“I understand that any procedure in addition to those described on this form will only be carried out if it is necessary to save my life or to prevent serious harm to my health. I have been told about additional procedures which may become necessary during my treatment.”
“77. … the small size of the aortic annulus and the fact that the calcification extended in and around the rather small coronary ostia were both contra-indications to performing aortic root enlargement, rendering the enlargement very challenging and of high risk. In order to enlarge the aortic root I would need to use a segment of pericardium to bridge the gap where incisions had been made in the aortic root to widen it, to allow it to take a larger valve. Where the aortic root is densely fibrotic it makes it very difficult to safely enlarge the root, because the tissue is not supple and accepting of a large valve. 78. In addition, the closeness of the origin of both the coronary arteries to the annulus would have created an additional risk factor. A large valve sitting close to the origin of the coronary arteries creates a risk of blocking the coronary arteries causing a heart attack. Attempting to insert a large size aortic valve into a small size aortic root also creates a risk that the aorta could tear, which could cause a risk of substantial damage to the aorta and bleeding as a result. 79. Taking into account all these factors, it was necessary to weigh the risk of performing aortic root enlargement, set against a risk of PPM resulting from having to insert a 19mm valve which was smaller than I had expected to be able to insert. Taking into account the risks identified both pre and intraoperatively in connection with aortic root enlargement, and taking into account the fact that I expected Tracy Neill to have a good outcome with a 19mm Carbomedics Reduced prosthesis, I concluded that this was the safest and most appropriate option. The 19mm Carbomedics Reduced prosthesis represented a significant improvement in EOA compared to Tracy Neill's native valve and was the largest valve I could safely insert.”
“I consider this was possibly due to either tissue beginning to grow across the valve, which can happen from three months post-operatively. Alternatively it is possible that the valve leaflets were not opening properly, which was impeding blood flow across the valve.”
“I totally agree that this lady suffers from symptoms of prosthetic-patient mismatch. I have discussed this with her today and explained that the aim of the next time surgery will be to implant a larger heart valve. This may only be possible by enlarging the aortic root or even replacing the aortic root using a mechanical composite. I quoted her a risk of 2-3% for this operation and she is keen to go ahead with surgery.”
“… [a medical practitioner] is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art. …. Putting it the other way round, a man is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of opinion who would take a contrary view. …”
“… fallen below a standard of practice recognised as proper by a competent reasonable body of opinion?”
“An adult person of sound mind is entitled to decide which, if any, of the available forms of treatment to undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment interfering with her bodily integrity is undertaken. The doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatments. The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it.”
“…The significance of a given risk is likely to reflect a variety of factors besides its magnitude: for example, the nature of the risk, the effect which its occurrence would have upon the life of the patient, the importance to the patient of the benefits sought to be achieved by the treatment, the alternatives available, and the risks involved in those alternatives. The assessment is therefore fact-sensitive, and sensitive also to the characteristics of the patient.”
“… the aim of which is to ensure that the patient understands the seriousness of her condition, and the anticipated benefits and risks of the proposed treatment and any reasonable alternatives, so that she is then in a position to make an informed decision. This role will only be performed effectively if the information provided is comprehensible. The doctor's duty is not therefore fulfilled by bombarding the patient with technical information which she cannot reasonably be expected to grasp, let alone by routinely demanding her signature on a consent form.”
“8. … in the ordinary run of cases, satisfying the "but for" test is a necessary if not a sufficient condition of establishing causation.”
“40. A claim will fail if the most that can be said is that the claimant's injury is likely to have been caused by one or more of a number of disparate factors, one of which was attributable to a wrongful act or omission of the defendant: Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority[1988] AC 1074 . In such a case the claimant will not have shown as a matter of probability that the factor attributable to the defendant caused the injury, or was one of two or more factors which operated cumulatively to cause it. …”
“24. ... If there has been a negligent failure to warn of a particular risk from an operation and the injury is intimately connected to the duty to warn, then the injury is to be regarded as being caused by the breach of the duty to warn; and this to be regarded as a modest departure from established principle of causation.” modest departure from established principle of causation.”
“28. … The crucial finding in Chester v. Afshar was that, if warned of the risk, the claimant would have deferred the operation. In contrast, in the present case, it was not the appellant’s case that she would not have had the operation, or would have deferred it or have gone to another surgeon. There was no such contention in either her Protocol Letter, the appellant’s pleading or her witness statement. Nor was it part of her evidence. To some extent, the reason for this omission is the artificial nature of the appellant’s argument on this part of the case. Nevertheless, it seems to me that if a claimant is to rely on the exceptional principle of causation established by Chester v. Afshar, it is necessary to plead the point and support it by evidence. In the event, the material evidence, such as it was, did not support the appellant’s case on this aspect of the causation argument. … the appellant did not say she would not have had the surgery if advised differently.”