" AND UPON the parties being in agreement as to the position and ownership of the eastern boundary, but not in agreement as to the terms of the easement in relation to the eastern boundary."
" the area of the easement has been eroded by successive owners of Heyshaw Spring Farm, culminating in the defendants' accelerating this process to a level that constitutes substantial interference with the claimants' right "
" AND UPON the Claimants indicating that they intend either to amend the Claim or bring fresh proceedings so as to include a claim in nuisance or such other claim as they deem appropriate and upon it being recorded that the Court would be content for any new or amended Particulars of Claim to be in schedule form and the Defendants confirming, by Counsel, that no objection or point would be taken as to the form of any Particulars of Claim drafted in such manner. For the avoidance of doubt, the Defendants making no concessions whatsoever as to the contents or matters raised in or by any such Particulars of Claim"
"(1) The Claimants shall be granted permission to amend their claim to add a further claim in private nuisance for alleged loss of quiet enjoyment of the Claimants' property due to the actions of the Defendants ("the Malice Claim") as particularised in the form of the Scott Schedule appearing at pages 3 to 41 of the Application Bundle ("the Malice Schedule"), save that the Claimant shall add to the Malice Schedule any reference required in relation to further photographs relied upon that appear in the Supplemental Bundle by inserting the annotation at the appropriate place of a reference to the Supplemental Bundle and the page thereof in the format: prefix "[SB:[Page no]]"
" The right with or without workmen and materials but on foot only to enter upon the said adjoining land retained by the Vendor so far as is necessary for repairing maintaining renewing painting and pointing any part of the Eastern and Southern walls of the buildings included in the property hereby conveyed "
" [18] A simple distillation, so far as material for present purposes, can be set out uncontroversially as follows: (1) When interpreting a written contract, the court is concerned to identify the intention of the parties by reference to what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have understood them to be using the language in the contract to mean. It does so by focussing on the meaning of the relevant words in their documentary, factual and commercial context. That meaning has to be assessed in the light of (i) the natural and ordinary meaning of the clause, (ii) any other relevant provisions of the contract, (iii) the overall purpose of the clause and the contract, (iv) the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the document was executed, and (v) commercial common sense, but (vi) disregarding subjective evidence of any party's intentions; (2) The reliance placed in some cases on commercial common sense and surrounding circumstances should not be invoked to undervalue the importance of the language of the provision which is to be construed. The exercise of interpreting a provision involves identifying what the parties meant through the eyes of a reasonable reader, and, save perhaps in a very unusual case, that meaning is most obviously to be gleaned from the language of the provision. Unlike commercial common sense and the surrounding circumstances, the parties have control over the language they use in a contract. And, again save perhaps in a very unusual case, the parties must have been specifically focussing on the issue covered by the provision when agreeing the wording of that provision; (3) When it comes to considering the centrally relevant words to be interpreted, the clearer the natural meaning, the more difficult it is to justify departing from it. The less clear they are, or, to put it another way, the worse their drafting, the more ready the court can properly be to depart from their natural meaning. However, that does not justify the court embarking on an exercise of searching for, let alone constructing, drafting infelicities in order to facilitate a departure from the natural meaning; (4) Commercial common sense is not to be invoked retrospectively. The mere fact that a contractual arrangement, if interpreted according to its natural language, has worked out badly, or even disastrously, for one of the parties is not a reason for departing from the natural language. Commercial common sense is only relevant to the extent of how matters would or could have been perceived by the parties, or by reasonable people in the position of the parties, as at the date that the contract was made; (5) While commercial common sense is a very important factor to take into account when interpreting a contract, a court should be very slow to reject the natural meaning of a provision as correct simply because it appears to be a very imprudent term for one of the parties to have agreed, even ignoring the benefit of wisdom of hindsight. The purpose of interpretation is to identify what the parties have agreed, not what the court thinks that they should have agreed. Accordingly, when interpreting a contract a judge should avoid re-writing it in an attempt to assist an unwise party or to penalise an astute party; (6) When interpreting a contractual provision, one can only take into account facts or circumstances which existed at the time the contract was made, and which were known or reasonably available to both parties. [19] Thus the court is concerned to identify the intention of the parties by reference to what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have understood them to be using the language in the contract to mean. The court's task is to ascertain the objective meaning of the language which the parties have chosen to express their agreement. This is not a literalist exercise; the court must consider the contract as a whole and, depending on the nature, formality, and quality of drafting of the contract, give more or less weight to elements of the wider context in reaching its view as to that objective meaning. The interpretative exercise is a unitary one involving an iterative process by which each suggested interpretation is checked against the provisions of the contract and its commercial consequences investigated ."
" The more important principles in this area can be summarised as follows: (1) interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the execution of the document; (2) the court will focus on the meaning of the relevant words in their documentary, factual and commercial context; (3) the meaning of the words is to be assessed in the light of— (a) the natural and ordinary meaning of the provision; (b) any other relevant provisions in the document; (c) the overall purpose of the relevant provisions; (d) the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the document was executed; (e) commercial common sense; (4) the process is an objective one in which one disregards subjective evidence as to the intentions of the parties; (5) the general rule is that all relevant facts and circumstances can be taken into account as an aid to interpretation of the words used in the document; (6) as an exception to the general rule referred to in (5) above, the court will not take into account the contents of pre-contractual negotiations save in so far as those negotiations reveal the existence of a background fact which is otherwise relevant; (7) there is a further exception to the general rule referred to in (5) above where the document in question is only effective when registered in a publicly accessible register. (This latter point does not give rise to any issues in this case. I would in any event question its application in case like this where the land was unregistered at the time of the relevant conveyance). "
" The right ....to enter....so far as is necessary for repairing, maintaining, renewing, painting (and pointing any part of the Eastern and Southern walls of) the buildings included in the property hereby conveyed."
" The Defendants accept that the [Access] Right permits the Claimants to enter Spring Farm for the purpose stated above (i.e. for repairing etc.) and accepts that these purposes include cleaning the windows and gutters. It is also further accepted that the [Access] Right on a true construction grants the Claimants a right to carry out work to the roof and chimneys of the building in question."
" [37] In order to reach a conclusion about the applicability of s.62 it is necessary to consider both the features observable on the ground at the date of the conveyances in 1998 and the use made of the claimed rights."
"[36] It is common ground that, for the purposes of s.62, if a quasi-easement falls within the category of easements "enjoyed with" the land conveyed, there is no additional requirement that such an easement must be necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the land: Watts v Kelson (1871) 6 Ch App 166. In this respect s.62 differs from and is broader than the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows . It is difficult to see how Mr and Mrs Wood could succeed under the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows if they fail under s.62. Since the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows is concerned with implication, while section 62 operates by way of express grant that is, perhaps, not surprising."
" It is not every interference with the full enjoyment of the easement that amounts in law to a disturbance; there must be some sensible abridgment of the enjoyment of the tenement to which it is attached, although it is not necessary that there should be a total destruction of the easement. The injury complained of must be of a substantial nature, in the ordinary apprehension of mankind, and not one arising merely from caprice or peculiar physical constitution of the party aggrieved "
"[21] whether the defendant's use of land has caused a substantial interference with the ordinary use of the claimant's land."
"[22] Courts have adopted varying phraseology to express the point that the interference with the use of the claimant's land must exceed a minimum level of seriousness to justify the law's intervention. The terms "real", "substantial", "material" and "significant" have all been used. Put the other way round, the courts will not entertain claims for minor annoyances.... [23] The test is objective. What amounts to a material or substantial interference is not judged by what the claimant finds annoying or inconvenient but by the standards of an ordinary or average person in the claimant's position. As famously expressed by Knight Bruce V-C in Walter v Selfe (1851) 4 De G&Sm 315, 322, the question is whether the interference ought to be considered a material inconvenience not merely according to elegant or dainty modes and habits of living, but according to plain and sober and simple notions among the English people; see also Barr v Biffer Waste Services Limited[2013] QB 455 , para 36(ii)."
"if either party turns his house, or any portion of it, to unusual purposes in such a manner as to produce a substantial injury to his neighbour, it appears to me that that is not according to principle or authority a reasonable use of his own property; and his neighbour, shewing substantial injury, is entitled to protection." (Emphasis added.)
"There must be, then, some principle on which such cases must be excepted. It seems to me that that principle may be deduced from the character of these cases, and is this, viz, that those acts necessary for the common and ordinary use and occupation of land and houses may be done, if conveniently done , without subjecting those who do them to an action. (Emphasis added.)"
"[36] [In Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd[1997] AC 655 ] The House of Lords reaffirmed the general rule at common law that anyone may build whatever they like on their land, unless this violates an agreement not to do so or an acquired right to light or to a flow of air through a defined aperture: see p 685D—F (Lord Goff), p 699C—H (Lord Lloyd), p 709A—H (Lord Hoffmann) and p 726B—H (Lord Hope). It followed that interference with the use of the claimants land caused by the mere presence of a building on the defendant's land could not give rise to a claim for private nuisance. The same principle explains why no claim lies for interference with a view or prospect. [37] The right to build (and demolish) structures is fundamental to the common and ordinary use of land, involving as it does the basic freedom to decide whether and how to occupy the space comprising the property. It follows that interference resulting from construction (or demolition) works will not be actionable provided it is.."conveniently done" that is to say, in so far as all reasonable and proper steps are taken to ensure that no undue inconvenience is caused to neighbours..."
"[39] There is now a considerable body of authority setting out the lessons of experience and of science in relation to the judicial determination of facts. Recent first instance authorities include Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd[2013] EWHC 3650 (Comm) (Leggatt J, as he then was) and two decisions of Mostyn J: Lachaux v Lachaux[2017] EWHC 385 (Fam) [2017] 4 WLR 57 and Carmarthenshire County Council v Y[2017] EWFC 36 [2017] 4 WLR 136 . Key aspects of this learning were distilled by Stewart J in Kimathi v Foreign and Commonwealth Office[2018] EWHC 2066 (QB) at [96]: "i) Gestmin: (1) We believe memories to be more faithful than they are. Two common errors are to suppose (1) that the stronger and more vivid the recollection, the more likely it is to be accurate; (2) the more confident another person is in their recollection, the more likely it is to be accurate. (2) Memories are fluid and malleable, being constantly rewritten whenever they are retrieved. This is even true of "flash bulb" memories (a misleading term), i.e. memories of experiencing or learning of a particularly shocking or traumatic event. (3) Events can come to be recalled as memories which did not happen at all or which happened to somebody else. (4) The process of civil litigation itself subjects the memories of witnesses to powerful biases. (5) Considerable interference with memory is introduced in civil litigation by the procedure of preparing for trial. Statements are often taken a long time after relevant events and drafted by a lawyer who is conscious of the significance for the issues in the case of what the witness does or does not say. (6) The best approach from a judge is to base factual findings on inferences drawn from documentary evidence and known or probable facts. "
"...this approach applies equally to all fact-finding exercises, especially where the facts in issue are in the distant past. This approach does not dilute the importance that the law places on cross-examination as a vital component of due process, but it does place it in its correct context. 45 The dissenting speech of Lord Pearce in Onassis and Calogeropoulos v Vergottis[1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep 403 , 431; Robert Goff LJ in Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA[1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1 , 57." [40] This is not all new thinking, as the dates of the cases cited in the footnote make clear. Armagas v Mundogas , otherwise known as The Ocean Frost, has been routinely cited over the past 35 years. Lord Bingham's paper on "
"..we are aware that you require access onto our property in order to carry out works. Now, due to the lack of regard which you have proven to us and the immediate area around Old Farm we are very worried about how your future works will affect us and our property so, we are proposing a way forward that should avoid further upset. With regard to any intended works by yourself or workmen on your behalf we will now require that the notice procedure be carried through and adhered to. All future works concerning points two and three and any others that are likely to cause disruption can be detailed in "notices" served by you (owner) to us (adjoining land owners) art least one month before you wish to start work. Due to the planned nature of the works this means that you may need to serve several notices so that the correct notice procedure is carried out following the relevant guidelines. Hence, prior to any works being done as outlined above we shall then have an opportunity to reply within the permitted time period; meaning that further discussion and or amendments is requested and agreed or not by either party BEFORE the start date. You will no doubt agree that by following the notice procedure any further upset and damage caused shall be kept to a minimum or at best avoided "
" We fear that this dispute has become an obsession, particularly for Mrs Rolph which must be damaging to her mental health, her family and certainly to our wellbeing. When children feel compelled to get involved on their parents' behalf. Someone needs to call a halt ."
" I mean they used to use it as a torture method. Its lethal. I've dealt with it at my daughter's and it grows like..."