“Governors should identify current prisoners and any prisoners sentenced following the issue of this note who are subject to a term of less than 12 months (or a single term comprising multiple under 12 month sentences) which is to run consecutively to, or concurrently with, a term of 12 months or more (or vice versa) so each establishment will be in a position to quickly recalculate [sentence and licence expiry dates] and HDC [eligibility dates] as soon as the new guidance is issued.”
“No, you are not eligible for HDC.”
“You are eligible for HDC under the new provisions so we are unsure where you have got the information that you are not eligible for HDC. A [form] HDC2 was sent to you on 2 September which we are waiting for to be returned.”
“246. Power to release prisoners on licence before required to do so (1) Subject to subsections (2) to (4), the Secretary of State may— (a) release on licence under this section a fixed-term prisoner … at any time during the period of 135 days ending with the day on which the prisoner will have served the requisite custodial period … (2) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply in relation to a prisoner unless— (a) the length of the requisite custodial period is at least 6 weeks, (b) he has served— (i) at least 4 weeks of that period, and (ii) at least one-half of that period. (3) Subsection (1)(b) does not apply in relation to a prisoner unless— (a) the number of required custodial days is at least 42, and (b) the prisoner has served— (i) at least 28 of those days, and (ii) at least one-half of the total number of those days ...”
“[41]…Even if the Justice Secretary's refusal of her application for HDC was an unlawful exercise of his discretion, her detention during the relevant period continued to be detention pursuant to a sentence lawfully passed. It was therefore neither tortious under domestic law nor in breach of article 5.1 , which excludes “the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court”
“42. Drawing together and synthesising the threads of these authorities, a statute containing broad target duties owed to the public at large, and which does not itself confer on individuals a right of action for breach of statutory duty, is unlikely to give rise to a common law duty of care, breach of which will support a claim by an individual for damages. Such a public law duty is enforceable, if it is justiciable at all, only by judicial review. There may, however, be relationships, arising out of the existence and exercise of statutory powers or duties, between a public authority and one or more individuals from which the public authority is to be taken to have assumed responsibility to guard against foreseeable injury or loss to the individuals caused by breach of the duty. There is then a sufficient relationship of proximity and it is fair, just and reasonable that a duty of care should be imposed. In order to determine whether the law should impose such a duty, an intense focus on the particular facts and the particular statutory background is necessary”
“65 If the Claimant were to succeed in his claim, I do not see any principled basis upon which other victims of alleged administrative “negligent detention” could be turned away, including those in the position of the claimant in W v Home Office itself. The proliferation of claims would be potentially vast, including, within the present context alone, those who alleged that they had received a “negligent” decision on HDC or, as foreign national prisoners, on early removal from the UK, and those serving life sentences or other indeterminate sentences who alleged that they had received a “negligent” decision as to the safety of their return into the community (where imposition of a duty of care would also be flatly inconsistent with Dixon v Secretary of State for the Home Office (CA,30 November 1998 )) . 66 … Imposing liability to pay compensation for administrative fault may lead to a deployment of resources to the targeted area that is out of proportion to the real needs of delivery of public services and, budgets not being unlimited, to a diversion of scarce resources from other parts of the public administration: See Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire[1989] AC 53 at 63, by Lord Keith, Elguzouli-Daf v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis[1995] QB 335 at 349, by Steyn LJ, as he then was; and, generally, Carol Harlow, State Liability, 2004 at pages 22–30. The Prison Service must meet a formidable array of demands, and must do so within ever tightening financial constraints. Disproportionate allocation of resources to HDC or early removal of foreign national prisoners would be a very great concern. It might also be noted, as a more general point, that all policy implementation is now subject to economic impact assessment: it would be a matter of considerable concern if the creation of legislative schemes such as HDC, which promote important objectives of public policy, were to be influenced by the likely prospect of having to pay compensation for any administrative failures in their operation. Finally, there is an element of distributive justice: selective extension of common law liability for administrative failure, in the absence of compelling justification, inevitably leaves other victims of maladministration wondering why their claims have failed and why they too were not beneficiaries ...”
“… First, there is the case of targeted malice by a public officer, i.e. conduct specifically intended to injure a person or persons. This type of case involves bad faith in the sense of the exercise of public power for an improper or ulterior motive. The second form is where a public officer acts knowing he has no power to do the act complained of and that the act will probably injure the plaintiff. It involves bad faith inasmuch as the public officer does not have an honest belief that his act is lawful.”