“Where the Claimant gives notice to the Defendant that the claim is unsuitable for this Protocol (for example, because there are complex issues of fact or law) then the claim will no longer continue under this Protocol. However, where the court considers that the Claimant acted unreasonably in giving such notice it will award no more than the fixed costs in rule 45.18.”
“(1) The court may make an order under this rule where – a party or that party’s legal representative, in connection with a summary or detailed assessment, fails to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order; or it appears to the court that the conduct of a party or that party’s legal representative, before or during the proceedings or in the assessment proceedings, was unreasonable or improper. (2) Where paragraph (1) applies, the court may – (a) disallow all or part of the costs which are being assessed; or (b) order the party at fault or that party’s legal representative to pay costs which that party or legal representative has caused any other party to incur.”
“53. The Defendant says that if the Claimant had not erred, the case would (or at least might) have stayed within the Protocol and the costs applicable to the Protocol would (or at least might) then have applied. I cannot be certain what would have occurred without indulging in speculation. 54. What can be said for certain in respect of the chronology of this case is that it became more valuable in terms of damages to the Claimant as it progressed. It is common ground that it appeared to be within the parameters of the Protocol at the outset and so must have been valued at less than£10,000 at that point. But, by the time the case concluded, it was worth at least£26,636 i.e. the settlement figure and possibly more based on the schedule of loss. 55. This progression in the value of the case would have entitled the Claimant, had the case remained in the Protocol, to have notified the Defendant at some point that the Protocol ceased to apply in accordance with paragraph 4.3. 56. It seems to me to be an inevitable conclusion that the amounts allowed by way of fixed costs and disbursements for Protocol cases have been arrived at on the basis of claims which fit within the parameters of the scheme. Cases which do not fit those parameters are either not included in the Protocol (if it is obvious for example that the value is too high at the outset) or may leave it if the parameters cease to fit the case (where, for example the case increases in value). Where cases remain in the Protocol throughout, it is still possible for the Claimant to argue that he should not be limited to the fixed costs provisions (based on exceptionality, for example see 45.29J). 57. These three methods of avoiding the applicable fixed costs reflect the fact that such cases would almost inevitably incur costs over and above those allowed for dealing with cases which do fit within the parameters of the Protocol. 58 . In order to guard against Claimants seeking to leave the costs regime inappropriately, rule 45.24 generally governs the costs consequences of cases which fail to comply with or fail to continue under the Protocol. This provision is only necessary because of the temptation for Claimants to leave the Protocol. The damages recoverable by the Claimant do not change by such a departure. The only change is in relation to the ability to avoid the limitation on costs. It is not a matter of speculation therefore, in my view, to conclude that Claimants and their solicitors, as a whole, are alive to the possibility of exiting the Protocol on various grounds when there is an opportunity to do so. In my Judgment, the Claimant’s solicitors here thought that they were able to do so because of the delay in making the interim payment and wasted no time in sending the relevant notification. 59 . On this basis, if the errant notification had not been given, then once the Claimant thought that the case was worth more than the Protocol limit, it seems to me inevitable that notification would have been given to the Defendant that the Protocol ceased to apply and subsequently Part 7 proceedings would have been issued. This conclusion is simply based upon what the Claimant solicitors actually did (i.e. seek to exit the Protocol at the first opportunity); the uncontested increase in the value of the case as it progressed; and the fact that the proceedings were indeed subsequently issued. 60. Against this conclusion lies the Defendant’s argument that the Defendant may have offered a figure which the Claimant may have accepted. It is obvious that such an argument relies entirely upon speculation. Indeed, it is the sort of speculation was particularly deprecated by the passage set out above in the Johnsey Estates case. It also requires me to conclude either that the Claimant would have accepted an offer of£10,000 i.e. the maximum within the Protocol limit or that if a higher offer, such as the one ultimately accepted, was made, this would not trigger the Claimant’s solicitors immediately certifying that the case was too valuable to continue within the Protocol. There is no evidence provided by the Defendant in support of either of these propositions. Nor is there anything in the facts of the case which would lend support to them. Consequently, I reject the Defendant’s argument in this respect. 61. Given my conclusion that this case would always have exited the Protocol at some stage, it seems to me that the costs incurred would essentially have been the same as were actually incurred. To the extent that the departure would have been at a different time, I do not consider that to be sufficient to demonstrate any prejudice to the Defendant. In those circumstances, it would be inappropriate to limit the Claimant’s costs in the manner contended for by the Defendant under rule 44.11. Instead, the Claimant should be entitled to such reasonable and proportionate costs as he can justify at a detailed assessment on the standard basis.”
“52. These provisions contain numerous ways in which a party whose conduct has been unreasonable can be penalised in costs (what I shall call “the Part 44 conduct provisions”). In my view, the Part 44 conduct provisions provide a complete answer to a case like this. They provide ample scope for a district judge or a costs judge, when assessing the costs in a claim which was unreasonably made outside the EL/PL Protocol, to allow only the fixed costs set out in the EL/PL Protocol ………. 59 …… It seems to me that, in a case where a claim was not reasonably made under a Protocol, rule 44.11 (Misconduct) is of equal, if not more, importance. It will very often be because of misconduct on the part of the Claimant or the Claimant’s legal representatives that a claim was made which unreasonably avoided the relevant Protocol altogether…… 60 . Mr Hutton QC accepted that Part 44 provides a mechanism which achieves the result he seeks. His principal complaint was that it was a less certain remedy than the automatic application of the fixed costs regime stop I have already said that that criticism is unrealistic: any dispute about whether or not the EL/PL Protocol should have been used, and whether it’s non-use was unreasonable, will inevitably introduce a level of uncertainty which cannot be cured by the CPR, at least until that dispute has been resolved.”
“47… Once it is clear… that a CFA may only carry one success fee, and that the task of a cost judge is to determine whether that success fee was a reasonable one in the light of the matters that the legal representative knew or should have known when it was made, there is simply no room for a costs judge to substitute different percentage increases for different items of costs, or for different periods when costs were incurred. He could only do this with the benefit of hindsight, which is prohibited, and the rules and regulations give him no power to remake the party’s agreement.”
“32. The submission has some superficial attraction on the facts of the present case; but, for my part, I would reject it. It seems to me that a court should resist invitations to speculate whether offers to settle litigation which were not in fact made might or might not have been accepted if they had been made. There are, I think, at least two reasons why a court should not allow himself to be led down that road. First, the rules of court…… Secondly, speculation is likely to be a most unsatisfactory tool by which to determine questions of costs at the end of the trial. It is not, I think, suggested that each party would be required to disclose, at that stage, what advice it had received, from time to time, as to the strengths and weaknesses of its claim or defence. But without knowing that – and without a detailed knowledge of the financial and other pressures to which each party was subject from time to time – speculation would be hopelessly ill informed. If Mr Gaunt’s submission were to be accepted generally, there would, I think, be a serious danger, that at the end of each trial, the court (in order to decide what order for costs it should make) would be led into another, potentially lengthy, enquiry on incomplete material into “what would have happened if…?”
“62….. In my Judgment Master Rowley erred in engaging in speculation as to what was in District Judge Thomson’s mind when he reached his decision on the budget. Since Master Rowley reached his decision on whether the misstatement of Grade A rates in the budget affected deputy judge Thomson’s decision based on speculation rather than evidence it cannot stand.”
“… It is not a matter of speculation… To conclude that Claimants and their solicitors, as a whole, are alive to the possibility of exiting the Protocol on various grounds when there is an opportunity to do so.”