25 Carrol Close, London NW5 1TF LON/00AG/HBA/2025/0006
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)
Case No LON/00AG/HBA/2025/0006
Between
The London Borough of CamdenApplicantLondon Living Group Limited (1) (“the First Respondent”) and Mr Alvaro Odeh Torro (2) (“the Second Respondent”)Respondent
Before
Judge P Korn
Members
Ms R Kershaw BScStephen Evans of Counsel instructed by London Borough of Camden Legal Department for the Applicantby Adco Legal representing the Second Respondent only for the RespondentDate 7 July 2026Hearing 2026-05-18Property: 25 Carrol Close, London NW5 1TFType of application: Application for a Banning Order – section 15(1) of the Housing and Planning Act 2016
DECISION
Description of hearing This was a face-to-face hearing. Decisions of the tribunal[1]The tribunal declines to make a banning order against either of the Respondents.[2]The tribunal refuses the Applicant’s cost application made under paragraph 13(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013. Introduction[1]The Applicant has applied for a banning order for a period of 5 years against each of the Respondents under section 15(1) of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (“the 2016 Act”).[2]The relevant parts of sections 14 to 17 of the 2016 Act read as follows: Section 14 (1) In this Part “banning order” means an order, made by the First-tier Tribunal, banning a person from – (a) letting housing in England, (b) engaging in English letting agency work, (c) engaging in English property management work, or (d) doing two or more of those things.[3]In this Part “banning order offence” means an offence of a description specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State. Section 15 (1) A local housing authority in England may apply for a banning order against a person who has been convicted of a banning order offence. (3) Before applying for a banning order under subsection (1), the authority must give the person a notice of intended proceedings – (a) informing the person that the authority is proposing to apply for a banning order and explaining why, (b) stating the length of each proposed ban, and (c) inviting the person to make representations within a period specified in the notice of not less than 28 days (“the notice period”).[4]The authority must consider any representations made during the notice period.[5]The authority must wait until the notice period has ended before applying for a banning order.[6]A notice of intended proceedings may not be given after the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which the person was convicted of the offence to which the notice relates. Section 16(1) The First-tier Tribunal may make a banning order against a person who – (a) has been convicted of a banning offence order, and (b) was a residential landlord or a property agent at the time the offence was committed (but see subsection (3)).(2) a banning order may only be made on an application by a local housing authority in England that has complied with section 15.(3) Where an application is made under section 15(1) against an officer of a body corporate, the First-tier Tribunal may make a banning order against the officer even if the condition in subsection (1)(b) of this section is not met.(4) In deciding whether to make a banning order against a person, and in deciding what order to make, the Tribunal must consider – (a) the seriousness of the offence of which the person has been convicted, (b) any previous convictions that the person has for a banning order offence, (c) whether the person is or has at any time been included in the database of rogue landlords and property agents, and (d) the likely effect of the banning order on the person and anyone else who may be affected by the order. Section 17 (1) A banning order must specify the length of each ban imposed by the order. (2) A ban must last at least 12 months. (3) A banning order may contain exceptions to a ban for some or all of the period to which the ban relates and the exceptions may be subject to conditions. (4) A banning order may, for example, contain exceptions – (a) to deal with cases where there are existing tenancies and the landlord does not have the power to bring them to an immediate end, or (b) to allow letting agents to wind down current business.[3]The issues for the tribunal to consider are set out in the above sections of the 2016 Act.[4]It became apparent at the start of the hearing that, having previously been a director of the First Respondent, the Second Respondent was no longer a director of the First Respondent and was therefore unable to instruct anyone to act for the First Respondent. After a brief adjournment to enable Mr Khan to clarify the position, Mr Khan advised the tribunal that neither he nor his instructing solicitors had been instructed by the First Respondent and that therefore the First Respondent was unrepresented at the hearing. Nobody else with authority to speak on behalf of the First Respondent was in attendance at the hearing and the tribunal had not received any request for a postponement on behalf of the First Respondent. In the circumstances, the tribunal decided to proceed without the First Respondent being either represented or present.[5]At the start of the hearing Mr Khan also confirmed the extent of the dispute between the Applicant and the Second Respondent. The Second Respondent accepted that(a) he had been convicted of one or more banning order offences,(b) the Applicant had complied with section 15 of the 2016 Act and(c) the Second Respondent fell within the categories of person against whom a banning order could in principle be made under sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 16 of the 2016 Act. The points in dispute were therefore (i) whether the tribunal should make a banning order and (ii) if the tribunal was minded to make a banning order, what the terms of the order should be. Applicant’s written case[6]In his witness statement, Mr Jack Kane, Operations Manager, states that the banning order application relates to offences committed at two properties within the London Borough of Camden, namely 25 Carrol Close NW5 1TF and Flat B, 68-70 Falkland Road NW5 2XA. The Second Respondent was the sole director of the First Respondent when the First Respondent committed the relevant offences.[7]Both properties were licensed Houses in Multiple Occupation, with the leasehold owners of each property being the licence holders and the First Respondent instructed as managing agent. On 5 September 2024 the Second Respondent was convicted of the following three banning order offence after pleading guilty to all offences at the Magistrates Court:(i) offence committed between 31 October 2022 and 2 February 2023 at 25 Carrol Close under section 72(2) of the Housing Act 2004;(ii) offence committed on or about 3 March 2023 under section 238(1) of the Housing Act 2004; and(iii) offence committed on or about 31 May 2023, at Flat B, 68-70 Falkland Road under section 72(2) of the Housing Act 2004.[8]On 5 September 2024 the First Respondent was convicted of the following five banning order offences after pleading guilty to all offences at the Magistrates Court:(i) offence committed between 31 October 2022 and 2 February 2023 at 25 Carrol Close under section 72(2) of the Housing Act 2004;(ii) two offences committed on or about 2 February 2023 at 25 Carrol Close under section 234(3) of the Housing Act 2004;(iii) offence committed on or about 21 February 2023 under section 238(1) of the Housing Act 2004; and(iv) offence committed on or about 31 May 2023 at Flat B, 68-70 Falkland Road under section 72(2) of the Housing Act 2004.[9]In addition to the above convictions both the Second Respondent and another company (Alterna Ltd) for which he was the sole director had also been subject to previous enforcement action under the Housing Act 2004 taken by the London Borough of Camden in respect of offences committed at a further five properties. Following the convictions of both Respondents for banning order offences in September 2024, a report was prepared and submitted to the Applicant’s Director of Housing Support Services for consideration in line with the Applicant’s banning order policy, and reference was also had to the MHCLG guidance on Banning Orders.[10]The Applicant considers that the Second Respondent and associated persons had full knowledge of the conditions at both properties and of their legal obligations under housing legislation. This was not a case of misunderstanding or lack of capacity, but one in which the Second Respondent chose to commit these offences despite being aware of the legislative requirements placed upon him.[11]The Applicant has made written submissions on(a) the seriousness of the offences of which each Respondent has been convicted,(b) any previous convictions that each Respondent has for a banning order offence,(c) whether the Respondent is or has at any time been included in the database of rogue landlords and property agents (pursuant to section 30 of the 2016 Act) and(d) the likely effect of the banning order on the Respondent and anyone else who may be affected by the order.[12]As to the seriousness of the offences, the MHCLG guidance states that all banning order offences are serious and that the local housing authority should consider the sentence(s) imposed by the court. The Upper Tribunal in Knapp v Bristol CC [2023] UKUT 118 (LC) stated that the tribunal is entitled to give such weight as it sees fit to the level of fines imposed by the magistrates. In this case the First Respondent was fined a total of £29,250 for five offences and the Second Respondent was fined a total of £13,950 for three offences. The licensing offences concerned breaches of licence conditions and included (amongst other things) placing two occupiers in undersized rooms and fire safety defects over a sustained period. The Applicant submits that the evidence reveals a systematic and deliberate attempt to fail to comply with the law, and a lack of due care to the tenants in the properties. Mr Kane also contends that the provision of false and misleading information to the investigating officer was a deliberate attempt to hinder the Applicant’s investigation.[13]As regards any previous convictions, Mr Kane refers to a background of:(i) prosecutions against another company (Alterna Ltd) of which the Second Respondent is/was the sole director in 2017 for offences under the Housing Act 2004 concerning residential premises,(ii) Civil Penalty Notices in 2021 and 2022 served on Alterna Ltd in relation to 3 other residential properties and(iii) a Rent Repayment Order made in 2022 against Alterna Ltd on the grounds of unlawful eviction from one of the above. The Applicant submits that banning order convictions, whether they are spent or not at the time of the hearing, may be relevant to the exercise of the discretion to make a banning order and that the tribunal is entitled to admit evidence of spent convictions and therefore to open up the possibility of a banning order being made on the basis of such convictions: see Hussain v LB Newham [2023] UKUT 287 (LC).[14]As to whether the Respondents are or have at any time been included in the database of rogue landlords and property agents (pursuant to section 30 of the 2016 Act), the Applicant states that it is not aware of their being on such a database.[15]As to the likely effect of the banning order, the MCHLG guidance requires the tribunal to consider(a) harm caused to any tenants,(b) the need to punish the offender;(c) the need to deter the offender and(d) the need to deter others. Given that in the Applicant’s submission previous convictions, civil penalties and a rent repayment order have not changed the Second Respondent’s behaviour, the Applicant’s hope is that the banning order will make him transfer management to a professional managing agent on a long-term basis. A banning order would also arguably act as a deterrent to others and prevent him from letting property in poor condition to others.[16]There are contingency plans for any homeless tenants as can be seen from Mr Kane’s witness statement. The harm caused to tenants in this case includes two undersized rooms in each property, damaged fire doors, windows not closing properly and defects in provision of ventilation in Carrol Close. Correspondence shows that occupiers experienced instability, uncertainty and distress not only from the physical conditions but also the manner in which the properties were managed as per Mr Kane’s witness statement. The Applicant’s proposed draft order allows 6 months for the Respondents to make arrangements for different agents.[17]As for any other factors, the Applicant states that the tribunal is not limited to the statutory factors: see LB Redbridge v Cikanavicius (LON//00BC/HBA/2020/0007) at paragraph 61 and therefore it can in its discretion take into account(a) the fact that the Second Respondent gave an undertaking he would not oppose any application for a banning order,(b) that the Second Respondent’s evidence reveals in the Applicant’s submission a less than full and frank admission of the commission of the offences, despite late guilty pleas. Second Respondent’s written case[18]The Second Respondent asserts that a banning order would be disproportionate, unnecessary, and unfairly prejudicial to a substantial number of existing tenants who are not concerned with the historic matters relied upon by the Applicant. In addition, he does not accept that the broad characterisations used in the Applicant’s notices justify the exceptional step of a banning order in the present circumstances.[19]The Second Respondent currently manages a number of occupied properties, as follows:(a) Fenner Square – 4 tenants;(b) Pennyford Court – 4 tenants;(c) Manor House – 6 tenants;(d) Queensgate Terrace – 36 tenants;(e) Ampthill Road – 7 tenants; and(f) Smithdown Road – 7 tenants. He also manages around 20 properties of different sizes across Islington, Kensington, Westminster and Liverpool. There are numerous ‘live’ tenancies across the properties presently managed by him and/or his business, and a banning order would have immediate and serious consequences for a significant number of current occupiers. Those occupiers would face uncertainty, disruption to their housing arrangements and the practical difficulties associated with any transfer of management or relocation.[20]The Second Respondent submits that the present application should be viewed in the context of the overall scale and duration of his business over approximately 12 years. During that period, he has managed a substantial number of tenancies. More than 1,000 tenancies have been granted, with only a very small number of disputes in comparison to the overall volume of lettings. His business records also show 971 closed tenancies recorded on the relevant platform. Since 2014, he and the First Respondent have managed over 1,500 tenancies, properties were inspected monthly with written and photographic records, there were less than a handful of complaints over that period, and no other local authority has issued proceedings against either of the Respondents. That history is important in his submission because it demonstrates that the matters relied upon by the Applicant concern a limited number of incidents within the context of a longstanding and substantial lettings operation.