“Although applications for leave to appeal under Section 69 are normally on paper without an oral hearing, the course adopted in the present case of hearing oral argument on the application for leave at the same hearing as for the Section 68 application, is a sensible and more cost efficient approach, particularly having regard to the fact that the underlying facts and legal submissions relevant to both applications are so closely related.”
“A detailed development appraisal of the Combined Site inclusive of a 25% gross developer’s margin”
“…Prior to applying for Planning Permission the Buyer [Newfield] shall provide the Seller [the Tomlinsons] with the Appraisal and the Buyer and Seller or their nominated Quantity Surveyors shall agree the Appraisal. Once this is agreed, it shall form the basis of the calculation of the anticipated profitability of the development of the Combined Site. In the event that the Buyer sells the units comprising the Combined Site for a value in excess of that set out in the Appraisal, then that excess value shall be divided equally between the Buyer and the Seller within 14 days of the sale of the last unit in the Combined Site. The Buyer undertakes to proceed in good faith and to perform its best endeavours to ensure that it completes the construction and sale of all of the units in the Combined Site at the best price reasonably obtainable and as expeditiously as possible….”
“A dispute has arisen with regard to the interpretation of Clauses 1.8 and 20 of the Contract, which provide for an Appraisal to determine the minimum development value and the division of any additional profit stemming from the eventual sale of the development. The nature of the dispute is limited to the way in which the minimum development value is calculated in the Appraisal and, in particular, the calculation of the Buyer’s profit therein.”
“6.1 Under clause 20 it is necessary to establish a figure (say, “Y”) as the “basis of calculation” in order to proceed to the division of excess value as set out therein. 6.2 If, upon the appraisal as set out in paragraph 3.1 and 3.2 above, the total development costs equal “X”, the Claimants contend that on a proper construction of the parties’ agreement, Y = X + 25% X This can also be expressed as Y = 1.25 X. This will be referred to as the “direct approach”. 6.3 If, upon the appraisal as set out in paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 above, the total development costs equal “X”, the Respondents contend that on a proper construction of the parties’ agreement Y – 25% Y = X This can also be expressed as Y = 1.333X. The respondent’s approach is artificial and requires, as an intermediate stage, for a figure to be devised which, less 25% amounts to X. For this reason, it will be referred to as the “hypothetical approach”
“6.1 (a) It is accepted that under clause 20 it is necessary to establish a figure (say ‘Y’) as the basis of calculation. (b) What JLT appear to overlook is that when the Feasibility Appraisals were produced in January 2002 by NCL, the primary reason for which was to establish a land value figure, the first figure to be written down was the projected sales figure. (c) This being the case it is perfectly simple and natural to calculate 25% of this figure to represent the ‘gross developer’s margin’. 6.2. (a) It is denied that the JLT formula represents the proper construction of the Parties’ Agreement. (b) Such a formula completely ignores the effect of the word ‘gross’ in the phrase ‘25% gross developer’s margin”. (c) There is no reason to consider the method set out by JLT as the ‘direct approach’ when one considers that the original method used in the Feasibility Appraisals by NCL was of itself the ‘direct approach’ in that 25% was applied to the forecast sales revenue. 6.3. (a) NCL agrees that its method of applying 25% to sales revenue gives the same answer as applying a one third addition to costs. (b) It is denied that NCL’s method is a hypothetical approach when one considers the history of the documentation particularly the Feasibility Appraisals dated8th January 2002 and the Dewhurst letter of18th January 2002 . • NCL draws the Arbitrator’s attention to the use in paragraph 3 of Dewhurst’s letter of18th January 2002 of the phrase ‘25% gross developer’s margin’. • NCL says that this phrase was taken by Dewhurst from the various alternative Feasibility Appraisals dated8th January 2002 and included within JLT’s Statement of Claim which make it plain that percentage growth margin is obtained by expressing the actual margin (profit) as a percentage of sale revenue and not as a percentage of cost.” (b) What JLT appear to overlook is that when the Feasibility Appraisals were produced in January 2002 by NCL, the primary reason for which was to establish a land value figure, the first figure to be written down was the projected sales figure. (c) This being the case it is perfectly simple and natural to calculate 25% of this figure to represent the ‘gross developer’s margin’. (b) Such a formula completely ignores the effect of the word ‘gross’ in the phrase ‘25% gross developer’s margin”. (c) There is no reason to consider the method set out by JLT as the ‘direct approach’ when one considers that the original method used in the Feasibility Appraisals by NCL was of itself the ‘direct approach’ in that 25% was applied to the forecast sales revenue. (b) It is denied that NCL’s method is a hypothetical approach when one considers the history of the documentation particularly the Feasibility Appraisals dated8th January 2002 and the Dewhurst letter of18th January 2002 . • NCL draws the Arbitrator’s attention to the use in paragraph 3 of Dewhurst’s letter of18th January 2002 of the phrase ‘25% gross developer’s margin’. • NCL says that this phrase was taken by Dewhurst from the various alternative Feasibility Appraisals dated8th January 2002 and included within JLT’s Statement of Claim which make it plain that percentage growth margin is obtained by expressing the actual margin (profit) as a percentage of sale revenue and not as a percentage of cost.”
“The appraisals submitted by NCL to JLT, whether 25% or 33⅓% is added to cost, effectively still produce a projected sales value. If the intent of the Agreement was that the detailed development appraisal produced an ‘actual’ sales value there would never have been any excess profit to be shared.”
“…neither party could predict the likely sales values of a residential development due for completion in about two years’ time. The Respondents themselves have advertised many different sale prices. Reasonable persons in the parties’ shoes would, in May 2002, have therefore considered a cost based appraisal as the reasonable approach to setting the base development value. Inevitably that appraisal would have included a best estimate at the time of likely construction cost, together with costs of site acquisition and professional fees. There was no necessity to define “costs” for this purpose….”
“3. The burden of proof is on JLT to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that ‘25% gross developer’s margin’ means 25% on Cost. … 5. It is not for NCL to prove its own contrary argument that 25% gross developer’s margin means 25% on Sales Revenue. … 29. On the basis of the above, the meaning of the phrase and intention of the parties is clear:- 25% gross developer’s margin is calculated by taking 25% of anticipated Sales Revenue and not anticipated Cost.” 25% gross developer’s margin is calculated by taking 25% of anticipated Sales Revenue and not anticipated Cost.”
“10. It is common ground that the Appraisal would comprise the costs of development, a 25% margin and a sale value. The actual sale value will not be known until the last dwelling has been constructed and sold. 11. The Claimants claim that their share of the proceeds of sale is half the difference between the Appraisal cost as increased by 25% and the actual sale value. The Respondent claims that the Claimants’ share is to be calculated at half the difference between the Appraisal cost, and the actual sale value as reduced by 25%.”
“The actual figures are not yet known but as long as the actual sales figures is greater than the cost plus 33.33% then the arbitration will have been of benefit to the claimant and thereby entitling him to his costs.”
“[Section] 68 is really designed as a long stop, only available in extreme cases where the tribunal has gone so wrong in its conduct of the Arbitration that justice calls at for it to be corrected.”
“Further, intervention under Section 68 should be invoked only in a clear case of serious irregularity. The court’s powers to interfere with an arbitrator’s discretionary decision as to how he should exercise his discretion under Section 30(1) should not be engaged unless it is clear that in exercising his discretion he has failed to have regard to the relevant facts and to his duty under Section 33. Unless he has arrived at a conclusion which no reasonable arbitrator could have arrived at in the case in question having regard to his duties under Section 33, it cannot be said that his decision is capable of being characterised as a serious irregularity.”