Lisa Pickering v Thomas Mansfield Solicitors Limited [2025] EWHC 3021 (SCCO)

[2025] EWHC 3021 (SCCO)Case No SC-2025-BTP-000086
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
SENIOR COURTS COSTS OFFICE
Venue Thomas More Building, Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 14/11/2025
Before
COSTS JUDGE NAGALINGAM
Between
Lisa PickeringClaimantThomas Mansfield Solicitors LimitedDefendant
Craig Ralph (instructed by Arch Law) for ClaimantPaul Thomas (instructed by Thomas Mansfield Solicitors Limited) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 22/10/2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 14.30pm on 14/11/2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................COSTS JUDGE NAGALINGAM

Costs Judge Nagalingam:

[1]This judgment concerns Thomas Mansfield Solicitors Limited’s (TM) application dated 25 September 2025 for security for costs in relation to their dispute with Lisa Pickering (LP). References to TM and LP are utilised throughout this judgment for ease of reference.[2]The application is be addressed on its original terms only. In that regard, there is no fallback position in terms that would otherwise invite me to treat this as a further application for a payment on account.[3]Further, and citing paragraph 27 of Mr Ralph’s skeleton argument, I am not going to permit LP to hijack TM’s application with a direction unrelated to an application for security for costs. In any event, the requested document referenced at paragraph 27 of Mr Ralph’s skeleton argument appears to have been disclosed, and LP is aware she may make a standalone application if she is not satisfied with that document.[4]Thus focussing on the application before me, I observe that the application is brought on terms of “CPR 25.27(b)(vi); &/or CPR 3.1(3)(a) & (b) &/or 3.1 (5)(a) and (b); &/or CPR 25.21(2)”.[5]The circumstances of the application are that a detailed assessment is listed to commence on 25 November 2025 at which preliminary issues (yet to be determined) will be argued and decided.[6]Contrary to the submissions of Mr Thomas, the detailed assessment will begin on 25 November 2025. The fact that time has been set aside to deal with preliminary issues before the assessment continues in January 2026 does not mean the hearing of 25 November 2025 (and subsequent 3 days) is not part of the detailed assessment hearing.[7]As such, the application was submitted just 2 months before the detailed assessment is due to begin, in circumstances when the notice of a detailed assessment hearing is dated 15 April 2025. Background[8]The invoices of TM subject to assessment total £2,533,579.14. TM accept that they have received payments on account of £1,175,849.50 to date. Thus it is recognised that not only is the balance due substantial (if assessed up to 100% of the amount owed), the sums paid on account to date are also substantial.[9]Pursuant to and following an application dated 22 January 2025, I made an order on 9 April 2025 that LP make a payment on account in the sum of £276,000. That payment was not made on time and I later made an unless order which carried a sanction of non-participation in the detailed assessment hearing for any further breach.[10]That order provided for the £276,000 ordered to be paid in instalments. Those instalments have thus far been paid on time, and the final payment is due by 4 November 2025. As such, the present application is made absent any breach of the unless order.[11]Assuming the final instalment is paid, TM will have the benefit of payments amounting to just over 57% of the fees they seek from LP.[12]Whilst I appreciate there may be claims for contractual interest and costs of assessment, both will not only be subject to orders for recovery but also subject to assessment. As such, I am only minded to take into account the principle sum in dispute when considering the impact of payments on account.[13]The point is, TM do not come to this assessment having not received any monies. In fact, TM have received substantial monies on account.[14]The question now is whether a further sum of £150,000 should be ordered (as security for costs).

CPR 3.1(3)(a) & (b) &/or 3.1(5)(a) and (b)

(a) and (b)

[15]TM rely on CPR 3.1(3)(a) and (b), which fall under “The court’s general powers of management” and provide that “When the court makes an order, it may -(a) make it subject to conditions, including a condition to pay a sum of money into court; and(b) specify the consequence of failure to comply with the order or a condition”.[16]This is relevant not to the question of whether to make the order, but rather whether to attach an automatic sanction to non-compliance. The sanction sought is significant, being non participation in a detailed assessment concerning a disputed seven-figure sum.[17]Whether or not I decide to make an order for security for costs, I would not be minded to attach an automatic sanction to the same. Whilst I acknowledge LP did not initially comply with my order dated 9 April 2025, culminating in a later unless order (which has since been complied with), any order I might be minded to make in TM’s latest application would simply be on terms for payment by a certain date, with liberty to then make an application for an unless order in the event of non-compliance.[18]In so far as reliance is placed on “3.1(5)(a) and (b)”, I consider this was likely intended to be a reference to CPR 3.1(5) and (6) which provide:
“(5) The court may order a party to pay a sum of money into court if that party has, without good reason, failed to comply with a rule, practice direction or a relevant pre-action protocol. (6) When exercising its power under paragraph (5) the court must have regard to – (a) the amount in dispute; and (b) the costs which the parties have incurred or which they may incur.” (a) the amount in dispute; and (b) the costs which the parties have incurred or which they may incur.”
[19]TM do not make clear which rule, practice direction or relevant pre-action protocol they say LP has not complied with.[20]In any event, whilst the amount in dispute is substantial, TM have also had the benefit of substantial payments on account.[21]Further, whilst TM have indicated their costs of assessment are going to be in the region of £400,000, such a figure certainly causes the proverbial judicial eyebrow to be raised and as such is not particularly persuasive as a factor.[22]On the basis that there is no compelling argument to make an order under CPR 3.1(5) I am not minded to do so.

CPR 25.21(2)

[23]In so far as CPR 25.21(2) is referenced in the application, this simply provides that a “claimant may make more than one application for an interim payment order”. Thus the rule sets out the court’s discretion but such an application still has to be made.[24]I do not consider that an application for an interim payment order is before me. The application is for security for costs. Accordingly, the application cannot succeed under this provision.[25]The wording of CPR 25.21(2) also serves to underline why I have used the language of “TM” and “LP” in this judgment. All of the costs pleadings in this matter adopt the language of LP as the Claimant and TM as the Defendant.[26]Costs pleadings do not carry the same status as a statement of case, and in Solicitors Act proceedings a client seeking assessment of their solicitor’s bills is not a claimant in the classic sense. They will not produce particulars of claim or a schedule of loss, nor will they receive a defence.[27]In fact the client is the party who owes money to the solicitor and has no ‘claim’ as such against the de facto defendant in that sense, save for the consequences that might follow an assessment.[28]If anything, TM are the de facto ‘claimant’ but the proceedings before this court arise out LP’s statutory right to an assessment under the Solicitors Act 1974.[29]TM have never needed an order for costs because they assert a contractual right to payment of outstanding fees by LP. It would have been open to TM to sue LP under Part 7 such that the outstanding fees would be treated as a money only claim. Whilst such claims are, on occasion, transferred to the SCCO, it is on the basis that the assessment will be an assessment of fees and not subject to the one fifth rule which applies to a Solicitors Act assessment.[30]That is not the procedural path which has been followed. TM are therefore not a claimant in Part 7 proceedings. Instead they are the receiving party in a Solicitors Act assessment, a procedural path that by operation only names the solicitor as the defendant.

CPR 25.27(b)(vi)

(b) (vi)

[31]In so far as TM rely on CPR 25.27(b)(iv), this somewhat jumps the gun. The starting point is ‘VI. Security for Costs’ (page 739 of the 2025 White Book) and CPR 25.26, which provides that:
“(1) A defendant to any claim may apply for security for their costs of the proceedings. (Part 3 provides for the court to order payment of sums into court in other circumstances. Rule 20.3 provides for this Section to apply to counterclaims or other additional claims.) (2) An application for security for costs must be supported by written evidence. (3) Where the court makes an order for security for costs, it must determine the amount of security, and direct the manner and time within which the security must be given.”
[32]Even if one ignores the fact that it is TM who is seeking monies from LP, the starting point is to consider if an eligibility arises to make this application. This requires consideration of whether LP’s assertion of a right to assessment of a solicitor’s bill under the Solicitors Act 1974 amounts to a “claim”.[33]Mr Ralph raised an interesting argument as to whether Solicitors Act proceedings qualify as a “claim” for the purpose of an application for security for costs and throughout preparation of this judgment I have questioned why TM elected to proceed with an application for security for costs as opposed to a further payment on account.[34]In Solicitors Act proceedings, applications for security for costs are a seldom invoked provision, and I have spent some time agonising over Mr Ralph’s contention that this route is not open to TM.[35]TM will say they are a defendant to a claim brought under Part 8. As per CPR 8.1(2), “A claimant may, unless any enactment, rule or practice direction states otherwise, use the Part 8 procedure where they seek the court’s decision on a question which is unlikely to involve a substantial dispute of fact.”[36]Whilst the Part 8 procedure is used to secure the necessary order for assessment, the originating power to make that order arises from Section 70 of the Solicitors Act 1974. Under Section 70(1) of the act, a “party chargeable with [a] bill” has an absolute right to an order for assessment of that bill if they make their application within one month of delivery of that bill.[37]Thereafter the language of “application” rather than “claim” is maintained throughout Section 70. LP has a procedural right to assessment of TM’s bills and she has asserted that right under Section 70 of the Solicitors Act 1974, via the vehicle of Part 8.[38]Having said that, and noting CPR 25.26 is not supplemented by an explanatory practice direction, one is assisted by the White Book editorial notes at 25.26.4 which note that the word “claim” is not defined and that “As a noun in other rules it usually refers to the whole of the case in question (see, for example, rr8.1 and 26.2)”.[39]On balance, I consider that the “case in question” is the Solicitors Act proceedings. TM’s fees are being challenged and they are defending that challenge. TM have no control over the depth and breadth of that challenge, and in cases where the sums in issue are substantial there is the potential for significant costs to be incurred in defending that challenge.[40]Further, simply because something is seldom invoked or even unusual does not make it procedurally barred. Whilst Solicitors Act proceedings brought by a client may not be a “claim” in the traditional sense, it is still proceedings which necessarily require the issuance of a Part 8 claim and thereafter directions to the ultimate assessment of costs.[41]In those circumstances, and noting CPR 25.26(1) is permissive, I consider that TM have a right to make this application. Attention thereafter turns to CPR 25.26(2), the requirement that the application “must be supported by written evidence” and CPR 25.27, the conditions to be satisfied before such an order can be made.[42]In so far as part of TM’s application relies on Section 70(2) of the Solicitors Act 1974, I acknowledge a discretion for the court to make a payment on account of costs a condition of ordering assessment of a solicitor’s bill/s.[43]Section 70(1) precludes the ordering of any sum to be paid into court where an application for an order for assessment is made within one month of the delivery of said bill/s. However, I cannot see there is any logic in a system which completely locks out firms of solicitors thereafter seeking to make an application for security for costs where the circumstances demand it.[44]This further cements my view that TM are permitted to make this application. Thereafter is the question of whether I am minded to exercise my discretion to make the order sought.[25]26(2) and 25.27 – written evidence and conditions[45]The requirement for the application to “be supported by written evidence” places an evidential burden on the applicant, i.e. TM.[46]This is not a case of LP claiming impecuniosity (such that she would be under a burden to evidence an inability to pay). Further, TM have not used the other procedural levers available to them to secure disclosure, such as a Part 18 request.[47]For example, Mr Thomas’ own skeleton argument acknowledges LP’s significant incomings from the sale of gold and jewellery. His skeleton argument also acknowledges significant outgoings after the realisation of those assets. As detailed below, the figures Mr Thomas references demonstrate there must be substantial remaining liquid funds available to LP and yet no effort seems to have been made to enquire as to that balance. That is the sort of question which a Part 18 request might address.[48]The fact is that the application for security is predicated on LP’s voluntary financial disclosures to date. Firstly in relation to earned income and secondly in relation to a combination of passive income and realised assets.[49]In so far as TM’s application is supported by evidence, it is entirely reliant on LP’s voluntary financial disclosures. No new evidence is presented by TM.[50]In so far as how the evidence assists in deciding the application, TM focuses on only one of the six CPR 25.27(b) conditions that must apply in order for a security for costs order to be made.[51]CPR 25.27 provides that:
“The court may make an order for security for costs if— (a) it is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that it is just to make such an order; and (b) either an enactment permits the court to require security for costs, or one or more of the following conditions apply— (i) the claimant is resident out of the jurisdiction; (ii) the claimant is a company or other body (whether incorporated inside or outside England and Wales) and there is reason to believe that it will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if ordered to do so; (iii) the claimant has changed their address since the claim was commenced with a view to evading the consequences of the litigation; (iv) the claimant failed to give their address in the claim form, or gave an incorrect address; (v) the claimant is acting as a nominal claimant, other than as a representative claimant under Part 19, and there is reason to believe that they will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if ordered to do so; (vi) the claimant has taken steps in relation to their assets that would make it difficult to enforce an order for costs against them.” (a) it is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that it is just to make such an order; and (b) either an enactment permits the court to require security for costs, or one or more of the following conditions apply— (ii) the claimant is a company or other body (whether incorporated inside or outside England and Wales) and there is reason to believe that it will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if ordered to do so; (iii) the claimant has changed their address since the claim was commenced with a view to evading the consequences of the litigation; (iv) the claimant failed to give their address in the claim form, or gave an incorrect address; (v) the claimant is acting as a nominal claimant, other than as a representative claimant under Part 19, and there is reason to believe that they will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if ordered to do so; (vi) the claimant has taken steps in relation to their assets that would make it difficult to enforce an order for costs against them.”
[52]Whilst TM focus on condition (vi) only, I note that as a matter of fact conditions (i) to (v) inclusive could not apply to LP in any event.[53]Paragraph 2(a) of Mr Thomas’ skeleton argument recognises the realisation of some “£1.8m by LP from the sale of gold bars, gold coins, jewellery etc..”. between February 2023 and July 2025.[54]Mr Thomas also recognises that:
“£650,000 was applied by [LP] voluntarily to repay alleged debts; paying off mortgages in advance of their due date; purchasing a bed and breakfast property for her son; while not making any provision in relation to [LP]’s liability to TM in these proceedings.”
[55]Mr Thomas submits:
“These are ‘steps’ which have had the effect, on [LP]’s evidence, of putting material assets (cumulatively £650,000) which would otherwise be available for payment of costs, out of reach of TM.”
[56]I observed during the course of the hearing that simply by adopting the figures taken from the Defendant’s own analysis of the “sale of gold bars, gold coins, jewellery etc..”. and contrasting that with the sum of £650,000 paid out (for various reasons), would still leave some £1.15m of liquidated assets.[57]Whilst TM seeks to criticise LP for not being “forthright about her financial resources”, I consider TM have ignored a number of important factors.[58]Firstly, LP has never claimed impecuniosity and as such is under no obligation to make the type of financial disclosures TM appears to be expecting.[59]Secondly, TM has always retained the option to make a request for further information under the Part 18 procedure, or otherwise make an application for specific disclosure relating to LP’s finances.[60]Thirdly, TM ignores the fact that LP’s financial disclosures to date have been voluntary (albeit in support of the Claimant’s own (failed) applications to either vary the amount of an ordered payment on account and/or vary the terms for payment). What is important to note is that those applications were made not based on an inability to pay, but rather when to pay (and to permit time to release liquid funds to make payment).[61]The hurdle TM seeks to overcome requires a demonstration that “the claimant has taken steps in relation to their assets that would make it difficult to enforce an order for costs against them.”[62]In so far as Mr Thomas references the court’s entitlement to draw inferences as “Per Keary (1995) quoted in Practical Law” at paragraph 2(vi) of his skeleton argument, I am not assisted because the Claimant is not denying she has the funds to satisfy a security for costs order. Thus I reject that the burden is on LP. That burden only arises where she is claiming “insufficient funds to provide the security”.[63]Further, as Mr Ralph observed, CPR 25.27(b)(vi) refers to “assets”, not cash or liquidated sums.[64]On LP’s own evidence, she retains several assets. In so far as these include property, using some of her available funds to pay down part of a mortgage is less a dissipation of such funds and rather a movement. Indeed, LP’s 5th witness statement explains two sums paid concerning mortgages.[65]One is described as a capital repayment to reduce the mortgage on LP’s Hopewell House property as a consequence of the mortgage term ending. The redemption statement is exhibited to the LP’s 4th witness statement and verified by a statement of truth.[66]Hopewell House is one of the properties LP acknowledges she may need to dispose of to meet any eventual costs order against her. Using monies to reduce the arrears on a mortgage, or indeed pay a lump sum to either secure more favourable repayment terms and/or reduce the repayable interest, is less a dissipation of funds, and more a movement of monies. That money has not been moved outside the jurisdiction. It is simply tied up in an asset the Claimant owns.[67]The other reference to a mortgage payment concerns a final capital repayment to leave LP mortgage free in respect of her main residential property, Westholme Farm. Again this is not a dissipation of funds nor the movement of monies beyond TM’s reach. Westholme Farm is now wholly owned by LP and is a further asset which LP acknowledges she may have to utilise to “cover any eventual costs order”.[68]The purchase of an investment property (a ‘Bed & Breakfast’ hotel) for LP’s son is not excluded from LP’s sources of capital in the event of a costs order against her. Again, this cannot reasonably be characterized as a dissipation of funds or attempt to put those purchase monies beyond the reach of TM. Those monies have simply been converted to property.[69]At this stage, it assists to observe the precise wording of CPR 25.27(b)(vi), which refers to “assets”. There is no presumption that a party must liquidate assets into cash so that they can readily satisfy any judgment against them.[70]Indeed, taking steps to make one asset (Westholme Farm) mortgage free, and another (Hopewell House) a nearly unencumbered property, arguably amounts to the taking of steps which makes it easier to enforce an order for costs.[71]Aside from property investment decisions, LP’s 4th witness statement exhibits a car purchase invoice. In that instance, LP has demonstrated receipt of £15,500 relating to the sale of one car, and expenditure of £31,995 as payment for a replacement car.[72]This is a net spend of just under £17,000 as a consequence of replacing one depreciating asset with another. The important thing is the referenced funds were used to purchase an asset. An asset which may be sold if necessary to meet any later order for costs.[73]The sum of £30,000 described as being “a partial repayment of a personal loan of £40,000 that [LP] took out to help fund the costs of the Portabond litigation” does not appear to be supported by disclosure of a formal loan agreement. However, LP has certified she took the benefit of a loan from a Mr Harrod, and it was within her gift to reduce that liability with a repayment.[74]The transactions with UK Bullion Trading Limited may have led TM to conduct their own investigation of this company, but ultimately LP’s evidence shows a trail of payments coming her way as a consequence of her selling “investment gold and jewellery”, i.e. not a trail of payments going the other way.[75]The gold and jewellery amount to assets but TM does not explain how the sale of those assets make it difficult for TM to enforce an order for costs against LP.[76]That leaves the issue of a £215,000 payment to LP’s brother’s company, Yorkshire Metal Recycling. Paragraphs 5 to 9 of LP’s 5th witness statement explain that payment, including the history behind it.[77]It is accepted that at least some of LP’s case was funded by way of direct payments to TM from LP’s brother, David Hughes, via his company Yorkshire Metal Recycling. The payments in question, totalling some £285,000, was not a generous gift from one sibling to another. Instead those payments were made in recognition of the fact that LP held assets but not in liquid form, and TM’s requirement for payment before LP could realise sufficient assets to make the required payment.[78]In accepting that payment, I consider TM demonstrated a willingness to either defer payment, accept payments made on behalf of LP, or otherwise understood LP was a client who was ‘good for the money’ but did not necessarily always hold sufficient funds in liquid form.[79]Indeed it was TM’s pragmatism in this regard, no doubt allied with sound business sense, which led to the drafting of an undertaking which LP was required to sign concerning the proceeds of the sale of Edlington Wood – a further property in LP’s portfolio (albeit a limited to a 50% beneficial interest).[80]The undertaking in question was drafted by TM and I find they were certainly aware of it. That undertaking required that payment of TM’s fees took precedence over any repayment to Yorkshire Metal Recycling with regards to any proceeds from the sale of Edlington Wood.[81]As of today, Edlington Wood remains unsold and accordingly I accept that Yorkshire Metal Recycling remained out of pocket for the payment of £285,000 used to fund LP’s case. Thus a repayment of £215,000 by LP to Yorkshire Metal Recycling ought not to have caused TM any consternation. It cannot reasonably be described as a dissipation of funds. Indeed the net effect of that payment must be that more of the proceeds of the sale of Edlington Wood may be redirected to paying off any further costs orders achieved in TM’s favour.[82]As an aside, it is regrettable that it seems Edlington Wood has fallen into disrepair, suffered had the hands of vandals and is the subject of some familial dispute as to otherwise maximising its value. However, even despite all those hurdles, my understanding is that a valuation of £500,000 in Edlington’s current state is not unrealistic, and that along with Westholme Farm (no mortgage), “The Barn” (no mortgage), Hopewell House (near unencumbered), the Bed & Breakfast purchased property, and Pondfield House (50% beneficial interest held), LP holds much in the way of assets to discharge whatever future costs orders she may be subject to.[83]That is in addition to any sums held in cash, which on LP’s evidence from gold and jewellery sales may be in excess of £1m even after the various payments out that TM complain of.[84]I pause to observe that at various times TM have raised concerns, sometimes bordering on allegations of impropriety on the part of LP, regarding some of her financial transactions.[85]I am not prepared to decide this application on the basis of inference and conjecture. It was within the gift of TM to seek a direction that both Mr Thomas and Ms Pickering be available for cross examination on their various statements for the purpose of deciding this application. It was within the gift of TM to make a Part 18 request of LP rather than make allegations or rely on inference. It was within the gift of TM to make an application for specific disclosure.[86]In the event, I am left to decide this application based only on the information before me. Decision[87]The ultimate question is has “the claimant has taken steps in relation to their assets that would make it difficult to enforce an order for costs against them.” On the evidence before me the answer is no.[88]None of LP’s assets have been put beyond the reach of TM. Some assets may have depreciated in value but where that has happened, there is no evidence that was a consequence of ‘steps taken’ by LP. Indeed LP has no interest in purposely devaluing her assets.[89]Other assets have arguably increased in value, for example in terms of reducing the sums that would otherwise be owed to creditors (in the form of mortgagor banks) such that more equity is available for realisation to pay sums owed.[90]In other instances LP has liquidated assets and used some of those monies to pay down non-mortgage debts owed. However, on the face of it, substantial amounts of those liquidated sums remain available to LP.[91]Other sums have been used to invest, such as the property which LP’s son intends to use to run a business. However, that is still an asset which is available to be enforced against.[92]I consider that both in the drafting of the application, and preparation for the hearing, it has dawned on TM that they may have been better served by making an application for a further payment on account rather than pursuing the more onerous route of seeking an order for security for costs.[93]However, I was very clear that I will only deal with the application before me, being the application LP was faced with, and so being on terms which left open no realistic scope for compromise of the application itself.[94]In all the circumstances I do not consider that TM have overcome the CPR 25.27(b)(vi) hurdle of demonstrating that “the claimant has taken steps in relation to their assets that would make it difficult to enforce an order for costs against them” and in that regard the application falls to be dismissed in any event.[95]For the sake of completeness, I must also address the CPR 25.27(a) requirement that “having regard to all the circumstances of the case, [it would be] just to make such an order”, where TM have otherwise invited the court to assume making an order for security for costs would be “just” in this particular case.[96]I disagree. As outlined above LP has already made substantial payments in satisfaction of the bills raised, has made further payments since (pursuant to an unless order), and was not in default of the schedule of payments directed in that order at the time of this hearing.[97]I also take into account that the detailed assessment hearing is very nearly upon us, and notwithstanding what TM may say about their costs of assessment (to date and anticipated), they ought to take heed that references to £400,000 of costs of assessment strike me as highly excessive and likely to be substantially reduced (if indeed TM are the party who secures an order for costs in their favour).[98]I also take account of the steps TM could otherwise have taken, whether in the form of an application for a further payment on account or to obtain evidence that might have better supported a subsequent application for security.[99]The application would, in any event, therefore have fallen at the first hurdle of establishing the making of the order was just in all the circumstances.[100]TM’s application for security for costs is dismissed and TM shall therefore pay LP’s costs of the application, to be summarily assessed at the start of the preliminary issues hearing if not agreed. In the alternative, and in so far as it may otherwise assist negotiations between the parties, a short 15 minute remote hearing could be arranged purely to conduct the necessary summary assessment exercise.

Cited in 1 later judgment