regulations.

(6) Where an appropriate amount is set by virtue of paragraph (a) of subsection (5), the amount of the relevant costs incurred on carrying out the works or under the agreement which may be taken into account in determining the relevant contributions of tenants is limited to the appropriate amount.

(7) Where an appropriate amount is set by virtue of paragraph (b) of that subsection, the amount of the relevant contribution of the tenant, or each of the tenants, whose relevant contribution would otherwise exceed the amount prescribed by, or determined in 9 accordance with, the regulations is limited to the amount so prescribed or determined. Section 20ZA (1) Where an application is made to a leasehold valuation tribunal for a determination to dispense with all or any of the consultation requirements in relation to any qualifying works or qualifying long- term agreement, the tribunal may make the determination if satisfied that it is reasonable to dispense with the requirements.