HD & Ors v North Devon Healthcare Trust & Ors [2026] EWHC 2009 (SCCO)

[2026] EWHC 2009 (SCCO)Case No:SC-2021-APP-000929
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
SENIOR COURTS COSTS OFFICE
Thomas More Building,
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand,Hearing Hearing date: 3 July 2026
London WC2A 2LL
Before
COSTS JUDGE JOSEPH
Between
HDClaimantsHLClaimantCBClaimantCMClaimantCDClaimantCTClaimantNorth Devon Healthcare TrustDefendantsUniversity Hospital Southampton NHS Foundation TrustDefendantUniversity Hospitals Bristol & Weston NHS Foundation TrustDefendantEast Sussex Healthcare TrustDefendantSouth Warwickshire NHS Foundation TrustDefendantDarren HanisonDefendant
Mr Alexander Hutton KC and Ms Margaret McDonald for Defendants for The Claimants did not appear and were not represented for The Claimant’s former solicitor, Mr Darren Hanison, did not appear and was not represented
JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10am on 4 August 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email and by release to the National Archives..............................Date 2026-07-03

Costs Judge Joseph:

[1]This judgment concerns various costs issues in 6 linked claims (“the 6 linked claims”) arising out of alleged failings in the consent process relating to the use of synthetic mesh in the treatment of female pelvic conditions, such as urinary stress incontinence. The 6 linked claims were a small part of a large cohort of similar claims in which Mr Darren Hanison, a sole practitioner solicitor trading as Fortitude Law (“Mr Hanison”), was instructed to act on behalf of claimants who wished to pursue claims for damages against various NHS trusts in England.[2]I refer in this judgment to “the defendants”. So that there is no confusion, that means the first 6 defendants listed in the heading of this case. It does not include the 7th defendant (Mr Hanison) and where I refer to him, I use his name separately.[3]NHS Resolution was notified of 305 claims by claimants who were represented by Mr Hanison. It received letters of claim in approximately 100 of those claims. Of those claims, 58 were compromised on terms which were on substantially the same terms as those which were agreed in the 6 linked claims i.e. for the payment by the particular NHS trust concerned, of damages, and reasonable legal costs.[4]The damages payable to the claimants in the 6 linked claims as a result of the various compromises have been paid by the defendants concerned. Mr Hanison commenced detailed assessment proceedings in respect of the costs of the claimants in the 6 linked claims and did so, by amongst other things, serving on the relevant defendant a signed and certified bill of costs. The defendants applied to link those cases together on various grounds, including that each of the bills contained significant similarities, and that the issues which might be raised in points of dispute to the 6 bills were going to be similar, if not identical.[5]On 7 July 2022, Costs Judge James heard and granted the application to link the 6 claims together. The 6 linked claims were then listed for a 5 day hearing to decide 7 preliminary issues which had been raised in points of dispute, and which were common to each of the 6 bills.[6]The first hearing of those preliminary issues was listed to take place from 28 November to 2 December 2022. The Judge was unfortunately unwell on 28 November, and the matter was stood down until the next day. Counsel then acting for the claimants served a skeleton argument late on 28 November. On 29 November, it became apparent that Mr Hanison had not lodged the papers which were required to be lodged, in breach of, in particular, para 13.11 of the Practice Direction to CPR Part 47 (“PD47”). An attempt was made to provide the court with a laptop computer late on 28 November. When the Judge came to look at it on 29 November, it became apparent that it did not contain all the necessary papers. Files relating to only three of the 6 linked claims were on it. It was, as a result, not possible for the preliminary issues hearing to proceed.[7]Costs Judge James made an order on 29 November which, amongst other things, adjourned the preliminary issues hearing to a further 5 day hearing (plus two days of judicial reading time) and which ordered the claimants to pay the costs of the hearing on 28 and 29 November, to be assessed if not agreed. I interject here to observe first, that the costs order made by Costs Judge James was against the claimants in the 6 linked claims only, and not against their solicitor, and second, that it was a standard basis order because it was silent as to the basis on which the costs would be assessed (see CPR Part 44.3(4)).[8]The preliminary issues hearing was then relisted for 27 – 31 March 2023 before Costs Judge James. The Judge heard submissions on all the preliminary issues and gave judgment on some of them. She reserved judgment on other issues and, on 13 April 2023, she provided the parties with a reserved judgment. As not all the preliminary issues had been dealt with, it was necessary for there to be a third hearing. The matter was relisted for 17 April 2023. At that third hearing, Costs Judge James dealt with the remaining preliminary issues.[9]On 18 May 2023, the Solicitors Regulation Authority intervened into Mr Hanison’s practice. The reasons given on its website for the intervention were that there was reason to suspect dishonesty on the part of Mr Hanison in connection with his practice (reference was made to paragraph 1(1)(a)(i) of Schedule 1 to the Solicitors Act 1974 as amended) and that Mr Hanison had failed to comply with rules made under sections 31, 31 and 37(2)(c) of the Solicitors Act 1974 (as amended) (reference was made to paragraph 1(1)(c) of Schedule 1 to the 1974 Act).[10]On 16 August 2023, Costs Judge James made an order granting anonymity to each of the claimants in the 6 linked claims.[11]The firm of Lester Aldridge was appointed to act as the SRA’s Intervening Agent. Fortitude Law then ceased to trade. On 14 May 2025, the SRA commenced disciplinary proceedings against Mr Hanison which ultimately led to a disciplinary hearing in the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal on 24 February 2026. Mr Hanison faced 17 allegations of professional misconduct arising from his handling of numerous medical negligence and product liability claims on behalf of several clients between 2015 – 2023. Those allegations included allegations of dishonesty, misleading clients and other parties, poor service and serious regulatory breaches.[12]Mr Hanison admitted many of those allegations, and some of his admissions included allegations of dishonesty. The SDT found several other allegations of dishonesty to have been proved on the balance of probabilities. Following a lengthy written judgment dated 12 March 2026, the SDT ordered that Mr Hanison be struck off the Roll of Solicitors. He was also ordered to pay a substantial sum in respect of the costs of the disciplinary proceedings.[13]After the SRA had intervened into Mr Hanison’s practice, DAC Beachcroft LLP (“Beachcrofts”), the solicitors for the defendants in the 6 linked claims, wrote to each of the claimants in those claims to suggest that they should obtain independent legal advice in relation to the costs process. Some of the claimants appear to have done that but none of them has engaged actively, or to any significant extent, in the costs process since the SRA’s intervention into Mr Hanison’s practice.[14]On 10 June 2025, Senior Costs Judge Rowley made an order which stated amongst other things, “Darren Hanison who practised as Fortitude, having ceased to act on behalf of the Claimants be immediately removed from the Court Record.” Hence, it was not until 10 June 2025 that Mr Hanison was formally removed from the record as the solicitor for the claimants in the 6 linked claims.[15]Since the end of the hearing before Costs Judge James on 31 March 2023, apart from her Order granting anonymity to the claimants in the 6 linked claims, nothing has taken place in the detailed assessment proceedings relating to the 6 linked claims. Also, none of the other claimants in the cohort of claims has commenced detailed assessment proceedings in respect of their claims for costs.

The application now before the court

[16]On 12 December 2025, the defendants in the 6 linked claims issued an application for various orders. The substance of the relief sought was as follows: i) A declaration that the retainers and, if different, the Conditional Fee Agreements, between each of the claimants in the 6 linked claims and their solicitor, have been terminated by Mr Hanison without good reason on his part for so doing, and are therefore unenforceable and/or that the retainers and/or Conditional Fee Agreements are otherwise unenforceable. ii) The Bills of Costs and detailed assessment proceedings in the 6 linked claims are struck out forthwith and/or all of the costs in the Bills be disallowed on the grounds that there has been an abuse of the process of the court on behalf of the claimants and/or there has been misconduct by the claimants’ solicitor, Mr Hanison. Alternatively, an Order that unless the Claimants in the 6 linked claims request a substantive detailed assessment hearing within 14 days, the Bills of Costs in the 6 linked claims will be struck out and/or all of the costs claimed in those Bills of Costs will be disallowed. iii) Orders that Mr Hanison shall repay various payments on account of costs, totalling £92,000, made to him by NHS Resolution in respect of costs of the claimants in the 6 linked claims, within 14 days. iv) An Order against each of the claimants in the cohort who are not the claimants in the 6 linked claims that unless they commence detailed assessment proceedings within 14 days, all of the costs to which they would otherwise be entitled, shall be disallowed. v) An Order that Mr Hanison should pay the defendants’ costs of the abortive hearing on 28 and 29 November 2022 and that they be summarily assessed and paid within 14 days. Alternatively, an order that unless Mr Hanison files, within 14 days of service of this Order on him, an application notice for a hearing to show cause why he should not pay those costs, he is to pay them within 14 days This paragraph in the application notice is not entirely clear. What appears above is what appears to me to have been intended to have been requested at this point in the application. . vi) An Order that Mr Hanison should pay the defendants’ costs of and associated with the detailed assessment proceedings in the 6 linked claims and that they be summarily assessed. Alternatively, an order that unless Mr Hanison files, within 14 days of service of this Order on him, an application notice for a hearing to show cause why he should not pay those costs, he is to pay them within 14 days. vii) An Order that Mr Hanison should pay the costs of the application issued on 12 December 2025 and that they be summarily assessed. Alternatively, an order that unless Mr Hanison files, within 14 days of service of this Order on him, an application notice for a hearing to show cause why he should not pay those costs, he is to pay them within 14 days.[17]The defendants were represented at the hearing on 3 July 2026 by Mr Alexander Hutton KC and Ms Margaret McDonald. They provided a skeleton argument. I am grateful to both of them for their helpful submissions both in writing and orally.[18]The application was supported by a witness statement signed by Mr Mark Ashley on 12 December 2025, who is a solicitor and partner in Beachcrofts, and the solicitor who leads the team of solicitors and staff at Beachcrofts dealing with the defence to all of the mesh litigation claims. Prior to the hearing on 3 July, two further witness statements were signed by Mr Myles Mundill on 16 June and 2 July respectively, who is a solicitor and senior associate at Beachcrofts, also involved in the conduct of the defence of the various claims.

Service on Mr Hanison

[19]In his first witness statement, Mr Mundill recorded that the application notice and the notice of hearing for it were served on each of Mr Hanison, the SRA, Lester Aldridge and the claimants in the 6 linked claims. None responded to that correspondence, and none appeared or were represented at the hearing before me on 3 July. That witness statement was silent as to service on Mr Hanison of the evidence in support of the application.[20]After the hearing on 3 July, I considered further the question of service, given the nature of the applications which had been made, and against whom they were made. The main focus of the application was Mr Hanison. I was concerned that Mr Hanison might not have been served with the evidence on which the defendants had stated on their application notice they relied in support of the application. I was also concerned that Mr Hanison, having been removed from the court record by Senior Costs Judge Rowley’s order of 10 June 2025 i.e. some 6 months before the defendants issued the application now before the court, was not, at the moment, a party to the action nor representing a party in the action. I raised these matters with Mr Hutton and Ms McDonald in correspondence with them following the hearing.[21]That correspondence generated a further application by the defendants’ solicitors to join in Mr Hanison as a party to the action. A further witness statement signed by Mr Mundill was also filed in which evidence was given to the effect that in fact Mr Hanison had been served, prior to the hearing on 3 July, with the evidence in support of the application. I was then satisfied that Mr Hanison had been served with the evidence prior to the hearing on 3 July but it seemed to me that it was appropriate for him to be joined formally into the action for the purposes of the defendants’ application.[22]On 13 July 2026, I made an Order to that effect which included various directions requiring service on Mr Hanison of the latest application and the evidence in support of it. As that Order was made without a hearing, it included the usual paragraph that any party affected by the Order could apply to vary it, stay it or set it aside within 7 days of receipt of it. The Order also stated that if no application was made within that time, the court would proceed to determine the application dated 12 December 2025 without further submissions.[23]No party applied to vary, set aside or stay that order within the time stipulated in it for so doing. I am satisfied, in all the circumstances, that Mr Hanison, in particular, has had every reasonable opportunity to respond to application dated 12 December 2025 and to make any submissions he might have wished to make.[24]I deal with each of the paragraphs in the application notice as set out in paragraph 16 above, separately.

Paragraph (i) – declarations concerning the retainers and the CFAs

(i) – declarations concerning the retainers and the CFAs

[25]Mr Hutton contends that the retainers between the claimants in the 6 linked cases and Mr Hanison have been terminated by Mr Hanison, without good reason to do. Mr Hutton points to and relies on the intervention by the SRA into Mr Hanison’s practice, the shutting down of that practice, due to, amongst other things, the admitted dishonesty of Mr Hanison, his eventual striking off the Roll (thereby meaning that even if he had wanted to continue to act in the matter, he personally was prohibited from so doing), and the failure by Mr Hanison to take any steps in the detailed assessment proceedings for a considerable period of time. In addition, the claimants have stopped instructing Mr Hanison and he has been removed from the court record as their solicitor.[26]It is difficult to reach any other conclusion than that the retainer has been terminated by Mr Hanison without any good reason on his part to justify him so doing. There is no evidence of any conduct on the part of any of the claimants in the 6 linked claims which might have justified Mr Hanison terminating the retainers. It is a fundamental term of any retainer that the solicitor should act in the matter in which he is instructed. Failing to act in any way, and for such a long time, and without any credible explanation, given the circumstances of this case, constituted a repudiatory breach of the retainers by Mr Hanison.[27]I find that the claimants in the 6 linked claims accepted Mr Hanison’s repudiatory breach of the retainers by their conduct in not instructing him any further after his practice had been intervened. Some of them, very sensibly and justifiably, sought alternative legal advice, thereby expressly indicating that they no longer wished to avail themselves of his services. There is no evidence before the court that might suggest that either the SRA or its intervening agents, Lester Aldridge, have taken any steps in the costs proceedings on behalf, or instead of Mr Hanison since the SRA intervened into Mr Hanison’s practice. In short, Mr Hanison has abandoned the claimants in the 6 linked claims and their costs proceedings.[28]I therefore have no hesitation in concluding that the retainers have been terminated by Mr Hanison without there having been any good reason on his part to do so.[29]The declaration sought by the defendants invites the court to go further than making a simple declaration that the retainers have been terminated. The defendants seek a finding that the retainers are unenforceable. In support of that contention, the defendants say that the retainers were entire contracts and that, following unlawful termination by the solicitor, the solicitor is unable to enforce any rights he may have had under them.[30]It is necessary to consider the terms of the retainers. In his witness statement, Mr Ashley records that the claimant denoted as HD disclosed, through her new solicitors, the CFA which she had concluded with Mr Hanison. Of course, any privilege which might have attached to such a document belonged to HD and HD is entitled to waive that privilege. I am satisfied that she elected to waive privilege over the CFA having first taken advice from new solicitors. Mr Ashley exhibited a copy of the CFA at exhibit MKA 1 to his witness statement.[31]The CFA, unsurprisingly, is in fairly standard terms. It was signed by Mr Hanison on 26 September 2018 and by HD on some unspecified date. I set out below the relevant parts of it:
“What is covered by this Agreement • Your claim for damages for personal injury and financial loss arising from a urogynaelogical product implantation surgery • An application for pre-action or non-party disclosure • Any appeal by the Defendant • Any appeal you make against an interim Order or an Assessment of Costs • Any proceedings you take to enforce a Judgment, Order or Agreement • Negotiations about and/or a court assessment of the costs of the claim. (emphasis added) …. Paying us if you win If you win your claim, you pay our Basic Charges, our expenses, disbursements and a Success Fee. You are entitled to seek recovery from the Defendant of part or all of our Basic Charges and our expenses and disbursements but not the Success Fee.”
[32]Schedule 2 to the CFA set out how Basic Charges were calculated. Schedule 4 contained definitions of certain capitalised terms under the heading, “Explanation of words used”:
“(f) our Expenses and Disbursements Payments we made on your behalf such as: • court fees; • barristers’ fees; • experts’ fees; • medical report fees; • travelling and subsistence expenses; • Postage, courier, copying and printing expenses. …. (m) The Success Fee The percentage our (sic) Basic Charges that we add to your bill if you win your Claim and that we cannot seek to recover from the Defendant.”
Payments we made on your behalf such as:[33]In Re Underwood & Piper v Lewis[1894] 2 QB 306, Lord Esher MR had this to say about the nature of a solicitor’s retainer, at page 309 and following:
“When one considers the nature of a common law action, it seems obvious that the law must imply that the contract of a solicitor upon a retainer in the action is an entire contract to conduct the action to the end. When a man goes to a solicitor and instructs him for the purpose of bringing or defending such an action, he does not mean to employ the solicitor to take one step, and then give him fresh instructions to take another step, and so on; he instructs the solicitor as a skilled person to act for him in the action, to take all necessary steps in it, and to carry it on to the end. If the meaning of the retainer is that the solicitor is to carry on the action to the end, it necessarily follows that the contract of the solicitor is an entire contract – that is, a contract to take all the steps which are necessary to bring the action to a conclusion. Where it is shewn that there were no special terms, but only the ordinary retainer for the purposes of the action, the implication I have mentioned is that which every reasonable person would make, and therefore the implication which the law makes in such a case… ….I do not propose to go through all the cases cited, but it seems to me that from that time downwards it has been held that a solicitor cannot sue for his costs until the contract has been entirely fulfilled….”
[34]Lord Esher MR then went on to say that there may be circumstances in which a solicitor was entitled to put an end to a contract but that he had to give his clients reasonable notice before doing so. An example would be the requirement to give a client reasonable notice of a request to be put in funds to pay disbursements.[35]The retainer with HD plainly encompassed not only negotiations with the defendant about those of her costs (including expenses and disbursements) which were recoverable from the defendant but also, if required, preparation for, and attendance at a detailed assessment hearing to determine those recoverable costs. Agreement as to recoverable costs, alternatively a court assessment of them, was an express and necessary step required by the retainer, and required in order to complete it. It is only when the agreed or court assessed recoverable costs have been ascertained that the parties to the retainer would know how much was payable to Mr Hanison by way of the shortfall which could not be recovered from the defendant. Presently, therefore, neither party to the retainer between Mr Hanison and HD can know how much HD might have to pay to Mr Hanison by way of the shortfall and/or by way of her contractual obligations to Mr Hanison.[36]Hence, I accept Mr Hutton’s argument that Mr Hanison’s contractual obligations pursuant to the retainer with HD included the obligation to obtain agreement, or a court assessment, of her recoverable costs. Although that process was started, as is apparent from the three hearings before Costs Judge James, it has by no means concluded. Following, amongst other things, the intervention into Mr Hanison’s practice, there is now no prospect at all of him ever completing his obligations under the retainer. Indeed, it is to be easily inferred, from, in particular, the passage of a very considerable period of time in which no activity at all has occurred, that he has evinced no intention of so doing. Given those facts, I conclude that the retainer between HD and Mr Hanison is unenforceable by Mr Hanison against HD.[37]I infer that the terms of the retainers between the rest of the claimants in the 6 linked claims were on the same, or substantially similar terms. As I have recorded, the retainer between Mr Hanison and HD was in relatively standard terms. There is no reason to believe that Mr Hanison would have concluded retainers with the other claimants in the 6 linked claims which were on materially different terms to those contained in the retainer between him and HD. Had that been the case, it has been open to Mr Hanison to adduce appropriate evidence establishing it. He has not done so.[38]In all the circumstances, I conclude that the retainers between each of the claimants in the 6 linked claims are unenforceable by Mr Hanison against any of those claimants. Mr Hutton raised various alternative arguments in support of his contention that the retainers between Mr Hanison and the claimants in the 6 linked claims were unenforceable. In the light of my findings, I do not need to address those alternative arguments. Paragraph (ii) – should the Bills of Costs and the detailed assessment proceedings in the 6 linked claims be struck out?[39]If the retainers between the claimants in the 6 linked claims and their solicitor are unenforceable, those claimants have no liability to their solicitor for any costs which were incurred pursuant to those unenforceable retainers. If they have no such liability, there can be no claim by those claimants against the defendants for any of those costs. Any other conclusion would amount to a breach of the indemnity principle. The further consequence of the findings which I have made must be that the detailed assessment proceedings in the 6 linked claims have to be struck out. Alternatively, the bills of costs in each of those six linked claims must be assessed at nil because there is nothing which is capable of being recovered from the defendants.[40]As I heard extensive argument from Mr Hutton and Ms McDonald on the separate arguments for strike out based on there having been an abuse of the process of the court and/or a breach of court rules, practice directions and/or court orders, it is appropriate that I should make some rulings on those issues.[41]CPR Part 3.4 provides as follows:
“(2) The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court- …. (b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; or (c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order.” …. (b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; or (c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order.”
[42]Mr Hutton draws to my attention and relies on the fact that the Part 8 Orders requiring the defendants to pay the costs of the claimants in the 6 linked claims were made variously in 2021 and 2022. The last ones, in the cases of CD and CT, were made on 10 March 2022. Whilst there were three hearings before Costs Judge James to deal with preliminary issues in the six lead cases. Apart from those hearings, there has been no attempt by any of the claimants in the 6 linked claims to progress their respective detailed assessments.[43]Put simply, Mr Hutton says that these detailed assessment proceedings are now an abuse of the process of court due to the extensive delay and lack of any progress following the last hearing before Costs Judge James. It is between 4 ½ and 5 years since the orders for payment of costs were made and over three years since the last hearing took place to deal with preliminary issues. Mr Hutton submits that the intervention by the SRA into Mr Hanison’s practice, the fact that he has been struck off the Roll, his removal from the court record as the solicitor for the claimants in the 6 linked claims and that no new solicitors have come on the record to act for any of those claimants, means that there is no realistic prospect of these detailed assessment proceedings being continued.[44]In Asturion Fondation -v- Alibrahim [2020] EWCA Civ 32, Arnold LJ set out the process by which applications to strike out for an abuse of process should be considered. At para [64], his Lordship said this:
“…first, the court should determine whether the claimant’s conduct was an abuse of process; and, if so, secondly, the court should exercise its discretion as to whether to strike out the claim. Counsel for Asturion supported a two-stage analysis. In my judgment the better reading of the authorities is that the analysis falls into two stages, and not three. Furthermore, this is supported by the structure of CPR r 3.4 (2)(b), which provides that the court "may" strike out a statement of case if it "is an abuse of the court's process" (it is perhaps worth noting that the authorities have added the gloss "in all the circumstances of the case" particularly the claimant’s conduct).”
[45]At the first stage of the analysis, the court will consider whether the claimant has deliberately allowed the proceedings to become dormant, and if so why. That involves examining the claimant’s intention (see Alfozan v Quastel Midgen LLP[2022] EWHC 66, at para [15]). Such intention is to be inferred from the evidence as a whole (see Morgan Sindall Construction and Infrastructure Ltd v Capita Property and Infrastructure (Structures) Ltd [2023] EWHC 166, at para [32]). The court must assess objectively the strength of any explanation advanced, having regard to the length of the period of inactivity (see para [61] of Asturion). It is not sufficient for a claimant simply to assert, in response to an abuse application, that it did not intend to warehouse the claim. Nor is it sufficient for a claimant to point to a lack of prejudice in answer to an allegation of warehousing the claims (see Morgan Sindall). The court is concerned not only with prejudice in a narrow sense, but with the integrity of the court's processes and the proper administration of justice.[46]Prolonged inactivity may itself support the inference that a claimant does not intend to advance the action (see Grovit v Doctor[1997] 1 W.L.R. 640). Where such stagnation is established, the burden shifts to the claimant to explain why the claim should be permitted to continue. Delay alone is not automatically an abuse, but delay coupled with serious and deliberate non-compliance with the rules, with full awareness of the consequences, (see Habib Bank Ltd v Jaffer[2000] 3 WLUK 866) may amount to abuse and may justify a strike out where it is fair to do so (see Grovit).[47]The second stage of the enquiry requires the court to consider whether striking out the claim is a proportionate response to the abuse. Considerations of unfairness or prejudice are more appropriately addressed at this stage of the enquiry. The absence of unfairness is not necessarily determinative of whether the conduct amounts to an abuse see Cable v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd [2020] 4 WLR 110, at para [72] per Coulson LJ. The striking out of a claim is the most draconian of remedies and must be used as a measure of last resort. However, the availability of other powers is only one factor in the exercise of the court’s discretion.[48]I have no evidence from the person who was the solicitor for the claimants in the 6 linked claims. Mr Hanison has been given the opportunity to give evidence and make submissions and has elected not to do so. The claimants in the 6 linked claims have also had a similar opportunity and have not taken it. No explanation has been given, let alone a credible one. In my judgment, the costs proceedings of the claimants in the 6 linked claims have indeed been deliberately allowed to become dormant. The extensive and wholly unexplained delay offends against the integrity of the court’s process. The serious abuse of the court’s process has been perpetrated by Mr Hanison, the solicitor and officer of the court whom the claimants in the 6 linked claims trusted to pursue their claims for costs.[49]I also find that there is now no realistic prospect of any of the detailed assessments in any of the 6 linked claims being pursued. In addition, there is significant prejudice to the defendants. They have made payments on account of costs in relation to 6 sets of detailed assessment proceedings. If the detailed assessment proceedings are allowed to remain extant, the defendants presently have no way of knowing when they will be resolved, nor for how much they might be liable.[50]I therefore accept Mr Hutton’s submission that, taken as a whole, the failure by the claimants in the 6 linked claims to take any steps at all since the last hearing before Costs Judge James is, in all the circumstances of this case, a serious abuse of the process of the court.[51]I now consider what action to take as a result of my various findings. The defendants in their application notice have put forward a possible alternative to the strike out of the claims i.e. an unless order against the claimants in the 6 linked claims to the effect that if they do not request a substantive detailed assessment hearing within 14 days, their claims should be struck out.[52]I have reached the conclusion that if such a course were a realistic option the claimants in the 6 linked claims would have appeared on the hearing of the defendants’ application to make submissions to that or similar effect. The fact that they have not done so indicates to me that they have no such intentions. In all the circumstances, I do not consider that any useful purpose will or could be served by delaying the strike out of the claims by the claimants in the 6 linked claims for any further period of time. Immediate strike out is, in my judgment, not only the proportionate response to the current state of affairs, but is the only realistic option, in order to do justice between the parties. It would be seriously unfair to the defendants to prolong these matters any further.[53]In the light of my decision as to abuse of process, it is not necessary to deal with Mr Hutton’s alternative argument based on CPR Part 3.4(2)(c).

Paragraph (iii) – should Mr Hanison be ordered repay the payments on account?

[54]This part of the defendants’ application can be dealt with relatively shortly in the light of the findings and decisions which I have so far made. Now that the detailed assessment proceedings in the 6 linked claims have been struck out and the retainers between Mr Hanison and the claimants in the 6 linked claims declared to be unenforceable, the case for the return of monies paid to Mr Hanison, on account of the costs of the claimants in the 6 linked claims, is unanswerable.[55]The payments on account were made on the footing that there were enforceable retainers in existence between the receiving parties and their solicitor. It would, to all intents and purposes, constitute a breach of the indemnity principle for those payments to be retained. The defendants have applied for an order against Mr Hanison only in this respect (they do not seek orders for repayment against any of the claimants in the 6 linked claims personally – a matter to which I shall return later in this judgement).[56]There will be orders against Mr Hanison for the repayment of all of the payments on account of costs which the defendants have made to him in the 6 linked claims. Paragraph (iv) – should any order be made against the claimants who are not claimants in the 6 linked claims?[57]No action at all has been taken by any of the other claimants in the cohort of claims against the various defendants to progress their respective claims for costs. Given the passage of time, in my judgement, it is entirely appropriate that the defendants should wish to obtain appropriate orders against those claimants.[58]The defendants have applied for an unless order against those claimants. This part of the application notice engages CPR Part 47.8:
“Sanction for delaying commencing detailed assessment proceedings 47.8 – (1) where the receiving party fails to commence detailed assessment proceedings within the period specified – (a) in rule 47.7; or (b) by any direction of the court, the paying party may apply for an order requiring the receiving party to commence detailed assessment proceedings within such time as the court may specify. (2) on an application under paragraph (1), the court may direct that, unless the receiving party commences detailed assessment proceedings within the time specified by the court, all or part of the costs to which the receiving party would otherwise be entitled will be disallowed…..” 47.8 – (1) where the receiving party fails to commence detailed assessment proceedings within the period specified – (a) in rule 47.7; or (b) by any direction of the court, the paying party may apply for an order requiring the receiving party to commence detailed assessment proceedings within such time as the court may specify. (2) on an application under paragraph (1), the court may direct that, unless the receiving party commences detailed assessment proceedings within the time specified by the court, all or part of the costs to which the receiving party would otherwise be entitled will be disallowed…..”
[59]None of the claimants to which this part of the application notice is directed has been involved in the detailed assessment proceedings commenced by the claimants in the 6 linked claims. Given that, it is appropriate that those claimants should be given an opportunity, if they so wish, to commence detailed assessment proceedings now. The orders for costs in favour of those claimants were made a considerable time ago. It is appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion under CPR 47.8.[60]The power to make an unless order is discretionary. In my judgment, it is right that the claimants should now be placed under the unless sanction. There will be an unless order against those claimants that they should commence detailed assessment proceedings in respect of their costs within 28 days, failing which all of the costs to which they would otherwise be entitled will be disallowed. Paragraphs (v) and (vi) – should Mr Hanison be ordered to pay the costs of the hearing on 28 and 29 November 2022 and the costs of the detailed assessment proceedings?[61]It is appropriate to take these two paras together.[62]I have recorded above (see para 7) that, in her Order of 29 November 2022, Costs Judge James ordered the claimants in the 6 linked claims to pay the costs of the hearing on 28 and 29 November on the standard basis. The application in para (v) of the defendants’ application notice is for something quite different i.e. for an order against Mr Hanison. The Order made by Costs Judge James has no bearing on the application now made against Mr Hanison.[63]Mr Hutton framed his case in this respect pursuant to CPR Part 44.11, which states as follows: “Court’s powers in relation to misconduct 44.11 –(1) the court may make an order under this rule where – (a) a party or that party’s legal representative, in connection with a summary or detailed assessment, fails to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order; or (b) it appears to the court that the conduct of a party of that party’s legal representative, before or during the proceedings, or in the assessment proceedings, was unreasonable or improper.(2) where paragraph (1) applies, the court may – (a) disallow all or part of the costs which are being assessed; all (b) order the party at fault or that party’s legal representative to pay costs which that party or legal representative has caused any other party to incur….” (2) where paragraph (1) applies, the court may –[64]CPR Part 44.11 gives the court a discretion to make an order against a party’s legal representative (as well as, or instead of, an order against the party concerned).[65]In relation to CPR 44.11(1)(a), Mr Hutton relies upon various defaults perpetrated in the course of the detailed assessment proceedings by Mr Hanison. He points to the failure prior to the first hearing before Costs Judge James to lodge at court those documents which were required to have been lodged prior to the hearing pursuant to para 13.11 of PD 47. He also relies on the fact that the failure to lodge the requisite documents was compounded by the attempt to provide documents to the court by means of a laptop computer which, in fact, did not contain the requisite documents.[66]In relation to CPR 44.11(1)(b), Mr Hutton submits that the conduct of Mr Hanison throughout the detailed assessment proceedings has been unreasonable. Mr Hutton’s main complaint in this respect is the substantial delay which has occurred following the last hearing before Costs Judge James and now. Mr Hutton also points to the various rulings which were made by Costs Judge James which he says demonstrate that very high and unsustainable claims for costs were made in respect of certain items in the Bills of Costs of the claimants in the 6 linked claims. By way of some examples, in respect of the letter of claim sent on behalf of HD, 63.3 hours were claimed, but only 15 hours were allowed. In respect of the letter of response, 66.1 hours were claimed but only 10 hours were allowed and, in respect of the Schedule of Loss, 31.3 hours were claimed but only 7.9 hours were allowed, of which one hour only was at grade A and the rest at grade D.[67]Having read the judgments of Costs Judge James, it is clear to me that she had very considerable concerns about the claims for costs which had been made. I share those concerns. The reductions in the claims which I have mentioned are substantial, as well as being reductions which one would not normally expect to see in claims for costs of this nature. However, of further concern is the fact that Mr Hanison has, to all intents and purposes, abandoned the detailed assessments.[68]The leading case on the operation of CPR Part 44.11 is Gempride Ltd -v- Bamrah [2018] EWCA Civ 1367. Mistakes or negligence, without more, are insufficient to engage the rule. Unreasonable conduct is essentially conduct permitting of no reasonable explanation. In order for the conduct of a legal representative to be unreasonable, that conduct must also breach the legal representative’s duty to the court. The burden of proof is on the applicant and even when the threshold criteria are satisfied, the court still has a discretion as to whether an order ought to be made. Any order made must be proportionate to the misconduct.[69]The hearings on 28 and 29 November 2022 were wholly ineffective due to the fact that the legal representative for the claimants in the 6 linked claims had failed to lodge at court prior to the hearing the necessary documents to enable the detailed assessment hearing to proceed effectively. There can be no doubt that a solicitor on the record has the responsibility for lodging those documents and for complying with the requisite practice direction. I am satisfied, having read the judgements of Costs Judge James, and formed my own view, that Mr Hanison was seriously in breach of his duties to the court. That conduct was unreasonable and there is no reasonable explanation for it.[70]Mr Hanison was not removed from the court record until the Order of 10 June 2025 of Senior Costs Judge Rowley. Until that point, he had sole responsibility for the conduct of the detailed assessments on behalf of the claimants in the 6 linked claims. It is a fundamental obligation on the part of a solicitor that unless and until he is removed from the record (by whatever means e.g. by agreement or by court order) he must act in the matter. This much is apparent from CPR Part 42.2(5) which contains the presumption that a solicitor on the record is acting until the conclusion of the matter. As the note at 42.2.3 in Volume 1 of the White Book states, that is the case even if the retainer has been terminated.[71]Since the last hearing before Costs Judge James, nothing of any substance has occurred. I have found that there has been a serious abuse of the process of the court in that respect. It follows from that finding that the conduct of the person who was responsible for that delay was itself unreasonable. I repeat there has been no explanation given for it.[72]I find that both CPR Part 44.11(a) and (b) are engaged such that I ought now to go on to consider whether any order pursuant to para (2) of that rule should be made. The costs to which the claimants in the 6 linked claims would otherwise have been entitled have already been disallowed. This part of the defendants’ application invites the court to order Mr Hanison to pay the defendants’ costs of the hearing on 28 and 29 November 2022, and of the detailed assessments as a whole.[73]I have no hesitation in concluding that Mr Hanison should pay the costs of the hearing on 28 and 29 November 2022. His various defaults amounted to conduct which was unreasonable and which, on any analysis, caused the hearing to have to be abandoned. It can hardly be controversial or unsurprising that a solicitor on the record who conducts himself in such a way should end up being ordered to pay the costs of the abortive hearing.[74]In relation to the rest of the costs of the detailed assessments, I reach the same decision. The various significant and substantial reductions in those parts of the bill which were assessed by Costs Judge James indicate an attempt to claim very much more than could ever have been allowed on a standard basis assessment. As Mr Hanison has not responded to the defendants’ allegations in this respect, I have to proceed with there being no explanation at all as to why and on what basis such high amounts were claimed. The making of a claim for costs, and the signing of a bill of costs which makes very high and unsustainable claims for costs, is itself unreasonable. On that basis, Mr Hanison’s unreasonable behaviour started at the very outset of the detailed assessment proceedings by the signing of the bills. Detailed assessment proceedings are, of course, started by the service of a Notice of Commencement and a signed and certified bill (see CPR Part 47.6).[75]As recorded above, since the hearings before Costs Judge James, nothing has happened. Mr Hanison has abandoned them (and his clients). I have found that such conduct has amounted to a serious abuse of the court’s process. Nothing of any value has been achieved by them due to the failure of the solicitor on the record to fulfil his obligations and duties to the court.[76]As an alternative to an order requiring Mr Hanison to pay the costs within 14 days, the defendants suggested that Mr Hanison should be given 14 days to issue an application to show cause why he should not be required to pay these costs. Mr Hanison has had a proper opportunity to contest the application which the defendants have made. It is neither appropriate nor necessary to allow him any further opportunity.

Indemnity or standard basis orders for costs?

[77]Mr Hutton contends that the costs for which Mr Hanison is liable should be paid on the indemnity basis. As is well known, the indemnity basis differs from the standard basis in two respects. First, the onus of showing that costs have not been reasonably incurred and/or are not reasonable in amount, is on the paying party. Secondly, there is no requirement of proportionality. See CPR Part 44.3 and Excelsior Commercial and Industrial Holdings Limited v Salisbury Hannah Aspden and Johnson [2002] EWCA Civ 879.[78]The criteria for the making of an indemnity costs order have been considered many times, of which Excelsior is but one example. In the very recent case of Breeze -v- Chief Constable of Norfolk Constabulary [2026] EWHC 1937 (KB), Cotter J set out (at paras [15] – [20]) in some detail the various important rules and decisions on the issue. As is recorded in Cook on Costs, one of the circumstances in which an indemnity order may be made is where there has been an abuse of the court’s procedure. In Three Rivers DC v Bank of England [2006] EWHC 816 (Comm), Tomlinson J also identified the relevant principles. It was emphasised that the court should have regard to all the circumstances of the case and that the discretion to award indemnity costs is very wide.[79]The critical requirement, before an indemnity order can be made, is that there must be some conduct or some circumstance which takes the case out of the norm. That was emphasised by Christopher Clarke J in Balmoral Group Ltd v Borealis (UK) Ltd [2006] EWHC 2531 (Comm) who, having adopted Tomlinson J’s summary in Three Rivers, and noting that an order for indemnity costs was itself a departure from the norm, said at para [30]:
“…it is important not to lose sight of the essential requirement of unreasonable or inappropriate conduct overall and not to treat examples of such which may amount to such conduct as necessarily constituting it.”
[80]In relation to the hearing on 28 and 29 November 2022, Mr Hanison failed to lodge the necessary papers to enable the hearing to proceed. He provided a laptop computer at the end of the first day which did not contain the necessary documents, and which meant that Costs Judge James had no choice but to abandon the hearing. He thereby wasted significant court time and resources in addition to causing the defendants to expend significant resources which ultimately were wasted. I am satisfied that the conduct of Mr Hanison in the relation to the hearing on 28 and 29 November 2022 was unreasonable to a high degree such that the case was taken out of the norm. An indemnity costs order in respect of those is the appropriate response.[81]In addition, Mr Hanison has abandoned the detailed assessment proceedings. The result of the findings and decisions which I have made is that those detailed assessment proceedings have themselves achieved nothing and that the defendants again have been required to expend considerable time, effort and resources in what has been for all concerned a fruitless and wasteful exercise. Mr Hanison has failed to fulfil his duties to the court in his capacity as the solicitor for the claimants in the 6 linked claims and as an officer of the court. His conduct was well outside the norm. Taking all the circumstances of this case into account, it is appropriate that Mr Hanison should pay the costs of the detailed assessment proceedings in the 6 linked claims on the indemnity basis.

Paragraph (vii) – costs of the defendants’ application dated 12 December 2025

[82]The defendants’ application has been successful. The general rule (CPR Part 44.2) is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party. Whilst the court has a discretion to make a different order, I can see no reason at all to depart from the usual rule in this case. Again, indemnity costs are sought and for the same reasons as are given above, it is appropriate that an indemnity order should be made.

Other matters

[83]At the hearing on 3 July 2026, I expressed a concern that, notwithstanding the application now being made by the defendants, the defendants might still have the right to pursue the claimants in the 6 linked claims personally in respect of the costs which the defendants had incurred in these detailed assessment proceedings. I enquired of Mr Hutton whether the defendants might be prepared to provide the court and those claimants with appropriate undertakings not to do so.[84]In making that enquiry I made it clear that I did not consider that the court had any right to require any such undertakings to be given, and that whatever judgment I might reach on the defendants’ application would in no way be conditional upon such undertakings being given.[85]Mr Ashley has now given appropriate undertakings dated 31 July 2026 on behalf of his clients, for which I am grateful.