1a Charteris Road, Finsbury Park, London N4 3AA LON/00AU/HMG/2024/0014

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)

Case No LON/00AU/HMG/2024/0014

Between

Mr Ian ColvinApplicant

Ms Jessica GottRespondent

Before

Tribunal Judge M Jones

Ms J Mann MCIEH

Ms Chloe Hayes, trainee solicitor for the Applicant

Mr Mathew McDermott, counsel Tenant’s application for a Rent Repayment Order under ss. 40, 41, 43 & for the Respondent

Date 19 September 2024

Property: London N4 3AA

Type of application: 44 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 Tribunal Judge M Jones

DECISION

Decisions of the tribunal(1) The Tribunal orders the Respondent to repay to the Applicants the sum of £7,500 by way of rent repayment.

(2) The application and hearing costs totalling £300 incurred by the Applicant in bringing this application are to be reimbursed by the Respondent.

(3) The above sums must be paid by the Respondent to the Applicant within 28 days after the date of this determination. Introduction

[1]The Applicant has applied by notice dated 13 November 2023 for a rent repayment order (“RRO”) against the Respondent under sections 40-44 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (“the 2016 Act”).

[2]It is asserted that the landlord committed an offence of control or management of an unlicenced dwelling contrary to section 95(1) of the Housing Act 2004, which is an offence under section 40(3) of the 2016 Act.

[3]The tenant occupied 1a Charteris Road, Finsbury Park, London N4 3AA (“the Property”) pursuant to a tenancy agreement dated 30 September 2021 for a term of 6 months at a rent of £1,475 per month. At the conclusion of the term of the tenancy he remained in occupation as a statutory periodic tenant on the same terms, albeit that the Applicant and Respondent agreed, and the Applicant then paid rent at the increased rate of £1,600 per month from 30 April 2023 to 31 August 2023, on which date he vacated and returned possession of the Property to the Respondent.

[4]The Applicant seeks a RRO in the sum of £18,325.00 for the twelve months ending on 31 August 2023.

[5]The Applicant served a statement of case in support of his application; the Respondent served a detailed narrative statement in response to the application.

[6]The parties each filed bundles in advance of the hearing. The Applicant’s bundle numbered some 51 pages, augmented by a ‘final reply’ of an additional 50 pages, and the Respondent’s some 284 pages.

[7]Whilst the Tribunal makes it clear that it has read each party’s bundles, the Tribunal does not refer to every one of the documents in detail in this Decision, it being impractical and unnecessary to do so. Where the Tribunal does not refer to specific documents in this Decision, it should not be mistakenly assumed that the Tribunal has ignored or left them out of account.

[8]This Decision seeks to focus solely on the key issues. The omission to refer to or make findings about every statement or document mentioned is not a tacit acknowledgement of the accuracy or truth of statements made or documents received. Not all of the various matters mentioned in the bundles or at the hearing require any finding to be made for the purpose of deciding the relevant issues in this application. The Decision is made on the basis of the evidence and arguments the parties presented, as clarified by the Tribunal in the hearing, and is necessarily limited by the matters to which the Tribunal was referred. Hearing

[9]This was a face-to-face hearing.

[10]The parties were each represented at the hearing, the Applicant by Ms Chloe Hayes, trainee solicitor, and the Respondent by Mr Mathew McDermott, counsel.

[11]The parties’ representatives each provided helpful skeleton arguments, for which we are grateful.

[12]The Applicant and Respondent each gave evidence. The Property

[13]The Property is a 1-bedroom flat situated on the ground floor in a converted end terrace building.

[14]We did not inspect the Property, where neither party requested us to do so, and we did not consider it necessary or proportionate to do so to determine the application before us.

[15]The Property was situated within a selective licensing area as designated by the London Borough of Islington (“LBI”) under s.80 of the Housing Act 2004 (“2004 Act”), which came into force on 1 February 2021, and is intended to remain in force until 1 February 2026. Applicant’s Case

[16]The Applicant states that the Property did not have a licence, but required one, for the entirety of the period 1 September 2022 to 31 August 2023.

[17]This was not in the event disputed by the Respondent, where Mr McDermott in his skeleton argument entirely sensibly conceded that the Property was subject to a selective licensing scheme at the relevant time, but that no licence had been applied for.

[18]Mr Colvin presented himself as a good tenant, who had paid his rent on time and in full throughout the term of his tenancy. He promptly notified his landlord of all repairs of which he became aware that needed to be done in the Property. He arranged for the Property to be deep-cleaned upon vacating. At an early stage of his occupation, he accidentally locked himself out: having arranged for the attendance of a locksmith who changed the lock in the process of gaining access, he promptly informed the Respondent and provided her with a new set of keys. By mutual agreement, he held onto post that was addressed to the Respondent at the Property, which she collected on sporadic visits to London.

[19]Albeit that there were periodic episodes of mould in various places in the Property, particularly the bathroom, these did not seem to have troubled the Applicant unduly and most seemed susceptible to cleaning with appropriate anti-fungal products. The applicant said that 99% of the mould in the bathroom was removed in 5 minutes. He agreed that up until the time he vacated, he was “definitely” happy with the condition of the Property. He said that he spoke to the respondent about the damp issues during her visits but did not press for repairs.

[20]Mr Colvin’s evidence, which we accept, was that he enjoyed a decent relationship as tenant and landlord with Ms Gott until the very end of his tenancy, when he was making arrangements to vacate. At this point, he states that he and the Respondent had a disagreement about liability for water damage which had clearly been sustained to the exterior kitchen window and frame. Ms Gott claimed this was Mr Colvin’s responsibility for failing to clear an exterior drainpipe and gutter of leaves on a regular basis.

[21]Mr Colvin maintained that he had engaged a builder to inspect the damage, who had confirmed verbally to him that the problem was a consequence of incorrect installation of the exterior downpipe, resulting in water pooling which ran down the window and frame, having nowhere else to go. The window was wooden, and had no inner plastic seal, and the membrane above the downpipe had perished, permitting further water penetration.

[22]Upon attempting to convey these points to the Respondent in the course of a telephone conversation, Mr Colvin said that Ms Gott surprised him by saying words to the effect of ‘Ian, I don’t care what these builders are saying. I will find new builders and pay them to say what I want, and then I will take you to a tribunal.’

[23]A curious feature of this disagreement was that the repairs to the window had been estimated in the sum of £500-£700, a figure dwarfed by the cost of necessary repairs to the bathroom that the Respondent was undertaking after a latent defect in the form of a persistent leak had been discovered.

[24]Notwithstanding this disagreement, Mr Colvin said that he had paid for repairs to the inner beading to the window and damage to the kitchen worktop and shed, simply because he wanted to leave the Property and obtain a reference from his landlord

[25]It was the threat he alleged regarding the exterior damage to the window that had caused Mr Colvin to seek advice from the Citizen’s Advice Bureau, which in turn directed him to the organisation Justice for Tenants, which advised him regarding the potential to apply for an RRO. It was the threat, he asserted, that had caused him to apply for such relief and see the matter through to the hearing.

[26]Cross-examined by Mr McDermott, Mr Colvin maintained his account of events. Asked about a contractual term to forward the Respondent’s post to her, he explained that he had asked for an address to forward post to, but an arrangement had been reached that Ms Gott would attend to collect. He had suffered no harm, detriment or prejudice while a tenant. There had been no, or no serious defects affecting his enjoyment of the flat whilst a tenant. An issue of dampness in the bathroom had been (apparently) resolved by provision of a dehumidifier by his landlord.

[27]Cross -examined by Mr Mc Dermott about a water leak in the Kitchen cupboards under the sink, the applicant said he did not know of the leak because he did not use those units.

[28]Cross-examined about a friendly exchange of text messages in August 2023, shortly before he vacated, Mr Colvin was asked about a message where he expressed sorrow for the level of damage. He explained, and we accept, that this was an expression of sympathy for level of damage that had been discovered behind the tiled surface in the bathroom, from the ongoing leak.

[29]It was put to Mr Colvin that he was incorrect about the threat he alleged against the Respondent. His response was “I stand by that one thousand billion trillion per cent. I don’t care if I win today, this is the only reason we’re here. This was not the correct way to speak to a good tenant after 2 years. It was only over the phone so I can’t prove it, but that is 100% what she said.”

[30]The other issue of factual contention between the parties related to the issue of the Applicant’s deposit, where he stated that a series of allegations had been made by the Respondent which, upon arbitration by the deposit protection service, were dismissed, save for the small sum of £15 which was retained for the cost of a replacement key. Respondent’s Case

[31]The Respondent’s case was, in essence, that she was a good, if relatively inexperienced landlord. She was unaware of the necessity to obtain a licence. She had let the Property when she had moved to Manchester for work in her field as a product development manager, and had then moved to Cambridge to care for her elderly parents. Messages between the landlord and tenant were always friendly and courteous.

[32]Ms Gott gave evidence. She had rented out the Property 3 times, whilst living in Germany between 2009 and 2013, in Amsterdam between May 2014 and May 2015, and then whilst living in Manchester between September 2021 and September 2022, which was when the Applicant became her tenant. Previous lettings whilst overseas had been managed through an agent. Ms Gott had first managed the property herself for the tenant living there before the applicant

[33]Ms Gott stated, and we accept, that when she had moved to Amsterdam, she had checked online to see what formalities were required of her as a landlord. When letting to the Applicant she simply presumed the requirements would be the same, and had no idea about the requirement to obtain a selective license. She candidly agreed that with hindsight she should have updated herself as to current laws. She was not a member of any landlords’ association, and had no relevant accreditation. She agreed that she had overlooked the necessity of a further gas safety check in September 2022. Ms Gott said she had a maintenance contract in place for the gas appliances.

[34]As to the kitchen window, Ms Gott explained that there was a flat roof above running to a downpipe which presented a persistent need for clearing out of the gutter. The builder, Greg, had ameliorated matters by installing a drain system at the bottom of the pipe, fixing an exterior sill, and repainting externally, and installing half beading and repainting internally. She was not cross-examined about the disputed threat regarding the attribution of responsibility for the window damage alleged by the Applicant.

[35]Ms Gott explained that she was aware of rising damp issues beneath the bay window in the living room and had the bay window area damp proof course redone after the applicant left the property. Relevant statutory provisions

[36]

Housing and Planning Act 2016 Section 40

(1) This Chapter confers power on the First-tier Tribunal to make a rent repayment order where a landlord has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies.

(2) A rent repayment order is an order requiring the landlord under a tenancy of housing in England to – (a) repay an amount of rent paid by a tenant ...

(3) A reference to “an offence to which this Chapter applies” is to an offence, of a description specified in the table, that is committed by a landlord in relation to housing in England let by that landlord. Act section general description of offence 1 Criminal Law Act 1977 section 6(1) violence for securing entry 2 Protection from Eviction Act 1977 section 1(2), (3) or (3A) eviction or harassment of occupiers 3 Housing Act 2004 section 30(1) failure to comply with improvement notice 4 section 32(1) failure to comply with prohibition order etc 5 section 72(1) control or management of unlicensed HMO 6 section 95(1) control or management of unlicensed house 7 This Act section 21 breach of banning order Section 41 (1) A tenant or a local housing authority may apply to the First-tier Tribunal for a rent repayment order against a person who has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies. (2) A tenant may apply for a rent repayment order only if – (a) the offence relates to housing that, at the time of the offence, was let to the tenant, and (b) the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the application is made. Section 43 (1) The First-tier Tribunal may make a rent repayment order if satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that a landlord has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies (whether or not the landlord has been convicted). (2) A rent repayment order under this section may be made only on an application under 41. (3) The amount of a rent repayment order under this section is to be determined in accordance with – (a) section 44 (where the application is made by a tenant) ... Section 44 (1) Where the First-tier Tribunal decides to make a rent repayment order under section 43 in favour of a tenant, the amount is to be determined in accordance with this section. (2) The amount must relate to rent paid during the period mentioned in the table. If the order is made on the ground that the landlord has committed the amount must relate to rent paid by the tenant in respect of an offence mentioned in row 1 or 2 of the table in section 40(3) the period of 12 months ending with the date of the offence an offence mentioned in row 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 of the table in section 40(3) a period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the landlord was committing the offence (3) The amount that the landlord may be required to repay in respect of a period must not exceed – (a) the rent paid in respect of that period, less (b) any relevant award of universal credit paid (to any person) in respect of rent under the tenancy during that period.

(4) In determining the amount the tribunal must, in particular, take into account – (a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant, (b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and (c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which this Chapter applies. Housing Act 2004 Section 95 (1) A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing a house which is required to be licensed under this Part (see section 85(1)) but is not so licensed. Section 263 (1) In this Act “person having control”, in relation to premises, means (unless the context otherwise requires) the person who receives the rack-rent of the premises (whether on his own account or as agent or trustee of another person), or who would so receive it if the premises were let at a rack-rent. (2) In subsection (1) “rack-rent” means a rent which is not less than two-thirds of the full net annual value of the premises. (3) In this Act “person managing” means, in relation to premises, the person who, being an owner or lessee of the premises – (a) receives … rents or other payments from … persons who are in occupation as tenants or licensees of parts of the premises, or of the whole of the premises; or (b) would so receive those rents or other payments but for having entered into an arrangement … with another person who is not an owner or lessee of the premises by virtue of which that other person receives the rents or other payments ... Tribunal’s analysis

[37]The uncontested evidence is that the Property was a dwelling which was required to be licensed but was not licensed at any point during the period of the claim. Having considered that uncontested evidence we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that for the whole period of the claim the Property required a licence, and it was not licensed.

[38]It is also clear that the Respondent was the landlord for the purposes of section 43(1) of the 2016 Act, as she was named as landlord in the tenancy agreement. Again, this was undisputed.

[39]The next question is whether the Respondent was a “person having control of or managing” the Property within the meaning of section 263 of the 2004 Act. The evidence shows that the rent was paid to the Respondent. The Respondent has not sought to argue that she was not a person having control of or managing the Property or that the rent paid was not the “rack-rent” as defined in section 263. We are, accordingly, satisfied that the Respondent received rent from the Applicant. The Respondent was additionally and in any event at the relevant time a person managing the Property. The defence of “reasonable excuse”

[40]Under section 72(5) of the 2004 Act, it is a defence that a person who would otherwise be guilty of the offence of controlling or managing a house which is licensable under Part 3 of the 2004 Act had a reasonable excuse for the failure to obtain a licence. The burden of proof is on the person relying on the defence.

[41]In this case, the Respondent maintained that she did have such reasonable excuse, on the following bases:(a) She had received no correspondence from LBI informing her that a licensing scheme was to be implemented/was implemented;

(b) The only correspondence she received indicating that a license may be required was a letter from LBI sent to the Property dated 3 August 2023, which the Applicant did not forward to her, and she did not receive until an email in April 2024.

(c) LBI conceded they had experienced a backlog in sending out letters due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and had been unable to send ‘chaser’ letters.

(d) She was an inexperienced landlord, emphasising her residence in Manchester and then Cambridge, looking after elderly parents, during the relevant period.

(e) She had no professional managing agent or significant property management experience. Any failure was attributable to oversight or mistake, as opposed to recklessness, wilful blindness, or dishonesty.

[42]In considering the question of reasonable excuse, the Respondent submits, correctly, that the Upper Tribunal has held (Marigold v. Wells

[2023] UKUT 33 (LC)

[47]-[49] & Newell v. Abbott

[2024] UKUT 181 (LC)

[13]-[16]) that the FTT should:(a) First establish what facts are asserted as to give rise to a reasonable excuse (this may include the belief, acts or omissions of the landlord or any other person, the landlord’s own experience or relevant attributes, the situation of the landlord at any relevant time and any other relevant external facts);

(b) Second, decide which of those facts are proven; and

(c) Third decide whether, viewed objectively, those proven facts amount to an objectively reasonable excuse for the default and the time when that objectively reasonable excuse ceased.

[43]The UT has also held, in IR Management Services Limited v Salford City Council [2020 UKUT 81(LC) that the burden of proof is on the party raising the defence of reasonable excuse to show on the balance of probabilities that the defence applies. Accordingly, it is for the Respondent to demonstrate that she had a reasonable excuse.

[44]In his closing submissions Mr McDermott submitted that the Applicant’s contention that the circumstances presented no defence was wrong, while he conceded that successful assertions of a reasonable excuse by Respondents in such circumstances was rare.

[45]We find that the LBI designation of the area in which the Property is situated as an area for selective licensing was announced on 22 October 2020, effective from 1 February 2021. The announcement was 11 months, and the start date more than 7 months before the Applicant moved into the Property. The requirement then subsisted for the entire duration of his tenancy, for a period of two years, within which the Respondent did nothing to educate herself as to her obligations, let alone apply for or obtain a selective license.

[46]We accept the factual matters raised by the Respondent, summarised ay §40(a), (c), (d) and (e), above. As to the letter sent in August 2023, summarised at §40(b), we reject any suggestion that the Applicant in some way deliberately intercepted or kept this correspondence from the Respondent. He was asked in cross-examination whether he had opened that letter, which he denied, and we accept his evidence on that issue. We also accept that the Applicant and Respondent had evolved by mutual agreement a system whereby mail would not be forwarded to her, but simply kept at the Property for collection from time to time.

[47]While it is regrettable that LBI did not write to subject properties, a landlord’s obligations in respect of licensing are not contingent upon being personally informed by a local authority, or other entity. Any suggestion otherwise was rejected by the FTT in Jesenska & Jesensky v Butt [2023] LON/00BH/HMG/2023/0003 which, while not binding upon us, is reasoning which we find persuasive and which we adopt.

[48]Ignorance and inexperience are similarly not matters that, we find, amount to a reasonable excuse. It is incumbent upon those letting residential properties to remain abreast of the regulatory framework governing such matters. Such was the approach of the UT in Aytan v Moore

[2021] UKUT 27

[49]Ultimately, it was the Respondent’s responsibility to obtain a licence and there is nothing in her explanation which in our view is sufficient to amount to a complete defence. In particular, there is nothing to suggest that the matter was wholly outside Ms Gott’s control or that she was relying on somebody else to take appropriate steps in circumstances where it was reasonable to do so.

[50]The purpose of the licensing regime is to try to ensure – insofar as is reasonably possible – that properties which are rented out are safe and of an acceptable standard, and it would frustrate that purpose if landlords could be excused compliance simply because their ignorance, inexperience or personal circumstances caused them to neglect to apply for a licence.

[51]While we accept the factual matters discussed above, the Tribunal ultimately concludes, beyond reasonable doubt, that the Respondent had no reasonable excuse for failing to seek the necessary licence. The offence

[52]Section 40 of the 2016 Act confers power on the First-tier Tribunal to make a rent repayment order where a landlord has committed an offence listed in the table in sub-section 40(3), subject to certain conditions being satisfied.

[53]An offence under section 95 of the 2004 Act is one of the offences listed in that table. Section 95 states that “A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing a house which is required to be licensed under this Part (see section 85(1)) but is not so licensed...”

[54]For the reasons given above we are satisfied(a) that the Respondent was a “person managing” the Property for the purposes of section 263 of the 2004 Act,

(b) that the Property was required to be licensed throughout the period of claim and

[55]Under section 41(2), a tenant may apply for a rent repayment order only if the offence relates to housing that, at the time of the offence, was let to the tenant and the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the application is made. On the basis of the uncontested evidence on these points we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Property was let to the Applicant at the time of commission of the offence and that the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which his application was made. Process for ascertaining the amount of rent to be ordered to be repaid

[56]Based on the above findings, we have the power to make a rent repayment order against the Respondent.

[57]The amount of rent to be ordered to be repaid is governed by section 44 of the 2016 Act. Under sub-section 44(2), the amount must relate to rent paid by the tenant in respect of a period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the landlord was committing the offence. Under sub-section 44(3), the amount that the landlord may be required to repay in respect of a period must not exceed the rent paid in respect of that period less any relevant award of housing benefit or universal credit paid in respect of rent under the tenancy during that period.

[58]In this case, the Applicant’s claim relates to the periods 1 September 2022 to 31 August 2023.

[59]The Applicant seeks a rent repayment order in the total sum of £18,325, being the entirety of the rent paid to the Respondent during the relevant period.

[60]We are satisfied on the basis of the uncontested evidence that the Applicant was in occupation for the whole of the period to which this rent repayment application relates, and that the Property required a licence for the whole of that period. Therefore, the maximum sum that can be awarded by way of rent repayment is the sum of £18,325, this being the amount paid by the Applicant by way of rent in respect of the period of claim.

[61]Under sub-section 44(4), in determining the amount of any rent repayment order the tribunal must, in particular, take into account(a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant,

(b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and

(c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which the relevant part of the 2016 Act applies.

[62]In its decision in Acheampong v Roman and others

[2022] UKUT 239 (LC)

, the Upper Tribunal recommended a four-stage approach to determining the amount to be repaid, which is paraphrased below:-(a) ascertain the whole of the rent for the relevant period;

(b) subtract any element of that sum that represents payment by the landlord for utilities that only benefited the tenant;

(c) consider how serious this offence was, both compared to other types of offence in respect of which a rent repayment order may be made and compared to other examples of the same type of offence; and

(d) consider whether any deduction from, or addition to, that figure should be made in the light of the other factors set out in section 44(4).

[63]Adopting the Acheampong approach, the whole of the rent in this case means the whole of the rent paid by the Applicant out of his own resources, which (where we have been unable to discern any relevant components of Universal Credit) is £18,325. Utilities

[64]We accept that the Applicant was solely responsible for payment of utilities. Accordingly, no reduction applies under this head. Seriousness

[65]In Acheampong at §20(c), Judge Cooke held that the Tribunal must consider how serious the housing offence forming the basis of the application is, both compared to other types of offences in respect of which a rent repayment order may be made, and compared to other examples of the same offence. As the issue was put in §21 of the judgment, this “...is an assessment of the conduct of the landlord specifically in the context of the offence itself; how badly has this landlord behaved in committing the offence?”

[66]Failure to license leads – or can lead – to significant health and safety risks for often vulnerable tenants, and sanctions for failure to license have an important deterrent effect on future offending as well as encouraging law-abiding landlords to continue to take the licensing system seriously and to inspire general public confidence in the licensing system. In addition, there has been much publicity about licensing of privately rented property, and there is an argument that good landlords who apply for and obtain a licence promptly may feel that those who fail to obtain a licence gain an unfair benefit thereby and therefore need to be heavily incentivised not to let out licensable properties without first obtaining a licence. Furthermore, even if it could be argued that the Applicant did not suffer direct loss through the Respondent’s failure to obtain a licence, it is clear that a large part of the purpose of the rent repayment legislation is deterrence. If landlords can successfully argue that the commission by them of a criminal offence to which section 43 of the 2016 Act applies should only have consequences if tenants can show that they have suffered actual loss, this will significantly undermine the deterrence value of the legislation.

[67]Nevertheless, the seriousness of the offences can be ascertained by comparing the maximum sentences upon conviction for each of them. Deploying this hierarchical analysis, the offence of having control of, or managing an unlicensed dwelling is generally less serious than other offences. This is, we find, particularly so in the case of a one-bedroom flat occupied by a single gentleman, by contrast to the very many sub-standard unlicensed Houses in Multiple Occupation we encounter in London. Mitigation

[68]In relation to the failure to license the Property, Ms Gott presents her personal circumstances as constituting significant relevant mitigation.

[69]In this case, we find no such mitigation. While we accept that Ms Gott doubtless had a host of issues to attend to during the relevant period, letting property as she did presupposes an obligation to inform oneself of the relevant licensing regulations, however busy one may otherwise be.

[70]As regards the specific matters listed in section 44, the Tribunal is particularly required to take into account(a) the conduct of the parties,

(b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and

(c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of a relevant offence. We will consider each in turn. Conduct of the Parties

[71]The most notable factor in dispute, to which the majority of the evidence at the hearing was directed, related to the conduct of the parties.

[72]By way of preamble, we find that the Property was (on the whole) in a good state of decoration and repair, that the tenant was provided with all necessary documentation at the commencement of his tenancy, that his deposit was appropriately protected, and that at the conclusion of his tenancy, after a dispute, the deposit was returned save for £15 in respect of a replacement key. We find that the very few instances of repairs for which the landlord was responsible were attended to promptly. It is admitted by the Respondent that one gas safety inspection was missed.

[73]In relation to the limited factual matters in dispute, we accept the evidence of Mr Colvin. He arranged for a deep clean of the Property at the conclusion of his tenancy, and in text messages exchanged between the parties (see pp. 250-1 of the Respondent’s bundle) it is apparent that the kitchen window was not properly waterproofed, and was susceptible to ingresses of water from the flat roof above. The Respondent has now sought to address the issue by modifications to the down pipe.

[74]We find that when Mr Colvin told Ms Gott about the conclusions of the builder, to the effect that it was not his responsibility to repair or replace the kitchen window, she simply would not accept it, against a background where, we find, Mr Colvin was paying for various other things that did not appear strictly to be his responsibility within the terms of his tenancy, for example for damage caused to the garden shed by scaffolders who had attended.

[75]As to the allegation that Mr Colvin breached his tenancy by failing to forward post, we find that the parties did indeed reach a verbal agreement as to collection by the Respondent, addressed above.

