“Caller reports a Land Rover on its Side in a Ditch...between Rascelf and Easingwold. Location is half way between the two locations…Are also a number of skidmarks on the road nearby as if another vehicle mayhave been involved …its very very slippery that road at the minute…..there’s no salt at all and its minus 1….. . This is the 2nd time vehicle has gone off the road tonight in this area…. Give location as half a mile from the Bridge that runs over the A19…. Will put signs out advising drivers to slow….Signs are out”
“2316 hrs, Call from Swingbridge to say that there was a water burst on Rascelf Road at junc with Alne Road. Police had informed Yorkshire Water. Police request the road to be gritted. I informed Swingbridge that it was a P2 route and would be treated in the morning and would speak to Inspector before treatment to advise him.” [ 1/13/168] PC Groom was told “they would not come unless there was a serious or fatal accident”
“a) The roads of North Yorkshire are divided into 7 areas and categorised according to priority as P1, P2 and P3 for the provision of winter services. Rascelf Road was in Area 2, Thirsk, and was a P2 route. It was a minor rural road running between Easingwold to the East and Rascelf to the West. It was part of the salting route 6S. The appropriateness of this categorisation is not challenged by D1. b) Under D2’s Winter Service Manual for 2015/2016 [1/12/109 at 113], P1 routes received pre-salting (gritting) in the evening unless the forecast was for extreme weather conditions, in which case evening salting for P2 routes could be considered. P2 routes were treated in the morning after salting of the Priority 1 routes had been completed. Salting usually took place prior to 11pm and after 5 am. c) In Area 2 there were routes on higher ground. They could be given priority and treated first or with an increased spread rate. Route 6S was not one of them. d) D2 utilised various 24 hours weather forecasting sources and road temperature data which were monitored throughout the day by the Duty Manager. There are 11 weather forecasting domains. Rascelf Road is nearest the weather domain of Carlton Miniott [1/12/132]. e) The Duty Manager would draw up a Daily Weather Forecast and Action Report at 12 noon which was distributed to the Area Offices, neighbouring authorities, Highway Officers, Ringway Infrastructure Services (“RIS”, D2’s contractors) and the police. If the forecast changed, an updated Forecast and Action sheet would be distributed. RIS drivers were “stood to” by 14:00 hours. f) Before the morning post-salting was undertaken, a duty Highway Officer would visually inspect part of the network between their home base and the area office to provide an accurate picture of the conditions before confirming that the previous day’s forecast is still appropriate. g) The policy could be departed from in exceptional circumstances in order to minimise the impact on the implementation of planned treatment. This was a matter of judgment for the Duty Manager; for example to allow access for emergency vehicles.”
“Requests for alleviation of bad road conditions Such requests received at County Hall will be passed to the appropriate Area. It will be the responsibility of each Area to determine the priority of individual requests relative to the prevailing situation.”
“ It would not be in accordance with NYCC policy to respond to an individual request for gritting save for exceptional circumstances , such as where treatment was required to enable access for emergency vehicles to the scene of an accident”
“If I had been told there had been an accident, I would have to give consideration to the weather forecast and potentially I would have spoken to the police officers to see what the situation was. I wouldn’t have gritted the road unless the emergency services had said that they couldn’t access the situation without gritting the road”
“Subject to the following provisions of this section, any person liable in respect of any damage suffered by another person may recover contribution from any other person liable in respect of the same damage (whether jointly with him or otherwise).”
“… in any proceedings for contribution under section 1 above the amount of the contribution recoverable from any person shall be such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of that person’s responsibility for the damage in question.”
“41.— Duty to maintain highways maintainable at public expense. (1) The ....highway authority … are under a duty…to maintain the highway. (1A) In particular, a highway authority are under a duty to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that safe passage along a highway is not endangered by snow or ice”
“ In any proceedings for an offence under any of the relevant statutory provisions consisting of a failure to comply with a duty or requirement to do something so far as is practicable or so far as is reasonably practicable, or to use the best practicable means to do something, it shall be for the accused to prove ( as the case may be) that it was not reasonably practicable or not reasonably practicable to do more than was in fact done to satisfy the duty or requirement, or that there was no better practicable means than was in fact used to satisfy the duty or requirement”
“The duty is not absolute in the sense that the road has to be perfect. As Diplock L.J. explained in the later case ofBurnsidev. Emerson [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1490, 1497, the duty is to put the road: “in such good repair as renders it reasonably passable for the ordinary traffic of the neighbourhood at all seasons of the year without danger caused by its physical condition.”
“81.Since it took the view that safety is absolute and unchanging, the Court of Appeal had to consider whether the qualification "so far as is reasonably practicable" enabled the employers to exonerate themselves by showing that reasonable employers would not have considered that there was cause to reduce noise exposure in the workplace below 90dB(A). The Court of Appeal held that the qualification gave no scope for such a defence. It said (para 89): "Under the statute, the employer must first consider whether the employee's place of work is safe. If the place of work is not safe (even though the danger is not of grave injury or the risk very likely to occur) the employer's duty is to do what is reasonably practicable to eliminate it. Thus, once any risk has been identified, the approach must be to ask whether it is practicable to eliminate it and then, if it is, to consider whether, in the light of the quantum of the risk and the cost and difficulty of the steps to be taken to eliminate it, the employer can show that the cost and difficulty of the steps substantially outweigh the quantum of risk involved. I cannot see how or where the concept of an acceptable risk comes into the equation or balancing exercise. I cannot see why the fact that a responsible or official body has suggested that a particular level of risk is 'acceptable' should be relevant to what is reasonably practicable. In that respect, it appears to me that there is a significant difference between common law liability where a risk might reasonably be regarded as acceptable and statutory liability where the duty is to avoid any risk within the limits of reasonable practicability." Smith LJ reiterated the point at the end of para 100, when rejecting the relevance of the Code of Practice to the question whether it was reasonably practicable to provide protection. 82. In the light of my conclusion that safety is a relative concept, the correctness of these passages does not strictly arise for consideration in this case. Had it arisen, I would have regarded the qualification as wide enough to allow current general knowledge and standards to be taken into account. Even the Court of Appeal in its formulation acknowledged the quantum of risk involved as material in the balancing exercise. But this can only mean that some degree of risk may be acceptable, and what degree can only depend on current standards. The criteria relevant to reasonable practicability must on any view very largely reflect the criteria relevant to satisfaction of the common law duty to take care. Both require consideration of the nature, gravity and imminence of the risk and its consequences, as well as of the nature and proportionality of the steps by which it might be addressed, and a balancing of the one against the other. Respectable general practice is no more than a factor, having more or less weight according to the circumstances, which may, on any view at common law, guide the court when performing this balancing exercise: see Swanwick and Mustill JJ's statements of principle, set out earlier in this judgment, and also Charlesworth on Negligence (12th ed) (2010), chapter 7, The Standard of Care, both generally and especially at para 7.38. It would be strange if the Court of Appeal was right in suggesting that, under the statutory formulation, this one factor is irrelevant, when the whole aim of the balancing exercise must, in reality, be to identify what is or is not acceptable at a particular time.”
"Provided that the formula of 'exceptional circumstances' is not turned into a straitjacket of its own, and the interests of justice and its constituents as laid down in the overriding principle are held closely to mind, I do not think that the proper balance will be lost. Clearly, it cannot be in every case that a litigant should be entitled to ask the judge to think again. Therefore, on one ground or another the case must raise considerations, in the interests of justice, which are out of the ordinary, extraordinary or exceptional. An exceptional case does not have to be uniquely special. 'Strong reasons' is perhaps an acceptable alternative to 'exceptional circumstances”. It will necessarily be in an exceptional case that strong reasons are shown for reconsideration."