“AND UPON The Court determining that the Claimant (having beaten her own Part 36 Offer dated21 June 2018 ) should be awarded the sums provided for inCPR r. 36.17 (4)(a), (b) and (c) but that it would be unjust to award the Claimant the sum set out in CPR r.
“There shall be no order in respect ofCPR 36.17 (4)(d).”
“a reference to “judgment being entered” is to the completion of the detailed assessment, and references to a “judgment” being advantageous or otherwise are to the outcome of the detailed assessment.”
“…whether the Court has the power to award some, but not all of the consequences set out inCPR r.36.17 (4) where the Claimant has achieved an award more advantageous that its own Part 36 offer, and if the Court does have that power, whether that power should be exercised so as to allow the consequences at subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the Rule, but not that at (d).”
“8. It was the Defendant's contention that the court in giving effect to rule 36.17(4) must approach the question whether it is 'unjust' to make an order, separately for each of the types of consequences (a)-(d), i.e. the Court must decide whether it is just to award all, some, or none of the consequences set out in the Rule. The Claimant's contention is that the test of whether the consequences would be unjust if imposed is a gateway criterion which once overcome triggers all of the consequences (a)-(d) with no discretion on the part of the court to depart from their provisions so as to omit one of them (in this case (d)).”
“27…it was said I should not be influenced on the 'injustice' point by the fact that it was the award of interest on the bill as assessed which had pushed the sum assessed above the level of the Part 36 offer. That was foreseen by the rules. I accept that. [At [28] she referred to the matters in Rule 36.17(5)] … 30. I do not think that in most cases the extent to which an offer has been beaten is a very material factor since the rules provide a clear definition of 'more advantageous'. In this case the offer was beaten by just short of£7,000 which is 'more advantageous' but it is nonetheless a very small percentage of a bill which had been greatly reduced. Given that the court is…empowered to apply the 'injustice' test on the basis of each cost consequence separately then in my mind considerations such as proportionality of the cost penalty must be applied separately for each of the sub-rules in 3.17(4). 31. I thus do have to consider whether the large sum by way of penalty (10% of a bill assessed at over£400,000 ) compared with the very small percentage margin by which the offer was beaten, in an assessment where the bill was significantly reduced on assessment, would amount to a disproportionate windfall leading to injustice rather than just a windfall for the recipient which is consistent with the objective of the rules. 32. Equally I should bear in mind that if the court does not adopt a high bar for the exercise of its discretion (and here I refer to the description of the 'injustice' test as being a formidable hurdle in, eg, Ayton), the purpose of the cost penalty rules could be weakened or defeated. 33. In my judgment it is only where the cost penalty created by the 10% rule would be clearly disproportionate that one would incline to exercise the discretion to waive it. But, that said, if the court was unduly unwilling to exercise its discretion on facts such as these – for example requiring something akin to 'exceptional circumstances' then a party in the position of the Defendant might be discouraged from taking the risk of legitimately going as far as assessment at all, despite having various meritorious objections to the Bill as drawn and which have (in this case) been shown in many instances to be correct. …. 38. The Defendant argued that it would be grossly unjust to order the additional 10% in this case and that it would be a significant windfall (given the size of the assessed bill, especially relative to the extent by which the offer was beaten). I take on board and accept the point made by the Claimant that Part 36 's additional sum provisions are not intended to be compensatory: they are intended to be an incentive to settle and will be ineffective if they do not operate, so that the fact that the penalty appears more generous than a purely compensatory approach would warrant is not of great assistance. See McPhilemy v The TimesNewspapers Ltd(No. 2)[2001] EWCA Civ 933 ...OMV PetromSA v Glencore International AG[2017] EWCA 195 . On the other hand, the rules do provide a discretion according to the 'unjust' test, by which the consequences can be disapplied so it cannot have been the rule-makers' intention that a consideration of disapplying the consequences provided for in the rules is a process meant to disregard situations where a large noncompensatory penalty has arisen. …. Conclusion 40. Taken together in my mind the most significant factors are (1) the very small margin by which the offer was beaten relative to the much greater size of the bill (2) the fact that where a bill is reduced (and seems to have been expected to be reduced) significantly, it will on the whole generally be very difficult for a party to know precisely or even approximately to within a few percent, where to pitch an offer such that even a competent costs lawyer would operate close to chance level as to whether an offer is likely to be 'over' or 'under' at the end of the hearing, and (3) the large size of the 10% 'bonus' award relative to the margin by which the offer was beaten. 41. In all the circumstances in my judgment the 'bonus' of 10% in this case would be a clearly disproportionate sum and it would be unjust to award it. That is also the case when one looks at the overall effect in the round of what would be the cumulative penalties in sub-rules (a)-(c) added to (d)….”
“(iv) Payment of an additional amount pursuant to Part 36.17(4)(d). Mr Croxford has not specifically addressed this in his written submissions, from which I infer that the Defendant does not seek to argue that it would be unjust to order that an additional amount should be payable. In the absence of any submissions on the point from Mr Croxford I propose to order that this additional amount will attract interest of 2% over base…”
“It does not seem to me to be inevitable that the relevant ‘circumstances’ will necessarily be identical for each of the four orders that the court will make, unless it would be unjust to do so”
“I was not referred to any authority on the application of the injustice test under Part 36.14. For present purposes, the principles which I derive from the authorities are as follows: (a) The question is not whether it was reasonable for the Claimant to refuse the offer. Rather, the question is whether, having regard to all the circumstances and looking at the matter as it affects both parties, an order that the claimant should pay the costs would be unjust…. (b) Each case will turn on its own circumstances, but the Court should be trying to assess “who in reality is the unsuccessful party and who has been responsible for the fact that costs have been incurred which should not have been.”… (c) The Court is not constrained by the list of potentially relevant factors in Part 36.14(4) to have regard only to the circumstances of the making of the offer or the provision or otherwise of relevant information in relation to it. There is no limit to the types of circumstances which may, in a particular case, make it unjust that the ordinary consequences set out in Part 36.14 should follow: see Lilleyman v Lilleyman (judgment on costs)[2012] EWHC 1056 (Ch) at paragraph 16. (d) Nonetheless, the Court does not have an unfettered discretion to depart from the ordinary cost consequences set out in Part 36.14. The burden on a Claimant who has failed to beat the defendant's Part 36 offer to show injustice is a formidable obstacle to the obtaining of a different costs order. If that were not so, then the salutary purpose of Part 36, in promoting compromise and the avoidance of unnecessary expenditure of costs and court time, would be undermined.” (a) The question is not whether it was reasonable for the Claimant to refuse the offer. Rather, the question is whether, having regard to all the circumstances and looking at the matter as it affects both parties, an order that the claimant should pay the costs would be unjust…. (b) Each case will turn on its own circumstances, but the Court should be trying to assess “who in reality is the unsuccessful party and who has been responsible for the fact that costs have been incurred which should not have been.”… (c) The Court is not constrained by the list of potentially relevant factors in Part 36.14(4) to have regard only to the circumstances of the making of the offer or the provision or otherwise of relevant information in relation to it. There is no limit to the types of circumstances which may, in a particular case, make it unjust that the ordinary consequences set out in Part 36.14 should follow: see Lilleyman v Lilleyman (judgment on costs)[2012] EWHC 1056 (Ch) at paragraph 16. (d) Nonetheless, the Court does not have an unfettered discretion to depart from the ordinary cost consequences set out in Part 36.14. The burden on a Claimant who has failed to beat the defendant's Part 36 offer to show injustice is a formidable obstacle to the obtaining of a different costs order. If that were not so, then the salutary purpose of Part 36, in promoting compromise and the avoidance of unnecessary expenditure of costs and court time, would be undermined.”
“Before the court can interfere it must be shown that the judge has either erred in principle in his approach, or has left out of account, or taken into account, some feature that he should, or should not, have considered, or that his decision is wholly wrong because the court is forced to the conclusion that he has not balanced the various factors fairly in the scale.”
“more advantageous was an open-textured phrase” and upheld the trial judge’s finding that it could not be said that the final outcome was “more advantageous” than accepting the Defendant’s offer. In the Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report December 2009 Chapter 41 (“the Jackson Report’) Jackson LJ reviewed the Carver decision and said: “2.9 Conclusion I confirm my provisional view expressed in the Preliminary Report that Carver introduces an unwelcome degree of uncertainty into the Part 36 regime and also that it tends to depress the level of settlements. I recommend that the effect of Carver should be reversed either judicially…or by rule change. It should be made clear that in any purely monetary case “more advantageous” in rule 36.14(1)(a) means better in financial terms by any amount, however small.”
“We agree that BAA v Carver...should be reversed. We can understand the judiciary’s desire for as much discretion as possible in order to enable them to do what they consider to be the right thing in each case. However, discretion inevitably creates uncertainty and, as a result, offers parties issues about which to argue thereby generating satellite litigation and further costs. A black letter rule has many virtues.”
“22. It appears that the low level of the Claimant's offer compared with the high level of the bill and with the costs assessed was considered to be in the Claimant's favour in deciding whether it would be unjust to make awards underCPR 36.14 (3)(a) to (c) but a point rendering it unjust to do so in relation toCPR 36.14 (3)(d).
“In circumstances in which the inflated level of costs claimed leads the Defendant to incur expense in investigating the claim before the Part 36 offer was made it may be unjust to make such an award”
“..the offer was made at a time when sufficient information was known for the recipient to take an informed view as to acceptance. Indeed the Defendant made its own offers which fell somewhat short (by about£7000 inclusive of interest on the bill)….”
“Nonetheless where a bill is reduced by a large figure, and it appears to be known to both sides that a large reduction is on the cards as it were, the ‘pitching’ of an offer becomes a more and more uncertain exercise and the merits or demerits of acceptance or rejection become far harder to judge.”
“…it was an offer fairly close to final hearing and hence at a time when sufficient information was known for either party to take advice as to whether to accept.”
“24. …Whilst all the relevant circumstances are to be considered in deciding whether it would be unjust to make an award under any of the paragraphs ofCPR 36.14 (3), it was not suggested that there was any particular feature or consequence of the bill of costs other than its size which would render the making of an order underCPR 36.14 (3)(d) unjust. 25. The making of an order of the level required byCPR 36.14 (3)(d) was decided as a matter of policy as explained in the Jackson Report. Under the previous regime it was considered that a Claimant was insufficiently rewarded and the defendant insufficiently penalised when the claimant has made an adequate Part 36 Offer. In my judgment the Master fell into the temptation 58. referred to by Sir David Eady in paragraph 61 of Downing of making an exception by not making an award underCPR 36.14 (3)(d) not because he considered the making of such an award unjust but because he thought it unjust to make an award of the required amount, 10% of the assessed costs…”
“..it seems to be essentially a neutral point on its own….the fact that it included interest is simply a consequence of the rules…”
“….I do not consider that the fact that the offer was made (fairly close to the detailed assessment hearing) is of assistance materially to the Defendant….it was an offer…at a time when sufficient information was known for either party to take advice as to whether to accept”
“Until the detailed assessment commences, it is impossible for the Defendant to have any idea whether the time claimed in the bill is excessive or justified given the quality of attendance notes on the file”
“No conduct points appear to arise in this case against the Claimant and none were taken by the Defendant.”
“3.13 Draft Rule I therefore propose that there should be added to rule 36.14(3) the following sub-paragraph: ‘(d) an additional sum comprising 10% of (i) the damages or other sum awarded and (ii) the financial value, as summarily assessed by the court on the basis of the evidence given at trial, of any non-monetary relief awarded. 3.14 If thought appropriate, provision could be added for scaling down the uplift in respect of higher value cases. The rule should, in any event, enable the court to award less than 10% uplift in cases where there are good reasons to take this course”