“16(a) In seeking to found his claim, the Claimant asserts that he had entered into an agreement, for consideration, to set fire to two vehicles of reasonably high value. Had such an agreement ever been made, the Claimant would have known, realised or suspected that the purpose of doing so was the making of a fraudulent insurance claim. The Claimant’s acts of arson and attempted arson were on his own case patently illegal, and he relies on his asserted illegality to found his claim. (b) The essence of the Claimant’s claim is that he had entered into a conspiracy to make fraudulent insurance claims with the Defendants and on being arrested by the police the Defendants had not admitted to their part in the conspiracy. It would be an affront to public conscience and to the integrity of the legal system for the law to afford the Claimant a remedy.”
“It is an entirely unrealistic prospect to suggest that the police would have brought charges against the Claimant had the Defendants admitted that they had given consent.”
“No judge would accept the Claimant’s assertion or implied assertion that this only occurred to him afterwards when he was in custody. That assertion, if it were to be made, would simply not be worthy of belief.”
“first, has the Claimant acted with turpitude; secondly, does that bar his claim.”
“On any view, even on a maximally charitable view of the Claimant’s actions on30 December 2012 , he must have known he was ‘up to no good’ and that engages the ex turpi causa principle with equal force. It therefore seems to me that a finding that the Claimant acted with turpitude is inevitable.”
“Where the character of the joint criminal enterprise is such that it is foreseeable that a party or parties may be subject to unusual or increased risks of harm as a consequence of the activities of the parties in pursuance of their criminal objectives, and the risk materialises, the injury can properly be said to be caused by the criminal act of the Claimant even if it results in the negligent or intentional act of another party to the illegal enterprise. I do not suggest that this necessarily exhausts situations where the ex turpi principle applies in joint enterprise cases, but I would expect it to cater for the overwhelming majority of cases.”
“The risk here was that the Claimant would be arrested and prosecuted. This was not just foreseeable, it was, in fact, foreseen and discussed between the Claimant and the Defendants. The risk materialised. The injury (i.e. in this case arrest and prosecution) can and can only properly be said to have resulted from the criminal or quasi-criminal acts of the Claimant.”
“The underlying purpose of the relevant prohibition in this case is to deter or defeat dishonest insurance claims. That purpose would itself be defeated or impaired if a party or accessory to such an enterprise could bring a claim in respect of one of its inherent risks, namely that the enterprise attracted the attention of the police and the prosecuting authorities.”
“There is one point in particular upon which the court will wish to be addressed. The Master found that the Claimant ‘must have known he was up to no good’ (para. 18) and was involved in illegal conduct, which conduct precluded the claim for damages (ex turpi causa) and led to the application being determined in the Defendants’ favour. That finding goes against the Claimant’s pleaded case that he was not engaged in any illegal conduct (see Reply, para. 6 (ii). But, like the Master, I’ve not been able to find any clear statement by the Claimant to the effect that he did not know that he was involved in an insurance fraud (assuming his version of the core facts). There is, or may be, an issue about whether the court was entitled to conclude that the Claimant was engaged in illegal conduct without first hearing from the Claimant, if that conclusion amounts to a finding that the Claimant has given false evidence to or advanced a false case before the court.”
“At no time was the Claimant engaged in a criminal act in regard to the offence charged.”
“When dishonesty is in question the fact-finding tribunal must first ascertain (subjectively) the actual state of the individual’s knowledge or belief as to the facts.”
“For the court to deal with that issue, which is a very serious issue from the Claimant’s point of view, he is being condemned as being dishonest on paper. In my view this is fundamentally unfair and that the Claimant should be allowed to come to court and say, ‘well it might look as if this is a staged accident or a contrived accident but I have a genuine reason why I made the claim and I have a genuine reason why I discontinued it’. It could be any number of those but I think it will be unfair to expect the court to deal with it without that explanation and, more importantly, fundamentally unfair on the Claimant not to give him the opportunity to look the Judge in the eye and say ‘I’m not a dishonest man and these are the reasons why I made the claim and these are the reasons why I discontinued’. No-one can force him to do so but given that, in the case such as the present one and many other similar cases, there may be a prima facia case of dishonesty, it is only fair to allow the Claimant the opportunity to convince the court that what may appear the case from the paperwork is actually inaccurate.”
“3. On the one hand, summary judgment is designed for plain cases – cases which are not fit for trial at all: Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (3)[2001] 2 All ER 513 per Lord Hope at [95]. That consideration weighs all the more heavily when the case involves allegations of serious fraud or dishonesty; generally, conclusions on such issues ought to be reached at trial, so that obvious caution ought to be exercised before giving summary judgment in a case of that nature: Wrexham Associated Football Club Ltd v Crucialmove Ltd [2006] DWCA Civ 237, esp. at (49 – 59). On the other hand, where it can be ascertained without the conduct of a mini-trial that there is no realistic prospect of a successful defence, then summary judgment will or may be appropriate and the Court should not be deterred from granting such relief simply because of the volume – or, in some cases, smokescreen – of documents. Moreover, if in all the circumstances, there is no real prospect of a Defendant successfully defending a claim, then, even though good faith, fraud or integrity are an issue, there is no longer a bar to giving summary judgment: Wrexham Associated Football Club.”
“I turn to the question of illegality. This resolves itself into two questions. Firstly, has the Claimant acted with turpitude? And secondly, if so, does that bar his claim?”
“23 This is plainly a more nuanced test of illegality. But it cannot make any difference to the outcome in this case. The underlying purpose of the relevant prohibition in this case is to deter or defeat dishonest insurance claims. That purpose would itself be defeated or impaired if a party or accessory to such an enterprise could bring a claim in respect of one of its inherent risks namely that the enterprise attracted the attention of the police and the prosecuting authorities. 24 Conversely, no other relevant public policy would be rendered ineffective or less effective by denial of the claim and Mr Holmes did not so argue. Indeed, the public would be surprised (affronted even) and would certainly think the less of lawyers and judges if a claim in those circumstances were to be allowed.”
“If the formation, purpose or performance of a contract involves conduct that is illegal (such as a crime) or contrary to public policy (such as a restraint of trade), the contract is unenforceable by one or either party if to deny enforcement would be appropriate response to that conduct, taking into account where relevant – (a) how seriously illegal or contrary to public policy the conduct was; (b) whether the party seeking enforcement knew of, or intended, the conduct; (c) how central to the contract or its performance the conduct was; (d) how serious a sanction the denial of enforcement is to the party seeking enforcement; (e) whether denying enforcement will further the purpose of the rule which the conduct has infringed; (f) whether it denying enforcement will act as a deterrent to conduct that is illegal or contrary to public policy; (g) whether denying enforcement will ensure that the parties seeking enforcement does not profit (h) whether denying enforcement will avoid inconsistency in the law thereby maintaining the integrity of the legal system.”
“99 Looking behind the maxims, there are two broad discernable policy reasons for the common law doctrine of illegality as a defence to a civil claim. One is that a person should not be allowed to profit from his own wrongdoing. The other, linked, consideration is the that the law should be coherent not self-defeating condoning illegality by giving with the left hand what it takes with the right hand.”
“101 … in answer to that question, one cannot judge whether allowing a claim which is in some way tainted by illegality would be contrary to the public interest because it would be harmful to the integrity of the legal system, without (a) considering the underlying purpose of the prohibition which has been transgressed, (b) considering conversely any other relevant public policies which may be rendered ineffective or less effective by denial of the claim, (c) keeping in mind the possibility of overkill unless the law is applied with a due sense of proportionality. We are, after all, in the area of public policy. That trio of necessary considerations can be found in the case law.”
“Where issues of illegality are raised, the courts have (as it seems to me) to steer a middle course between two unacceptable positions. On the one hand it is unacceptable that any court of law should aid or lend its authority to a party seeking to pursue or enforce an object or agreement which the law prohibits. On the other hand, it is unacceptable that the court should, on the first indication of unlawfulness affecting any aspect of a transaction draw up its skirts and refuse all assistance to the plaintiff, no matter how serious his loss nor how disproportionate his loss to the unlawfulness of his conduct.”
“107 in considering whether it would be disproportionate to refuse relief to which the Claimant would otherwise be entitled, as a matter of public policy, various factors may be relevant. Professor Burrows’ list is helpful but I would not attempt to lay down a prescriptive or definitive list because of the infinite possible variety of cases. Potentially relevant factors include the seriousness of the conduct, its centrality to the contract, whether it was intentional and whether there was marked disparity in the parties’ respective culpability.”
“That purpose would itself be defeated or impaired if a party or accessory to such an enterprise could bring a claim in respect of one of its inherent risks namely that the enterprise attracted the attention of the police and the prosecuting authorities”
“The claimant and the first defendant stole some ladders and placed them in a van in which they fled the scene of the crime. The claimant fell out of the back of the van whilst the first defendant was driving quickly away from the crime scene and was very seriously injured. The first defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to dangerous driving. The claimant brought a claim in negligence against the first defendant and the second defendant’s insurers seeking damages for personal injury. The judge dismissed the claim, accepting the submissions of the insurers who had contended that the principle of ex turpi causa non oritur actio afforded the first defendant a defence on the basis that no duty of care was owed by one participant in crime to another participant in the same crime in relation to an act done in connection with the commission of that crime; and (2) the claimant could not recover compensation for loss suffered as a consequence of his own criminal act.” 33. That case is distinguished by Mr Holmes on the basis that the compensation claimed here is not in direct consequence of the Claimant’s criminal acts: on the contrary, he was committing no criminal act at all when he set fire to the cars because he had the consent of the owners to do so, as exemplified by the jury’s verdicts. However, the Master referred to the formulation of the principle by Elias LJ, giving the judgment of the court where he said: “Where the character of the joint criminal enterprise is such that it is foreseeable that a party or parties may be subject to unusual or increased risks of harm of a consequence of the activities of the parties in pursuance of their criminal objectives, and the risk materialises, the injury can properly be said to be caused by the criminal act of the claimant even if it results from the negligent or intentional act of another party to the illegal enterprise. I do not suggest that this necessarily exhausts situations where the ex turpi principle applies in joint enterprise cases, but I would expect it to cater for the overwhelming majority of cases.”
“21 That test is quite plainly met in this case. The risk here was that the Claimant would be arrested and prosecuted. This was not just foreseeable it was, in fact, foreseen and discussed between the Claimant and Defendants. The risk materialised. The injury (i.e. arrest and prosecution) can and can properly be said to have resulted from the criminal or quasi-criminal acts of the Claimant.”
“Counsel for FTX argued that … the English law on illegality was ‘clear and well known’. This struck me as a bold submission in the light of the changes in the law even since the point was pleaded in the commercial court action. One only has to read the judgments in Patel v Mirza to appreciate how accurate was the description by Professor Andrews Burrows in his ‘Restatement of the English Law of Contract’ of the law of illegality as being ‘in state of flux’ and the observation of Lord Neuberger that the different approaches adopted by members of the Supreme Court in recent cases had ‘left the law on the topic in some disarray’. That state has not been brought to an end by the decision that in the application in the doctrine of illegality regard must be had for the policy factors involved and to the nature and circumstances of the illegal conduct in determining whether the public interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial system should result in the denial (on the grounds of illegality) of the relief claimed (see the Judgment of Lord Toulson – with whom Baroness Hale, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson and Lord Hodge agreed). Of course Patel v Mirza does render relatively clear and certain the law on illegality where a claimant has paid money to a defendant to carry out an illegal activity and the illegal activity is not proceeded with. But that is not relevant to this dispute.”