Mariele Aurora Locke Istvan Veres Vilhelms Patriks Skabardis Nikolina ItlchevaApplicantFlat Justice Community Interest Company Walid Gamil SherifRespondent
Before
Judge Daley
Members
Mr John Stead-Professional MemberDate 29 April 2026Hearing 2026-03-10Property: 39 Steventon Road, London W12 0SuType of application: Applications for Rent Repayment Orders by Tenants Sections 40, 41, 43 & 44 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016
DECISION
I) The Tribunal finds that on the admission of the respondent and on the evidence before it that grounds exist for a rent repayment order in in that the Landlord committed the offence of managing or having control of a house in multiple occupation that was required to be licensed and was not licensed. II) The Tribunal finds that the offence of having an unlicensed HMO was committed to the required standard of proof, that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. III) The Tribunal is satisfied that grounds exist to make a rent repayment order against the Respondent. IV) The Tribunal makes a Rent repayment order in the sum of £ for the rent paid by the applicant for the period 1 June 2023 to 31 May 2024. V) The Tribunal makes an order for the reimbursement of the application fee in the sum of £114.00. No application having been made in respect of the hearing fees. Introduction[1]This is an application for a Rent repayment Order under section 41 of the Housing & Planning Act 2016. The Application is made on the grounds that the Landlord had control and management of an unlicensed HMO, that was subject to a mandatory licensing requirement in breach of Section 72 (1) of the Housing Act 2004. The first applicant made an application for a rent repayment order on 21 May 2025, for the periods 1.06.23 to 31.05.2024.[2]The Tribunal issued Directions on 3 September 2025, setting out how the parties should prepare for the hearing. This matter was set down for an in-person hearing on 10 March 2026.[3]The Tribunal by way of the amended directions permitted the following additional tenants to be added as applicants Mr Istvan Veres, Mr Vilhelms Patriks Skabardis and Ms Nikolina Itlcheva.[4]The directions were subsequently amended on 14 January 2026 following applications dated 28 November 2025 in respect of the second applicant, and 4 December 2025 in respect of the third and fourth applicant. The second, third and fourth applicants applied for a rent repayment order for the periods 9.02.2024-8.02.2025.[5]On 28 January 2026, the applicants applied for Ms Maria Sharif to be joined as a respondent, the application was granted and further amended directions were issued. Ms Sharif is referred to as the second respondent in these proceedings. Property Details[6]The property is a converted house comprising 5 individual bedrooms and shared facilities over 2 floors. The ground floor kitchen is shared by all tenants. The ground floor toilet is shared by the 2 bedrooms on that floor. The 1st floor bathroom is shared by the 3 bedrooms on that floor. The converted garage shared by all tenants contains a laundry room and 2 shower cubicles.[7]The Tribunal did not inspection of the property and makes no assumptions about its current condition or regarding the accommodation. The Hearing[8]The hearing of this matter was held at the First Tier Property Tribunal Alfred Place, London. The following parties were in attendance, Ms Helena Murphy pro bono representative and Ms Mariele Locke, Mr Vilhelms Skabardis and Mr Istvan Veres. Ms Nikolina Itlcheva was not in attendance.[9]The Respondent was not in attendance. The Tribunal had also received a request for an adjournment from the Respondent. The grounds upon which the request was made was that the first Respondent lived in Dubai and due to the hostilities in the middle east was unable to secure a flight to return to London. His request was made by email was received by the Tribunal outside of office hours. Preliminary Matters[10]The Tribunal had also received a request for an adjournment/postponement of the hearing, from the Respondent. The grounds upon which the request was made was that the first Respondent lived in Dubai and due to the hostilities in the middle east was unable to secure a flight to return to London. His request was made by email and received by the Tribunal outside of office hours.[11]The Applicant had also made an application for the Respondent to be debarred from presenting new evidence at the hearing on the grounds that the introduction of new evidence would prejudice the Applicant’s case.[12]At the hearing the Applicant’s representative Ms Murphy, was informed by the Tribunal of that the Tribunal would deal with the application for an adjournment as the first issue. Regarding the second issue, the Tribunal received a hearing bundle of 259 pages from the Applicant on 28.11.2025, a copy of the documents had also been sent to the Applicant’s representative.[13]The Tribunal arranged for a copy to be sent to Ms Murphy. After a short adjournment, she indicated that they had been received by Flat Justice, unfortunately they had not been brought to her attention. However, she indicated that she was content to proceed with the hearing, and was not seeking a postponement, and was opposing the respondent’s request for the hearing to be adjourned.[14]She referred to the conduct of the respondent, in seeking an adjournment/postponement at what was in effect the eleventh hour. She noted that the recent conflict was into its 10th day, and that the respondent could have anticipated the need to make such an application at an earlier stage. There was also a second respondent, who had not taken any part in these proceedings to date. She also reminded the Tribunal that the respondent had been very late in complying with directions and as such had tried to delay the proceedings. She asked the Tribunal to take account of these factors and to refuse the application.[15]The Tribunal considered its power to grant a postponement in rule 6 (J) of The Tribunal Procedure (First tier) (Property Chambers) Rules 2013, it also considered rule 3. the overriding objective. In particular Rule 3 2 (a) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties and of the Tribunal;(c) ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings;(e)avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues.[16]The Tribunal noted that of the applicants, all (save one) had attended the hearing, and the applicants were represented and ready to proceed. It noted that the respondent in choosing to ask for an adjournment at this late stage, had put the parties to the expense of attending. It had no evidence of any attempts having been made by the respondent to make himself available for the hearing either prior to or after the recent events in the Middle East.[17]Although a decision to proceed would put the respondent at a disadvantage, there was no information which he could reliably present about how long such a postponement was likely to be. The Tribunal had received written representations from the respondent which it would take into consideration when reaching its decision which would mitigate some of the disadvantage in his not being present. The Decision of the Tribunal on the application for postponement[18]For all the reasons set out above, the Tribunal decided to proceed with the hearing.[19]The Tribunal asked about the joining of Mrs Sherif as the second respondent. The Tribunal was informed that a request had been made in January 2026, and that the second respondent had been given until 29 January 2026 to make any representations that she had about being joined, which she had failed to do. The Tribunal noted that the second respondent had only been given 6 weeks to prepare for the hearing. It asked Ms Murphy to set out her case as to why an order should be made against the second respondent. Relevant Law Section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004 A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing an HMO which is required to be licensed under this Part (see section 61(1)) but is not so licensed. Section 41(1) of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (the 2016 Act) provides: A tenant or a local housing authority may apply to the First-tier Tribunal for a rent repayment order against a person who has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies.(2) A tenant may apply for a rent repayment order only if —(a) the offence relates to housing that, at the time of the offence, was let to the tenant, and (b) the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the application is made. Section 40(5) of the 2016 Act lists 7 categories of offence and offence no 6 refers to Control or management of an unlicensed house. Category 2 refers to eviction or harassment of occupiers. The First-tier Tribunal may make a rent repayment order under Section 43 of the 2016 Act or if satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that a landlord has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies (whether or not the landlord has been convicted). Section 44 of the 2016 Act sets out the amount of order: (1) Where the First-tier Tribunal decides to make a rent repayment order under section 43 in favour of a tenant, the amount is to be determined in accordance with this section. (2) The amount must relate to rent paid during the period mentioned in the table. Under Section 44(4) the Tribunal in determining the amount the tribunal must, in particular take account of (a)the conduct of the landlord and tenant (b) the financial circumstances of the landlord and (c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which this chapter applies The Applicants’ Submissions[20]The Tribunal heard from Ms Murphy who set out the background which was as set out in paragraph 3 of the witness statement of Ms Locke-: “...I first signed my tenancy agreement with Mr Gamil Sherif at his other property, Boston Court Hotel at 26 Upper Berkeley Street, London W1H 7QL. The first two tenancy agreements I signed named Mr Gamil Sherif as the landlord, who passed away in 2023. Subsequent fixed tenancy agreements named Mrs Maria Sherif as the new landlord, the late former landlord’s wife. When Mr Gamil Sherif passed away, all communications regarding the property went through his son, Mr Walid Gamil Sherif and occasionally his widow, Mrs Maria Sherif.”[21]Ms Murphy told us that Ms Locke and Mr Skabardis jointly occupied accommodation and that Ms Locke paid half of the total rent to Mr Skabardis who then paid the rent on their behalf to the landlords. Ms Nikolina Itlcheva also jointly occupied a room and paid rent along with her partner Oleg Penev, however he was not a party to these proceedings. Mr. Veres was solely responsible for his rent. (The amounts are set out further below)[22]Ms Murphy told the Tribunal that following Mr Gamil death on 13 April 2023, the second respondent was named as the landlord in tenancy agreements from 1/07/2023. However, Ms Locke continued to pay her rent to Mr Gamil account until October 2023, when she commenced paying to the second respondent.[23]Letters of administration were granted to Mr Walid Sherif on 6 October 2023. On 5.03.2024 the property was transferred to the first respondent; however, Ms Itlcheva signed a contract with Mrs Sherif named as the landlord.[24]The Tribunal was referred to pages 86 to 145 which provided the Tribunal with details of the rent payments which were made by the applicants. The Tribunal noted that the rent payments which were collected on behalf of the applicants were paid to Mr Gamil, Sherif and then to Mrs Maria Sherif from October 2023.