“The answer to this appeal brought as of right, is a simple one. These orders were an entirely proper response to the Appellants’ calculated disobedience with the court’s orders against a background of serious, wholesale defiance of the planning laws. The breaches of the orders were not disputed and the sentences passed by [the] Judge were the least that he could reasonable have imposed in the circumstances. His decision to suspend the sentences was more than fair to the Appellants. The timings he gave for compliance were similarly generous. There is nothing of any substance in the grounds of appeal.”
“I finally reject the submission that the Judge did not take sufficient account of the Appellants’ personal circumstances. The maximum term of imprisonment for a contempt of court is two years, and the breaches in this case are brazen. The level of the sentences shows that the Judge well understood the human factors, in addition to which he suspended them when he might have made them immediate. In any case, as Floyd LJ said, it is unattractive for those who are in plain breach of the civil and criminal law to contend that insufficient consideration has been given to their interests by those taking the necessary steps to return the land to the condition it was in before they entered on it.”
“(i) Can the court conclude, in all the circumstances as they now are, that the contemnor has suffered punishment proportionate to his contempt? (ii) Would the interest of the State in upholding the rule of law be significantly prejudiced by early discharge? (iii) How genuine is the contemnor's expression of contrition? (iv) Has he done all that he reasonably can to demonstrate a resolve and an ability not to commit a further breach if discharged early? (v) In particular has he done all that he reasonably can (bearing in mind the difficulties of his so doing while in prison) in order to construct for himself proposed living and other practical arrangements in the event of early discharge in such a way as to minimise the risk of his committing a further breach? (vi) Does he make any specific proposal to augment the protection against any further breach of those whom the order which he breached was designed to protect? (vii) What is the length of time which he has served in prison, including its relation to (a) the full term imposed upon him and (b) the term which he will otherwise be required to serve prior to release pursuant tos.258(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 ? (viii) Are there any special factors which impinge upon the exercise of the discretion in one way or the other?”
“The third defendant’s failure to comply with court orders was extremely serious, repeated, deliberate and flagrant. There is a significant public interest in contemnors serving a proper sentence for such non-compliance with court orders, not only to punish the third defendant himself, but to deter him (and others) from disregarding court orders. That said, I am satisfied that there is now a solid basis for the third defendant to be released given the fact that the site has been cleared, and he is very close to having served the penal part of his sentence. I will accept the formal undertaking offered by him …” and then he reminded the third defendant that the injunction of Foxton J. remained in force. He ended with these words: “It hopefully goes without saying that should he breach the injunction again he would be likely to be facing a more significant period of detention.”
“… whether in the circumstances of an individual case, the interests of justice are best served by hearing a party in contempt or by refusing to do so, always bearing in mind the paramount importance which the court must attach to prompt and unquestioning observers of court orders.”