City Apartments 1307-1321 London Road Leigh On Sea Essex SS9 2AD CAM/00KF/LRM/2025/0011

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)

Case No CAM/00KF/LRM/2025/0011

Between

City Apartments Leigh-On-Sea RTM Company LimitedApplicant

1. Ingleton Luxury Homes City Apartments Limited 2. Assethold LimitedRespondent

Before

Judge Wendy Banks

Judge David Wyatt

Philip Bazin for the Applicant

Date 21 January 2026

Property: City Apartments 1307-1321 London Road Leigh On Sea Essex SS9 2AD

Type of application: Application in relation to the denial of the Right to Manage

DECISION

(1) finds that no counter notice was given for the purposes of section 84 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 (the “Act”);

(2) observes that it appears the right to manage was therefore acquired automatically on 19 October 2025, as specified in the claim notice, under section 90 of the Act;

(3) strikes out the remainder of the Applicant’s case for a determination under section 84(3) of the Act, to dispose of these proceedings; and

(4) orders the Second Respondent, Assethold Limited, to pay £114 to the Applicant to reimburse the tribunal application fee paid by it.

REASONS

[1]The background to this case is summarised in the directions issued by Judge David Wyatt on 27 November 2025. That summary has not been disputed by either party. The key points are as follows:

[2]By application dated 28 August 2025, the applicant RTM company applied to the tribunal under section 84(3) of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 (the “Act”) for a determination that, on the relevant date, they were entitled to acquire the right to manage (“RTM”) the property.

[3]By claim notice dated 6 June 2025, said to have been posted on 9 June 2025, the Applicant gave notice to the First Respondent, and also to the Second Respondent, that they intended to acquire the RTM the Property.

[4]It appears there was no counter notice or other response from the First Respondent. On 18 July 2025, Eagerstates Ltd sent by e-mail to Mr Bazin a document headed “COUNTER-NOTICE” which states that Assethold Limited is a landlord within the meaning of the Act, asserts a wide range of “Grounds of Dispute” without giving any particulars and asserts that Assethold Limited “objects to the acquisition of the right to manage”. The document ends: “Signed: … Ronni Gurvits … For and on behalf of ASSETHOLD LIMITED”.

[5]The Applicant states that the First Respondent was at the relevant time the sole registered proprietor of the freehold titles at the Land Registry. The First Respondent appeared still to be on the register of companies, subject to a strike off proposal. It appears the Second Respondent has claimed to have purchased the freehold but (at least when the application was made to the tribunal) had not been registered as proprietor.

[6]The Applicant alleges that the Second Respondent’s document was not a counter notice because they were not the registered proprietor, so could not be the “landlord”, and sent their document only by e-mail to Mr Bazin, not the address of the company. As to the former issue, the directions referred the parties to 159-167 Prince of Wales Road RTM Company Ltd

[2024] EWCA Civ 1544

. The Second Respondent’s document also seems not to contain the matters required by section 84(2) of the Act, including the required statement and the wording for counternotices prescribed by the Right to Manage (Prescribed Particulars and Forms) (England) Regulations 2010 (the “Regulations”).

[7]The directions concluded: “In the circumstances, it appears that the tribunal may have no jurisdiction to make the determination sought, if no counter notice was given for the purposes of section 84 of the Act. The directions below enable this to be determined first, if appropriate. It appears the issues for determination in these proceedings will be(a) whether a counter notice was given and, if so,

(b) whether on the date on which the relevant claim notice was given, the applicant was entitled to acquire the RTM the premises specified in the notice. The issues will also include whether to make an order for reimbursement of the tribunal application/hearing fees.” Directions and responses

[8]The tribunal gave directions on 27 November 2025, noting the matters set out above as they appeared from the application documents.

[9]Paragraph 3 of the directions set out that if the First Respondent wished to take an active part in these proceedings, they must comply with the directions as if references to the Second Respondent also included them. Otherwise, on the understanding that they have given no counter notice, the directions required no action from them.

[10]It appears that the First Respondent remains on the register of companies at Companies House (no. 11241714), subject to proposed strike-off. As the First Respondent has taken no active part in these proceedings (and appears not to have responded to them at all), we take it that they received the claim notice, gave no counter notice and do not dispute entitlement to the right to manage as claimed in the claim notice.

[11]The Second Respondent was directed to, by 19 December 2025, prepare a bundle of the documents they rely upon including a statement of case in response to the issue of whether their document dated 18 July 2025 was a counter notice under section 84 of the Act, setting out all matters and all submissions relied upon in relation to the matters identified above; a statement of their substantive case (on the assumption that their document dated 18 July 2025 was valid), setting out full particulars, including clear and unequivocal details, of all reasons relied upon for disputing entitlement, to include any legal submissions; and all relevant supporting witness statements/evidence/ information/documentation relied upon.

[12]It was further directed that on or after 7 January 2026 the tribunal will determine on paper, without a hearing, whether a counter notice was given (and so whether it has jurisdiction), and if not whether to order reimbursement of tribunal fees and otherwise strike out this case. The directions warned that if the tribunal decided it does have jurisdiction but any party has failed to comply with directions or articulate a case with a reasonable prospect of success, it may also decide whether to take any action and make any summary determination under Rule 9 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 (the “Rules”), and whether to order reimbursement of tribunal fees.

[13]The Second Respondent has also taken no active part in these proceedings and appears not to have responded at all. It has not complied with the directions above, which warned that if any Respondent failed to comply they could be barred from further participation and matters could be determined summarily against them. On 2 January 2026, the Applicant made a case management application alleging that the Second Respondent had failed to comply with the directions and asking that they be barred. Having considered all of the evidence and having mind to the overriding objective, we bar the Second Respondent in accordance with Rule 9(3)(a) (and Rule 8(2)(e)). As no party has requested that this matter be determined by way of a hearing, in accordance with Rule 31(3) and the directions set out at paragraph 12 above, we are satisfied that no hearing is necessary and make a determinative judgment. No counternotice

[14]We find that the only document in this case which purports to be a counternotice under section 84 of the Act, is not.

[15]At the time the Claim Notice (“Notice”) was served, the freehold of the Property (Title Nos: EX691855 and EX848487) was registered to the First Respondent, Ingleton Luxury Homes City Apartments Ltd (Company Registration No. 11241714), as confirmed by Official Copies of the entries in the Register of Title dated 28 March/4 April 2025 and 12 August 2025. These show that the First Respondent had been registered as proprietor since May 2018, and remained so on 12 August 2025.

[16]We have referred to the proofs of postage provided with the application documents and find, as a matter of fact, that the Notice dated 6 June 2025 was duly served on the First Respondent, the registered proprietor of the freehold titles to the Property, on about 11 June 2025.

[17]Although the Applicant says they were informed that the freehold was sold to the Second Respondent, no supporting evidence has been provided. This point is immaterial to the present determination.

[18]In any event, the Applicant also served a copy of the Notice on the Second Respondent, who subsequently issued a response on 18 July 2025 (the “Response”), as described above.

[19]The RTM legislation is contained in Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Act. Its provisions were described in detail in the Supreme Court decision in A1 Properties (Sunderland) Ltd v Tudor Studios RTM Co Ltd

[2024] UKSC 27

[2024] 3 WLR 601

("A1 Properties"). The most relevant provisions for present purposes are set out below.

[20]Section 71 introduces the Chapter as follows: “71. The right to manage(1) This Chapter makes provision for the acquisition and exercise of rights in relation to the management of premises to which this Chapter applies by a company which, in accordance with this Chapter, may acquire and exercise those rights (referred to in this Chapter as a RTM company).

(2) The rights are to be acquired and exercised subject to and in accordance with this Chapter and are referred to in this Chapter as the right to manage."

[21]The legislation goes on to specify the circumstances in which the RTM can arise and the process for obtaining it. This involves an initial stage in which a company is formed for the purpose and qualifying tenants (broadly, tenants under long leases) are invited to participate in it, followed by the service by the company of a "claim notice". Section 79(6) provides that the claim notice must be served as follows: "(6) The claim notice must be given to each person who on the relevant date is-(a) landlord under a lease of the whole or any part of the premises,

(b) party to such a lease otherwise than as landlord or tenant, or

(c) a manager appointed under Part 2 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 (c.31) (referred to in this Part as "the 1987 Act") to act in relation to the premises, or any premises containing or contained in the premises."

[22]By s. 79(1) the ''relevant date" is the date on which the claim notice is given. Under s.79(8) a copy of the claim notice must also be given to the qualifying tenants.

[23]Section 84 enables a person "given a claim notice by a RTM company under section 79(6)" to serve a counter-notice which may challenge the company's entitlement to acquire the RTM. It also provides a procedure for the RTM company to apply under s.84(3) to the appropriate tribunal (for present purposes, the FTT) for a determination that it was in fact entitled to acquire the RTM.

[24]The issue we have to consider is whether the Second Respondent is a landlord for the purposes of section 79(6) of the Act. We have been referred by the Applicant to 159-167 Prince of Wales Road (noted above). We have found this judgment to be extremely helpful when reaching our decision for the reasons set out below. Falk LJ gave the leading judgment and considered the same issue. She found in that case that Assethold was not a landlord for the purposes of section 79(6) for the reasons below: “27. Assethold's case is that a buyer of property in the "registration gap" between completion of a purchase and its registration at the Land Registry is a "landlord" for the purposes of s.79(6) and the costs provisions in s.88. Mr Bates submitted that equitable ownership of the freehold and headlease had passed to Assethold in October 2019 when it had purchased them from Millcastle, and that was sufficient to make Assethold a landlord at the date of the claim notice even though Millcastle had remained the registered, and therefore legal, owner of both interests at that date. The critical focus of the legislation was on the persons whose management functions would be lost to the RTM company, as confirmed by A1 Properties at [67]. Beneficial ownership had passed at the time of Assethold's purchase. Buyers in the registration gap could exercise almost all of the rights which would be exercisable once registered title was acquired, including powers as a landlord. It was Assethold, not Millcastle, that was in fact responsible for the management of the property. Mr Bates did not suggest that any distinction should be drawn for these purposes between s.79, which explicitly directs attention to the position as at the date of the claim notice, and s.88. He also relied on s.112(2) and (3) of the CLRA.

[28]I do not agree that an equitable owner can be a "landlord" for the purposes of ss. 79(6) and 88 of the CLRA. In its ordinary and natural meaning, a "landlord under a lease" means the landlord as a matter of law. Both the freehold and headlease interest were existing registered estates. Their legal owners at the relevant time were the two Millcastle entities, not Assethold, because under s.27(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002 the transfers did not operate at law unless and until they were completed by registration. Until Assethold became the registered owner the legal estate remained vested in Millcastle. It could not therefore be said that Assethold was a landlord under any lease of the premises…” “45. The requirements of the legislation are prescriptive. Section 79 requires the claim notice to be served on a number of different persons which include each landlord. We now know that a failure to serve a claim notice as required makes it voidable rather than void: A1 Properties at [87], but there remains a real risk that those unwilling to acquiesce in a transfer of management will seek to obstruct the process with claims that not all relevant persons have been notified and their potential objections addressed, which RTM companies would need to spend time and incur costs in dealing with.

[46]Although Assethold was in fact served in this case, an RTM company may well have no means of knowing that a landlord has sold its interest or otherwise parted with equitable ownership. Lord Briggs and Lord Sales noted that there were some unavoidable difficulties in identifying landlords, such as landlords under short term leases that will not appear on the register ([99]), but the aim of having a simple process would be further, and materially, undermined if the difficulties were compounded by including equitable owners of interests that are registered. Rather, RTM companies should so far as possible be able to rely on the entries on the register…” “63. Assethold then served a counter-notice. While this equally did not name Assethold as the landlord, it was necessarily implicit in it that Assethold considered that it was entitled to serve it. Counter-notices which challenge the acquisition of the RTM have the important procedural effect of preventing the acquisition from proceeding until they are disposed of. Under s.84(1) a counter-notice can be served by a person given a claim notice "under section 79(6)", not by anyone else.”

[25]For those same reasons we find that the Second Respondent was not a landlord for the purposes of section 79(6) at the time the Notice was served. We further find that they did not fall within any other specified category in section 79(6) and therefore the Second Respondent’s Response is invalid (or not a counter notice under section 84).

[26]We note the other argument made by the Applicant. At paragraph 5, the Notice states as follows: “If you are-(a) landlord under a lease of the whole or any part of the premises,

(b) party to such a lease otherwise than as landlord or tenant, or

(c) a manager appointed under Part 2 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 to act in relation to the premises, or any premises containing or contained in the premises, you may respond to this claim notice by giving a counter-notice under section 84 of the 2002 Act. A counternotice must be in the form set out in Schedule 3 to the Right to Manage (Prescribed Particulars and Forms) (England) Regulations 2010. It must be given to the company, at the address in paragraph 1, not later than 18 July 2025.”

[27]Paragraph 1 of the Notice sets out the company details as follows: “CITY APARTMENTS LEIGH-ON-SEA RTM COMPANY LIMITED ("the company''), of ( 205, City Apartments, 1307-1321 London Road, Leigh-On-Sea, 559 2AD and of which the registered number is 16397844 …”

[28]An email from admin@eagerstates.co.uk to the Applicant’s Representative, dated 18 July 2025 at 17:01, enclosed the Response. However, section 84(1) of the Act requires that a counternotice be served directly on the company by the specified date in the claim notice. As the Response was served on the Representative rather than the company, it was not served as required. Similarly, we note the other issue raised in the directions, that the Response did not contain the matters required by s.84(2), including the required statement and the wording for counternotices prescribed by the Regulations. We do not need to determine the effect of these defects in isolation following A1 Properties, but they are further obstacles to the validity of the Response in addition to the certainly fatal ground that it was given by a person who did not fall within s.79(6).

[29]Since no counter notice has been given, it appears the tribunal has no jurisdiction to make a determination under section 84(3). Accordingly, we will strike out the remainder of the Applicant's case under Rule 9(2). While the tribunal cannot advise, section 90(2) and (3) of the Act provide that there is no dispute about entitlement where no counter notice is given; the right to manage is acquired on the date "specified in the claim notice under section 80(7)". Accordingly, it appears the Applicant acquired the right to manage the Property on 19 October 2025, the date specified in the claim notice under section 80(7) as the date on which the Applicant intended to acquire the right to manage. Entitlement

[30]If a counter notice had been given, we would have determined that the Applicant was on the relevant date (about 11 June 2025) entitled to acquire the right to manage the Property.

[31]Having determined that no valid counter notice was served, we do not need to address this point further. However, for completeness, we note the following.

[32]In the Response dated 18 July 2025, Mr Gurvits asserts that the Notice is invalid or ineffective due to inaccuracies or omissions in particulars required under section 80 of the Act and Regulation 5. The Response does not identify any such inaccuracy or omission. The Second Respondent has failed to comply with the directions requiring adequate particulars in a statement of case, or provide any other explanation. We have already found that the Notice was served on the registered proprietor and nothing has been identified which might affect the validity of the Notice. The reference to Regulation 5 is misplaced, as it concerns counter notices.

[33]The other grounds of dispute expressed in the Response also appear so generic/vague as to be meaningless. The Second Respondent has failed to comply with the directions requiring adequate particulars in a statement of case, and provided no supporting evidence. In the circumstances, we would find there are no substantive grounds of dispute and would concur with the Applicant’s submissions.

[34]If a counter notice had been given by an entitled party, we would have accepted the Applicant’s evidence and determined that on the relevant date the Applicant was entitled to acquire the right to manage the Property. Costs

[35]Under Rule 13, the tribunal has discretion to order reimbursement of tribunal fees. No explanation has been given in relation to the purported counter notice signed by Mr Gurvits; it appears that Assethold Limited or their agents were the cause of these proceedings. Even disregarding that, they have been unsuccessful and no submissions have been made to oppose the order proposed in the directions. We order the Second Respondent to pay £114 to the Applicant to reimburse the tribunal application fee paid by them. Name: Judge Wendy Banks Date: 21 January 2026 Rights of appeal By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. If the application is not made within the 28-day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28-day time limit; the tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber).