“Reason(s) for refusing bail are that it is believed necessary to further detain the person for their own protection, that the detained person has been arrested for a non-imprisonable offence and it is believed necessary to further detain to prevent physical injury to another person, that the detained person has been arrested for an imprisonable offence and it is believed necessary to further detain in order to prevent the commission of a further offence. The grounds are Dp [sc. detained person] has been involved in a ‘gang’ related fight where he has sustained injuries that required hospital treatment. It is feared that if released on bail there will be repercussions where he may sustain further injuries or inflict violence upon his original intended victims.”
“A person arrested for an offence shall not be kept in police detention except in accordance with the provisions of this Part of this Act”
“A person to whom this section applies shall be granted bail except as provided in Schedule 1 to this Act.”
“The defendant need not be granted bail if the court is satisfied that the defendant should be kept in custody for his own protection or, if he is a child or young person, for his own welfare.”
“the exhaustive nature of the exceptions, which must be interpreted strictly, and which do not allow for the broad range of justifications under other provisions (arts 8-11 of the Convention in particular); the repeated emphasis on the lawfulness of the detention, both procedural and substantive, requiring scrupulous adherence to the rule of law; and the importance of the promptness or speediness of the requisite judicial controls.” 24. 5(3), there must be “relevant and sufficient reasons” and the justification for any period of detention, however short, must be “convincingly demonstrated by the authorities”
“The Court is therefore of the general view that in order not to make it impracticable for the police to fulfil their duties of maintaining order and protecting the public, provided that they comply with the underlying principle of art. 5, which is to protect the individual from arbitrariness, the lawful detention of a person outside the context of criminal proceedings can, as a matter of principle be permissible under art. 5(1)(c) of the Convention.”
“art. 5 cannot be interpreted in such a way as to make it impracticable for the police to fulfil their duties of maintaining order and protecting the public, provided that they comply with the underlying principle of the provision, which is to protect the individual from arbitrariness”
“The ECtHR has recognised that pre-trial detention may be compatible with the defendant’s right to release under Article 5(3) where it is for the purpose of avoiding a real risk that, were the defendant released, (1) he or she would (a) fail to attend trial; (b) interfere with evidence or witnesses, or otherwise obstruct the course of justice; (c) commit an offence while on bail; or (d) be at risk of harm against which he or she would be inadequately protected; or (2) a disturbance to public order would result.”
“The persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence – a point which is not contested in the present case – is a condition sine qua non for the validity of the continued detention, but, after a certain lapse of time, it no longer suffices; the Court must then establish whether the other grounds cited by the judicial authorities continue to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds are ‘relevant’ and ‘sufficient’, the court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed ‘special diligence’ in the conduct of the proceedings…”
“The Court accepts that in some cases the safety of a person under investigation required his continued detention, for a time at least. However, this can only be so in exceptional circumstances having to do with the nature of the offences concerned, the conditions in which they were committed and the context in which they took place.”
“5.2 We provisionally concluded that a refusal of bail for the defendant’s own protection can be compatible with the Convention, but only if there are exceptional circumstances and (perhaps) only if those exceptional circumstances relate to the nature of the alleged offence and the conditions or context in which it is alleged to have been committed. We provisionally proposed that guidance be issued to reflect this. We invited comments on what form such guidance might take, and asked for information on how often the power to refuse bail for this purpose is used, in what circumstances and, in particular, whether it is commonly used to guard against self-harm as distinct from harm from others. 5.3 Our provisional conclusions were based on the only case of which we were aware in which the ECtHR has considered the lawfulness of detention pending trial on the ground of protecting the defendant from harm, IA v France. The applicant had been charged with the murder of his wife. He had been continuously detained for over five years, partly because the judicial authorities feared that his wife’s family would attack him. The ECtHR held that there are cases in which ‘the safety of a person under investigation requires his continued detention, for a time at least’. It is thus a true ‘ground’ for denying bail, rather than a reason for concluding that a ground is substantiated. The ECtHR held that, on the facts of that case, the ground was not made out. 5.4 Having concluded that the protection of the defendant was capable of being a relevant and sufficient reason for detention, the Court added, without further explanation: ‘However, this can only be so in exceptional circumstances having to do with the nature of the offences concerned, the conditions in which they were committed and the context in which they took place.’ 5.5 Although these words would not seem to encompass a risk of self-harm unconnected to the circumstances of the offence, we warned that it would be unwise to rely too heavily on one rather enigmatic statement, particularly since the possibility of selfharm had not arisen in that case.”
“86. While paragraph 1(c) of Article 5 sets out the grounds on which pre-trial detention may be permissible in the first place (see De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v. the Netherlands,22 May 1984 , §44, Series A no. 77), paragraph 3, which forms a whole with the former provision, lays down certain procedural guarantees, including the rule that detention pending trial must not exceed a reasonable time, thus regulating its length. 87. According to the Court’s established case-law under Article 5§3, the persistence of a reasonable suspicion is a condition sine qua non for the validity of the continued detention, but, after a certain lapse of time, it no longer suffices: the Court must then establish (1) whether other grounds cited by the judicial authorities continue to justify the deprivation of liberty and (2), where such grounds were ‘relevant’ and ‘sufficient’, whether the national authorities displayed ‘special diligence’ in the conduct of the proceedings (see, among many other authorities, Letellier, cited above, §35, and Idalov v. Russia [GC], no.5826/03, §140,22 May 2012 ). The Court has also held that justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities. When deciding whether a person should be released or detained, the authorities are obliged to consider alternative means of ensuring his or her appearance at trial (ibid.). 88. Justifications which have been deemed ‘relevant’ and ‘sufficient’ reasons (in addition to the existence of reasonable suspicion) in the Court’s case-law, have included such grounds as the danger of absconding, the risk of pressure being brought to bear on witnesses or of evidence being tampered with, the risk of collusion, the risk of reoffending, the risk of causing public disorder and the need to protect the detainee (see, for instance, Stögmüller v. Austria,10 November 1969 , §15, Series A no. 9; Wemhoff, cited above, §14; Tomasi, cited above, §95; Toth v. Austria,12 December 1991 , §70, Series A no. 224; Letellier, cited above, §51; and I.A. v. France,23 September 1998 , §108, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VII).”