“(3) The part of his sentence is to be such as the court considers appropriate taking into account – (a) the seriousness of the offence … and (b) the effect of section 240ZA (crediting periods of remand in custody) … (5) In considering under subsection (3) … the seriousness of an offence … the court must have regard to – (a) the general principles set out in Schedule 21 ..” (b) the effect of section 240ZA (crediting periods of remand in custody) … (a) the general principles set out in Schedule 21 ..”
“§211 German Penal Code. (i) a murderer should be punished with imprisonment for life; (ii) a murderer is any person who kills a human being out of murderous lust, for sexual gratification, out of greed or other base motives, treacherously or cruelly or with means dangerous to the public or in order to make another crime possible or cover it up. § 25 German Penal Code. (i) any person who commits the crime himself or through another, shall be punished as a perpetrator. (ii) if one or more than one person commits the crime jointly, each shall be punished as a perpetrator (co-perpetrator).”
“According to prevailing opinion, a person acts treacherously, if he exploits with evil intentions the unsuspecting state of mind and defencelessness of his victim for the purpose of killing. “Unsuspecting state of mind” means that at the moment of an unforeseeable attack the victim is taken by surprise, reducing in this way any chances of self-defence. In this connection it is sufficient that a victim has no reason to reckon with an attack against his person and has no concrete suspicion at the moment of the first blow inflicted with the intention to kill. In order to apply the murder criterion “treacherous”, the victim must have been defenceless on account of his unsuspecting state of mind, depriving him of his ability to defend himself or greatly reducing his chances for defence. It is also necessary that the murderer was aware of the circumstances qualifying the killing as treacherous. He must have understood the effects of these circumstances facilitating the commission of his crime and must have realised that he was unexpectedly attacking an unsuspecting and thus defenceless victim. The proven facts show that the defendant Akgűn exploited intentionally the unsuspecting state of mind and defencelessness of his victim. The deceased had no reason to expect that the defendant would be in his flat and lying in wait for him there. Furthermore he did not open the door for the defendant. There was no verbal argument before the attack. The murder criterion “treacherous” applies because the defendant committed this murder with evil intentions based on hostile feelings… The question of whether a motive is base, that is to say at the lowest level of moral standards, must be examined in the context of an overall assessment including the circumstances of the crime, the personality of the perpetrator and the conditions of his life. This crime is not only out of all proportion to the reason given in justification, it was also determined by crass egotism. With the killing of Baris Baser, the defendants, wanted to improve their own situation, eliminating a husband who stood in the way of their love affair. It was not possible to ascertain as an additional decisive motive whether the defendants connected financial expectations with the murder of Baris Baser, since the co-defendant Nase Baser would have come into an inheritance. On the basis of its overall assessment the court regards the motivation of this crime, committed for gratification of personal desires, not only as reprehensible, but also as absolutely despicable and on the lowest level of moral standards.”
“The task of the administering state under Article 10.2 is, when adapting a sentence, as far as possible to bring correspondence between the “punishment” which would have been imposed in the sentencing state and (the remainder of) the sentence to be served in the administering state. That will require a reasoned judgment as to the likely duration of the custodial element of the sentence had the sentence been served in the sentencing state. To do otherwise would require us to ignore the reality that in both countries a sentence of life imprisonment does not usually mean custody for life”