[21]In relation to the allegation concerning an undersized room, he states that he did not know at the time that the room was undersized and neither he nor the First Respondent was the licence holder. In relation to the allegation that false or misleading information was provided, any incorrect information was not provided deliberately or dishonestly and there was no intention to mislead. In relation to the allegation that sham licences were used, he agrees that licences were issued but this was not with any intention to evade or reduce the legal protections afforded to occupiers.[22]In relation to the Falkland Road property, permission was given for storage of belongings and not for residential occupation. In relation to allegations concerning matters such as fire doors and extractor fans, he does not accept that the Applicant’s allegations were supported by proper technical evidence and in his view some of the alleged defects were matters of opinion.[23]The Second Respondent states that the existence of a banning order offence conviction is only a statutory gateway to the possibility of making a banning order; it is not determinative. In other words, it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for these proceedings that there is a conviction for a banning order offence. This is clear from the wording of section 16 of the 2016 Act (the tribunal “may” make a banning order) and from the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Knapp v Bristol City Council UKUT 118 (LC) at [41].[24]The Second Respondent submits that the very fact that the offences committed by the Respondents are serious - which is not in dispute - is not the benchmark for the making of a banning order. Rather, the tribunal has to consider whether there is something about the offences in question that elevates their seriousness so as to justify the making of a banning order. Banning orders are not run-of-the-mill matters, and the MHCLG guidance makes clear that they are expected to be pursued against the most serious offenders. That must be right, states the Second Respondent, because a banning order is, self-evidently, a draconian measure.[25]There have been fines imposed on the Respondents, but the tribunal has considerable latitude when placing weight on the level of fine. Given that the Respondents entered guilty pleas, the Second Respondent submits that the seriousness of the offences should not be solely determined by the level of fine but should also take into account the full context.[26]The Second Respondent’s submits that there is a difference between non-compliance with regulations from a position of innocent negligence (which he states is the case here) as compared with breaches that are compounded by aggravating features.[27]The Second Respondent argues that banning orders are intended to crack down on rogue landlords: see, for example, the tribunal’s decision in Newcastle City Council v Johnson (MAN/00CJ/HBS/2022/0003, FTT Property Chamber - Residential Property, 13 June 2023) at paragraph 36, and he is not a rogue landlord. As for the harm done to tenants by reason of the offences, the Second Respondent no longer manages the properties which are the subject of the banning order offences. In those circumstances, further harm to those specific tenants is not foreseeable. And in circumstances where no other local housing authority has pursued action against the Respondents, prospective harm to tenants by reason of further breaches is nothing more than speculative. Follow-up by Applicant[28]In response, Mr Kane notes that the MHCLG Banning Order guidance states it is expected that local authorities will pursue a banning order for the most serious offenders and he asserts that the Second Respondent certainly fits that criterion. The scale of his offending has impacted numerous tenants at each of the properties where it has occurred. As such the making the of the banning order is both proportionate and necessary to reflect the seriousness and scale of offending and protect tenants.[29]Mr Kane adds that previous enforcement action and the sheer number of previous convictions and financial penalties against the Second Respondent and his companies render the banning order necessary. Despite the Applicant using all enforcement tools available to it in respect of the Second Respondent, he continued to commit serious offences at numerous properties which severely impacted the lives of numerous tenants. No written submissions from First Respondent[30]The tribunal has not received any written submissions on behalf of the First Respondent. The hearing Initial statements[31]At the hearing, Mr Evans for the Applicant took the tribunal through the list of offences that had been committed by the Respondents. He also referred to an undertaking given by the Second Respondent not to oppose a banning order in relation to the London Borough of Camden.[32]Mr Evans confirmed that it was accepted that there was no evidence of either Respondent being on the rogue landlord database.