“AMENDMENTS TO THE PARTICULARS OF CLAIM”
“First, this is, it appears to the Defendant, an acceptance that the Particulars of Claim require amendment. Secondly, any application to amend should be rejected given: (i) the late stage we are now at, (ii) the fact that, as a result of the way in which the claim was pleaded, there is no evidence on this issue, save for that of the orthopaedic experts, who have given evidence as to the extent of the delay, but not with the consequences of any delay, and (iii) the Claimant has not raised this issue with any of the Defendant’s witnesses. Thirdly, in the alternative, the absence of persuasive evidence that results from the way in which the claim has been pleaded and conducted leads to the conclusion that, even if he establishes that his CRP, WCC, and ESR would have been raised on1 May 2008 , the Claimant cannot demonstrate that he is materially worse than he would have been in any event, in circumstances where: (i) he would have deteriorated so that he was systemically unwell before intervention, on the evidence of both orthopaedic experts; (ii) it follows that he would have received antibiotics on or about5 May 2010 , and debridement on or about6 May 2008 ; and, (iii) there is no evidence that this caused him to be materially more unwell than he would otherwise have been. Fourthly, as to the last paragraph of the Amendments to the Particulars of Claim, the proposition that there was a delay between 5 and10 May 2008 is not supported by the orthopaedic experts, who have agreed that the delay was in fact between6 May 2008 , when debridement should have taken place, and10 May 2008 , when debridement did take place.”
“Mobilise as pain allows. Rpt bloods ?Infection.”
“Obs stable, Afebrile, Pt d/c, Pt pain under control – likely all from lower back, Pt keen to go home, Home as prev arranged.”
“Old wound opened up & large amount of pus came out. Going down to the implant. Stitches opened up & necrotic tissue debrided. Thorough washout done…”
“I myself would prefer to put it this way, that [a medical practitioner] is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art. ... Putting it the other way round, a man is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of opinion who would take a contrary view.”
“in my view, the court is not bound to hold that a defendant doctor escapes liability for negligent treatment or diagnosis just because he leads evidence from a number of medical experts who are genuinely of opinion that the defendant's treatment or diagnosis accorded with sound medical practice. In the Bolam case itself, McNair J. stated [1957] 1 W.L.R. 583, 587, that the defendant had to have acted in accordance with the practice accepted as proper by a "responsible body of medical men." Later, at p. 588, he referred to "a standard of practice recognised as proper by a competent reasonable body of opinion." Again, in the passage which I have cited from Maynard's case, Lord Scarman refers to a "respectable" body of professional opinion. The use of these adjectives -responsible, reasonable and respectable--all show that the court has to be satisfied that the exponents of the body of opinion relied upon can demonstrate that such opinion has a logical basis. In particular in cases involving, as they so often do, the weighing of risks against benefits, the judge before accepting a body of opinion as being responsible, reasonable or respectable, will need to be satisfied that, in forming their views, the experts have directed their minds to the question of comparative risks and benefits and have reached a defensible conclusion on the matter.”
“These decisions demonstrate that in cases of diagnosis and treatment there are cases where, despite a body of professional opinion sanctioning the defendant's conduct, the defendant can properly be held liable for negligence (I am not here considering questions of disclosure of risk). In my judgment that is because, in some cases, it cannot be demonstrated to the judge's satisfaction that the body of opinion relied upon is reasonable or responsible. In the vast majority of cases the fact that distinguished experts in the field are of a particular opinion will demonstrate the reasonableness of that opinion. In particular, where there are questions of assessment of the relative risks and benefits of adopting a particular medical practice, a reasonable view necessarily presupposes that the relative risks and benefits have been weighed by the experts in forming their opinions. But if, in a rare case, it can be demonstrated that the professional opinion is not capable of withstanding logical analysis, the judge is entitled to hold that the body of opinion is not reasonable or responsible. I emphasise that in my view it will very seldom be right for a judge to reach the conclusion that views genuinely held by a competent medical expert are unreasonable. The assessment of medical risks and benefits is a matter of clinical judgment which a judge would not normally be able to make without expert evidence. As the quotation from Lord Scarman makes clear, it would be wrong to allow such assessment to deteriorate into seeking to persuade the judge to prefer one of two views both of which are capable of being logically supported. It is only where a judge can be satisfied that the body of expert opinion cannot be logically supported at all that such opinion will not provide the bench mark by reference to which the defendant's conduct falls to be assessed.”
“It seems to me with respect that Smith LJ asked herself the wrong question. One is not concerned with whether the plaque is in some sense “injury” or (as she went on to decide) a “disease”