“10. On19th November 2012 (namely day before the fire) I had been to Kempton Race course to collect oil which was transferred into the IBC in the back of my van. 11. I recall it was a busy day on the roads and there was lots of traffic. 12. Whilst I was stuck in traffic I had a call from John Howard advising that he needed to leave early due to a family matter as someone was ill. I can’t recall the exact time of this call but I think it was around 2pm. He asked that I drop the IBC off on site and lock up when I left. 13. By the time I arrived at the Fryclean site I would estimate it was around 3.30pm to 4pm although I can’t now recall the exact time. 14. When I arrived, I recall the site was locked and there was no one on site. I unlocked the gate, reversed up alongside the boiler room being the usual drop-off area. 15. As there was no one on site to remove the IBC from the van with a forklift truck, I walked over to the IBC storage area and dragged an empty IBC over to the passenger side of the van in the drop off area. 16. Having been back to site I would estimate that the edge of the IBC was around 4ft to 5ft in front of the boiler room. 17. I then pumped out the oil into the empty IBC as I needed the IBC in the van to be empty to enable me to collect oil the following day. …”
“… If we look at page 83 at paragraph 34, Mr. Smith says this, bottom of the page: “It was not usual practice to leave IBCs containing oil just anywhere on the site, they were either taken to the tipping room for emptying immediately after weighing or if they could not be weighed they would be stored in the IBC storage area opposite the tipping room. To my knowledge an IBC containing oil had never been left anywhere else”
“50. It is my opinion that had the ‘relevant IBC’ been stored in the designated storage area, at a safe distance from a structure, any resulting structure fire would not have caused the ‘relevant IBC’ to become involved in a fire. A fire in a structure would, in my opinion, have been limited to the structure its self [sic], with limited external spread. A fire in a structure would typically have been ‘aggressively attacked’ by the initial fire crews, leading to its early extinguishment. 51. The involvement of the ‘relevant IBC’ in early stages of the fire in my opinion caused 1000 1 of waste cooking oil to leak on to the floor of the yard. The sloping bund area, to the south by the canteen, could only take a maximum volume of 421 1; the remainder of the 1000 1 (approximately 580 1) flowed along the yard to the east. The waste oil, once ignited, spread the fire along the yard to the east (direction of slope). …”
“63) A fire in the portacabin and boiler room would, in my opinion, have been limited to the structure itself, with limited external spread. Such a fire would typically have been aggressively 'attacked' by the initial fire crews, leading to its early extinguishment. 64) The involvement of the 'relevant IBC' in early stages of the fire in my opinion caused 1000lts of waste cooking oil to leak on to the floor of the yard. The sloping bund area, to the south by the canteen, could only take a maximum volume of 421Its. When the capacity of the sloping ground had been exceeded, approximately 580Its of cooking oil would have flowed eastwards along the yard hemmed in by the plinth running along the east west axis. The oil carrying burning debris, when ignited would have spread the fire to the east. 65) The 'relevant IBC' had a significant impact on the spread of the fire, and that had it not been for its presence, the fire would have been contained by the fire service and limited to the porta-cabin and the boiler room with minimal damage to the warming room or the remainder of the site.”