[25]Ms Murphy submitted that throughout the period that Ms Locke occupied the premises there was a maximum of eight occupants, and at least six occupants of the premises which meant that the premises were covered by the mandatory licensing scheme. She submitted that the second respondent was the person who was in control of the premises pursuant to section 263 of the Housing Act 2004, as the second respondent received the ‘rank rent’ for the periods from the 1 June 2023 until the property was transferred to the first respondent.[26]She told the Tribunal that in January 2025, the second respondent sought to evict the applicants from the premises by giving notice in an email, she told the Tribunal that this was directly in retaliation for the tenants refusing a request for the second respondent to move into the premises, as the tenants did not want a residential landlord.[27]As a result of the eviction notice the tenants sought advice from the local authority, who wrote to the occupants on 27 January 2025, informing them that the property was an unlicensed HMO, and that the landlord could not evict them under Section 21, the same letter advised them of their right to apply for a rent repayment order.[28]Civil enforcement action was taken by the LA, and a Civil Penalty Notice was served in July 2025, and the sum of £4500 was paid to the LA.[29]The first respondent applied for a licence on 9 February 2025, which was granted a month later. The condition of the licence was that the premises could be occupied by a maximum of 4 people across three households and that fire safety standards which had been identified as necessary needed to be put in place.[30]Ms Murphy submitted that the main reason that the respondent had applied for a license was to enable the eviction of the tenants.[31]Ms Murphy referred to the Section 249A Housing Act 2004 notice to impose a financial penalty dated 21 May 2025, and the fact that the notice was not appealed and the fact that the penalty was not contested and subsequently paid as proof that the respondent had committed the offence. Given this she submitted that the Tribunal could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.[32]Ms Murphy told us that since the licence was granted the maximum number of people the property was licensed for was 4 people across three households. This meant that prior to the property being licensed it had been overcrowded, the Respondent had also been required to undertake fire safety work which meant that the property had not had fire equipment prior to licensing.[33]Ms Murphy in her submissions, set out how she calculated the rent repayment due to each tenant from each of the named respondents. She helpfully provided the Tribunal with a schedule of her calculations which set out that the total sum claimed for which a rent repayment order was sought was £27,699.70 she set out the sums calculated for each of the applicants in relation to the respondents.[34]She submitted that the Tribunal’s starting point should be 100% of the rent for the period in issue. She referred the Tribunal to Acheampong v Roman 2022 [2022] UKUT and the more recent case of Hancher v David & ORS [2022] UKUT 277 (LC) (Hancher). She told the Tribunal that utilities were included within the rent, however she submitted that the licensing offence was at the higher end of severity as the premises was in poor condition, she referred to Mold growth within the property and the general overcrowding. Ms Murphy referred to the fact that there was no gas safety certificate or installations report, neither had the tenants been given a How to Rent Guide. She also noted that at the beginning of the tenants’ occupancy the landlord had been a professional landlord as he had a 12-bedroom hotel which was operated for profit. She stated that in answer to the respondents’ submissions that they had not known about the need for a licence stated that the landlord had chosen not to use an agency and given this ignorance of the law was not an excuse.[35]She also submitted that the Civil Penalty should not be considered as a factor to reduce the liability of the landlord. She further stated that there had been a degree of vindictiveness in the decision to seek to evict the tenants, who had informed the landlord that they were unwilling to consent to the second respondent occupying the property.[36]Ms Murphy rejected the submissions that the breach was at the lower end and given this, she did not consider that this was akin to the situation in Hallet –v- Parker [2022] UKUT 165 where the culpability of the respondent was at the lower end.[37]She accepted that the Tribunal had a discretion to deduct for utilities, however she submitted that the Tribunal should not make deductions.[38]Ms Murphy submitted that Vadamalayan and Stewart (2020) UKUT 183 was the starting point of authority that the full rent paid was the starting point for the repayment order, and that the point of an order was to serve as a deterrent and to have a punitive effect on the landlord. She submitted that in acknowledging the Seriousness of the offense there ought to be an element of punitiveness to serve as a deterrent to irresponsible landlords.[39]In respect of fees paid by the claimant for the hearing, she requested that the sum of £341.00 be awarded to the Applicant for the hearing and application fee. Submissions of the Respondent[40]Although neither of the respondents were present at the hearing, and the Tribunal had declined the application on behalf of the first respondent to adjourn the hearing and no reasons had been advanced by the second respondent for her non- attendance, the Tribunal carefully considered the documents which had been provided by the first respondent in support of his case.[41]In his written submissions Mr Sheriff set out as follows-: “Although I accept that the property did not have an HMO licence during part of the period claimed, I respectfully submit that I had a reasonable excuse within the meaning of s.72(5) because: ● I did not acquire ownership or legal responsibility for the property until March 2024, nine months into the period claimed. ● The occupation at the property was a legacy arrangement inherited from my late father, who passed away in April 2023. ● I live abroad and have done so for over 15 years; I had no involvement in nor knowledge of the day-to-day arrangements at the property. ● I held a genuine misunderstanding of the licensing requirement, which I explained to the Council in my formal representations dated 1 June 2025. ● As soon as the Council notified me of the requirement, I immediately applied for the licence and paid the civil penalty without dispute.”[42]He submitted that under Section 263 of the Housing Act, during the period 1 June 2023 to 31 May 2024, he was not the person defined as “having control” of the premises as he was neither the legal owner, manager, or the person receiving rent.[43]He further submitted that-: “My only involvement was paying occasional water bills, which does not meet the statutory definition of control or management. Therefore, the requirements for an offence under s.72(1) is not met, and I respectfully submit that I did not commit the offence.”[44]He further submitted that he was informed that Ms Locke left the property on 3 June 2024, he therefore queried the accuracy of the information provided by her and stated that her application for a rent repayment order was out of time.[45]He further submitted that there had been a lack of complaints concerning the condition of the property during the applicants’ occupancy of the premises. and that her application for a rent repayment order was out of time.[46]Within his bundle the Tribunal were provided with the documents concerning his application for licence, the terms upon which the licence was granted and the calculations made by the LA in imposing the fine. Which it stated was a medium offence as there was no previous history of contravention and the failure to licence occurred in circumstances were the responsibility was a shared one. The level of fine imposed was £5000.00.[47]The Respondent had also provided bank statements, and copies of utility bills concerning the premises. The Applicant’s reply to the respondent’s submissions[48]Ms Murphy on behalf of the Applicant’s in the Applicant’s reply set out that during the periods after Mr Gamil Sheriff died 13 April 2023, the second respondent was appointed to administer the estate in October 2023. She submits that during the relevant rent payment period 1.06.23 until October 2023 rent continued to be paid into the account of Mr Sheriff until October 2023 when rent was paid directly to the second respondent.[49]In the Applicants’ reply it was stated as follows-: The "Immediate Landlord" Rule: under the Supreme Court decision in Rakusen v Jepsen, a Rent Repayment Order (RRO) can only be made against the immediate landlord of the tenant at the time the offence was committed, which is the person legally entitled to receive the rent. 2. Liability Upon Death: when a landlord dies, their legal responsibilities and assets vest in their estate. As demonstrated in Cobb v Jahanghir, an RRO application concerning a deceased landlord correctly proceeds against their estate, acting through their personal representative (in this case, R2 as the administrator). 3. Agents and Rent Collection: if rent is paid to an agent or a family member acting on behalf of the legal landlord, the legal landlord remains the correct respondent. In Cabo v Dezotti, the Upper Tribunal confirmed that where a family member's company collected the rent on behalf of the property owner, the property owner remained the immediate landlord liable for the RRO, 4. Rent Paid to a Deceased Person: payments made into Mr Gamil Sherif's bank account after his death on 13/04/2023 legally belong to his estate, which is administered by R2. Tribunal Decision Whether an offence has been committed by the respondent?[50]The Tribunal in reaching its decision considered whether it found that the offence under Section 40(3) of the Housing and planning Act was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and if so,(i) Whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to make a rent repayment order.(ii) Determination of the amount of any order.[51]The Tribunal in reaching its decision was satisfied on the evidence before it that the offence had been committed beyond a reasonable doubt. In reaching this decision it considered that the first respondent had made an admission that the offence had been committed and had paid a financial penalty in accordance with Section 249 A of the HA. Given this the Tribunal is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offence has been committed. Whether an order should be made against the second respondent?[52]The Tribunal at the hearing indicated that although permission had been granted to join the second respondent in the Tribunal’s opinion there was still an issue to determine concerning the addition of the second respondent. It noted that she had been added as a respondent to these proceedings on 28 January 2026. given this, it considered that the first issue was whether it had jurisdiction to make an order against the second respondent on the date that the applicant applied to join her to the existing proceedings.[53]The Tribunal in reaching its decision considered Section. 41 (2) (b) of the 2016 Act which prescribes a 12 months’ limitation period for applications for rent repayments orders by providing that a tenant may apply for a rent repayment order only if the relevant offence “was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the application was made”. The original application was made on 21 May 2025, in respect of the periods 1.06.23 to 31.05.2024.[54]However, the second respondent was not named in these proceedings, neither was the application brought against the deceased landlord’s estate. The Tribunal has asked whether the respondent could merely be added to the existing claim. It finds that for this to occur the offence would at the time the application was made have to have been committed in the period of 12 months preceding the application to amend to add the second respondent. However, when the amendment was made it was outside the prescribed limitation period. Given this the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend the limitation period. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that in respect of the rent repayment period for the first Applicant, the relevant period was 6 October 2023, when letters of administration were granted to the first respondent until 31 May 2024 when she left the premises. However, the Applicant had not sought an order against the personal representatives of the Respondent. The decision as to whether to make an order against the second respondent?[55]Accordingly, the Tribunal has dismissed the application for an order against the second respondent and has noted that the only other respondent in these proceedings is the first respondent. Whether to make an order against the second respondent[56]The Tribunal next considered whether to make an order against the first respondent who had conceded that the property was not licensed, it noted that in his submissions he referred to the fact that he was unaware of the need to license the property. However, the Tribunal noted that the respondent had letters of administration granted on 6 October 2023, however he did not apply for a licence until May 2025. Given this the Tribunal consider that had sufficient time to license the property after he became the person responsible. Given this the Tribunal does not accept that the respondent had a reasonable excuse under Section 72 (5) of the HA. Accordingly, the Tribunal consider that it is reasonable to make a rent repayment order.[57]The Tribunal also reminded itself of the law which had been referred to above and the case law referred to by the applicants. The Tribunal noted that the starting point was the maximum rent that had been paid, however the Tribunal noted that it had an obligation to exercise its discretion in the making of an order.[58]The Tribunal also had regard to the cases referred to, the fact that the landlord was the landlord of a single property. It noted that there had been a lack of evidence of complaints about the condition of the property during the applicants’ tenancy and that the applicants had long standing tenancies at the property.[59]Although the Applicants’ representative Ms Murphy stated in her submissions that the property had only been licensed to enable the tenants to be evicted and that the eviction was motivated by vindictiveness. However, the Tribunal has noted that the respondent had to complied with the licensing requirement and given this the Tribunal does not consider that the subsequent eviction of the tenants is an aggravating factor, as it was necessary for the respondent to undertake work and reduce the occupancy to license the property.[60]The Tribunal reminded itself of the purpose of the licensing regime and noted that although in its view it would not characterize the respondent as a rogue landlord, He was responsible for ensuring that he had complied with any requirements to license the property prior to embarking on renting the property.[61]The Tribunal considered that it is appropriate to make an order which marks the seriousness of the offence which has been committed by the landlord in failing to apply for a licence for the periods in issue. The Determination of the amount of order?[62]The Tribunal next considered the level of rent repayment order to make; it took account of the utility bills which were payable by the respondent for the period in issue and the mitigation set out by the respondent in his written documents. whether to make deductions for the utilities, it considered that rather than breaking this down separately it would make a percentage deduction to take account of all of the factors it decided to make an order in the sum of 75% of the rent which was payable for each of the Applicants for the periods for which an order can be made.[63]For the first applicant the applicable period is March 2024- until May 2024[64]For the second, third and fourth applicants for the period 9 June 2024 to 9 February 2025. The Tribunal has determined to make an order for 75% of the rent that was payable during that period.[65]The sums payable for each of the applicants is as set out below-:[66]The Tribunal makes an order in respect of reimbursement of the hearing and application fees in the sum of £340.00. Signed: Judge Daley Dated: 29 April 2026 Right to Appeal[67]If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the Regional office which has been dealing with the case.[68]The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application.[69]If the application is not made within the 28-day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28-day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit.[70]The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e., give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking.