(a) a witness statement signed by a named individual with a statement of truth setting out any grounds of dispute and any explanation in relation to the conduct noted below and any other matters complained of by the Applicants and all other matters relied upon, exhibiting copies of any relevant documents relied upon; and (b) any submissions they wish to make in response to the costs application. If they do not do so, they will automatically be barred from further participation under Rule 9(1) and the costs application may be determined summarily against them without further warning; c. if the Applicants have made an application under Rule 13, they must by 12 June 2026 send to the tribunal and the Respondent a single PDF electronic bundle of the documents needed for thisApplicantAssethold LimitedRespondent
Before
Judge Virginia LloydDate 8 May 2026Property: Wisbech Cambridgeshire PE13 1PE (1) Stephen Hudson and the other leaseholders named in Schedule 1Type of application: (2) Uncommitted service charges Judge David Wyatt
[3]The background and expressions used in this decision are described in the decision and further directions dated 27 November 2025 (the “2025 Decision”). This: a) noted acquisition by the Applicant RTM company of the right to manage on 30 August 2024 following a tribunal decision confirming entitlement, and the determination by a different tribunal on 23 September 2024 of payability of disputed service and administration charges for 2017 to 2023 (the “2024 Decision”); and b) determined (based on the lack of demands and failure by the Respondent to comply with directions requiring information) that no service or administration charges were payable by any of the Applicant leaseholders to the Respondent for the service charge year ending on 25 December 2024. The 2025 Decision determined everything the tribunal then could, save for the possibility of an application to seek additional service charge determinations in relation to the earlier years, the application under section 94 of the 2002 Act and costs applications. The decision notice fixed and notified the parties of the final hearing date of 10:00am on 7 April 2026 to determine these remaining matters. For the purposes of the application under section 94, the Respondent was ordered (and directed) to provide bank statements or a witness statement to explain all sums held on 30 August 2024 which had been paid by way of service charges in respect of the Property (amongst other things). On 16 January 2026, the day of the deadline for compliance with that order (and those directions), Ronni Gurvits of Eagerstates Limited applied for variation of the directions. He argued that disclosure of all bank statements was too broad because a shared client account was used for multiple properties and section 94 required only accounting for the service charge fund for this property, not others. On 20 January 2026, 5 the tribunal refused that application, noting that the directions already provided for the alternative of a witness statement setting out the requisite information/documents and no actual variation had been proposed by the Respondent.[6]On 19 February 2026, after the Applicants informed the tribunal that the Respondent had still failed to comply, the tribunal barred the Respondent from further participation (to the extent they had not already been barred for non-compliance with earlier directions). At the hearing conducted by video on 7 April 2026, the Applicants were represented by Corinne Tuplin. David Housden, one of the Applicant leaseholders, attended to give evidence. The Respondent was represented by Oliver Dixon of counsel (who had not previously been involved). Despite the Respondent’s repeated failures to comply with directions, we acceded to the request from Mr Dixon to lift the bar to allow him to make submissions because that appeared to be in accordance with the overriding objective and would not cause additional delay; he confirmed that he was not seeking to introduce new evidence or cross-examine Mr Housden. This decision was sent to the parties in draft on the morning of 20 April 2026, asking that any corrections of the relevant figures copied from the Applicants’ tables or the tribunal’s arithmetic in relation to the other figures be sent by 22 April 2026. Instead, the tribunal received late e mails from Ms Tuplin which do not appear to have been prepared with sufficient care or to reflect careful reading of previous decisions or the draft decision. I have amended this final decision to give Ms Tuplin’s title on the first page as requested, and to note the rule 13 application sent by Ms Tuplin today. On review of the documents attached to Ms Tuplin’s e mail of 30 April 2026, it appears these are confused and/or attempting to re-argue the case. The table produced as “corrections” is in fact attempting to (amongst other things) give different figures to those which had been produced at the appropriate time for the Respondent to answer as set out in the directions (e.g. 184 onwards) and which we were assured had been prepared very carefully. Since no clear corrections have been provided, I have not changed the tables at the start of this decision. If the Applicants attempt again to argue with these figures, they may be at risk of the tribunal deciding to review its decision to give these clarifying additional determinations in these proceedings at all. Section 94 application[7]It was not disputed that the scope of section 94 of the 2002 Act is limited, following earlier references to OM Ltd v New River Head RTM Co Ltd [2010] UKUT 394 (LC) and the discussion in Tanfield (Service Charges and Management) at 27-23 onwards. Sadly, because the Respondent has failed to comply with the order and directions requiring the necessary details of the amounts held by them on the acquisition date, the tribunal cannot make a determination of the relevant amount in the usual way. 6[8]The Applicant RTM Company had on a contingency basis produced a witness statement from Mr Housden of the sums they said the tribunal could determine summarily in default of disclosure, based on the information available to the Applicants, with their calculations. Mr Dixon noted that they did so late, on the day of the deadline in the directions (of 16 January 2026 for any such proposal/evidence) but after 5pm. To the extent they did so after 5pm on that day we extended the time for compliance since no prejudice was caused.[13]Mr Housden confirmed in his witness statement that he had sold the freehold to the Respondent on 27 April 2012. He had been unable to find out whether any service charge payments were handed over to the Respondent on completion of that sale, or calculate any overall surplus which could be inferred. In his witness statement, Mr Housden had suggested that the tribunal could calculate “any surplus amounts” from the service charge apportionments under the lease (which he said strictly could result in overpayments of 7.5% each year, explaining that because the Respondent had demanded the wrong proportions from some leaseholders these overpayments were said to amount to 4.4%). It seems to us that the Applicants were right not to pursue this at the hearing. The authorities mentioned above confirm that uncommitted service charges under section 94 cannot necessarily include amounts for costs/service charges said to have been overpaid previously, only relevant sums which would actually have been held by the Respondent on the acquisition date (less claimed expenditure and any sums known to have been committed to fund the payment of costs which had already been incurred). Instead, Ms Tuplin asked the tribunal to make determinations that the uncommitted service charges included the specific amounts described below. First, £4,907.60 was sought in respect of a buildings insurance claim said to have been made by Eagerstates/Assethold on 28 December 2020 to MI Specialty. It was said the 2024 Decision “did not determine” that works had taken place in respect of damage to the exterior wall. We note the 2024 Decision simply determined for 2021 that a service charge of £260 claimed by the Respondent for “repair after damage to wall” was not payable for lack of evidence, noting a £4,907.60 insurance claim. The Applicants produced a claims history document obtained by them from the brokers, which appears to note a payment of this amount for “Impact to Wall”. Ms Tuplin said a “refund” had been requested and there had been no answer, arguing this sum had been a “covert” payment. Mr Dixon argued that this was not a payment by way of service charges. It seems this was a payment for an insurance claim for costs of repairing damage to a wall from some kind of impact, as noted in the insurance document. The Applicants did not produce sufficient evidence (to show for example relevant damage remaining to the wall to suggest insurance money was collected but not spent on repairs). 7[14]In any event, we accept Mr Dixon’s submission that this payment cannot be included in the amount of any accrued uncommitted service charges. Section 94(2) requires that, amongst other things, these be sums which have been paid “by way of service charges” in respect of the premises. Ms Tuplin argued this payment was, but gave no real reasons why. We were shown nothing to change the usual position under leases that a landlord is obliged to insure and apply proceeds of insurance claims towards the costs of repairing damage from insured risks (not to pay such sums into the service charge account). If the Applicants have any remedy in relation to this insurance payment they would have to pursue it elsewhere.[16]Second, Ms Tuplin sought £5,666.40 said to have been paid in 2022 by Flats 5a, 5b, 5e and 6c through the service charge towards a £12,000 major works deposit for roof repairs which “did not progress and was cancelled”. Mr Housden explained the amounts he said had been paid by each relevant leaseholder towards this figure. We could see that the final demand in December 2022 includes the relevant £12,000 deposit in the “final” figures for 2021/22 [321]. Bank statements referring to payments were produced and it was not disputed that the relevant payments had been made. Ms Tuplin told us that nothing had been refunded. However, the service charge demand from December 2023 [324] shows in the “final” figures for 2022/23 a “credit” of £12,000 reducing the costs for the year, recorded as “Refund of Deposit for Roof works … -£12,000”. Ms Tuplin then told us that the lease(s) did not permit credits in this way, so the relevant sums should have been refunded. The Applicants had not included a copy of any lease in their hearing bundle. Following discussion, Ms Tuplin accepted that “maybe” as a matter of fact it did not follow that the Respondent would still have been holding this money, whether or not crediting it against costs in later periods was permissible under the lease(s). In case Ms Tuplin did not intend to concede this, we confirm we are not satisfied that the relevant sums were still held by the Respondent as uncommitted service charges on 30 August 2024. Section 27A application[18]As provided for in the 2025 Decision, the Applicants sought permission to amend their current service charge case (which has otherwise been determined) to seek further determinations for 2017 to 2023. Sadly, the way the previous proceedings were conducted left the relevant tribunal having to make some general and some long form findings, as set out in the 2024 Decision. The parties only have themselves to blame for that, but it does seem sensible to consider this opportunity to clarify the position to avoid unnecessary disputes in future. Despite previous warnings, the Applicants continued to seek to persuade the tribunal to determine “overpayments” or order the Respondent to reimburse sums which the Applicants said were paid in excess of the service charges determined to be payable. They could not explain how the tribunal would have jurisdiction to do so. We are not satisfied that we 8 have jurisdiction to order such repayments, or determine amounts paid save to the extent that is necessary to enable us to determine payability of later service charges.[23]The Applicants attempted to argue that demands for various flats had been invalid during earlier (or for all) service charge periods because they had sought to recover the wrong service charge proportion, and the effect of section 20B of the 1985 Act was that the relevant service charges were not payable. We agree with Mr Dixon that we should not permit addition of these new arguments, which go beyond the potential additions contemplated in the 2025 Decision. The Applicants made no cogent case that any demands would have been invalid on this ground. Nor did they explain why any such argument could not have been adequately identified and made during the previous proceedings. Cases between these parties about this property have already taken up a disproportionate share of tribunal resources. The Applicants had prepared helpful tables setting out figures for the total costs which they said were recoverable under the 2024 Decision for each relevant year and (for 2017 to 2021), the amount of service charges which they said were payable by each Applicant leaseholder (as whichever was the lower of the relevant proportion of the relevant total cost figure or the amounts demanded from that leaseholder). They also set out the sums which they said had been paid by each leaseholder for each period; Ms Tuplin confirmed she had spent a long time checking these against the relevant bank statements. They did the same for 2022 and 2023 save that they calculated different figures for Mr/Mrs Hudson’s flats for 2022 (based on their purchase date, as examined below) and for various flats for 2023 based on their new section 20B argument for that year (as examined below). The Respondent had been directed to provide case documents in response to the schedules produced for the Applicants, but had not. Mr Dixon accepted that generally the Applicants had provided a numerical calculation and he had no evidence to dispute it, subject to assessment on the merits of the “new” points noted above for 2022 and 2023. It was not disputed that the result of the determinations made by the tribunal in the 2024 Decision was that the recoverable costs for the year ending 25 December 2022 totalled £20,058.04. Mr and Mrs Hudson had purchased their leases of flats 5a and 5b on 13 October 2022. The Applicants’ calculations said this would equate to £2,228.45 (1/9) for 5a and £3,338.67 (1/6) for 5b. However, they then sought to apportion this on a daily basis (from purchase to the date of the December 2022 demand) to £323.58 and £484.79 respectively. Ms Tuplin could not explain why this liability would be apportioned in this way. She referred to conveyancing apportionments produced by the sellers, which do not seem to assist. She referred to paragraph (2) of the 2024 Decision, which determined that insofar as the Respondent had 9 demanded service charges from Mr and Mrs Hudson in relation to these flats for any period before 13 October 2022 those sums are not payable. We note that the tribunal used the word “apportionment” in [41-42], but in substance the 2024 Decision is confirming that Mr and Mrs Hudson were not liable to pay service charges demanded before 13 October 2022 [42]. We cannot read it as a determination changing the position that after they became leaseholders in October 2022 and a balancing charge was demanded from them in December 2022 for the actual costs incurred in 2021/22 this was, subject to the adjustments made by the 2024 Decision, payable.[27]The service charge demands dated 5 December 2022 [322] acknowledge that for 2021/22 interim charges of £1,618.63 had previously been paid for 5a and demand a balancing charge of £3,380.29 (based on 1/9 of the claimed costs). The demand for 5b was not produced, but it was not disputed that the Respondent had always demanded amounts equating to 1/9 (rather than 1/6) in relation to 5b and the completion statements produced for each flat confirm the same figures for apportionments of the sums paid/payable by the sellers. Accordingly, we take it that the same sums were demanded and the same interim charges were paid for 5b. On the evidence provided to the tribunal, that leaves a potential balance of £609.82 (1/9, £2,228.45, less £1,618.63) for 5a and £1,720.04 (1/6, £3,338.67, less £1,618.63) for 5b. In relation to 2023, the Applicants said and it was not disputed that the result of the 2024 Decision is that only total costs of £13,809.12 were reasonably incurred, no final demands had been made for Flats 5c, 5d, 5f, 6a and 6b, and the effect of section 20B of the 1985 Act is that it would now be too late for any such demands, so no service charges are payable by the relevant leaseholders for 2023. It does seem appropriate for us to consider this additional argument, since the alleged time limit may not yet have been reached at the previous hearing. We are not satisfied that section 20B limits the payability of service charges for the relevant proportions of the £13,809.12. Unfortunately for the leaseholders, in December 2022 the Respondent had demanded high interim service charges for the year ending 25 December 2023, far exceeding the sums later determined for the year. For Flats 5c and 5f (1/9) it had demanded £4,998.92 [345], more than the £1,534.35 payable (1/9 of £13,809.12). For 5d, it had demanded [357] £4,499.03, more than the £1,380.91 (1/10) payable. For 6a and 6b, it had demanded [395] £5,623.79, more than the £1,726.14 (1/8) payable. Since there was no dispute about the Applicant’s calculations of the amounts payable and paid, we have used their figures summarily (save for some obvious minor corrections) in the tables above for 2017 to 2021, and for 2022 save for Flats 5a and 5b as explained above. We have also used their calculations of the total recoverable costs and sums paid for 2023, while calculating the sums payable simply as the relevant proportion of the undisputed recoverable cost figure, in the absence of anything better from the parties. 10[28]For the avoidance of doubt, we are not in this decision attempting to conduct an account between the parties. Our “balance” figures given in the last column are illustrative, again in the absence of anything better from the parties, to show why we have determined that on the balance of probabilities the Applicant leaseholders are not liable to make any further service charge payments to the Respondent. Even if these payments include ground rent (the Applicants say they do not), it appears the rents are modest (£125 half yearly) and the payments substantially exceed the service charges which were payable. The Respondent has failed to raise any grounds of dispute, let alone to suggest or show that these payments include sums paid for other purposes and were not sufficient to cover all the relevant service charges.[30]It appears the Applicants’ calculations reproduced in the tables above were prepared before they knew about the payments by the mortgagee of Flat 5f, so those are not taken into account in the tables above (Ms Tuplin has in response to the draft of this decision insisted that they are, but seems to mean schedules produced more recently). We have not been given payment figures for 2024, but the tribunal has already determined that no service charges (or administration charges) are payable for that year. If the Applicant leaseholders wish to pursue their claims for repayments in the County Court or elsewhere, that is a matter for them, but they may wish to take specialist independent legal advice generally and on whatever evidence may be required for any such claims. Section 20C/paragraph 5A[32]In the previous tribunal proceedings, it was conceded for the Respondent that it cannot recover the costs of service charge proceedings through the service charge or as administration charges under the terms of the lease(s). Mr Dixon did not have instructions to make the same concession in these proceedings, but made no submissions to the contrary. In the circumstances, it seems unlikely that the Respondent could recover the costs of these proceedings through the service charge. In any event, the Applicants were entirely successful in relation to the matters decided in the 2025 Decision and have been successful in seeking additional service charge determinations. In this case, we do not criticise their unsuccessful attempts to demonstrate specific uncommitted service charges in anticipation that the Respondent would fail to give disclosure. The reason the tribunal cannot determine any uncommitted service charges is the Respondent’s own failure to comply with the disclosure order/directions. As Mr Dixon pointed out, an order under section 20C may be academic - since 30 August 2024 the Respondent no longer has management functions. However, given the unfortunate history we consider it just and equitable to make an order under section 20C of the 1985 Act to ensure there is no dispute about this in future. 11[33]It also seems unlikely that the Respondent could seek to recover any costs of these proceedings as an administration charge in any event, given the findings in the 2024 Decision. However, since no particular administration charge for such costs has been identified or seems remotely likely, we consider it better not to make any order under paragraph 5A of Schedule 11 to the 2002 Act. This is not intended to preclude anyone from applying for such an order if any such administration charge is sought in future. Costs under Rule 13[38]The tribunal has a general discretion to order reimbursement of tribunal fees, but (save for Rule 13(1)(a)) can only make any other order in respect of costs under Rule 13 if a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting these proceedings. The relevant provisions and authorities are noted in the decision of 26 November 2025 (Judge Evans) explaining why no order in respect of costs was made in relation to the previous tribunal proceedings. The Applicants had made it clear throughout that they wished to make another application under Rule 13 for their costs in relation to these proceedings, but seemed not yet to have done so. Mr Dixon noted that all parties had caused delays or got things wrong in the previous proceedings; the focus should be on these proceedings. The Applicants had already complained about the Respondent’s repeated failures to comply with orders/directions in these proceedings. On 2 March 2026, Ms Tuplin wrote to Ronni Gurvits for the Respondent to complain about alleged harassment of the leaseholder of Flat 6c, saying that service charges were still being sought from him which were not payable and that refunds were due to him following the 2024 Decision and the 2025 Decision. On 19 March 2026, Ms Tuplin wrote again to Ronni Gurvits for the Respondent and to the tribunal complaining specifically that, while failing to comply with directions, the Respondent was “actively alleging and pursuing a non-existent service charge debt”. Ms Tuplin said that: a) in around May 2023, the Respondent instructed a debt collection agency to write to Birmingham Midshires, the mortgagee of flat 5f, seeking £9,028.28 for alleged arrears, and this was paid by the mortgagee in July 2023 without the knowledge of the leaseholder; b) the mortgagee later repossessed that flat; and c) in March 2026, the solicitors acting for the mortgagee confirmed that Ronni Gurvits had for the Respondent requested a further £76,516.34 in alleged arrears. In the bundle for the hearing, the Applicants included copies of the letter dated 11 May 2023 from the debt collection agency, which included a breakdown with an alleged “debit” of £4,456.82 from 2020/21 plus “SVC” 12 of £2,499.46 for December/June 2022 plus ground rent and administration charges. The demand in December 2021 seeks a total of £1,025.83 including all sums said to have been unpaid from previous periods [381]. The demand in December 2022 acknowledges receipt of a payment of £542.10 for 2021/22 but claimed far more was spent than estimated, seeking a balancing payment of £4,456.82 plus £2,499.46 as half of the estimated charge for 2022/23.[43]If nothing else, this shows that the payment from the mortgagee in July 2023 would have settled even all sums claimed by the Respondent for Flat 5f (including payment of the ground rent and administration fees claimed) at least for the period to the summer of 2023, when a further £2,499.46 was sought as the remaining half of the estimated service charge claimed for 2022/23. The right to manage was acquired on 30 August 2024, pursuant to the decision given to the parties on 2 May 2024. The 2024 Decision was given on 23 September 2024. It determined that the majority of the service charge costs claimed by the Respondent for 2017 to 2023 were not reasonably incurred, as set out in detail in paragraphs 51 to 372 of that decision. The 2025 Decision was given on 27 November 2025 and determined that no service charges were payable for 2024, as noted above. It appears the mortgagee of Flat 5f obtained a possession order on 13 August 2025 and took possession of the property in February 2026. The correspondence from the solicitors for the mortgagee on 12 March 2026 states: “As part of the forfeiture proceedings the managing agents have asserted that arrears in the sum of £76,516.34 are outstanding in relation to Flat 5F. Despite repeated requests, no documentary evidence has been produced explaining how that figure has been arrived at.” They add that, on the understanding that ground rent was paid up to and including September 2022, a further £1,250 was being paid to cover the ground rent up to the end of 2026. It does appear unreasonable conduct for the Respondent to fail to comply with orders/directions in a way which frustrates the purpose of the jurisdiction under section 94 of the 2002 Act (and limits the other determinations which the tribunal can make), in general but all the more so when it appears that despite the decisions and payments noted above the Respondent has at the same time been threatening/seeking forfeiture and attempting to claim a further £76,516.34 in relation to Flat 5f, and seeking to claim other charges from the leaseholder of Flat 6c. However, these matters came to light only relatively recently, there may be a reasonable explanation and it seems best to deal with all potential matters in relation to costs at the same time. Accordingly, the directions at the start of this decision are given to enable the Applicants to make a formal application with a costs statement (including the tribunal fees paid and if practicable estimating the proportion of costs incurred in relation to the payability case and the uncommitted service charges case) if they 13 wish to pursue this. The tribunal should not be taken to be encouraging such application, but any such application must be made by the time limit specified if at all. The Respondent will then have their last opportunity to respond, and to give and evidence any explanation. The tribunal would then determine the costs application on paper, without a further hearing unless it decides otherwise. Name: Judge David Wyatt Date: Rights of appeal 8 May 2026 If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. If the application is not made within the 28-day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28-day time limit; the tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber). Schedule 1 – Applicant leaseholders Flat Leaseholder(s) 5a Stephen and Patricia Hudson 5b Stephen and Patricia Hudson 5c David and Eileen Housden 5d David and Eileen Housden 5e Mr Kevin Clayton 14 5f Mrs Susan Field Mr Tsen Wharton 6a 6b David and Eileen Housden 6c Ricky Stephen Griggs 15