[33]Mr Khan for the Second Respondent noted that the tribunal had a wide discretion but that it needed to be satisfied that such a draconian order was justified. He submitted that the Second Respondent was not a rogue landlord and had a long history of letting out property, most of which had been fine. Furthermore, the last offence was back in 2023 and the Second Respondent was a diligent property agent as regards the condition of his various properties. Mr Kane’s evidence[34]In cross-examination Mr Kane described the Second Respondent’s offending as systematic and said that there had been offending at 7 different properties. He did not accept that the overcrowding was an oversight on the Second Respondent’s part. But he did accept that allowing someone to occupy an undersized room for a limited amount of time due to having a resident who overextended their stay and defaulted in their rent payment could potentially amount to a mitigating circumstance.[35]Mr Kane accepted that he had no evidence of enforcement against the Respondents by other local housing authorities. But when asked about works that the Second Respondent had carried out to the Property Mr Kane said that he had only carried out those works because the Applicant had raised issues.[36]In relation to the photographs of the Property in the Applicant’s hearing bundle, it was put to Mr Kane that the condition of the Property seemed good, to which Mr Kane said that he had seen better and he had seen worse. As to whether the photographs showed obvious breaches, Mr Kane said that there were fire safety issues which had not been dealt with.[37]Mr Kane accepted that the Second Respondent had not committed any offences in Camden since 2023 but said that this was simply because he no longer operated in Camden. Second Respondent’s evidence[38]The Second Respondent accepted that he had initially pleaded not guilty to certain offences in the Magistrates’ Court and had later pleaded guilty, but he said that this was because initially he was negotiating with the Applicant. He also said that he had been following his solicitor’s advice at the time.[39]Regarding his undertaking that he would not oppose any application for a banning order, he accepted that he might have given this undertaking in order to get a reduced fine in the Magistrates Court.[40]The Second Respondent confirmed that the First Respondent operated a rent-to-rent scheme at the Property with Mrs Patel, who was the leasehold owner and licence holder, although he accepted that as a director of the First Respondent at the relevant time he did not ask to see her lease or her licence. On the Fulton Road property, again he had not seen a copy of the licence. He said that he asked for a copy of the Fulton Road licence but accepted that he had not followed up when he had not received them. He added that he did not appreciate at the time that he could be committing a criminal offence.[41]In relation to the Falkland Road property, he said that he had not been letting out the relevant room as a residential space but rather just for storage, and even this was only as a gesture of goodwill.[42]In relation to the issues with fire doors, he did not accept that there were any problems with fire doors and said that the fire doors closed perfectly well. Closing statement – Applicant[43]Mr Evans said that there was a 7 month period of offending in relation to two separate properties. In addition, he noted that Alterna Ltd, a company of which the Second Respondent was a director, was successfully prosecuted in 2017 for a failure to license a property in Kentish Town Road and then the Second Respondent was convicted of the same offence on other properties in 2022 and 2023, indicating that he had not learnt his lesson.[44]Although the Second Respondent was not on the national rogue landlord database, Mr Evans noted – when the point was raised during the course of the hearing – that the Second Respondent was on the London rogue landlord database. Mr Evans also said that there was no evidence that the Second Respondent would struggle financially if a banning order was made against him nor that anyone else was financially dependent on him. He had not learnt from previous punishments and therefore a stronger deterrent was needed. There was also evidence of a risk of harm that would be caused by the Second Respondent continuing to manage property, for example the damaged fire doors. Mr Evans added that there was a lack of contrition in the Second Respondent’s witness statement. Closing statement – Second Respondent[45]Mr Khan said that the Second Respondent had been very candid about the offences of which he had been convicted and about his guilty pleas.[46]He added that a banning order is a draconian penalty and that on the evidence before the tribunal the Second Respondent had not been a serious enough offender to warrant such a penalty.[47]There was some evidence before the tribunal of the Second Respondent having carried out work to improve the condition of the properties for which he was responsible, and therefore he had been taking an active approach. He noted that the Second Respondent managed a large number of properties and said that there was no evidence of there being problems in relation to any of his other properties. Nor was there evidence of any problems since 2023, and therefore there was no evidence of a need to constrain his behaviour. Tribunal’s analysis[48]The convictions on the part of the First Respondent on which the Applicant relies are the following:• knowingly permitted another person to occupy the Property, that occupation resulting in the Property being occupied by more persons than was authorised by the