4 Ella Court, Luton, LU2 0BP Appellant : Mr Mohammed Uddin CAM/00KA/HIN/2025/0014

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)

Case No CAM/00KA/HIN/2025/0014

Between

Luton Borough CouncilRespondent

Before

First-tier Tribunal Judge K Neave

Mr Roland Thomas MRICS

In person for the Applicant

Ms Campbell, Litigation Officer Appeal against an Improvement Notice for the Respondent

Venue Luton, LU1 5BL

Date 3 December 2025

Property: 4 Ella Court, Luton, LU2 0BP

Type of application: under paragraphs 10-12 of schedule 1 of the Housing Act 2004 First-tier Tribunal Judge K Neave

DECISION

Decisions of the tribunal(1) The tribunal quashes the improvement notice dated 19 June 2025.

(2) The tribunal quashes the charge of £453.90 made by the Respondent of the Appellant in respect of the service of the improvement notice. The application

[1]By his application dated 6 July 2025, the Appellant appealed, under the provisions of paragraphs 10 – 12 of schedule 1 to the Housing Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”) the improvement notice dated 19 June 2025 served on him by the Respondent local authority. The background

[2]The background to this matter is set out in the documents contained in the Appellant’s 149 page hearing bundle and the witness statement of Jennifer Wyatt dated 2 October 2025, which we have considered in detail.

[3]The Appellant is the landlord of the residential flat known as 4 Ella Court, Luton, LU2 0BP. 4 Ella Court is a one-bedroom flat located on the first floor of a low-rise block of 12 flats situated just outside the town centre in Luton. The flat is let to Richard Hutton under the terms of an assured shorthold tenancy.

[4]On or around 19 June 2025, the Respondent served on the Appellant an improvement notice under section 11 of the 2004 Act. The notice identified category 1 and 2 hazards at the property relating to damp and mould, falling on level surfaces, hygiene, and flames and hot surfaces.

[5]On 6 July 2025, the Appellant issued this appeal, asserting, amongst other things, that no such hazards existed at the flat and that the Respondent should not have taken enforcement action against him.

[6]Directions were given by the tribunal on 15 July 2025. The Respondent was required to prepare a bundle for the hearing by 19 August 2025, including its grounds for opposing the appeal and its calculations for the hazard ratings applied.

[7]The Respondent failed to comply with the directions and nor did it respond to the tribunal’s invitation dated 27 August 2025 to make representations regarding a proposed banning order. On 15 September 2025, Judge MacQueen made an order barring the Respondent from further participation in these proceedings. The hearing

[8]The hearing took place on 6 October 2025 at Luton Magistrates Court. The Appellant appeared in person and the Respondent was represented by Ms Campbell, a litigation officer.

[9]On 3 October 2025 (the last working day before the hearing), the Respondent made an application to the tribunal to lift the barring order made by Judge MacQueen. Ms Campbell apologised for the failure to comply with the tribunal’s directions, and asserted that, mistakenly, an “out-of-office” message had not been placed on the email account of the officer dealing with the appeal before she left the Respondent’s employment.

[10]At the hearing, Ms Campbell clarified the nature of the Respondent's application. She confirmed that the Respondent was asking the tribunal to lift the barring order only to a limited extent in order to allow the Respondent to rely on, and the tribunal to consider, the witness statement of Jennifer Wyatt, Private Sector Housing Manager, dated 2 October 2025. She confirmed that the Respondent was not seeking an adjournment of the hearing and that she did not intend to call Ms Wyatt to give oral evidence, nor cross-examine the Appellant, nor make submissions.

[11]The Appellant did not oppose the Respondent’s application for the limited relief sought by Ms Campbell. Though the Respondent’s breach of the directions was clearly serious, and Ms Campbell accepted that there was no good reason for it, given the parties’ respective positions it was in our judgment fair and just to grant the application as it was advanced by Ms Campbell at the hearing.