[76]We find that the conduct of both parties from the commencement of the tenancy was good, in their communications with one another.

[77]There was persistent dampness in the bathroom, addressed in part by the provision of a dehumidifier, which transpired to be attributable to a latent defect in the form of a serious leak that neither party was aware of until the end of Mr Colvin’s occupancy. Insofar as there were periodic episodes of mold, he seems to have been very phlegmatic in his response. We do find that the provision of a dehumidifier suggests that the landlord was aware of the problem of dampness in the bathroom, and did not inspect further to establish the cause of the problem, or any remedial response. Financial Circumstances of the Landlord

[78]We are also required to consider the financial circumstances of the landlord under section 44(4).

[79]We take note of what is said in the evidence of the Respondent of her limited means to meet any award.

[80]We do however note that when in employment on a freelance basis, the Respondent states that she earns a salary of around £60,000 per annum. She possesses a significant asset in the form of the Property, which is said to be worth approximately £450,000, subject to a mortgage of around £40,000, so there is equity exceeding £400,000. When let, this commands rents of at least £1600 per month.

[81]We do however accept that the Respondent is not currently working, and provided the Tribunal with an email from her former employer, No Uniform, confirming that she had ceased employment on 3 July 2024. We have however seen no evidence either in the form of payslips or bank statements, or any claims for benefits. She states that she has savings of approximately £5,000, again unsupported by bank statements. She intends to re-let the Property to obtain an income.

[82]We accept that the Respondent has no immediate prospect of returning to work, in consequence of the difficult circumstances of looking after her elderly parents, which is an open-ended commitment. We consider that it is proper to take account of these circumstances in reaching our decision, as explained at §89 below. Whether the Landlord has at any time been convicted of a relevant offence

[83]The Respondent has not been convicted of a relevant offence. Other Factors

[84]It is apparent from the wording of sub-section 44(4) itself that the specific matters listed in sub-section 44(4) are not intended to be exhaustive, as sub-section 44(4) states that the tribunal “must, in particular, take into account” the specified factors. However, in this case we are not aware of any other specific factors which should be taken into account in determining the amount of rent to be ordered to be repaid. Decision

[85]We have had regard to various cases cited by the parties, some of them of higher judicial authority and some from this Tribunal, of persuasive effect only.

[86]Against the evidence presented by the parties, we find:86.1 This was a case of technical, accidental as opposed to intentional breach.

86.2 The Applicant enjoyed accommodation of a generally high standard, subject to issues of persistent dampness in the bathroom, and water penetration through the kitchen window.

86.3 But for one missed Gas Safety check, which in the event caused no lack of (actual) safety, all necessary checks and safety provisions were provided.

86.4 Until the very end of the tenancy, exemplary relations were maintained between the Applicant and Respondent.

86.5 We find no aggravating features whatsoever as against the Applicant.

86.6 We find that the Respondent failed adequately to ascertain the source of the dampness in the bathroom prior to, and through the course of letting to the Respondent.

86.7 The Respondent is not a professional landlady, and received no advice at the time of the letting as to the need for licensing.

86.8 There is no evidence of repeat offending.

[87]The four-stage approach recommended in Acheampong has been set out above. The amount arrived at by considering the first stage is £18,325.

[88]Stage (b) warrants no deduction.

[89]Considering the further matters required by stages (c) and (d), the Tribunal’s conclusion is that the appropriate amount is reduced to 50% of that sum.

[90]That exercise would produce a figure of £9,162.50. Considering it proper to take account of the Respondent’s current financial circumstances, we adjust that sum to £7,500.

[91]Accordingly, taking all of the factors together, the Rent Repayment Order is made in the sum of £7,500. Reimbursement of Tribunal Fees

[92]The Applicant has applied under paragraph 13(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 for an order that the Respondent reimburse their application fee of £100.00 and the hearing fee of £200.00.

[93]As the Applicant’s claim has been successful, albeit that there has been a deduction from the maximum payable, we are satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances to order the Respondent to reimburse these fees. Name: Judge M Jones Date: 19 September 2024 Rights of appeal By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have.(a) (A) If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case.

(b) (B) The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application.

(c) (C) If the application is not made within the 28-day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28-day time limit; the tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit.

(d) (D) The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking.

(e) (E) If the tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber).