“(1) Subject to the provisions of this or any other enactment and to rules of court, the costs of and incidental to all proceedings in… the High Court… shall be in the discretion of the court. (2) Without prejudice to any general power to make rules of court, such rules may make provision for regulating matters relating to the costs of those proceedings… (3) The court shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid.”
“Subject to rules 44.15 and 44.16, orders for costs made against a claimant may be enforced without the permission of the court but only to the extent that the aggregate amount in money terms of such orders does not exceed the aggregate amount in money terms of any orders for damages and interest made in favour of the claimant.”
“The Claimant's costs of the claim arising from the cause of action described in the claim form in respect of which terms of settlement have been agreed shall be paid by the Defendant and be the subject of a detailed assessment hearing in this Court.”
“… the Claimant seeks a de novo detailed assessment hearing so that all issues and costs not agreed are heard afresh and assessed in the usual manner. Therefore all decisions made by Costs Officer Kenny at the provisional assessment and subsequent oral hearing are appealed…”
“(1) Although costs orders against non-parties are to be regarded as “exceptional”, exceptional in this context means no more than outside the ordinary run of cases where parties pursue or defend claims for their own benefit and at their own expense. The ultimate question in any such “exceptional” case is whether in all the circumstances it is just to make the order. It must be recognised that this is inevitably to some extent a fact-specific jurisdiction and that there will often be a number of different considerations in play, some militating in favour of an order, some against. (2) Generally speaking the discretion will not be exercised against “pure funders”, described in paragraph 40 of Hamilton v Al Fayed (No 2) QB 1175, 1194 as “those with no personal interest in the litigation, who do not stand to benefit from it, are not funding it as a matter of business, and in no way seek to control its course”
“Suppose that the claimants had no financial interest in the outcome of the appeal at all because the solicitors had assumed liability for all the disbursements with no right of recourse against the clients. In that event, the only party with an interest in the appeal would be the solicitors. In my judgment, they would undoubtedly be acting outside the role of solicitor…”
“Suffice it to say that the rationale for QOCS that Jackson LJ expressed in…” (chapters 9 and 19 of his report) “… came through loud and clear. It was that QOCS was a way of protecting those who had suffered injuries from the risk of facing adverse costs orders obtained by insured or self-insured parties or well-funded defendants. It was, Jackson LJ thought, far preferable to the previous regime of recoverable success fees under CFAs and recoverable ATE premiums. There is nothing in the Jackson report that supports the idea that QOCS might apply to the costs of disputes between those liable to the injured parties as to how those personal injury damages should be funded amongst themselves.”
“Any other result would give a claimant carte blanche to commence proceedings against as many defendants as he or she likes, requiring those defendants to run up large bills by way of costs, whilst remaining safe in the knowledge that, if the claim fails against all but one defendant, he or she will incur no costs liability of any kind to the successful defendants, despite the recovery of sums by way of damages from the unsuccessful defendant. That seems to me to be wrong in principle, because it would encourage the bringing of hopeless claims.”
“It should be emphasised that one of the principal purposes of QOWCS is to provide some assistance to claimants with personal injury claims. It is not to penalise their prospective defendants. So I disagree with para 22 of Mr Hogan's skeleton argument, that a central feature of the regime is that defendants ‘would have to stand their own costs in unsuccessful claims’. That might be a common outcome of the QOWCS regime, but it is not its principal purpose or intent. If a defendant can bring itself within rule 44.14(1) , then it can recover its costs.”
“I entertain some doubt that my decision will send an unacceptable chill through the litigation funding industry, whose aim is not to finance hopeless cases but those with strong merits. If it serves to cause funders and their advisors to take rigorous steps short of champerty, ie behaviour likely to interfere with the due administration of justice – particularly in the form of rigorous analysis of law, facts and witnesses, consideration of proportionality and review at appropriate intervals – to reduce the occurrence of the sort of circumstances that caused me to order indemnity costs in this case, that is an advantage and in the public interest.”
“…the legislation does visualise the possibility that a solicitor might fund disbursements and, in that event, it would not be right to conclude that such a solicitor was ‘the real party’ or even ‘a real party’ to the litigation.”
“…they may become more acute if defendant’s insurers can undermine the principle of one-way costs shifting…by pursuing solicitors acting for the claimant who fails”
“(1) The starting point in any case must be the first principle stated by Lord Brown in Dymocks, namely that the ultimate question is whether in all the circumstances it is just to make a non-party costs order, that this is a fact-specific enquiry, and that it must be recognised that in a particular case the court may have to balance a number of different considerations, some of them conflicting. (2) The starting point when considering the position of a solicitor is that it must be shown that he has in some way acted beyond or outside his role as a solicitor conducting litigation for his client to make him liable for a non-party costs order. (3) The starting point when considering the position of a solicitor acting under a CFA is that the fact that he stands to benefit financially from the success of the litigation, in that otherwise he will not be able to recover his profit costs or his success fee, does not of itself mean that he has acted in some way beyond or outside his role as a solicitor conducting litigation for his client. (4) The starting point when considering the position of a solicitor acting under a CFA who has agreed to fund disbursements under the CFA should be no different from the case of a solicitor who has not, since both arrangements are permitted and are regarded as meeting a recognised legitimate public policy aim. The position is no different where the solicitor knows that the client is impecunious and that there is no ATE policy in place; that is because acting for clients who are impecunious does not take the solicitor outside his role as such and, indeed, it is consistent with the recognised public policy aim of promoting access to justice, and because there is no obligation on a solicitor acting under a CFA to ensure that ATE insurance cover is in place when his client is impecunious. … It follows, in my judgment, that there must be something beyond this combination of factors by themselves which would render it just to make a non-party costs order in such circumstances. Whilst it is unrealistic to seek to identify what will or will not be sufficient in any individual case, I do consider that in the majority of cases there will be present either some financial benefit to the solicitor over and above the benefit which he can expect to receive from the CFA, or some exercise of control of the litigation over and above that which would be expected from a solicitor acting on behalf of a client, or some combination of both.”