[12]After we gave our decision on the application, Ms Campbell confirmed that she did not intend to remain at court for the rest of the hearing nor attend the inspection of the flat. We heard oral evidence from the Appellant who confirmed the content of his witness statement dated 15 September 2025 and answered questions from the tribunal. We considered the witness statement of Ms Wyatt dated 2 October 2025. The Appellant made closing submissions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the tribunal inspected the property, accompanied by the Appellant. The tribunal’s decision

[13]We start by considering Ms Wyatt’s witness statement and the documents exhibited to it. Ms Wyatt relied on her response to the Appellant’s stage 1 complaint made to the Respondent in July 2025 in which she states that the improvement notice was served following a complaint and was based on the investigating officer’s inspection of the property and the HHSRS system.

[14]Though we have taken into account Ms Wyatt’s response to the Appellant’s stage 1 complaint, we find it of little assistance in circumstances where we have not been provided with the hazard calculations nor any of the notes prepared by the housing officer (which was not Ms Wyatt) recording what she observed when she inspected the property, nor about her decision making process in electing to take enforcement action against the Appellant.

[15]We have also considered the response of Joanne Nelson, Head of Private Sector Housing, to the Appellant’s stage 2 complaint. In this document, Mrs Nelson addresses a point that is also advanced by the Appellant in this appeal about the mistaken reference in the improvement notice to the presence of a gas hob in the flat. Mrs Nelson agrees that this was an error in the notice but asserts that the “the legislation around the distance of the main switches to the cooker applies to electric cookers, as does the guidance concerning the distance between the hob and wall, or end of the work surface”. Again, we find this of little assistance in circumstances where Mrs Nelson has not provided any detail about the legislation she is referring to.

[16]We next consider the Appellant’s unchallenged written and oral evidence. We found the Appellant to be a helpful and credible witness. He gave his evidence in a clear and straightforward manner and there were no inconsistencies that caused us any concern. In the course of his oral evidence, the Appellant addressed each matter raised in the improvement notice in turn. We adopt a similar approach in this decision and set out below our findings and reasons about each of the hazards that were said to exist at the date of service of the notice.

[17]Damp and mould: the Respondent asserted that when the property was inspected mould was found around the window reveals and soffits in the kitchen, living room and bedroom at the flat. The Respondent directed the Appellant to sterilise the mould growth and redecorate where necessary. As set out above, we were not provided with any photographs of the mould, nor information about how the hazard calculation was arrived at, nor the inspection notes, nor details of why the Respondent elected to pursue enforcement action.

[18]The Appellant’s evidence was that he had owned the flat since 2017 and had never had any issues with damp or mould. When he inspected the property in or around February 2025, there was only a very small area of mould around the kitchen window and this was not caused by any disrepair in the property but by the tenant running two leaking washing machines in the kitchen and failing to ventilate the flat adequately. He relied on a damp survey report of D Bromell & Co that he commissioned in March 2025 which identified that the ventilation arrangements in the flat were compliant but could be improved by installing mechanical extraction systems in the kitchen and bathroom, which the Appellant did in July 2025.

[19]We accept the Appellant’s clear and straightforward evidence and find that there was no mould around the living room and bedroom windows at the material times, and that the mould around the kitchen window was minor and caused by the leaking washing machine(s) introducing water into the flat and the tenant failing to ventilate the kitchen by opening the kitchen window. In the circumstances, we are not satisfied that a category 1 hazard relating to damp and mould existed in the flat at the material time as a result of the mould in the kitchen, nor that the mould that we have found to be present around the kitchen window justified the service of an improvement notice.

[20]Secondly, the Respondent refers in the notice to a “leak under the property believed to originate from burst water pipe from water meter to Flat 4 and the communal areas”. We are unable to clearly understand what is meant by this rather vague sentence and none of the information supplied by the Respondent clarifies matters. It is unclear to us how any such leak is said to have caused hazards within the residential premises. It is not clear, because the Respondent has not explained, why the Appellant has been required to resolve a water leak which, at least on the face of it, would appear to concern a water pipe located outside of the flat and which is not said to affect the flat itself. We accept the Appellant’s clear evidence, which was supported by what the tribunal observed during its inspection of the property, that a water leak outside the block would not be capable of causing (for example) rising damp to the first floor flat. In the circumstances, we are not satisfied that a category 1 hazard relating to damp and mould existed at the property at the material time as a result of the water leak referred to in the notice, nor that enforcement action was justified.

[21]Falling on level surfaces: the Respondent refers in the improvement notice to damaged and lifting flooring in the kitchen of the flat. We were provided with no photographs of the damaged flooring taken during the Respondent’s inspection nor any notes of the inspection.

[22]The Appellant’s clear and straightforward evidence, which was supported by the documents in the hearing bundle and which we accept, was that the kitchen floor was damaged by the tenant’s leaking washing machine(s) referred to above. One piece of laminate flooring was raised by 5 or 6mm. The Appellant asked the tenant on 26 March 2025 for permission to enter the flat that week to assess the damage to the floor but the tenant refused to allow access and said that he had forwarded the Appellant’s email to the police. When he was able to access the flat in July 2025 and once the flooring had dried out, the Appellant was able to reattach the flooring by gluing it back down. When the tribunal inspected the property at the conclusion of the hearing, it could not identify any evidence that the laminate flooring had worn through and lacked sufficient coating and nor was it apparent to us why the kitchen flooring needed to be replaced, as asserted in the improvement notice. On the facts as we have found them to be, we are not satisfied that a category 2 hazard relating to falls on level surfaces existed at the property at the material times nor that enforcement action was justified.

[23]Hygiene: the Respondent refers in the improvement notice to the existence of a gap between the tiles in the bathroom and the window, which needs to be filled, and a missing tile to the window soffit in the bathroom. The Appellant’s clear and straightforward evidence, which we accept, was that his tenant told him in February 2025 that he had some grout and would fill the gap, and also that he would re-fix the tile with spares that were already in the flat. The Appellant assumed that he had done this work as promised. The Respondent has not explained how it has assessed these issues as creating a category 2 hazard in relation to hygiene and nor why it elected to serve an improvement notice in the circumstances. We are not satisfied that a category 2 hazard relating to hygiene existed at the material time nor that enforcement action was justified on the facts as we have found them to be.

[24]Flames, Hot Surfaces: The Respondent refers in the improvement notice to guidance relating to the positioning of gas hobs and the cooker isolation/socket switch. As set out above, the Respondent now acknowledges that the hob in the flat is not a gas hob and that this is a mistake in the notice. Though it asserts that the same rules apply to electric hobs, the legislation and/or guidance relied on by the Respondent has not been provided to the tribunal. The Appellant’s clear and straightforward evidence, which we accept, was that other flats in the building have kitchens that are designed in the same way. The flat passed an electrical inspection in July 2025 and no issues were raised with the positioning of the hob and the isolation switch. The inspecting engineer informed him that there were no issues with the positioning of the switch or the sockets, which are RCD protected. If the kitchen were to be newly installed then the hob and sockets would need to be rearranged, but these regulations do not apply to existing installations. Having considered the Appellant’s evidence and the errors that the Respondent accepts are present in the notice, we are not satisfied that a category 2 hazard relating to flames and hot surfaces existed in the flat at the material time nor that enforcement action was justified. Conclusion

[25]For the reasons set out above, we are not satisfied, in respect of all of the matters raised in the improvement notice, that any hazard existed nor that the Respondent was justified in taking enforcement action in the manner it did.

[26]We accordingly quash the Respondent’s improvement notice dated 19 June 2025.

[27]In light of our findings and determination, we consider it appropriate to quash the charge of £453.90 in respect of the service of the improvement notice made of the Appellant by the Respondent. Name: Judge K Neave Date: 3 November 2025 Rights of appeal By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. If the application is not made within the 28-day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28-day time limit; the tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber).