Judge BrilliantYogendra Patel (brother) for the ApplicantArmel Collard for the RespondentDate 23 January 2026Property: 156a Uxbridge Road, W12 8AAType of application: licensing - Sections 87-94 & Part 3 of Schedule 5 to the Housing Act 2004
DECISION
[1]The Applicant appeals against the grant of a selective HMO licence by the Respondent local authority under ss.87-94 and Part 3 of Schedule 5 to the Housing Act 2004 (the ‘2004 Act’) .[2]In accordance with paragraph 34(2) of Schedule 5 to the 2004 Act, the appeal is to be by way of a re-hearing, but may be determined having regard to matters of which the Respondent was unaware.[3]The appeal relates to the grant of a licence in respect of 156a Uxbridge Road London W12 8AA (“the property”) dated 7 April 2025.[4]According to the application, the property is located on the first and second floors above a retail shop. The first floor comprises a living room, kitchen and bathroom and the second floor comprises two bedrooms. Further, it is said that the Respondent has determined that the building is of local merit and falls within the conservation area determined by the Respondent.[5]The licence does not, of course, apply to the commercial premises on the ground floor.[6]Directions were given following a case management hearing which took place on 25 September 2025.[7]The basis of the appeal is that the property should not require a licence. The Applicant provided detailed submissions in this regard . The Applicant relies on the Selective Licensing of Houses (Specified Exemption) (England) Order 2006 (“the 2006 Order”). This creates exemptions for tenancies or licences for the purposes of Part 3 of the Housing Act 2004 if the tenancy falls within one of the descriptions in paragraph 2. The first ground of appeal[8]Paragraph 2(1)(e) of the 2006 Order creates an exemption for: “a tenancy of a house or a dwelling where—(i) the full term of the tenancy is more than 21 years;(ii) the lease does not contain a provision enabling the landlord to determine the tenancy, other than by forfeiture, earlier than at end of the term; and(iii) the house or dwelling is occupied by a person to whom the tenancy was granted or his successor in title or any members of such person’s family;”[9]It is argued by the Applicant that the present case falls within that exemption because the property is let by way of a tenancy (“the tenancy”) under the Rent Act 1977 (“the 1977 Act”). The tenancy commenced in 1973, which is more than 21 years ago. The current tenant, Mrs Sila Freedman (“the tenant”), succeeded to the tenancy following the death of her husband on 30 April 1998.[10]The point is correctly made that such a tenancy is not a short term arrangement, in the sense that it cannot be easily terminated. The landlord has to place reliance upon one or more of 16 grounds for possession. The tenancy has been in existence, it is said, for 53 years.[11]The Respondent argues that the tenancy does not fall within this exemption as it was not a tenancy where “the full term of the tenancy is more than 21 years”. It is noted that on the Rent Register, the period of the tenancy is described as “weekly”.[12]I prefer the submission of the Respondent to that of the Applicant. This is clearly a weekly tenancy and not a long tenancy of more than 21 years. The fact that the 1977 Act prevents the tenant from eviction ( subject to certain provisions) does not make the tenant a long one. It is and has always been a weekly tenancy, either contractual or statutory. The second ground of appeal[13]The matter came on for an oral face to face hearing before me on 10 December 2025.[14]Unbeknown to me, the Applicant had on 02 November 2025 made a case management application to the Tribunal on Form Order 1 asking for permission to raise a second ground for appeal.[15]The second ground of appeal also relies upon the 2006 Order. Paragraph 2(1)(b) of the 2006 Order creates an exemption for: “a tenancy described in any of the following provisions of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Housing Act 1988, which cannot be an assured tenancy by virtue of section 1(2) of that Act—(i) paragraph 4 (business tenancies);(ii) paragraph 5 (licensed premises);(iii) paragraph 6 (tenancies of agricultural land); or(iv) paragraph 7 (tenancies of agricultural holdings etc);”[16]One now needs to turn to s.1(2) of the Housing Act 1988 (“the 1988 Act”) which, where relevant, provides: “…if and so long as a tenancy falls within any paragraph in Part I of Schedule 1 to this Act, it cannot be an assured tenancy;”[17]Turning then to Part I of Schedule 1 to the 1988 Act, paragraph 13(1) provides: “A protected tenancy, within the meaning of the Rent Act 1977.”[18]The Applicant argues that the tenancy is a protected tenancy and therefore falls within paragraph 2(1)(b) of the 2006 Order.[19]As this point was taken late, I gave directions instead of hearing it there and then. I gave permission the Applicant to amend the application and directed a response thereto to be served by the Respondent and a brief reply thereto by the Applicant. I adjourned the hearing and determined I would then decide the case on the papers.[20]With respect, the second ground of appeal is hopeless. It is only the four named types of tenancies expressly mentioned in paragraph 2(1)(b) of the 2006 Order, namely(i) business tenancies,(ii) licensed premises,(iii) tenancies of agricultural land and(iv) tenancies of agricultural holdings etc, which are exempt.[21]It was suggested by the Applicant that a notice issued by the London Borough of Newham supported his case. It does not. Conclusion[22]The appeal is dismissed. Judge Simon Brilliant 23 January 2026 Right to appeal In accordance with s.11 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and Rule 21 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) (Lands Chamber) Rules 2010, the applicant may make an application for permission to appeal against this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber). Such application must be made in writing and received by the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) no later than 14 days after the date on which the First-tier Tribunal sent notice of this refusal to the party applying to set aside the decision.