160C Muswell Hill Road London N10 3NG LON/00AP/HMF/2022/0102-2024-05-13
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)
Case No LON/00AP/HMF/2022/0102-2024-05-13
Between
Mr H Ramsdale, Mr M J Congdon, Mr C KeeganApplicantJalay Enterprises LtdRespondent
Before
Judge PittawayMr S Wheeler MCIEH CEnvHRepresent Law Ltd (Mr D Gyulai) for the ApplicantMr Ashok Patel, a director of the Respondent. Application for a Rent Repayment Order by tenants for the RespondentDate 13 May 2024Property: 160C Muswell Hill Road London N10 3NGType of application: Sections 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45 Housing and Planning Act 2016. Judge Pittaway
DECISION
[1]The Tribunal find that the Respondent committed an offence under section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004 without reasonable excuse.[2]The Tribunal makes a Rent Repayment Order in favour of the Applicants in the sum of £10,767.90.[3]The Tribunal orders the Respondent to refund the Applicants’ application and hearing fees of £300.[4]The Tribunal makes no order for costs under Rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013.[5]The reasons for the Tribunal decisions are given below. The background[6]The Tribunal received an application from the Applicants dated 3 May 2022 under section 41 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (“the 2016 Act”) for a rent repayment order in respect of 160C Muswell Hill Road London N10 3NG (‘the Property’). The amount claimed in the Grounds of Application was £16,566 (the monthly rent being £1,980) for the period from 29 August 2020 to 9 May 2021.[7]The ground for making the application was that the Respondent had committed the offence of having control or managing an unlicensed HMO in breach of section 72(1) of Housing Act 2004 (the ‘2004 Act’).[8]On 11 October 2023 the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) [2023] UKUT 247 (LC) set aside the Rent Repayment Order made by the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) on 16 January 2023 and remitted the case for reconsideration by a differently constituted panel. The Upper Tribunal directed that the witness statement of Mr Ashok Patel dated 9 November 2022 and the statement of case of the same date be admitted as evidence on behalf of Jalay Enterprises Limited in the reconsidered application.[9]The parties were notified on 17 January 2024 that the application would be reheard on 16 February 2024.[10]On 25 January 2024 the Respondent’s representative, Civil Londinium, notified the Tribunal and the Applicants that it had been disinstructed. By e mails of 25 and 30 January 2024 the Respondent requested that the Hearing be postponed. On 31 January 2024 the Applicants’ representative objected to the requested postponement. The Tribunal advised the parties that the hearing on 16 February would remain listed, that the parties should attend, that the postponement application could be renewed then but that the parties should be in a position to proceed if the postponement application was not successful. The Hearing and subsequently[11]Mr Gyulai of Represent Law Ltd represented the applicants at the Hearing and Mr Ashok Patel represented the Respondent. The hearing was attended by all of the Applicants. Mr Harshad Patel, a friend of Mr Ashok Patel, was also present.[12]Mr Patel repeated his request for a postponement of the hearing to give the Respondent the opportunity of appointing a new legal representative, which he said should be possible within two weeks. He submitted that the previous legal representative had been disinstructed because it had been unresponsive.[13]Mr Gyulai objected to the request on the basis that the application had been made over a year ago, and that a postponement was not a useful use of the Tribunal’s time. He submitted that the only legal issue before the Tribunal was whether the Respondent had a reasonable excuse for committing the offence. There was no evidence before the Tribunal that the Respondent’s legal representative had been unresponsive. He submitted that the Applicants had complied with all directions throughout, and a postponement was not appropriate when this was the second appearance in the Tribunal.[14]The Tribunal adjourned to consider the postponement application. The Tribunal determined that in order to deal with the application fairly and justly it should adopt an approach which was proportionate and have regard to the resources of the Tribunal and the parties. It had regard to the attendance at the hearing of all the witnesses. The Tribunal therefore determined that it would proceed to hear the evidence in the application at the hearing, but would direct that the parties had until 15 March 2024 to make legal submissions, whereafter the Tribunal would reconvene, without the parties present, to reach its decision. The Tribunal invited the parties to consider whether, in making their legal submissions, they might wish to have regard to the decision in Palm View Estates v Thurrock Council [2021] EWCA Civ 1872.[15]At the Hearing the Tribunal had before it an Applicants’ bundle of 12 January 2023 of 137 pages, a Respondent’s bundle of 78 pages, the Respondent’s Defence dated 9 November 2022 of 6 pages, a witness statement dated 9 November 2022 by Mr Ashok Patel of 7 pages, and a supplemental witness statement by Mr Ashok Patel dated 12 January 2022 of 5 pages. It also had a skeleton argument for the Respondent prepared by Londinium Solicitors dated 12 January 2021 but stated to be for the hearing on 12 January 2023.[16]The Tribunal heard evidence at the hearing from Mr Ramsdale, Mr Congdon, Mr Keegan and Mr Ashok Patel.