“I agree that we should not pursue this case. I have previously expressed concerns about the Home Office position with regards to Somalis with a mental illness. The UTT finding – extract below – is clear (a) that those with mental health disorders are often subject to humiliating conditions including that they are often chained; and (b) that the chaining of mental health patients amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment. As I have previously stated, unless we wish to challenge one or other of these findings it follows that Somalis whom we accept have serious mental health issues cannot normally be returned. There would have to be exceptional factors such as a strong family network in the Mogadishu area to have even a chance of overcoming that presumption that Article 3 applies. Given that, where we accept that a Somali has serious mental health issues and does not have a strong family support network in Mogadishu, I do not understand why we would not grant leave nor why we would incur taxpayers’ money on futile attempts to deport.”
“[…] it is clear, whether through overwork or a change of handler, the matter could have been handled differently and with greater clarity and speed. However, that is, at worst, incompetence perhaps bordering on negligence. But that is not sufficient for the serious tort of misfeasance.”
“… safeguards against impropriety [as to the manner in which litigation is conducted] are to be found in the rules and procedure that control the litigation and not in tort.”
“In the ordinary course of adversarial litigation a solicitor does not owe a duty of care to his client’s adversary”
“47 I do not find the analogy compelling. When parties embark on contested court proceedings, even under the rules of procedure in force today, they are entitled to treat the other side as opponents whom they wish to vanquish. So they do not owe them a duty of care: Business Computers International Ltd v Registrar of Companies[1988] Ch 229 . Equally, when the parties employ solicitors and counsel to act for them in the proceedings, in general, those representatives owe no duty of care to the other side: Al-Kandari v J R Brown & Co[1988] QB 665 , 675f—h per Bingham LJ. But, as the narrative of events shows, Barclays did not represent their customers in their dispute with the commissioners. In reality, they were no more on the companies’ side in that dispute than the companies’ butchers, bakers or candlestick-makers.”
“35 My Lords, the cases in this second line of authority, including the Martine case 20 BMLR 51, which I regard as having been rightly decided, establish, in my opinion, that where the preparation for, or the commencement or conduct of, judicial proceedings before a court, or of quasi-judicial proceedings before a tribunal such as a registered homes tribunal, has the potential to cause damage to a party to the proceedings, whether personal damage such as psychiatric injury or economic damage as in the present case, a remedy for the damage cannot be obtained via the imposition on the opposing party of a common law duty of care. The protection of parties to litigation from damage caused to them by the litigation or by orders made in the course of the litigation must depend upon the control of the litigation by the court or tribunal in charge of it and the rules and procedures under which the litigation is conducted.”
“14. I recognise that the procedure of the AIT is predominantly adversarial, but the AIT must, I think, put themselves in a position to decide the real issues in the case. In my view it is part of the Secretary of State's public responsibility to assist in that task. It is unsatisfactory, in a context touching on issues such as refugee status and claims under the European Convention on Human Rights, that the relevant tribunal should go on the bare burden of proof.” (Emphasis added)
“44 … Proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal are sufficiently adversarial in nature to give rise to litigation privilege. Although there may be extreme instances where legal advice privilege and, possibly, litigation privilege have no bearing on the issue to be decided (e.g. to protect human life: Brown), the mere fact that human rights issues are in play does not mean litigation privilege has to be balanced against those issues. In the circumstances of this particular case, (subject to what is said below) the applicant was entitled to rely on litigation privilege. No adverse inference could be taken as a result of that claim. The fact that the applicant had disclosed certain information pursuant to her duty of candour -and that this information formed part of a document in respect of which litigation privilege was claimed – did not constitute a reason for thinking the applicant had not complied fully with that duty…”
“66 In our view, the time has now come to accept that a mistake of fact giving rise to unfairness is a separate head of challenge in an appeal on a point of law, at least in those statutory contexts where the parties share an interest in co-operating to achieve the correct result. Asylum law is undoubtedly such an area…”
“25 Secondly, there is no presumption that the procedure will necessarily follow the adversarial model which (for the time being at least) is the hallmark of civil court procedures. In a specialist tribunal, particularly where parties are not represented, there is more scope, and often more need, for the judges to adopt an inquisitorial approach. This has long been accepted in respect of social security benefits (see Kerr v Department for Social Development[2004] 1WLR 1372 , paras 61—63, where Baroness Hale spoke of the process of benefits adjudication as “inquisitorial rather than adversarial . . . a co-operative process of investigation in which both the claimant and the department play their part”). However, there is no single approach suitable for all tribunals. For example, in a major case in the tax or lands tribunals, the sums may be as great, and the issues as complex, as in any case in the High Court, and the procedure will be modelled accordingly. … 31 There is another important aspect to cases such as the present. The higher courts have emphasised the special responsibility carried by the tribunals in the context of asylum appeals. It is customary in this context to speak of the need for “anxious scrutiny” (following R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Bugdaycay[1987] AC 514 , 531, per Lord Bridge of Harwich). As a concept this is not without its difficulties, but I repeat what I said in R (YH) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2010] 4All ER 448 , para 24: “the expression [anxious scrutiny] in itself is uninformative. Read literally, the words are descriptive not of a legal principle but of a state of mind: indeed, one which might be thought an ‘axiomatic’ part of any judicial process, whether or not involving asylum or human rights. However, it has by usage acquired special significance as underlining the very special human context in which such cases are brought, and the need for decisions to show by their reasoning that every factor which might tell in favour of an applicant has been properly taken into account. I would add, however, echoing Lord Hope [in R (BA (Nigeria)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2010] 1AC 444 , para 32], that there is a balance to be struck. Anxious scrutiny may work both ways. The cause of genuine asylum seekers will not be helped by undue credulity towards those advancing stories which are manifestly contrived or riddled with inconsistencies.” 32 Similar considerations in my view impose a special responsibility on the Secretary of State and those representing her to ensure that the evidence presented to the tribunal is adequately supported. So in this case Lord Eassie rejected the suggestion that it was enough for the Secretary of State to provide the interview tapes to the Appellants, leaving them to obtain their own expert advice. He said, at para 66: “as a matter of principle, it is the Secretary of State who invokes the purported expert evidence for her purposes in order to impugn the honesty of the Appellant. In accordance with all normal rules of procedure it must therefore be for her to establish, by active demonstration of the appropriate expert qualification, the worth of the evidence upon which she relies to counter the testimony of the Appellant.”
“169. In determining the existence or otherwise of a duty of care in the three cases, Lord Toulson and Lord Reed applied the orthodox common law approach and the established principles of law. What follows is a distillation of the key general principles drawn from those cases. It is intended to provide the uncontroversial backdrop to the issues which I must decide in this case. i) At common law public authorities are generally subject to the same liabilities in tort as private individuals and bodies. Accordingly, if conduct would be tortious if committed by a private person or body, it is generally equally tortious if committed by a public authority. It follows therefore that public authorities are generally under a duty of care to avoid causing actionable harm in situations where a duty of care would arise under ordinary principles of the law of negligence ( Robinson at [33]). ii) Like private individuals, public authorities are generally under no duty of care to prevent the occurrence of harm. In Michael , Lord Toulson said at [97]: “English law does not as a general rule impose liability on a Defendant (D) for injury or damage to the person or property of a claimant (C) caused by the conduct of a third party (T): Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] A.C. 241 . The fundamental reason as Lord Goff explained is that the common law does not generally impose liability for pure omissions. It is one thing to require a person who embarks on action which may harm others to exercise care. It is another matter to hold a person liable in damages for failing to prevent harm caused by someone else”. iii) The distinction between negligent acts and negligent omissions is therefore, as Lord Reed said in Poole at [28] of fundamental importance. Lord Reed reflected that the distinction to be drawn could be better expressed as a “distinction between causing harm (making things worse) and failing to confer a benefit (not making things better) rather than the more traditional distinction between acts and omissions, partly because the former language better conveys the rationale for the distinction drawn in the authorities and partly because the distinction between acts and omissions seems to be found difficult to apply”. iv) Public authorities do not therefore owe a duty of care towards individuals to confer a benefit upon them by protecting them from harm, any more than would a private individual or body, see Robinson at [35]. Lord Reed continues at [36] “That is so, notwithstanding that a public authority may have statutory powers or duties enabling or requiring it to prevent the harm in question”
“English law does not as a general rule impose liability on a Defendant (D) for injury or damage to the person or property of a claimant (C) caused by the conduct of a third party (T): Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] A.C. 241 . The fundamental reason as Lord Goff explained is that the common law does not generally impose liability for pure omissions. It is one thing to require a person who embarks on action which may harm others to exercise care. It is another matter to hold a person liable in damages for failing to prevent harm caused by someone else”. iii) The distinction between negligent acts and negligent omissions is therefore, as Lord Reed said in Poole at [28] of fundamental importance. Lord Reed reflected that the distinction to be drawn could be better expressed as a “distinction between causing harm (making things worse) and failing to confer a benefit (not making things better) rather than the more traditional distinction between acts and omissions, partly because the former language better conveys the rationale for the distinction drawn in the authorities and partly because the distinction between acts and omissions seems to be found difficult to apply”. iv) Public authorities do not therefore owe a duty of care towards individuals to confer a benefit upon them by protecting them from harm, any more than would a private individual or body, see Robinson at [35]. Lord Reed continues at [36] “That is so, notwithstanding that a public authority may have statutory powers or duties enabling or requiring it to prevent the harm in question”
“4. The distinction between careless acts causing personal injury, for which the law generally imposes liability, and careless omissions to prevent acts (by other agencies) causing personal injury, for which the common law generally imposes no liability, is not a mere alternative to policy-based reasoning, but is inherent in the nature of the tort of negligence. For the same reason, although the distinction, like any other distinction, can be difficult to draw in borderline cases, it is of fundamental importance. The central point is that the law of negligence generally imposes duties not to cause harm to other people or their property: it does not generally impose duties to provide them with benefits (including the prevention of harm caused by other agencies). Duties to provide benefits are, in general, voluntarily undertaken rather than being imposed by the common law, and are typically within the domain of contract, promises and trusts rather than tort. It follows from that basic characteristic of the law of negligence that liability is generally imposed for causing harm rather than for failing to prevent harm caused by other people or by natural causes. It is also consistent with that characteristic that the exceptions to the general non-imposition of liability for omissions include situations where there has been a voluntary assumption of responsibility to prevent harm (situations which have sometimes been described as being close or akin to contract), situations where a person has assumed a status which carries with it a responsibility to prevent harm, such as being a parent or standing in loco parentis, and situations where the omission arises in the context of the defendant’s having acted so as to create or increase a risk of harm. 5. The argument that most cases can be equally analysed in terms of either an act or an omission, sometimes illustrated by asking whether a road accident is caused by the negligent driver’s act of driving or by his omission to apply the brakes or to keep a good lookout, does not reflect the true nature and purpose of the distinction, as explained above. The argument was answered by Lord Hoffmann in Stovin v Wise[1996] AC 923 , 945: “One must have regard to the purpose of the distinction as it is used in the law of negligence, which is to distinguish between regulating the way in which an activity may be conducted and imposing a duty to act upon a person who is not carrying on any relevant activity. To hold the defendant liable for an act, rather than an omission, it is therefore necessary to be able to say, according to common-sense principles of causation, that the damage was caused by something which the defendant did. If I am driving at 50 miles an hour and fail to apply the brakes, the motorist with whom I collide can plausibly say that the damage was caused by my driving into him at 50miles an hour.”
“(2) Neither private individuals nor public bodies generally owe a duty of care to confer benefits on others: [Poole] at p.1489, para.28. The distinction is drawn between causing harm, as in making things worse, and failing to confer a benefit, as in not making things better. This terminology conveys the rationale better than the traditional distinction between acts and omissions: and see also Robinson per Lord Reed at p.759, para.69 points 4 and 5. In the present case the duty allegedly owed by the Home Secretary is, in this terminology, a duty to confer a benefit by granting discretionary leave to remain and providing a status letter enabling the pursuer to access employment and/or benefits.”
“65 It follows (1) that public authorities may owe a duty of care in circumstances where the principles applicable to private individuals would impose such a duty, unless such a duty would be inconsistent with, and is therefore excluded by, the legislation from which their powers or duties are derived; (2) that public authorities do not owe a duty of care at common law merely because they have statutory powers or duties, even if, by exercising their statutory functions, they could prevent a person from suffering harm; and (3) that public authorities can come under a common law duty to protect from harm in circumstances where the principles applicable to private individuals or bodies would impose such a duty, as for example where the authority has created the source of danger or has assumed a responsibility to protect the claimant from harm, unless the imposition of such a duty would be inconsistent with the relevant legislation.” (Emphasis added)
“64 Robinson did not lay down any new principle of law, but three matters in particular were clarified. First, the decision explained, as Michael had previously done, that Caparo[1990] 2 AC 605 did not impose a universal tripartite test for the existence of a duty of care, but recommended an incremental approach to novel situations, based on the use of established categories of liability as guides, by analogy, to the existence and scope of a duty of care in cases which fall outside them. The question whether the imposition of a duty of care would be fair, just and reasonable forms part of the assessment of whether such an incremental step ought to be taken. It follows that, in the ordinary run of cases, courts should apply established principles of law, rather than basing their decisions on their assessment of the requirements of public policy…”
“34 … Confusion also persisted concerning the effect of Caparo until clarification was provided in Michael and Robinson. The long shadow cast by Anns and the misunderstanding of Caparo have to be borne in mind when considering the reasoning of decisions concerned with the liabilities of public authorities in negligence which date from the intervening period. Although the decisions themselves are generally consistent with the principles explained in Gorringe and later cases and can be rationalised on that basis, their reasoning has in some cases, and to varying degrees, been superseded by those later developments.”
“The process whereby the decision-making body gathers information and comes to its decision cannot be the subject of an action in negligence. It suffices to rely on the absence of the required proximity. In gathering information, and taking it into account the defendants are acting pursuant to their statutory powers and within that area of their discretion where only deliberate abuse would provide a private remedy. For them to owe a duty of care to immigrants would be inconsistent with the proper performance of their responsibilities as immigration officers. . .”
“…but when I stand back and review the case file, it is clear, whether through overwork or a change of handler, the matter could have been handled differently and with greater clarity and speed. However, that is, at worst, incompetence perhaps bordering on negligence, but that is not sufficient for the serious tort of misfeasance.”
“The whole thrust of the Three Rivers case was that … mere reckless indifference without the addition of subjective recklessness will not do. This element virtually requires the claimant to identify the persons or people said to have acted with subjective recklessness and to establish their bad faith. An institution can only be reckless subjectively if one or more individuals acting on its behalf are subjectively reckless and their subjective state of mind needs to be established.”
“17. In considering whether a challenge to the Secretary of State's decision to remove a person must clearly fail, the reviewing court must, as it seems to me, consider how an appeal would be likely to fare before an adjudicator, as the tribunal responsible for deciding the appeal if there were an appeal. This means that the reviewing court must ask itself essentially the questions which would have to be answered by an adjudicator. In a case where removal is resisted in reliance on article 8 , these questions are likely to be: (1) will the proposed removal be an interference by a public authority with the exercise of the applicant's right to respect for his private or (as the case may be) family life? (2) If so, will such interference have consequences of such gravity as potentially to engage the operation of article 8? (3) If so, is such interference in accordance with the law? (4) If so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others? (5) If so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to be achieved?”
“Mr Chirico cannot now, through his submissions, try and turn the argument from the period [of delay] to its affect (sic) to somehow avail the claimant of a cause of action under the Human Rights Act. On any consideration, five months was a short period and I am satisfied that period of delay does not engage a breach of Article 8.”
“119. Even if I am wrong I am satisfied, in any event that any interference would be justified. There is important public interest in immigration control, the deportation of offenders and parties being able to seek permission to appeal so at (sic) to engage Article 8(2).”