licence;• failing to take safety measures and ensure that all means of escape from fire in the Property were maintained in good order and repair, there being disrepair to the fire doors protecting the means of escape;• without reasonable excuse failed to ensure that all common parts of the Property were maintained in good and clean decorative repair, in particular the kitchen extractor fan being so noisy that the occupants could not reasonably be expected to use it;• supplying false or misleading information in answer to a document request made by the Applicant in connection with its functions under the Housing Act 2004 knowing or being reckless as to whether it was false or misleading; and• knowingly permitting another person to occupy Flat B, 68-70 Falkland Road, London, NW5 2XA, that occupation resulting in the property being occupied by more persons than was authorised by the licence.[49]The convictions on the part of the Second Respondent on which the Applicant relies are the following:• knowingly permitted another person to occupy the Property, that occupation resulting in the Property being occupied by more persons than was authorised by the licence;• supplying false or misleading information, namely rental receipts totalling £16,288.00 to the Applicant in connection with its functions under the Housing Act 2004 knowing or being reckless as to whether it was false or misleading; and• knowingly permitting another person to occupy Flat B, 68-70 Falkland Road, London, NW5 2XA, that occupation resulting in the property being occupied by more households than was authorised by the licence.[50]The issues for the tribunal to consider include:(i) whether the Applicant has given each of the Respondents a Notice of Intended Proceedings in compliance with section 15 of the 2016 Act and whether it has otherwise complied with the procedural requirements of that section;(ii) whether each of the Respondents has been convicted of a banning order offence;(iii) whether, at the time the offence was committed, each Respondent was a ‘residential landlord’ or a ‘property agent’; and(iv) whether to make a banning order (and, if so, what order to make) having regard to the matters set out in section 16(4) of the 2016 Act and the MHCLG Guidance.[51]There is no dispute between the Applicant and the Second Respondent on points (i) to (iii) above; the Second Respondent accepts that the Applicant has complied with (i) above, that he has been convicted of one or more banning order offences and that he was a ‘residential landlord’ or a ‘property agent’. The First Respondent has made no submissions, and the tribunal is satisfied on the basis of the evidence before it that the tests set out in (i) to (iii) above has been met in relation to each of the Respondents.[52]The issue is therefore, in the light of the tests in (i) and (iii) above having been met, whether to make a banning order and, if so, on what terms.[53]Under section 16(4) of the 2016 Act, in deciding whether to make a banning order against a person the tribunal must consider –(a) the seriousness of the offence of which the person has been convicted,(b) any previous convictions that the person has for a banning order offence,(c) whether the person is or has at any time been included in the database of rogue landlords and property agents, and(d) the likely effect of the banning order on the person and anyone else who may be affected by the order.[54]Dealing first with the Second Respondent, the offences relied on comprise(a) permitting an extra person to occupy the Carrol Close property and an extra person to occupy the Falkland Road property and(b) supplying false or misleading information on rent receipts knowing that it was or being reckless as to whether it was false or misleading. It is for the tribunal to assess how serious those offences are in the context of a potential banning order.[55]In Knapp v Bristol CC [2023] UKUT 118 (LC), the Upper Tribunal stated that tribunal is entitled to give such weight as it sees fit to the level of fines imposed by the magistrates, and in this case the Second Respondent was fined £13,950 in total for 3 offences.[56]Previous convictions must also be taken into account. The Applicant has identified prosecutions against another company (Alterna Ltd) of which the Second Respondent was the sole director for Housing Act 2004 offences concerning residential premises, Civil Penalty Notices in 2021 and 2022 served on Alterna Ltd in relation to 3 other residential properties, and a Rent Repayment Order made in 2022 against Alterna Ltd on the grounds of unlawful eviction.[57]As to whether the Second Respondent is on the database of rogue landlords and property agents, he is not on the national database and until the date of the hearing both parties were proceeding on the basis that he was not on any rogue landlord database. However, seemingly by chance, during the course of the hearing the Applicant stumbled upon the fact or belief that the Second Respondent is on a London rogue landlord database.