147 Gladstone Street, Peterborough, PE1 2BN CAM/00JA/HMF/2024/0600-AND-CAM/00JA/HMF/2024/0601
DECISION
Decisions of the tribunal(1) The tribunal is not satisfied that the matters raised by the Applicants and the facts as we have found them to be establish beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondent is guilty of an offence under section 72(1) of the 2004 Act.(2) The tribunal is not satisfied that the matters raised by the Applicants and the facts as we have found them to be establish beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondent has committed an offence under sections 1(3) and/or (3A) of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977.(3) The tribunal accordingly dismisses the application for a rent repayment order. The applications[1]By applications dated 22 May 2024 made under section 41 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (“the 2016 Act”) the Applicant tenants seek a rent repayment order (“RRO”) against the Respondent. The hearing[2]The Applicants attended the hearing in person. The Respondent also attended and was represented by Mr Singh, a solicitor of Hegarty LLP. The Applicants did not file or serve any witness statements. They adopted the documents in their hearing bundle as their evidence in chief and were cross-examined by Mr Singh. The Respondent adopted the content of her witness statement dated 19 August 2025 and the Applicants asked questions of her in cross-examination. All the parties made closing submissions. We reserved our decision. The background[3]The background to these applications is set out in the Applicants’ hearing bundle and the Respondent’s witness statement dated 19 August 2025, which the parties confirmed contained the relevant documents and evidence upon which they wished to rely and which we have considered in detail.[4]The subject property is a three-bedroom terraced house located in Peterborough. None of the parties requested an inspection of the property, and the tribunal did not consider that an inspection was necessary, nor would it have been proportionate to the issues in dispute.[5]The First Applicant occupied the property between 29 July 2023 and early June 2024. The Second Applicant occupied the property between 10 September 2023 and early June 2024. There is no dispute that their occupation of the property was linked to their work as carers and that they both moved to the United Kingdom in 2023 in order to take up jobs in care work, having both worked in similar positions abroad beforehand.[6]Though they suggested in their application forms that the Respondent had committed an offence under section 30 of the Housing Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”) of failing to comply with an improvement notice, they agreed at the outset of the hearing that no improvement notice had been served by the local authority in this case.[7]Their case, as it was clarified at the outset of the hearing, is that:(i) the Respondent is guilty of offences under sections 1(3) and (3A) of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 (“the 1977 Act”) arising out of an incident at the property on 20 May 2024.(ii) the Respondent had control of or was managing a house in multiple occupation (“a HMO”) which was required to be licenced under the 2004 Act but which was not so licenced, and is guilty of an offence under section 72(1) of the 2004 Act.[8]The Respondent denies that she is guilty of any of these offences. She points out that she was not present at the property on 20 May 2024. She asserts that she is an employee of Harvest Life Care Limited. Harvest Life Care Limited is the company that arranged for the Applicants to move into the property and take up work in the United Kingdom. She denies that she had control of or managed the property.[9]The freehold owner of the property is Aurangzeb Hamid, registered under title number CB37140. The Applicants have not sought to join Mr Hamid to these proceedings despite the point being raised by the tribunal in earlier directions and the Applicants having been given an opportunity to join Mr Hamid if they wished to do so. The issues[10]At the start of the hearing the parties agreed that the following issues remain in dispute and require determination:(i) Whether the tribunal is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondent has committed an offence or offences to which Chapter 4 of the 2016 Act applies.(ii) whether the Applicants are entitled to a RRO under sections 41 and 43 of the 2016 Act; and if so(iii) the amount of the RRO, to be determined in accordance with section 44 of the 2016 Act.[11]Having heard evidence and submissions from the parties and considered all the documents provided, the tribunal makes determinations on these issues below. We focus in our judgment on the main points that have been identified by the parties, though we have considered all the documents and the evidence and the issues raised and taken these into account. Legal framework[12]Section 40 of the 2016 Act provides that a RRO is an order requiring the landlord under a tenancy of housing in England to repay an amount of rent which has been paid by a tenant.[13]Section 41 of the 2016 Act provides:(1) A tenant … may apply to the First-tier Tribunal for a rent repayment order against a person who has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies.(2) A tenant may apply for a rent repayment order only if — (a) the offence relates to housing that, at the time of the offence, was let to the tenant, and (b) the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the application is made.”[14]The relevant offences to which Chapter 4 of the 2016 Act applies are set out at section 40. They include the offences under section 1((3) or (3A) of the 1977 Act of evicting or harassing occupiers and the offence under section 72(1) of the 2004 Act of having control or management of an unlicensed HMO.[15]By section 1(3) of the 1977 Act: “If any person with intent to cause the residential occupier of any premises—(a) to give up the occupation of the premises or any part thereof; or(b) to refrain from exercising any right or pursuing any remedy in respect of the premises or part thereof; does acts likely to interfere with the peace or comfort of the residential occupier or members of his household, or persistently withdraws or withholds services reasonably required for the occupation of the premises as a residence, he shall be guilty of an offence”.[16]By section 1(3A) of the 1977 Act: “(3A) Subject to subsection (3B) below, the landlord of a residential occupier or an agent of the landlord shall be guilty of an offence if—(a) he does acts likely to interfere with the peace or comfort of the residential occupier or members of his household, or(b) he persistently withdraws or withholds services reasonably required for the occupation of the premises in question as a residence, and (in either case) he knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, that that conduct is likely to cause the residential occupier to give up the occupation of the whole or part of the premises or to refrain from exercising any right or pursuing any remedy in respect of the whole or part of the premises.”[17]Section 72 of the 2004 Act provides, so far as is material: (1) A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing an HMO which is required to be licensed under this Part (see section 61(1)) but is not so licensed.[18]The definition of a HMO is found in section 254 of the 2004 Act, which sets out various tests by which a building may fall within the definition of a HMO. By section 254(2) of the 2004 Act: “a building or a part of a building meets the standard test if(a) it consists of one or more units of living accommodation not consisting of a self-contained flat or flats;(b) the living accommodation is occupied by persons who do not form a single household (see section 258);(c) the living accommodation is occupied by those persons as their only or main residence or they are to be treated as so occupying it (see section 259);(d) their occupation of the living accommodation constitutes the only use of that accommodation;(e) rents are payable or other consideration is to be provided in respect of at least one of those persons' occupation of the living accommodation; and(f) two or more of the households who occupy the living accommodation share one or more basic amenities or the living accommodation is lacking in one or more basic amenities.[19]A person “having control” of premises means “the person who receives the rack-rent of the premises (whether on his own account or as agent or trustee of another person), or who would so receive it if the premises were let at a rack-rent”.[20]A person “managing” premises means: the person who, being an owner or lessee of the premises— (a) receives (whether directly or through an agent or trustee) rents or other payments from— (i) in the case of a house in multiple occupation, persons who are in occupation as tenants or licensees of parts of the premises; and (ii) in the case of a house to which Part 3 applies (see section 79(2)), persons who are in occupation as tenants or licensees of parts of the premises, or of the whole of the premises….”[21]The amount of a RRO is to be determined under section 44 of the 2016 Act as follows: “…The amount that the landlord may be required to repay in respect of a period must not exceed—(a) the rent paid in respect of [the period of 12 months ending with the date of the offence / a period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the landlord was committing the offence], less(b) any relevant award of universal credit paid (to any person) in respect of rent under the tenancy during that period. (4) In determining the amount the tribunal must, in particular, take into account— (a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant, (b)the financial circumstances of the landlord, and(c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which this Chapter applies.” . Findings Has the Respondent committed a relevant offence?[22]We consider first whether the Respondent has committed an offence under section 72(1) of the 2004 Act, namely being a person having control of or managing an HMO which is required to be licensed under the 2004 Act but is not so licensed.[23]Limited information about the nature of the subject property nor of its occupants was provided in the Applicants’ application forms. The First Applicant described the property as a “”three bedroom terrace with parking”. The Second Applicant described the property as a “three bedroom villa with parking. Four tenants”. No further details were provided before the hearing, despite the directions of Judge Wyatt dated 21 February 2025 by which the Applicants were ordered to give full details of the alleged offences, including a schedule of occupancy during the relevant period, and were reminded that the tribunal would need to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that an offence had been committed.[24]Little further information was provided during the course of the Applicants’ oral evidence to the tribunal. Though the First Applicant said that two other individuals (named Marvic Arboleda and Amy Benular) were living at the property when she moved in in July 2023, she also confirmed that, at other times, including in May 2024, the Applicants were the only occupiers of the property. They could not tell the tribunal when Marvic Arboleda and Amy Benular stopped living at the property. Beyond being told that the property had three bedrooms, no other details about its other facilities (i.e. the number of kitchens, bathrooms or toilets) was provided to the tribunal.[25]Accordingly, the tribunal does not know, because it has not been told:(i) The periods of time during which the property was occupied by the Applicants and Marvic Arboleda and Amy Benular.(ii) Whether, during those periods, Peterborough City Council operated an additional licencing scheme which required those in control of or managing properties occupied by three or four unrelated persons to hold a HMO licence.(iii) Whether the Applicants or either of them were required to share one or more basic amenities or the property was lacking in one or more of these amenities.[26]For these reasons, we are not satisfied that, during the period in which the Applicants occupied the property, the property was required to be licenced under part 2 of the 2004 Act. We are accordingly not satisfied that the Respondent is guilty of an offence under section 72(1) of the 2004 Act.[27]We now turn to the alleged offending under sections 1(3) and (3A) of the 1977 Act.[28]The Applicants described in their application forms and in their oral evidence an incident which took place on 20 May 2024 in which an individual they identify as Mr Akram Ayub attended the property with Ms Arboleda in the morning when the Applicants were still asleep. This followed notification from the local authority that they intended to inspect the property on 22 May 2024 in order to identify whether any category 1 or 2 hazards existed at the property. Mr Ayub had not told the Applicants that he would be attending the property. The Second Applicant said that the front door to the property opened into the living room, which she used as her bedroom and was where she was sleeping at the time. The Second Applicant said that she felt humiliated by Mr Ayub’s entry into her room, and that she blocked the door at night afterwards because she feared that the same thing might happen again. The Applicants said that Mr Ayub began shouting at them and they called the police, who attended, though they have not taken any further action against Mr Ayub.[29]I have seen a short video of a confrontation between the Applicants and Mr Ayub on 20 May 2024, in which both the Applicants and Mr Ayub are engaged in a heated discussion about Mr Ayub’s attendance at the property that day, the basis upon which the Applicants occupy the property, and in which each side tells the other to “shut up”. The video ends with the Applicants resolving to call the police and the council.[30]There was little clear evidence before us as to who Mr Ayub is and the nature of his connection to the property. The First Applicant said that she thought that he lives next door to the Respondent. The Respondent’s unchallenged evidence was that Mr Ayub represents the freehold owner of the property, Mr Aurangzed Hamid. We accept her clear, straightforward and unchallenged evidence and find that Mr Ayub is a representative of the freeholder, not of the Respondent, and that Mr Ayub has no relationship with her in relation to the property.[31]The Second Applicant said in her oral evidence that Mr Ayub had told her that he had been sent to the property that day by the Respondent. She also said that Ms Arboleda had told her the same thing and also that the Respondent had dropped her off to the property that day.[32]However, none of this was put to the Respondent in cross-examination and she has not been given any opportunity to answer the allegations levelled at her. The Applicants did not call Mr Ayub or Ms Arboleda to give any oral evidence to support their assertions. They agreed that they had not seen the Respondent at the property that day. It was entirely unclear to the tribunal, from the evidence available to us, why the Respondent would have sent Mr Ayub and Ms Arboleda to the property in circumstances where Mr Ayub is the freeholder’s representative. The Respondent’s unchallenged evidence, which was clearly and straightforwardly given, and which we accept, was that she had no reason to be involved directly with the matters between the local authority and the tenants because these issues were being dealt with directly by Mr Ayub, the tenants and the freeholder. We are accordingly not satisfied that Mr Ayub or Ms Arboleda attended the property on 20 May 2024 on the Respondent’s instructions or as her agent. We accept her evidence and find that she did not instruct Mr Ayub or Ms Arboleda to attend the property.[33]Furthermore, it is the Applicants’ case that Ms Arboleda was a tenant and occupier of the property alongside them. She would presumably therefore have been entitled to enter the property as a tenant of it and to allow Mr Ayub inside.[34]In any event, it is a key element of the offences under sections 1(3) and 1(3A) of the 1977 Act that the offender either has the intent to cause the occupiers of the premises to give up their occupation or refrain from exercising rights or remedies (section 1(3) of the 1977 Act) or that the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that their conduct is likely to cause the occupiers of the premises to give up their occupation or refrain from exercising rights or remedies (section 1(3A) of the 1977 Act).[35]That this was the Respondent’s intention or within her knowledge or reasonable belief was not explored with her in cross-examination at all. Even if the Respondent did instruct Mr Ayub or Ms Arboleda to attend the property on 20 May 2024, there is in our judgment no basis upon which we could find that she did so intending or knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that these actions would likely cause the Applicants to give up their occupation of the property or refrain from exercising rights or remedies in relation to it. It is not enough to say that Mr Ayub or Ms Arboleda entered the property without the Applicants’ permission – such actions may found a claim in trespass but do not in our judgment, without more, amount to an offence under sections 1(3) and/or (3A) of the 1977 Act. Conclusions[36]Having carefully considered the evidence, for the reasons set out above, we are not satisfied on the facts as we have found them to be that the matters raised by the Applicants establish beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondent has committed any offence under sections 1(3) and/or (3A) of the 1977 Act nor under section 72(1) of the 2004 Act.[37]We accordingly dismiss the application. Name: Judge K Neave Date: 28 October 2025 Rights of appeal By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. If the application is not made within the 28-day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28-day time limit; the tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber).