“6. Finance for the JVA 6.1 The parties to this agreement acknowledge that DBI has provided a detailed breakdown of its investment it has made in total$600,000 (six hundred thousand US dollars) prior to the execution of this agreement in Muhammad Ali, towards negotiating the licence agreement, royalty payments, development, operational costs, product, salaries and operational costs. 6.2 The parties to this agreement agree that JVA shall be financed by May Fair for a total of$550,000 (five hundred and fifty thousand US dollars) of which$170,000 (one hundred and seventy thousand US dollars) is invested and the outstanding investment stands at$380,000 (three hundred and eighty thousand US dollars), to be invested on execution of this agreement. May Fair undertakes to make the outstanding investment of$380,000 (three hundred and eighty thousand US dollars) in the JVA following three stages: (a) First payment of$100,000 (one hundred thousand US dollars) on or after the execution of this agreement; (b) Second payment of$50,000 (fifty thousand US dollars) on or before10 January 2018 ; (c) Third payment of$230,000 (two hundred and thirty thousand US dollars) on or before1 March 2018 . … 6.4 The parties to this agreement agree that May Fair and DBI through the JVA shall make payments towards Royalty Payments in relation to the Licence Agreement for Muhammad Ali products based on the percentage (%) ratio of purchase and sales, as seen in the example: If the total sales of the JVA amount to a total net profit of$1,000,000 (one million US dollars) then this amount shall be divided into$800,000 (eight hundred thousand US dollars) for May Fair and$200,000 (two hundred thousand US dollars) for DBI. The Royalty Payments for that period shall be paid 80% by May Fair and 20% by DBI. 6.5 The parties agree that Robert Halefi Mofrad shall be paid a salary for an amount equal to 10% of the value of every purchase order generated by May Fair, for his appointment as the project director for the JVA.” (a) First payment of$100,000 (one hundred thousand US dollars) on or after the execution of this agreement; (b) Second payment of$50,000 (fifty thousand US dollars) on or before10 January 2018 ; (c) Third payment of$230,000 (two hundred and thirty thousand US dollars) on or before1 March 2018 . … 6.4 The parties to this agreement agree that May Fair and DBI through the JVA shall make payments towards Royalty Payments in relation to the Licence Agreement for Muhammad Ali products based on the percentage (%) ratio of purchase and sales, as seen in the example: If the total sales of the JVA amount to a total net profit of$1,000,000 (one million US dollars) then this amount shall be divided into$800,000 (eight hundred thousand US dollars) for May Fair and$200,000 (two hundred thousand US dollars) for DBI. The Royalty Payments for that period shall be paid 80% by May Fair and 20% by DBI. 6.5 The parties agree that Robert Halefi Mofrad shall be paid a salary for an amount equal to 10% of the value of every purchase order generated by May Fair, for his appointment as the project director for the JVA.”
“120. I note that May Fair placed 2 purchase orders to the value of$838,596.60 (see attached invoices at pages 330-331). 121. On my calculation, the total amount outstanding in connection with my salary is therefore$83,859.66 , and therefore the Claimant is claiming half of that amount.”
“I was keen to do this because I did not feel I could trust him and we no longer had a good working relationship. When we started discussing how much I would need to pay him, Negm grossly overvalued his share in the company at$1,000,000 .”
“The selling process would include every stock I have personally such as the goods which is more than 29,000 bottles of perfume those kept in the free zone store in Jabel Ali port, Dubai.”
“To date DBI has reported sales of 29,000 units totalling$725,000 in sales and$65,250 in earned royalties.”
“In the circumstances, our client has no option but to terminate the15 November 2017 joint venture agreement with immediate effect.”
“We inform you that any new purchase of goods of Muhammad Ali fragrance will be invoiced by our affiliate company Moon City Star Property Investment LLC … who now holds all the stock for any new purchase.”
“Dear Mr Robert, as discussed please find the ridiculous request we received from Negm which leaves us all speechless. I hope below will help you and you can relief us all from such unusual profile and strange person to deal with. On one hand you tell us he has been terminated on the other his letter says complete opposite! From this point, I please ask you to not involve me further and make sure we do not get any further threats or abusive behaviour from him as we wish to avoid unnecessary problems especially from such dangerous person.”
“46. Nasr’s conduct is a paradigm example of someone who poses a risk of dissipation. Apart from general evasiveness, refusals to respond or nonsensical threats and claims, there is solid evidence which shows that Nasr (and May Fair through him) have no regard for their contractual obligations and are actively taking steps, in breach of MJVBA and of the licence to dissipate assets by holding May Fair out as an ‘official licensee’ and diverting licenced products, customers and sales revenue to Moon City.”
“I did not think that my earlier exchanges with Mr Farid were relevant as I considered that Elysa’s requests were reasonable. I did not doubt the veracity of these documents as they had emerged following my email correspondence with Mr Farid and, importantly the management. For the avoidance of doubt, I confirm I did not notice or pay any attention to the email address from which Mr Farid had corresponded. I simply replied to the addresses from which he had corresponded.”
“I understand that such registration can only be completed from within the UAE and once appropriate due diligence on the identity of the applicant has been undertaken.”
“34. I confirm that my investigations have not revealed anything suspicious or any fact which would suggest that the emails sent by Mr Farid from his farid@elysadeparis.ae email account did not originate from Mr Farid. In any event the fact that the 13th and14th February 2019 emails were sent from an .ae account server is a matter which I only noticed once this was pointed out in Mr Negm’s affidavit. As far as I can elicit the domain is registered to Elysa de Paris and I cannot comment any further as to why Mr Farid chose to use this account. 35. As for the Official Notice and invoice attached to the14 February 2019 email, I cannot comment on this other than to say that I received these from Elysa de Paris and I did not have any involvement whatsoever in the creation of these documents. I did not forge these documents.”
“apskhouri@gmail.com”
“Kindly clarify what is this email address ‘khalidkhouriapskhouri@gmail.com’ because this email address does not exist in our company!”
“P.S. in regards with the cited email this seems to be a glitch from our corporate server in which we are investigating internally, and we will revert back to you.” “Kindly clarify what is this email address ‘khalidkhouriapskhouri@gmail.com’ because this email address does not exist in our company!” “P.S. in regards with the cited email this seems to be a glitch from our corporate server in which we are investigating internally, and we will revert back to you.”
“P.S. in regards with the site of the email after further checking internally in our server, there seemed to be a confusion related to the email of 25.06.2018 where documents of your companies have been exchanged with us indicating Mr Khalid Khouri as General Manger on trade license. Back then it was internally communicated the email is khourisaps which was wrongfully mixed up with the apskhouri and registered as Khalid as indicated in the document provided. Therefore when I used our corporate CEO email to send your company an email all registered webmail address on server came up (I do apologise I do not know who is who). We have since advised internally and erased from the server the wrong email address.”
“The granting of a freezing injunction is a matter for the discretion of the judge hearing the application. In the exercise of this discretion, in the context of English proceedings the court may grant an application for a WFO where the following matters are established: (1)The claimant has a good arguable case; (2) The claimant has satisfied the court – a. That there are no assets or insufficient assets within the jurisdiction to satisfy his claim, and b. That there are assets without the jurisdiction; (3) There is a real risk of dissipation or secretion of those assets so as to render any judgment which the claimant may obtain nugatory. In addition, in exercising its discretion the court should consider whether undertakings or provisos, or a combination of both, should be requested or imposed for the purpose of protecting the defendant from oppression and for protecting the position of foreign third parties.”
“The [duty of candour] is I think a thoroughly healthy one. It serves the important purposes of encouraging persons who are making ex parte applications to the court diligently to observe their duty to make full disclosure of all material facts and to deter them from any failure to observe this duty, whether through deliberate lack of candour or innocent lack of due care. Nevertheless, the nature of the principle, as I see it, is essentially penal and in its application the practical realities of any case before the court cannot be overlooked. By their very nature, ex parte applications usually precipitate the giving and taking of instructions and the preparation of the requisite drafts in some haste. Particularly, in heavy commercial cases, the border line between material facts and non-material facts may be a somewhat uncertain one. While in no way discounting the heavy duty of candour and care which falls on persons making ex parte applications, I do not think that the application of the principles should be carried to extreme lengths. In one or two other recent cases coming before this court, I’ve suspected signs of a growing tendency on the part of some litigants against whom ex parte injunctions have been granted or of their legal advisors, to rush to the R v Kensington Income Tax Commissioners[1917] 1 KB 486 principle as a “tabula in naufragio”, alleging material non-disclosure on sometimes rather slender grounds, as representing substantially the only hope of obtaining the discharge of injunctions in cases where there is little hope of doing so on the substantive merits of the case or on the balance of convenience.”
“Issues of non-disclosure or abuse of process in relation to the operation of a freezing order ought to be capable of being dealt with quite concisely. Speaking in general terms, it is inappropriate to seek to set aside a freezing order for non-disclosure where proof of non-disclosure depends on proof of facts which are themselves in issue in the action, unless the facts are truly so plain that they can be readily and summarily established, otherwise the application to set aside the freezing order is liable to become a form of preliminary trial in which the judge is asked to make findings (albeit provisionally) on issues which should be more properly reserved for the trial itself. Secondly, where facts are material in the broad sense in which that expression is used, there are degrees of relevance and it is important to preserve a due sense of proportion. The overriding objectives apply here as in any matter in which the court is required to exercise its discretion.”
“I would add that the more complex the case, the more fertile is the ground for raising arguments about non-disclosure and the more important it is, in my view, that the judge should not lose sight of the wood for the trees. In applying the broad test of materiality, sensible limits have to be drawn. Otherwise there would be no limit to the points of prejudice which could be advanced under the guise of discretion.”