[58]As to the likely effect of a ban, there is some evidence that it would inconvenience the Second Respondent’s existing property occupiers, although this is a point that can be addressed by building in a time lag to the full operation of the ban, something that the Applicant has recognised would be sensible and has proposed. Such a time lag would not erase that inconvenience but it would lessen it. As regards the effect on the Second Respondent personally, necessarily a ban would adversely impact on him but the issue here is whether the impact would be so severe that the ban would represent an unfair or a disproportionate punishment.[59]The other element of the effect of a ban is whether it would achieve a legitimate purpose. MCHLG guidance states that a ban – including the length of any such ban – should ensure that it has a real economic impact on the offender and demonstrate the consequences of not complying with their responsibilities. The guidance also states that the tribunal should consider the harm caused to occupiers, and as well as considering the inconvenience that may be caused to occupiers by imposing a ban it is right that the tribunal should also consider the effect on occupiers of not imposing a ban. In other words, will the ban protect occupiers from likely continuing poor behaviour by someone who has already committed a number of banning order offences.[60]Turning back the seriousness of the offence or offences, the MHCLG Guidance makes very clear that banning orders are aimed at the worst offending landlords and property agents who behave egregiously and rent out unsafe and substandard accommodation. The offences in this case relate to the two instances of knowingly permitting another person to occupy a property resulting in the property being occupied by more persons than authorised by the licence and supplying false or misleading information in respect of rental receipts knowing the information to be false or misleading or being reckless as to whether it was false or misleading.[61]Whilst all criminal offences are by their nature serious and whilst the offences committed had the potential to have an impact on housing safety, we do not consider these offences to be at or near the top end of offending. In addition, whilst this is not a defence to the relevant offences themselves, the evidence indicates that the Second Respondent may have been unaware of the terms of the property licences and therefore that his breach of those licences might not have been deliberate. As for the aggregate fine imposed on the Second Respondent, neither party has made detailed submissions as to the relationship between the aggregate fine and the seriousness of the offences. In our view, £13,950 is a significant amount but is not so high as to demonstrate that these offences were committed in a particularly egregious manner such that one could reasonably conclude that the Second Respondent’s actions were particularly worthy of a banning order.[62]Specifically in relation to the points made by the Applicant on fire safety, these points were discussed at the hearing and the tribunal was directed towards some photographs in the hearing bundle. The photographs seen by the tribunal indicated an acceptable property condition or at least were not indicative of poor condition, and whilst there may have been some fire safety issues there was a factual dispute between the parties on this point and the Applicant did not present compelling evidence that there had been serious fire safety issues.[63]As for undersized rooms being occupied, whilst the Second Respondent did not come across particularly well at the hearing it is possible that his level of culpability was less than suggested by the Applicant, for example because he was allowing someone to use a room either for storage or temporarily as a favour.[64]We accept that to some extent the previous convictions add to a feeling of a wider pattern of offending and we also note that in relation to the offences committed by the First Respondent the Second Respondent was a director of the First Respondent at the relevant time, which is a further aggravating factor. However, the nature of each of these offences is such that again they are not at or near the top end of offences. In addition, and whilst it is accepted that we do not have detailed knowledge or much objective information on the Second Respondent’s other properties, it does appear to be the case that he had management responsibilities in relation to many other properties in respect of which we are not aware of there having been any problems. If the offences relied on had been of a higher (or maybe better phrased as an ‘even’ higher level of seriousness) then the point about the Second Respondent’s other properties would be of less relevance, but in the context of the level of seriousness of the offences relied on by the Applicant we consider that some weight can be attached to this point.