[17]After the Hearing and in accordance with the directions issued by the Tribunal the Respondent made written legal submissions (5 Pages) dated 15 March 2024. The Applicants also made written legal submissions dated 15 March 2024 (10 pages.[18]The Respondent’s submissions raised an issue not previously raised, namely that the application was invalid as it had been made more than 12 months after the alleged offence had occurred and that it was therefore out of time. If legal submissions had been made at the hearing the Applicants would have had the opportunity of responding to this submission. The Tribunal therefore directed that the Applicants should have until 22 April 2024 to reply to the submission that their application was invalid. The Applicants made submissions (5 pages plus supporting documents, in total 52 pages) on 19 April.[19]The Tribunal reconvened without the parties present to reach its decision. The Property[20]The Property is described in the application as a 3 bedroom flat split over two floors, with 2 bedrooms a bathroom kitchen and living room on the first floor and a bedroom and en-suite bathroom on the second floor.[21]No party requested an inspection and the Tribunal did not consider that one was necessary.[22]The Respondent let the Property under a single AST dated 29 August 2020 to the Applicants for a term of 12 months from 29 August 2020 at a rent of £1980 per calendar month. The Licence[23]The relevant local housing authority is the London Borough of Haringey. Its additional licensing scheme came into force on 27 May 2019 for a period of five years. and effectively extended licensing to all HMOs occupied by three or four persons.[24]In an e mail dated 25 April 2022 Mrs Glayne Russell of the private Sector Housing Team at Haringey confirmed that it had received an application to licence the Property as an additional HMO on 10 May 2021. Issues[25]The Respondent, in its Defence of 9 November 2022 accepts that the Property is one which required an additional HMO licence while let to the Applicants who are 3 unrelated tenants in 3 separate households. Failure to have such a licence is an offence under section 72 (1) of the Housing Act 2004 (the ‘2004 Act’) (controlling or managing an unlicensed HMO)[26]The issues before the Tribunal to determine were;• Was the application made within twelve months of the offence being committed?• During the period in which the offence was committed did the Respondent have a defence to the commission of the offence under section 72(5) of the 2004 Act?• If an offence has been committed the maximum amount of RRO that can be ordered under section 44(3) of the 2016 Act.• Whether the Respondent had been responsible for the cost of any utilities at the Property• The severity of the offence• Any relevant conduct of the landlord, the landlord’s financial circumstances, whether the landlord has any previous conviction of a relevant offence, and the conduct of the tenants to which the Tribunal should have regard in exercising its discretion as to the amount of the RRO. The Tribunal’s decision and reasons[27]The Tribunal reached its decision after considering the witnesses’ oral and written evidence and the written submissions, including documents referred to in that evidence and submissions and taking into account its assessment of the evidence.[28]As appropriate, and where relevant to the Tribunal’s decision these are referred to in the reasons for the Tribunal’s decision.[29]This determination does not refer to every matter raised by the parties, or every document the Tribunal reviewed or took into account in reaching its decision. However, this doesn't imply that any points raised or documents not specifically mentioned were disregarded. If a point or document was referred to in the evidence or submissions that was relevant to a specific issue, it was considered by the Tribunal.[30]The relevant legal provisions are set out in the Appendix to this decision Was the application made within twelve months of the alleged offence?[31]Under section 72(4)(b) of the 2004 Act in proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (1) it is a defence that, at the material time an application for a licence had been duly made.[32]On the basis that Haringey accepted the Respondent’s application as being valid on 10 May 2021 the Respondent submits that the offence ceased on 9 May 2021.[33]The Respondent submits that under section 41(2) of the 2016 Act a tenant may only apply for an RRO if the offence was committed in the period of twelve months ending on the day on which the application was made. It submits that the application was invalid as it had been made more than 12 months after the alleged offence had occurred and that it was therefore out of time.[34]The Respondent submits that while the original application by the Applicants is dated 3 May 2022 a revised application form and the fee were received by the Tribunal on 11 May 2022, more than twelve months after the date upon the alleged offence ceased.[35]The Applicants submit that the limitation deadline is 12 months from the date that Haringey received the Respondent’s additional HMO licence application, namely 9 May 2022 and that the application to the Tribunal was filed on 3 May 2022, within the twelve month period. The Tribunal confirmed receipt of the application by e mail at 6.09 pm on 4 May 2022, which was deemed received by the Applicants on 5 May 2022. The Applicants submit that ‘starting’ proceedings in the Tribunal has the same meaning as bringing the claim in the county court i.e they must be ‘brought’ to issue within the limitation period.[36]The Applicants refer the Tribunal to Rule 26 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 and submit that they had complied with Rule 26 when the application was submitted to the Tribunal on 3 May 2022. There is no requirement in Rule 26 that the issue fee be paid when making the application, nor is there any requirement that the applicants provide a letter authorizing their legal representative to pursue the claim, nor is information about a previous RRO at the Property a requirement. These were the issues which resulted in the revisions to the application received by the Tribunal on 11 May.[37]On the evidence before it the Tribunal finds that the offence ceased on 10 May 2021. It agrees with the Applicants’ submissions that the application was submitted on 3 May and finds that the application was made within the twelve month period of the offence having been committed. Did the Respondent have a reasonable excuse to the commission of an offence under section 72(1) Housing Act 2004[38]Mr Patel gave evidence that he had first applied for a licence in May 2020 describing the property as 160 Muswell Hill Road, on the advice of an officer at Haringey. Because this was not the correct address Mr Patel then had to resubmit the application rather than amending the original application, which he did on line on 24 November 2020. The on-line application resulted in a response that the licence he had applied for was a ‘selective licence’. Mr Patel accepted in his supplemental witness statement that Haringey did not operate a selective licensing system. Mr Patel gave evidence that it was not until May 2021 that he was able to make the necessary payment for the additional licence.[39]Mr Patel submitted that it was through no fault of his that he was prevented from making a payment until May 2021, and that his actions demonstrated a clear intention to obtain a licence.[40]The Applicants submitted that there is no evidence before the Tribunal that Haringey received the May 2020 application or of any technical or administrative issues with its online application system, and that the defence of reasonable excuse therefore does not apply to the May application.[41]As for the November application the Applicants submit that the e mail from Haringey of 27 November, “We’re looking into why the system is asking for £0 as nothing seems to be wrong on the application. I will get back to you as we need the payment online.” is not evidence that the November application was completed then. The Applicants refer the Tribunal to a series of e mails between 3 December 2020 and 20 January 2021 from Haringey to Mr Patel as evidence that the application form had not been completed correctly, the final warning from Haringey of 8 February 2021 that no HMO application had been submitted, the e mail from Haringey of 16 April 2021 that the application was ‘very outstanding’ and the letter from Haringey of 20 April 2021 advising that no HMO application had been received.[42]On the evidence before it the Tribunal finds that Mr Patel had completed the on-line form incorrectly (so that it appeared that it was a selective licence that the Respondent was applying for ) and that he chose to ignore the assistance offered by Haringey to amend his application and the warnings sent to him that he had not completed an application, choosing to rely on the mail of 27 November which stated that nothing seemed to be wrong with the application. The Tribunal finds that in light of the subsequent e mails from Haringey Mr Patel should have looked more closely at his original application but he does not appear to have done so.[43]The Respondent’s bundle contained a copy of the application which the Respondent made to Haringey in May 2020 (which stated that the application was for an additional HMO Licence) and that made in November 2020, which did not specify the type of licence applied for. As a result of the information provided by the Respondent in the November application the automatic system determined that the licence applied for was a ‘selective licence’. As there was no selective licencing in Haringey this stated that a fee of £0 was payable. From the e mail from HMO Licensing of 24 November 2020 it is clear that the information provided by the Respondent had not been correct, as one of the bathrooms and the kitchen were shared, not exclusive. And an mail from HMO licensing of 26 November 2020 clarified that the application should have referred to 3 lettings not one. From a further email of 26 November it is clear that rather than seeking to pay the required fee of £500 Mr Patel had attempted to pay £0 (the fee identified when the information provided led to a selective licence) seven times. The Tribunal find that the Respondent continued to contact the council about the payment but there is no evidence that it had made the amendments to the application that would have resulted in the fee of £500 being demanded[44]The Tribunal finds that the Respondent may not rely upon the defence of reasonable excuse, however the position in which it found itself is considered by the Tribunal as relevant to the factors considered by the Tribunal below in determining the amount of the RRO. Amount of the RRO[45]In its decision in Acheampong v Roman and others [2022] UKUT 239 (LC), the Upper Tribunal recommended a four-stage approach to determining the amount to be repaid, which may be summarised as follows(a) ascertain the whole of the rent for the relevant period;(b) subtract any element of that sum that represents payment by the landlord for utilities that only benefited the tenant;(c) consider how serious this offence was, both compared to other types of offence in respect of which a rent repayment order may be made and compared to other examples of the same type of offence; and(d) consider whether any deduction from, or addition to, that figure should be made in the light of the other factors set out in section 44(4).[46]The Tribunal have adopted the approach recommended in Acheampong v Roman and others[47]The Respondent did not challenge the correctness of the amount of rent that the Applicants stated they had paid during the relevant period, nor the relevant period. The applicants’ witness statements contained confirmation that they had not received any universal credit when living at the Property. Accordingly the Tribunal has taken the whole of the rent for the relevant period to be £16,566.[48]The Property was occupied under an Assured Shorthold Tenancy Agreement dated 29 August 2020 which names the three Applicants as the ‘Tenant’. Clause 4(2) provides that the Tenant is responsible for Council Tax. Clause 4(3) provides that the Tenant pays for all gas, electricity, water and sewerage services supplied to the Property. The Tribunal therefore finds that there should be no deduction from the total rent for utility payments.[49]As to the seriousness of the offence, the Tribunal has taken into account that that proper enforcement of licensing requirements against all landlords, good and bad, is necessary to ensure the general effectiveness of licensing system and to deter evasion, and the seriousness of the offence.[50]The offence in this application was operating an HMO without an additional licence.[51]The Tribunal finds that the offence is not the most serious type of offence for which a RRO may be sought, as recognised in the decision in Daff v Gyalui [2023] UKUT 134 (LC), which case also recognised that there can be more or less serious offences within each category.[52]Factors that may be relevant in assessing how serious an offence is within its category include• Failure to keep abreast of legal obligations• The length of the offence• Fire safety breaches• Breach of The Management of Houses in Multiple Occupation (England) Regulations• Breach of s234(3) of the 2004 Act• Breach of housing health and safety rating system• Disrepair and maintenance issues• Failure to protect the Applicant’s deposit• Failure to ensure electrical safety certificate and EPC were in place and provided to the Applicant[53]The applicants stated that they did not believe that the Respondent had protected their rent deposit. They had not been given any deposit protection information. Mr Congdon gave evidence that there had been an issue with mould in his bedroom. Mr Keegan gave evidence as to there having been mould in his room which the Respondent had dealt with, and that he had had issues with his en-suite toilet.[54]The Applicants made no specific submissions on the seriousness of the offence.[55]The Tribunal in assessing the seriousness of the offence within the category of operating an HMO without an additional licence, has had regard to the fact that once the Respondent submitted the correct application a licence was granted and that the irregularities in relation to the rent deposit were procedural irregularities, not that the deposit had not been protected. It has also had regard to the applicants’ statements as to mould and problems with a toilet.[56]On the conduct of the Respondent in its application to obtain a licence the Tribunal finds on the evidence before it that the errors that the Respondent made in the November application may have been the result of a genuine misunderstanding by the Respondent as to how to complete the form online, but that subsequently it failed to accept Haringey’s offer of assistance or consider whether it should had sought professional advice. This resulted in the offence of operating an unlicensed HMO being committed for longer.[57]Section 44(4) provides that in determining the amount of the RRO there are various factors which the Tribunal should take into account, namely the conduct of the landlord and the tenant, the financial circumstances of the landlord and whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which that Chapter of the 2016 Act applies.[58]The Respondent made no submissions as to any of these factors.[59]The Applicants submitted that the Respondent had obtained considerable financial benefit from letting the Property, that it is a company landlord with considerable property assets, that Mr Patel, a director of the Respondent, is an experienced property manager, that the Respondent had had a previous RRO awarded against it for 100% of the rent and that the Respondent did not take good care of the Property.[60]There is no evidence before the Tribunal as to the assets of the Respondent apart from Land Registry information stating that it owns the freehold of 160 Muswell Hill. The previous RRO order was made in October 2021, by which time the Respondent had applied for the correct licence.[61]The Tribunal finds on the evidence before it that the Respondent was seeking to licence the Property as an HMO but was not proactive in its attempt.[62]Having regard to the total rent for the relevant period, the severity of the offence and the deductions that it considers should be made in light of factors to which the Tribunal must have regard under section 44(4) of the 2016 Act, the Tribunal makes a Rent Repayment Order against the Respondent in the sum of £10,767.90, being 65% of the rent paid for the relevant period. Fees[63]The Applicant sought repayment of their application and hearing fees under Rule 13(2) of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013.[64]The Tribunal finds it appropriate, in light of its decision to make an RRO, to reimburse the application and hearing fees, a total of £300. Rule 13 costs[65]In their submissions the applicants invited the Tribunal to consider an order for costs under Rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013.[66]The tests to be considered by the tribunal when considering whether a costs order should be made under Rule 13 are set out in the Upper Tribunal decision in Willow Court Management Company (1985) Ltd v Mrs Ratna Alexander [2016] UKUT (LC) (‘Willow’), at Paragraphs 27 and 28 which are set are below. ‘27. When considering the rule 13(1)(b) power attention should first focus on the permissive and conditional language in which it is framed: “the Tribunal may make an order in respect of costs only … if a person has acted unreasonably….” We make two obvious points: first, that unreasonable conduct is an essential pre-condition of the power to order costs under the rule; secondly, once the existence of the power has been established its exercise is a matter for the discretion of the tribunal. 6 With these points in mind we suggest that a systematic or sequential approach to applications made under the rule should be adopted.[28]At the first stage the question is whether a person has acted unreasonably. A decision that the conduct of a party has been unreasonable does not involve an exercise of discretion but rather the application of an objective standard of conduct to the facts of the case. If there is no reasonable explanation for the conduct complained of, the behaviour will properly be adjudged to be unreasonable, and the threshold for the making of an order will have been crossed. A discretionary power is then engaged and the decision maker moves to a second stage of the inquiry. At that second stage it is essential for the tribunal to consider whether, in the light of the unreasonable conduct it has found to have been demonstrated, it ought to make an order for costs or not; it is only if it decides that it should make an order that a third stage is reached when the question is what the terms of that order should be.’[67]The Applicants submit that the Respondent acted unreasonably in unsuccessfully appealing the previous RRO, thereby wasting time and resources of the Tribunal the Upper Tribunal and the Applicants, and that Respondent’s defence had been unsuccessful in that case.[68]It is not clear whether the Applicants are referring to the decision dated 26 October 2021 which involved different Applicants, or the decision involving these Applicants which has been remitted to the Tribunal to be reheard.[69]Applying an objective standard the Tribunal does not find the actions of the Respondent in this application to be unreasonable. It is reasonable to seek to appeal the decision made against it in favour of the present Applicants and the fact that the Upper Tribunal remitted the matter to the Tribunal to be reheard evidences that it was reasonable of the Respondent to make the appeal.[70]Any application for an RRO must be considered on its own merits and on the evidence provided to the Tribunal in connection with it and that is what the Tribunal has done here. It is not bound by the previous decision of the First-tier Property Tribunal against the Respondent of 26 October 2021. There is nothing before the Tribunal in connection with any appeal of that decision, but if the Upper Tribunal permitted an appeal of it that points to the appeal having had a reasonable prospect of success[71]The Tribunal is mindful, as stated in Paragraph 62 of Willow, that ‘The residential property division of the First-tier Tribunal is a costs shifting jurisdiction by exception only and parties must usually expect to bear their own costs….’[72]The Tribunal makes no order for costs under Rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 Name: Judge Pittaway Date: 13 May 2024 Rights of appeal By rule 36(2) of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber). Appendix of Relevant Legislation Housing Act 2004 72 Offences in relation to licensing of HMOs (1)A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing an HMO which is required to be licensed under this Part (see section 61(1)) but is not so licensed. (2)A person commits an offence if— (a)he is a person having control of or managing an HMO which is licensed under this Part, (b)he knowingly permits another person to occupy the house, and (c)the other person’s occupation results in the house being occupied by more households or persons than is authorised by the licence. (3)A person commits an offence if— (a)he is a licence holder or a person on whom restrictions or obligations under a licence are imposed in accordance with section 67(5), and (b)he fails to comply with any condition of the licence. (4)In proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (1) it is a defence that, at the material time— (a)a notification had been duly given in respect of the house under section 62(1), or (b)an application for a licence had been duly made in respect of the house under section 63, and that notification or application was still effective (see subsection (8)). (5)In proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (1), (2) or (3) it is a defence that he had a reasonable excuse— (a)for having control of or managing the house in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (1), or (b)for permitting the person to occupy the house, or (c)for failing to comply with the condition, as the case may be. Housing and Planning Act 2016 40 Introduction and key definitions(1) This Chapter confers power on the First-tier Tribunal to make a rent repayment order where a landlord and committed an offence to which this Chapter applies.(2) A rent repayment order is an order requiring the landlord under a tenancy of housing in England to – (a) repay an amount of rent paid by a tenant, or (b) pay a local housing authority an amount in respect of a relevant award of universal credit paid (to any person) in respect of rent under the tenancy.(3) A reference to “an offence to which this Chapter applies” is to an offence, of a description specified in the table, that is committed by a landlord in relation to housing in England let to that landlord. Act section general description of offence 1 Criminal Law Act 1977 section 6(1) violence for securing entry 2 Protection from Eviction Act 1977 section 1(2), (3) or (3A) eviction or harassment of occupiers 3 Housing Act 2004 section 30(1) failure to comply with improvement notice 4 section 32(1) failure to comply with prohibition order etc 5 section 72(1) control or management of unlicensed HMO 6 section 95(1) control or management of unlicensed house 7 This Act section 21 breach of banning order(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), an offence under section 30(1) or 32(1) of the Housing Act 2004 is committed in relation to housing in England let by a landlord only if the improvement notice or prohibition order mentioned in that section was given in respect of a hazard on the premises let by the landlord (as opposed, for example, to common parts). 41 Application for rent repayment order (1) A tenant or a local housing authority may apply to the First-tier Tribunal for a rent repayment order against a person who has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies. (3) A local housing authority may apply for a rent repayment order only if – (a) the offence relates to housing in the authority’s area, and (b) the authority has complied with section 42. (4) In deciding whether to apply for a rent repayment order a local housing authority must have regard to any guidance given by the Secretary of State. 43 Making of a rent repayment order (1) The First-tier Tribunal may make a rent repayment order if satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that a landlord has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies (whether or not the landlord had been convicted). (2) A rent repayment order under this section may be made only on an application under section 41. (3) The amount of a rent repayment order under this section is to be determined with – (a) section 44 (where the application is made by a tenant); 44 Amount of order: tenants (1)Where the First-tier Tribunal decides to make a rent repayment order under section 43 in favour of a tenant, the amount is to be determined in accordance with this section. (2)The amount must relate to rent paid during the period mentioned in the table. If the order is made on the ground that the landlord has committed the amount must relate to rent paid by the tenant in respect of an offence mentioned in row 1 or 2 of the table in section 40(3) the period of 12 months ending with the date of the offence an offence mentioned in row 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 of the table in section 40(3) a period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the landlord was committing the offence (3)The amount that the landlord may be required to repay in respect of a period must not exceed— (a)the rent paid in respect of that period, less (b)any relevant award of universal credit paid (to any person) in respect of rent under the tenancy during that period. (4)In determining the amount the tribunal must, in particular, take into account— (a)the conduct of the landlord and the tenant, (b)the financial circumstances of the landlord, and (c)whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which this Chapter applies. The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 13.—(1) The Tribunal may make an order in respect of costs only— (a) under section 29(4) of the 2007 Act (wasted costs) and the costs incurred in applying for such costs; (b) if a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings in— (ii) a residential property case, or (iii) a leasehold case; 26 (1) An applicant must start proceedings before the Tribunal by sending or delivering to the Tribunal a notice of application. (2) Such an application must be signed and dated and, unless a practice direction makes different provision, include— (a) the name and address of the applicant; (b) the name and address of the applicant’s representative (if any); (c) an address where documents for the applicant may be sent or delivered; (d) the name and address of each respondent; (e) the address of the premises or property to which the application relates; (f) the applicant’s connection with the premises or property; (g) the name and address of any landlord or tenant of the premises to which the application relates; (h) the result the applicant is seeking; (i) the applicant’s reasons for making the application; (j) a statement that the applicant believes that the facts stated in the application are true; (k) the name and address of every person who appears to the applicant to be an interested person, with reasons for that person’s interest; (l) in agricultural land and drainage cases, a description of all the land or holding to which the application relates; (m) in agricultural land and drainage cases relating to succession under section 39, 41 or 53 of the 1986 Act—[1]confirmation that the applicant has given prior written notice of the application to the landlord of the holding and has brought the application to the notice of other persons interested in the outcome of the application; and[2]the names and addresses of each person to whom the applicant has provided such notice; (m) all further information or documents required by a practice direction. (3) Where an application is made to which a paragraph in a practice direction relating to residential property cases, tenant fees cases or leasehold cases applies, it must be accompanied by the particulars and documents specified in the relevant paragraph.