“(1) Proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against a person if he makes, or causes to be made, a false statement ina document verified by a statement of truth without an honestbelief in its truth. (Part 22 makes provision for a statement of truth) (Section 6 of Part 81 contains provisions in relation to committal for making a false statement of truth.)”
“(1) A committal application in relation to a false statement of truth or disclosure statement in connection with proceedings inthe High Court, a Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal, may be made only— (a) with the permission of the court dealing with theproceedings in which the false statement or disclosurestatement was made; or (b) by the Attorney General. … (3) A committal application in relation to a false statement of truth or disclosure statement in connection with proceedings inthe County Court may be made only— (a) with the permission of a single judge of the High Court; or (b) by the Attorney General.”
“(1) The application for permission to make a committal application must be made by a Part 8 claim form which must include or be accompanied by— (a) a detailed statement of the applicant’s grounds for bringing the committal application; and (b) an affidavit setting out the facts and exhibiting all documents relied upon. (2) The claim form and the documents referred to in paragraph (1) must be served personally on the respondent unless the court otherwise directs. (3) Within 14 days of service on the respondent of the claim form, the respondent— (a) must file and serve an acknowledgment of service; and (b)may file and serve evidence. (4) The court will consider the application for permission at an oral hearing, unless it considers that such a hearing is not appropriate. (5) If the respondent intends to appear at the permission hearing referred to in paragraph (4), the respondent must give 7 days’ notice in writing of such intention to the court and any other party and at the same time provide a written summary of the submissions which the respondent proposes to make. (6) Where permission to proceed is given, the court may give such directions as it thinks fit, and may— (a)transfer the proceedings to another court; or (b) direct that the application be listed for hearing before a single judge or a Divisional Court.” (a) a detailed statement of the applicant’s grounds for bringing the committal application; and (b) an affidavit setting out the facts and exhibiting all documents relied upon. (a) must file and serve an acknowledgment of service; and (b)may file and serve evidence. (b) direct that the application be listed for hearing before a single judge or a Divisional Court.”
“A major rift emerged in the family as a result of our marriage. Stephen came to bear enormous animosity towards … us, and to our son (and Herbert’s step son) Paul Snow. Eventually Stephen and … Herbert became embroiled in litigation (two sets of proceedings; one issued by each party) and the ownership of the Business. The proceedings settled but unsurprisingly their relationship never recovered.”
“11.5 The Second Defendant [i.e. Mrs Norton] was not privy to the First Defendant’s exact reasoning in conducting his affairs in this way. It was nevertheless characteristic of the First Defendant to wish to keep his affairs confidential so far as possible. Although a very successful businessman the First Defendant was not given to formalising matters and placed great store in personal relationships. The Second Defendant knew him to believe throughout his life that confidentiality as to his affairs was an end in itself; the court should therefore no assume it was a means to achieve some improper outcome. 11.6 The Defendants will rely on evidence that, of the relatively small amount of money that passed through the Bank Accounts, much of it was of a character that could not possibly be construed as belonging to the Claimant. For example, the bulk of the money passing through the Bank Accounts were legacies left to the Defendants by their own parents (on which, incidentally, tax had been paid in full). It is fanciful to suggest this money was intended to belong beneficially to the Claimant.”
“3.5 The sale of St Mary’s Crescent [i.e. Mrs Gavigan’s property] led to a reconciliation of the money owed to the Claimant. The First Defendant asked the Claimant if she would be content to keep the account open and allow him to use it for his own transactions. The Claimant agreed to this in the clearest possible terms in a letter on which the Defendants will rely: ‘I don’t have a problem with you keeping the Account open and using it.’” ‘I don’t have a problem with you keeping the Account open and using it.’”
“The real reason for the power of attorney is that it was necessary to sell a property known as “The Old School Chapel” that the Claimant was holding as trustee for the Defendants, and was executed on the advice of Holmes and Hills Solicitors. This bare trust arrangement does not seem to be disputed and is an example of how the Claimant periodically acted as nominee owner of property for the Defendants (as was the fact that Elmhurst was originally purchased in the Claimant’s name, as she seems to admit). The Claimant has also provided these nominee services to Stephen, for example in respect of a property at 8 Church Road, Benfleet. A further purpose of the 2013 Power of Attorney was to enable the Second Defendant to act for the Claimant in legal proceedings. The legal proceedings in question were yet another set of intra-family proceedings, involving Stephen’s brother Paul Norton (funded and supported by Stephen) seeking to assert an entitlement to a greater share of the proceeds of sale of The Old School Chapel. It should be noted, however, that the 2013 Power of Attorney was not used in relation to the Bank Accounts and was never registered with any bank.”
“That she denied that either she or the First Defendant in those proceedings (“the First Defendant”) had, from at least the 1996 Power of Attorney, had control over the Claimant’s financial affairs and assets in the United Kingdom, including the Caravan and any rents received therefrom. (Paragraph 19 [of the Original Defence])”; ii) Particulars of Contempt 1(b): “That ‘Mr Norton’s [the First Defendant’s] duties as an attorney and/or agent ceased upon the sale of the claimant’s property’ (i.e. in 1996) (Paragraph 20 of the Original Defence)”; iii) Particulars of Contempt 1(e): “that ‘all monies paid into the Bank Accounts in the Claimant’s name were not for the Claimant or for the Claimant’s benefit’ (Emphasis added) and averred there to be a private agreement for Mr Norton to open and use bank accounts in the Claimant’s name from 1996 (Paragraphs 10 and 23 of the Original Defence)”; iv) Particulars of Contempt 1(f): “That ‘no property was held by the 2nd Defendant for the Claimant’ (paragraph 23 of the Original Defence) (Emphasis added)”; v) Particulars of Contempt 1(g): “They admitted that ‘no monies were paid out to the Claimant. As no monies were due to the Claimant.’ (Paragraph 14 of the Original Defence).” vi)Particulars of Contempt 1(h): “They denied that ‘the Claimant is entitled to (i) an account and enquiries of all the Claimant’s monies and property received, handled or controlled by Mr Norton and/or the 2nd Defendant since 1996 as, save for the proceeds of sale of the Property, which the Claimant admits to receiving, no such monies or property was received, handled or controlled for the Claimant by [the Defendants].’ (Emphases added) (Paragraph 24 of the Original Defence”; vii)Particulars of Contempt 2(g): “‘It will be absolutely obvious when the court comes to evaluate the transactions on the Accounts … that they were used by the First Defendant in respect of his own funds, and the rent from the Caravan is no different’. (Response 3.6 to Request 4); viii) Particulars of Contempt 2(h): “‘All payments were beneficially owned by the First Defendant and/or the Second Defendant’. (Response to Request 12); ix) Particulars of Contempt 3(h): “The Claimant is not beneficially entitled to the money in the bank accounts in her name, ‘such entitlement as the Claimant may have had to any funds in the Bank Accounts was therefore held for the First Defendant on trust’. (Draft Amended Defence para 11.4)” x) Particulars of Contempt 3(i): “‘…the funds held in the Bank Accounts (other than the rent on the Property [i.e. Mrs Gavigan’s property] and proceeds of sale of the property …) were the property of the Defendants.’ (Draft Amended Defence para 14.3)”; xi) Particulars of Contempt 4(a): “‘Any legal duties we owed the claimant as attorneys effectively ceased in either 1996 after the completion of the sale of the claimant’s property or in May 2001 when the claimant confirmed we could continue to use bank accounts in her name.’ (Paragraph 4 of the AN Witness Statement); xii) Particulars of Contempt 4(c): “‘All money paid into the account was for our sole benefit’ (Paragraph 10 of the AN Witness Statement)” xiii) Particulars of Contempt 4(d): “‘all money passing through the account was ours and from that date she has no legitimate claim to any money’ (paragraph 19 of the AN Witness Statement); xiv) Particulars of Contempt 4(e): “‘Mrs Gavigan has no right to any money passing through the account from at least May 2001’ (paragraph 21 of the AN Witness Statement).”
“Re Unit at Elmhurst Further to previous correspondence, we have taken instructions and confirm as follows: 1. The rental unit was originally purchased by Mrs Bonner over ten years ago. 2. The rental unit is currently located on Elmhurst for no charge. 3. There is no lease or contractual licence between the Nortons and Mrs Bonner in respect of the unit. The Nortons have simply given Mrs Bonner permission to keep the unit on Elmhurst. 4. Consequently, Mrs Bonner keeps the unit on Elmhurst pursuant to a bare licence which is terminable at any time upon reasonable notice. …”
“Request 15: is the truth of the contents of [paragraph 23 of the 2015 Affidavit] – generally, and in particular that the caravan was owned by the Claimant and that she was entitled to the£23,000 referred to – denied? If the truth is denied, is it denied in whole or in part, and if in part in which part?”
“This affidavit was made by … my late husband with the full knowledge, approval and support of the claimant, who did so to support … Herbert in a previous legal claim against his son, Stephen Norton, and the claimant was fully aware that by agreeing to, and supporting, the content of the affidavit that no real transfer, confirmation or other rights of ownership or benefit, would be conveyed to the claimant. The claimant is now attempting to construct a narrative around this affidavit in [an] attempt to seize any income derived from the caravan.” [an] attempt to seize any income derived from the caravan.”
“42. I believed and still do believe today that the money Herbert used to buy the caravan was his own. I have since accepted that the legal consequence of his having made the affidavit referred to, is that from that day Herbert was agreeing that the Claimant was the owner of the caravan. I believed and still believe that the contents of this affidavit were agreed between Herbert and the Claimant although I do not know why this was. 43. I believed that the contents of the affidavit could not be true as I believed that the caravan had been bought by Herbert with his own money and therefore must have been his, so I did not know why he would say that it was the Claimant’s. I now understand that a chattel can be transferred between people by intention and agreement. In all the circumstances and with the costs of the litigation mounting, by December 2019 I was prepared to admit that the legal effect of the affidavit in May 2015 [sic] was that from that date both Herbert and the Claimant were agreeing and declaring that the caravan should be treated as belonging to the Claimant. May amended defence says just that.”