[65]The Applicant has invited the tribunal to take into account(a) the fact that the Second Respondent gave an undertaking he would not oppose any application for a banning order and(b) that the Second Respondent’s evidence reveals in the Applicant’s submission a less than full and frank admission of the commission of the offences, despite late guilty pleas. First of all, it is accepted that the tribunal can take into account any factors in addition to those specifically listed by the legislation if it considers it appropriate to do so. In relation to the Second Respondent’s undertaking, that undertaking was limited to not opposing a ban in Camden rather than a national ban, and we can see why the Second Respondent may well have felt in the context of proceedings in the Magistrates Court that it would be tactically prudent to offer not to operate within Camden for a period of time. In addition, the evidence indicates that the Second Respondent did in practice cease to operate in Camden.[66]In relation to the point about the Second Respondent’s less than full and frank admission, the impression given by the Second Respondent based on the papers and the hearing is of someone who will make whatever decision he considers to be in his best interests at the time, whether because he has been advised to say or not to say something by his solicitor or whether for some other reason. In some ways this may not seem a very honourable approach, but we do not consider it to be a significant aggravating factor in the specific context of whether to take the draconian step of imposing a banning order on him.[67]Regarding the rogue landlord issue, the Applicant’s pleaded case is that the Second Respondent is not on any rogue landlord database, and the statement at the hearing that he is or was on a London-wide rogue landlord database needs to be treated with caution, particularly as the Second Respondent did not have an opportunity to consider the point and its implications and because a banning order is such a draconian remedy.[68]All relevant factors need to be considered together, but in our view the stand-out point here is that only three offences have been relied on by the Applicant and they are not at the serious end compared to other offences which potentially endanger occupiers more. Occupiers do need to be protected from landlords and property agents, but it would in our view be disproportionate to protect future occupiers from harm by imposing a banning order on the Second Respondent on the strength of these three offences and his involvement as director in the First Respondent’s other offences plus the previous offences committed by Alterna Ltd. There is no real evidence that the Second Respondent is a danger to current occupiers and there is some evidence that in relation to the rest of his portfolio he has complied with the law. There is also some mitigating evidence which casts some doubt on how serious the fire safety issues were and on how deliberate or otherwise his offending has been. That is obviously not to say that – for example – reckless offending is acceptable, but it is relevant to seriousness for the purposes of assessing whether a banning order should be made.[69]In conclusion, therefore, we are not persuaded that a banning order should be made against the Second Respondent and therefore there is no need to go on to consider the terms of any such order.[70]Dealing next with the First Respondent, the Applicant has not in its approach to this case sought to distinguish between the First Respondent and the Second Respondent. It has, of course, provided relevant factual evidence such as the offences for which each of them has been convicted, but it has not sought to argue that their circumstances are different such that the case for making a banning order against one of them is stronger or weaker than the case for doing so against the other. That is understandable, but it is nevertheless the case.[71]In the absence of evidenced submissions that the case for making a banning order against the First Respondent is stronger than the case for making a banning order against the Second Respondent, we are not persuaded that it is any stronger. The First Respondent was convicted of five offences rather than three, which is not irrelevant, but it has not been demonstrated that the First Respondent’s offences were significantly more serious or that there are other compelling reasons for making a banning order against the First Respondent, and there is no evidence before us that the First Respondent is on any rogue landlord database. Therefore, we are also not persuaded that a banning order should be made against the First Respondent. Cost applications[72]The Applicant seeks an order under paragraph 13(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 that the Respondents be required to reimburse the application and hearing fees paid by the Applicant.[73]Paragraph 13(2) reads as follows: “The Tribunal may make an order requiring a party to reimburse to any other party the whole or part of the amount of any fee paid by the other party …”. The Applicant has been unsuccessful in its substantive application and, in the circumstances, we do not consider it appropriate to order the successful party to reimburse these fees to the unsuccessful party. The tribunal therefore declines to make such an order. Name: Judge P Korn Date: 7 July 2026 RIGHTS OF APPEALa. A. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office dealing with the case.b. B. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application.c. C. If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit.d. D. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking.