R v Spriddell [2026] EWHC 567 (SCCO)

[2026] EWHC 567 (SCCO)Case No T20207211SCCO Reference: SC-2025-CRI-000066
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
SENIOR COURTS COSTS OFFICE
Thomas More Building
Venue Royal Courts of JusticeDate 12 March 2026
London, WC2A 2LL
Before
COSTS JUDGE LEONARDRvSPRIDDELLDecision on Certifying a Point of Principle of General Importance under Regulation 11 of the Costs in Criminal Cases (General) Regulations 1986Applicant: Mr David SpriddellI am unable to certify a Point of Principle of General Importance, for the reasons set out below.COSTS JUDGE LEONARD
Between
SpriddellDefendantRCrown
[1]On 6 February 2026 I gave judgment dismissing the appeal of Mr David Spriddell (“The Applicant”) from the assessment, by the Legal Aid Agency’s Determining Officer, of the amount of costs recoverable by him under a defendant’s costs order made in his favour. The order had been made on 6 April 2023, under section 16(3) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, by the Crown Court at Southwark.[2]Following the dismissal of his appeal the Applicant has applied for me to certify a Point of Principle of General Importance. This is my decision on that application, which should be read in conjunction with my judgment on the appeal.[3]I will explain the statutory framework for the application.

The 1986 Regulations

[4]The costs recoverable under a defendant’s costs order are assessed by reference to the provisions of Part III of the Costs in Criminal Cases (General) Regulations 1986. Regulation 5 provides for the costs payable under a section 16 order to be determined by an officer appointed by the Lord Chancellor. In this case, that was the Legal Aid Agency’s Determining Officer.[5]Regulation 10 provides for an appeal from the Determining Officer to a costs judge. Sub-paragraphs (1) and (12) provide:
“(1) Where the appropriate authority has given its reasons for its decision on a redetermination under regulation 9, an applicant who is dissatisfied with that decision may appeal to a costs judge… (12) The costs judge shall have the same powers as the appropriate authority under these Regulations and, in the exercise of such powers, may alter the redetermination of the appropriate authority in respect of any sum allowed, whether by increase or decrease, as he thinks fit…”
[6]The appeal dismissed by me on 6 February had been made under regulation 10.[7]Regulation 11 provides for a further appeal to the High Court. The relevant provisions, for present purposes, are as follows:
“11. — Appeals to the High Court (1) An applicant who is dissatisfied with the decision of a costs judge on an appeal under regulation 10 may apply to a costs judge to certify a point of principle of general importance. (2) Subject to regulation 12 , an application under paragraph (1) shall be made within 21 days of notification of a costs judge 's decision… (3) Where a costs judge certifies a point of principle of general importance, the applicant may appeal to the High Court against the decision of a costs judge on an appeal under regulation 10, and the Lord Chancellor shall be a respondent to the appeal… (8) The judge shall have the same powers as the appropriate authority and a costs judge under these Regulations and may reverse, affirm or amend the decision appealed against or make such other order as he thinks fit.”

The Merits of the Application

[8]The Applicant has made his application under regulation 30 of the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013. Those are the wrong regulations, but as there is no material difference in the relevant provisions that does not matter.[9]The amounts payable under a defendant’s costs order are payable by reference to prescribed rates and scales published by the Lord Chancellor. They incorporate provision to the effect that where, owing to the exceptional circumstances of a case, the payment due to an advocate in accordance with those prescribed rates and scales would not provide reasonable remuneration, it is open to the Determining Officer to allow such amount as would appear to be reasonable remuneration.[10]Paragraph 5.1 of the prescribed rates and scales requires that “reasonable remuneration” is to be interpreted as if the determination was being conducted under the “Criminal Legal Aid Regulations”, which I have found to mean the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013.[11]The Determining Officer found that this was such an exceptional case, and allowed the fees of counsel, as advocates, in an amount that she found would represent “reasonable remuneration” in a legally aided case.[12]On appeal, I rejected the Applicant’s argument that the Determining Officer had not made adequate allowance for counsel’s fees, including by comparison to counsel for another defendant who had been paid under the Very High Costs Case IFFO scheme (“the IFFO scheme”).[13]The point that the Applicant now wishes me to certify as of general importance is whether, in determining the “reasonable renumeration” payable, the court could or should have regard to the potential fixed fees that might, in a legally aided case, have been payable to counsel under the IFFO scheme.[14]Paragraphs 59 to 61 of my judgment on the appeal addressed the point in this way:59. “Two particular points have troubled me in the course of preparing this judgment. The first is that the 2013 Regulations (in accordance with regulation 3(8), and excluding some provisions for litigators which have no bearing on this appeal) expressly do not apply to VHCCs except in relation to the reporting requirements and prescribed rates set out at regulations 12, 12A and Schedule 6. There must, accordingly, be at least a respectable case to the effect that an IFFO cannot be a valid comparator when calculating reasonable remuneration by reference to the 2013 Regulations.60. Further… it must also be arguable that that one must, in identifying “reasonable remuneration” for counsel under paragraph 5.1 of the published rates and scales, look only to the provisions of the 2013 Regulations (including the extent to which they do apply to VHCCs) and that one can only depart from the fees prescribed by the 2013 Regulations to the extent that those provisions themselves allow for that. As I noted in Perkins, the circumstances in which one can do so are limited, and none of them seem to apply here.61. That is not however the way in which the Lord Chancellor’s case is put. As I understand it, the Lord Chancellor’s case is (consistently with Perkins) only that one must, in assessing the amount due under a defendant’s costs order, have regard to Legal Aid rates rather than open market rates. I can, accordingly, put those two points aside for present purposes.”[15]It should, I believe, be evident from the above paragraphs that although I considered the proposition that payment under an IFFO could not be a valid comparator when determining reasonable remuneration, that proposition did not form any part of the reasoning that led to my decision on the appeal.[16]On the contrary, the Determining Officer’s decision had been made on the basis that the amounts paid to another advocate under the IFFO scheme could be such a comparator for the purposes of determining reasonable remuneration. Her conclusion however was that, on the facts of the case, the comparator offered by the Applicant was not a good one. I agreed with that conclusion.[17]The appeal was, accordingly, determined on the basis that an IFFO could be a valid comparator. I felt obliged to raise the possibility that it could not, but that was, for the purposes of the appeal, an entirely academic point.[18]It is, in consequence, not a point upon which the Applicant could found an appeal, and not a point which I should certify as a Point of Principle of General Importance for the purposes of such an appeal.