“some residual symptom is likely to remain and the previous cauda equina type of symptoms and the residual pain and sensory disturbances in her left lower extremity would not be improved by addressing this new herniation on the right side.”
“as a Doctor I rely on patients giving me accurate information. If I find there has been deliberate misrepresentation in respect of walking I now have to question how much of what I was told in respect of other symptoms can be relied upon.”
“I have not been dishonest and I maintain that my disability has restrictions are as I have always maintained throughout this litigation”. b) 64.3.3 She required someone to be in attendance when showering c) 64.3.7 She was not able to drive a manual care. d) 64.3.8 She required a mobility scooter when on holiday 3. The above statements were made without honestly believing them to be true and were grossly exaggerating her symptoms and disability for the purposes of her claim. 4. The above statements were made knowing they would be likely to have interfered with the administration of justice.”
“14 …I summarise the relevant principles as follows: a) The applicant must prove each of the three elements of the contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. Given the quasi-criminal nature of contempt proceedings, any genuine doubt must be resolved in the respondent’s favour. b) The three elements are: i) the falsity of the statement; ii) the false statement has or would have interfered with the course of justice; iii) when the false statement was made the maker had no honest belief in the truth of the statement. c) Exaggeration of a claim is not, without more, automatic proof of contempt of Court. What may matter is the degree of exaggeration (the greater the exaggeration, the less likely it is that the maker had an honest belief in the statement verified by the statement of truth) and/or the circumstances in which any exaggeration is made (a statement to an examining Doctor may forgivably focus on the worst aspects of the maker’s physical condition, whilst it may be less easy to dismiss criticism of a similar statement made when the maker has been repeatedly asked to specify variations in his or her physical condition, and chosen only to give one side – the worst - of the story).”
“2. For many years the courts have sought to underline how serious false and lying claims are to the administration of justice. False claims undermine a system whereby those who are injured as a result of the fault of their employer or a defendant can receive just compensation. 3. They undermine that system in a number of serious ways. They impose upon those liable for such claims the burden of analysis, the burden of searching out those claims which are justified and those claims which are unjustified. They impose a burden upon honest claimants and honest claims, when in response to those claims, understandably those who are liable are required to discern those which are deserving and those which are not. 4. Quite apart from that effect on those involved in such litigation is the effect upon the Court. Our system of adversarial justice depends upon openness, upon transparency and above all upon honesty. The system is seriously damaged by lying claims. It is in those circumstances that the courts have on numerous occasions sought to emphasise how serious it is for someone to make a false claim, either in relation to liability or in relation to claims for compensation as a result of liability. 5. Those who make such false claims if caught should expect to go to prison. There is no other way to underline the gravity of the conduct. There is no other way to deter those who may be tempted to make such claims, and there is no other way to improve the administration of justice. 6. The public and advisors must be aware that, however easy it is to make false claims, either in relation to liability or in relation to compensation, if found out the consequences for those tempted to do so will be disastrous. They are almost inevitably in the future going to lead to sentences of imprisonment, which will have the knock-on effect that the lives of those tempted to behave in that way, of both themselves and their families, are likely to be ruined. 7. But the prevalence of such temptation and of those who succumb to that temptation is such that nothing else but such severe condemnation is likely to suffice.”
“49. In relation to fraudulent claims in respect of injuries said to have been sustained in road traffic accidents, Sir John Thomas P in Liverpool Victoria Insurance v Bashir[2012] EWHC 895 (Admin) referred to the great difficulty of detecting such fraud. The Court in that case concluded that the conduct of the defendants was of great seriousness and must attract a custodial sentence, even though they were only “foot soldiers” who had been recruited for a fee to make a false claim in relation to a contrived collision, and even though the amount of the claim was only in the range£5,000 to£15,000 . The Court initially had in mind sentences “well in excess of 12 months’ imprisonment”, but found two very important factors in the defendants’ favour: their early admissions of their fraud; and the assistance they had given to the insurers in relation to the wider fraud. One defendant was the mother of two children, the younger of whom was only four months old and was still being breast-fed. The Court made a very substantial reduction in the length of the sentence to reflect the factors in her favour, but committed her for an immediate term of 6 weeks. … 58. In the context of a contempt of Court involving a false statement verified by a statement of truth, the contemnor may have acted dishonestly, or recklessly in the sense of not caring whether the statement was true or false. In either case, it is always serious, because it undermines the administration of justice. In considering just how serious it is in all the circumstances of an individual case, and in deciding the appropriate punishment for contempt of Court, we think that the approach adopted by the criminal courts provides a useful comparison, though not a precise analogy. In particular, the Sentencing Council’s definitive guidelines on the imposition of community and custodial sentences (see [30] above) and on reduction in sentence for a guilty plea are relevant in cases of this nature. It is therefore appropriate for a Court dealing with this form of contempt of Court to consider (as a criminal Court would do) the culpability of the contemnor and the harm caused, intended or likely to be caused by the contempt of Court. Having in that way determined the seriousness of the case, the Court must consider whether a fine would be a sufficient penalty. If it would, committal to prison cannot be justified, even if the contemnor’s means are so limited that the amount of the fine must be modest. 59. We say at once, however, that the deliberate or reckless making of a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth will usually be so inherently serious that nothing other than an order for committal to prison will be sufficient. That is so whether the contemnor is a claimant seeking to support a spurious or exaggerated claim, a lay witness seeking to provide evidence in support of such a claim, or an expert witness putting forward an opinion without an honest belief in its truth. In the case of an expert witness, the fact that he or she is acting corruptly and makes the relevant false statement for reward, will make the case even more serious; but it will be a serious contempt of Court even if the expert witness acts from an indirect financial motive (such as a desire to obtain more work from a particular solicitor or claims manager), or without any financial motivation at all, and even if the expert witness stands to gain little financial reward by it. This is so because of the reliance placed on expert witnesses by the Court, and because of the corresponding importance of the overriding duty which experts owe to the Court (see [33-34] above). … 64. As we have indicated, an order for committal to prison will usually be inevitable where an expert witness commits this form of contempt of Court, and counsel for the respondent realistically accepted that it was inevitable in this case. As to the appropriate length of sentence, it is important to emphasise that every case will turn on its particular facts. The conduct involved in a contempt of this kind may vary across a wide range. The Court must, therefore, have in mind that the two year maximum term has to cater for that range of conduct, and must seek to impose a sentence in the instant case which sits appropriately within that range. Where more than one contemnor is before the Court, as in the present case, it will of course be necessary to make a judgment as to the comparative seriousness of their respective misconduct. As we have noted at [49] above, Sir John Thomas P in Bashir had in mind as a starting point sentences “well in excess of 12 months” even for those who played the role of “foot soldiers” in the dishonest claims in that case. 65. In determining what is the least period of committal which properly reflects the seriousness of a contempt of Court, the Court must of course give due weight to matters of mitigation. An early admission of the conduct constituting the contempt of Court, before proceedings are commenced, will provide important mitigation, especially if it is volunteered before any allegation is made. So too will cooperation with any investigation into contempt of Court committed by others involved in the same proceedings or in other fraudulent claims. Where the Court is satisfied that the contemnor has shown genuine remorse for his or her conduct, that will provide mitigation. Serious ill health may be a factor properly taken into account.”
“The key general principles are as follows: (a) The Court has a broad discretion when considering the nature and length of any penalty for civil contempt. It may impose: (i) an immediate or suspended custodial sentence; (ii) an unlimited fine; or (iii) an order for sequestration of assets; (b) The discretion should be exercised with a view to achieving the purpose of the contempt jurisdiction, namely (i) punishment for breach; (ii) ensuring future compliance with the Court's orders; and (iii) rehabilitation of the contemnor; (c) The first step in the analysis is to consider (as a criminal Court would do) the culpability of the contemnor and the harm caused, intended or likely to be caused by the breach of the order; (d) The Court should consider all the circumstances, including but not limited to: (i) whether there has been prejudice as a result of the contempt, and whether that prejudice is capable of remedy; (ii) the extent to which the contemnor has acted under pressure; (iii) whether the breach of the order was deliberate or unintentional; (iv) the degree of culpability; (v) whether the contemnor was placed in breach by reason of the conduct of others; (vi) whether he appreciated the seriousness of the breach; (vii) whether the contemnor has cooperated, for example by providing information; (viii) whether the contemnor has admitted his contempt and has entered the equivalent of a guilty plea; (ix) whether a sincere apology has been given; (x) the contemnor's previous good character and antecedents; and (xi) any other personal mitigation; (e) Imprisonment is the most serious sanction and can only be imposed where the custody threshold is passed. … (f) The maximum sentence is 2 years' imprisonment:s. 14(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 . A person committed to prison for contempt is entitled to unconditional release after serving one half of the term for which he was committed:s. 258(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 ; (g) Any term of imprisonment should be as short as possible but commensurate with the gravity of the events and the need to achieve the objectives of the Court's jurisdiction; (h) A sentence of imprisonment may be suspended on any terms which seem appropriate to the Court.”