“This claim for misfeasance in public office relates to the abrupt and unlawful transfer of the Claimant from open conditions at HMP North Sea Camp to HMP Lincoln on8 May 2008 , effected without due process and in circumstances that breached assurances given to the Parole Board. The Claimant’s case is that the transfer was effected by Michael Gilbert, the then acting lifer manager at HMP North Sea Camp, who created a false and deliberately distorted case in support of his removal from open conditions without regard to the Claimant’s actual risk to the public and for his own improper reasons as set out below.”
“The conduct of Mr Gilbert was motivated by improper purposes namely in order to divert criticism of the mishandling of the Claimant’s case from those responsible at the prison and/or motivated by his view that the Parole Board were about to order the Claimant’s release at the eleventh review or in any event confirm his placing in open conditions, such that he felt that he should take matters into his own hands to pre-empt this.”
“This clearly indicates an imminence to risk of serious harm should he be released into the community. This renders Mr Houchin’s continued presence in North Sea Camp untenable.”
“Mr Houchin is a life sentence prisoner who remains in denial. The denial is clearly an issue however the prison system has allowed him an opportunity to gain insight into his offending by in effect working around his denial and allowing him to focus on his previous behaviour. This has not had the desired effect and he has now to accept a return to closed conditions. Clearly the value of any work in relation to the 1964 offence [for murder] is limited so in my submission Mr Houchin should be expected to work on the issues related to the 1979 offence [for rape], perhaps overcoming his internal inhibitions in relation to this and working from a position of denial to an open and frank acceptance of the facts of the case and the impact upon his victim who after all was a teenage stranger to him who went to his house in connection with employment, and not for sex. Unless this work is achieved … Mr Houchin will unfortunately render himself unsuitable to be considered for release.”
“(1) Issue 1: was there any evidence of heightened risk whilst Mr Houchin was in open conditions? (2) Issue 2: should Mr Houchin have been relocated from category D open conditions in HMP North Sea Camp and transferred to category B closed conditions in HMP Lincoln on8 May 2008 ? (3) Issue 3: what is Mr Houchin’s current risk of harm and how should that risk be addressed? (4) Issue 4: can Mr Houchin now be recommended for a transfer back to open conditions and what risk would he pose in open conditions?”
“The reality is that, on any objective view, no evidence has emerged during Mr Houchin’s time in open conditions, a period of twenty-five months, that his risk has been raised above, or was higher than, the OASys assessment of his risk that he was a medium harm risk to the public, that had been made in 2005 and which had formed the basis of the decision to transfer him to open conditions.”
“(3) Neither HMP North Sea Camp nor Ms Plank provided a satisfactory explanation or any reasonable basis for deciding to raise Mr Houchin’s risk of harm from medium to high on13 October 2006 and from high to very high on2 April 2008 . (4) Mr Houchin, both in his conduct at HMP North Sea Camp and on escorted town visits, did nothing that would lead to a reasonable conclusion that his risk levels were raised above the levels that they had been assessed as having been lowered to at the time of his arrival at HMP North Sea Camp. (5) The assessments of heightened risk that were made at various times by Ms Rawlings, MAPPA [Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements], Mr Gilbert and Ms Plank were all based on their erroneous views as to his allegedly risky behaviour, attitudes and beliefs on inadequate information and on a very inadequate psychological risk assessment made by Ms Rawlings. These assessments also proceeded on several false bases, particularly that… Mr Houchin had a dangerous strangulation fetish, that he had significant untreated risk associated with his second index offence and that his risk assessment had not previously taken account of his denial of the second index offence, his tendency to minimise his guilt, the possibility that he had undertaken insufficient SOTP offending behaviour work and the extensive domestic violence he was considered to have perpetrated against his ex-second wife.”
“(1) On the evidence available to the panel, the decision taken to transfer Mr Houchin to open conditions taken in 2005 was a reasonable decision… There is no basis for it now being contended that that decision was erroneous or based on an inadequate knowledge of Mr Houchin’s risk factors or levels of risk. (2) No full risk assessment had been undertaken since 2005. … … (4) Until January 2008, HMP North Sea Camp continued to assess Mr Houchin’s risk as being low enough for him to remain in HMP North Sea Camp in open conditions. … … (6) The only assessments that had occurred in or after January 2008 were those of Mr Gilbert and Ms Plank. In the case of Mr Gilbert, his assessment, without any reasonable basis, concluded that Mr Houchin should be returned to closed conditions, a conclusion he had reached at or soon after his only one-to-one meeting with Mr Houchin on3 January 2008 . The panel heard from Mr Gilbert at some length. It had in mind that Mr Gilbert had been responsible for the decision to withhold from the panel, for no good reason, the OASys prepared by Ms Plank on2 April 2008 and the Secretary of State’s view dated11 April 2008 and to mislead the panel on12 April 2008 that Mr Houchin would remain in open conditions and to allow his deferred hearing in July 2008 and, without prior warning to anyone, to arrange for HMP Watton in November 2008, following the adjournment of the part-heard hearing to prepare a SARN relating to the BLB programme completed in March 2006. The panel concluded that these matters, the many erroneous and unfairly unfavourable references in his report to Mr Houchin and his partial oral evidence show that Mr Gilbert had not carried out an objectively reliable risk assessment of Mr Houchin but was concerned to make a case for his return to closed conditions irrespective of his risk levels having first decided that this move was necessary so as to extricate HMP North Sea Camp from its difficulties caused by the mis-management of Mr Houchin’s sentence whilst he had been in open conditions.”
“It was clear to the panel that the decision to return Mr Houchin to closed conditions, both as recorded by Mr Gilbert and on any other basis not then considered, was flawed, unreasonable, ill-motivated and invalid in a public law sense.”
“The panel had particular difficulty in assessing Mr Houchin’s risk. Four psychologists had given written and oral evidence and each had a range of structured risk assessments to call on. Mr Houchin’s risk presents considerable difficulties for any risk assessment at the best of time but the history of his sentence since 2005 and of this review and of the circumstances in which each assessment was arranged and carried out have significantly added to those difficulties. It was also clear from the detailed but skilful cross-examination by both counsel of their opposing experts and professional witnesses that the panel could not be wholly reliant on any of the assessments.”
“The panel concluded that it should first identify common ground and then determine whether, on the basis of that common ground, Mr Houchin’s risk could be assessed with confidence currently to be sufficiently lowered to be safely managed in open conditions. On this basis, the panel concluded that Mr Houchin’s risk is sufficiently lowered and that he could immediately be transferred to open conditions. However, no unescorted leaves should be taken before he has successfully retaken the BLB programme. In practice, since that programme is no longer available in open conditions, it will first be necessary for him to complete the BLB programme in closed conditions. An OASys re-assessment should take place as soon as possible since he cannot be transferred to open conditions with his current, inappropriate, OASys assessment that places him as being a very high risk of harm. Subject to satisfactory completion of the BLB and an OASys reassessment, Mr Houchin can then immediately be transferred to open conditions. As had occurred in 2006, this transfer should take place prior to his being provided with a SARN but a SARN should be prepared and he should also be provided with a full psychological risk assessment which takes account of all relevant matters including his performance on the BLB programme. Again subject to satisfactory assessments, he should then start to take unescorted temporary home leaves, build his release and risk management plan and develop a good working relationship with his offender manager.”
“Mr Houchin presents in precisely the same way to the panel as he did to the previous Panel and as accepted by the Secretary of State following that Panel. The panel considers that Mr Houchin’s remaining risk areas are his potential to be insufficiently aware of his risk and of his being in a risky situation, his risk management and his possible need to address risks in a relationship once he has been released. Overall, he will need to make progress gradually whilst he develops both his release and risk management plan and a good working relationship with his offender manager.”
“17. On14 January 2009 , HMP Lincoln disclosed to the parties and to the Parole Board a copy of a SARN document prepared by HMP Whatton. This was erroneously stated to be the SARN prepared following the BLB programme completed by Mr Houchin in March 2006. In fact, the report had been prepared at short notice in January 2009 following a telephone call to HMP Whatton soon after the hearing on5 November 2008 . The Secretary of State’s witnesses were not prepared to identify this caller but it was clear to the panel from the evidence that the caller was Mr Gilbert and that he called to ask for a SARN to be prepared in time for the adjourned hearing. The panel also concluded that Mr Gilbert made the call in the light of the unfavourable evidence, from his point of view, that had been given at the hearing on5 November 2008 so as to belatedly place before the panel a psychological risk assessment of Mr Houchin which he hoped would show Mr Houchin to be a high risk of re-offending. It is to be regretted that a psychological risk assessment was obtained in such circumstances by HMP North Sea Camp without prior warning and in disregard of the protocol for the preparation of SARNs which provides that they should be prepared within 6 months of the completion of the relevant SOTP or BLB programme and not thirty-two months later in the middle of a parole review hearing.”
“It is, or should be, clear from the decision taken as a whole that the panel with considerable regret made a general finding that Mr Gilbert was a wholly unreliable witness whose evidence was unreliable and who had been ill-motivated throughout his direct dealings with Mr Houchin and in his involvement in the parole process with the sole objective of ensuring that he was returned to closed conditions at the earliest possible opportunity, irrespective of his current risk and levels of risk. This general conclusion was based on the entirety of Mr Gilbert’s evidence and of the other evidence adduced to the panel. It also has to be stated, in order to answer the Secretary of State’s amplification request that the panel found that Mr Gilbert was shown to have lied in his written and oral evidence to the panel in significant respects.”
“The panel has referred to the evidence of Mr Gilbert at such length because all his evidence is closely inter-linked. Moreover, it is important for the Secretary of State to know and have placed in context a particular finding relating to a relatively small part of a long pattern of ill-motivated behaviour.”
“…Given the difficulty the panel had in assessing the risk you present, and also the fact that they have identified the need for you to undertake further work on sexual offending and possibly Domestic Violence, the Secretary of State is not persuaded it is appropriate for you to transfer to open conditions at this time. Neither does he accept that the prison psychologist’s evidence, and in particular that of Ms Fentem, who completed the SARN report was unreliable. Indeed, the SARN report points to a need to undertake the HRP, and the panel themselves have identified a possible need for work on Domestic Violence. In particular, you will be aware from the Treasury Solicitor’s letter of30 October 2009 that the Secretary of State has raised very serious concerns about the panel’s conclusions about the reliability of the SARN, based as they are on a fundamentally flawed approach to the evidence concerning the circumstance in which is was prepared. For the avoidance of any doubt, the Secretary of State also does not agree with the panel’s view that your visits to female or unisex hairdressers, and explanations for such, did not give rise to any concerns about your insight and risk, nor that the issues raised by your ex-wife in the injunction and divorce proceedings should be disregarded for the purposes of assessing your risk, but it is unnecessary to address these matters further in the light of the panel’s recommendation that, even based on its assessment of your risk, you undertake the BLB before any transfer to open conditions. The panel deemed it appropriate for you to re-do the Better Lives Booster in open conditions if possible, but failing that in closed conditions followed by an immediate move to an open establishment where post-programme assessments could be completed. Whilst it is not within the Parole Boards’s remit to specify particular programmes, the Secretary of State agrees that because of the nature of your offending and your risk factors, it is appropriate that you should undertake the programme. Better Lives Booster is only available in closed conditions. The Secretary of State understands that you have recently been assessed and found suitable for the programme. Prior to doing the BLB you will be assessed as to your suitability for the Healthy Relationships Programme (HRP)… … The Secretary of State does not agree that the BLB should be completed prior to assessment for and completion of the HRP. Because the BLB draws together learning from previous courses it is preferable that the HRP is completed first if it is deemed appropriate for you to do the programme. Furthermore, because completion of an offending behaviour programme is not in itself indicative of a reduction in risk, the Secretary of State does not accept the panel’s recommendation that you should be transferred to open conditions immediately following undertaking the BLB. Indeed, the Secretary of State knows that the panel itself repeatedly refers to the need for you to “satisfactorily” complete the BLB before any transfer to open conditions. Therefore, once you have finished the programme, the level of your engagement and the benefit you have gained will need to be considered at the post-programme reviews along with the need for any further work, before the issue of your potential transfer to open conditions should be considered. The Secretary of State also takes the view that it is appropriate for the Parole Board to have the opportunity [to advise] upon this issue, based on up to date risk assessments and reports, in order to assist him in determining whether it would then be appropriate for you to be moved to open conditions.”
“…the Claimant is right to characterise this letter as Wednesbury unreasonable. …what this letter wholly fails to have regard to is the exceptional nature of the circumstances in which the advice was sought, the exceptional nature of the Parole Board hearing, the exceptional nature of the level of scrutiny given, both to the documentation and the oral evidence – subject to cross-examination on both sides – and the exceptionally long and detailed nature of the decision itself. In my judgment, the way in which the Secretary of State has stated his disagreement with the main conclusions of the Parole Board is so cursory and lacking any supporting argument that it is evidence of only the most superficial consideration of the decision. In light of that I am driven to the conclusion that the views expressed by the Parole Board have scarcely been given any consideration at all. This is supported by the fact that, in dealing with the Parole Board’s assessment of current risk, the Secretary of State has focused exclusively on the statement by the Parole Board that it found the matter to be one of some difficulty for reasons including, the inherent and unreliability of the psychologists’ reports. He has wholly failed to take into account the way in which the Parole Board stated it was going to deal with the matter, notwithstanding those difficulties, and the clear conclusion to which it came, which was consistent with its detailed analysis of and consideration of the other issues which it had identified for itself.”
“Whilst it exercised the Secretary of State it did not inform his letter of 13 November so I do not consider that I have to deal with it” (para 70). Further Wilkie J noted that the correctness, or otherwise, of the Parole Board’s conclusions in its decision of July 2009 had not been the subject of substantive debate before him. Accordingly he did not consider it would be appropriate for him to issue any relief in relation to the decisions of8 May 2008 (para 101). He added: “The issue of whether those decisions were lawful or not is one which as Collins J recognised should now be determined in any parallel civil proceedings which may be commenced.”
“…the Parole Board panel did not envisage an immediate transfer to open conditions because, as it indicated, it was necessary for the Claimant to undergo the BLB programme which is only available in closed conditions. He could not, therefore, be transferred to open conditions until he had satisfactorily completed that course.”
“...his completing the course satisfactorily must be a matter of substance not simply a matter of form. He could not properly be considered to have satisfactorily completed the BLB course until the review of his performance on that course has taken place in the form of a post programme review. Furthermore, the Parole Board panel did envisage the Claimant should be assessed for an appropriate level of HRP…(Para 104).”
“1. His satisfactory completion of a BLB, to include any post programme review of his performance on that course. 2. A re-assessment of his suitability for an appropriate HRP by a forensic psychologist…, such assessment to be conducted as soon as possible without necessarily waiting the completion of the BLB. 3. The completion of any HRP for which the claimant is assessed as having a need in the event that such a course may only be delivered in closed conditions. 4. There to be no requirement before his re-transfer to open conditions for any further Parole Board review.”
“First there is the case of targeted malice by a public officer, i.e. conduct specifically intended to injure a person or persons. This type of case involves bad faith in the sense of the exercise of public power for an improper or ulterior motive. The second form is where a public officer acts knowing that he has no power to do the act complained of and that the act will probably injure the plaintiff. It involves bad faith in as much as the public officer does not have an honest belief that his act is lawful.”
“This may arise from a straightforward breach of the relevant statutory provisions or from acting in excess of the powers granted or for an improper purpose... The test is the same as or similar to that used in judicial review.”
“Recklessness is demonstrated where it is shown that the public officer was aware of a serious risk of loss due to an act or omission on his part which was unlawful but chose deliberately to disregard that risk. That is sufficient to establish that he did not have an honest belief in the lawfulness of the conduct which, to his knowledge, gave rise to that risk. Recklessness about the consequences, in the sense of not caring whether the consequences happen or not, will satisfy the test.”
“It is a question of fact. The majority in the Court of Appeal and Auld LJ held that it is unsuitable for summary determination. That is plainly correct.”
“The criterion which the judge has to apply under Part 24 is not one of probability; it is absence of reality. The majority in the Court of Appeal used the phrases “no realistic possibility” and distinguished between a practical possibility and “what is fanciful or inconceivable” (ante, p83 H). Although used in a slightly different context these phrases appropriately express the same idea.”
“HP33 Sex offenders constituted around 10% of the population. Many have been held at the prison for some time without any opportunity to continue addressing their offending behaviour. Except for a few lifers, who were being ‘caseworked’ by members of the lifer team, no other ongoing work was carried out with sex offenders. There were no local policies or procedures to help ensure that sex offenders were treated appropriately or to help minimise deterioration during their time in open conditions. Lifers in general also needed more help to minimise the risk of future re-offending.”
“3.65 A local policy for the management of prisoners convicted of a sexual offence should be produced to help ensure that they do not deteriorate during their time in open conditions. 3.66 Based on the results of a needs analysis, suitable provision should be made for prisoners to participate in appropriate programme work.”
“As you probably know I am acting as life manager at NSC. Going through some cases I have identified one in particular who given cause for considerable concern. His name is Alan Houchin. He has been here for some time and has made no progress due to being HR [high risk] of harm. There have been two MAPPA meetings on this man attended by MSC staff which only serve to up the anxiety levels about his risk. He remained here however and there appears to have been no strategy for doing anything with him. … I take the view that we must not sit on him any longer but don’t feel that we can regress him, even though there is no support for his release. … Have you any suggestions as to what to do in situations such as this. …”
“Initial thoughts are around exploring the current offence in more depth and also current potential risk factors (simply to give more ammunition for putting him back to closed conditions). For e.g. does he have sexual fantasies about young women? What are the circs of the current offence and can you see offence paralleling behaviours in current bhav (e.g. any parallels regarding him chatting up female hairdressers and how he managed to access the current victim?). Also are there any parallels between the original offence and the current offence. E.g. was strangulation evidence in both cases? …”
“If I can’t evidence any paralleling behaviours I’m relying on the clear evidence that he has not gained much from the SOTP. It sounds as though this will not be enough to re-cat [re-categorise] him.”
“Report relates to information that whilst being interviewed by a member of staff [Ms Rawlings], it was felt that he became controlling when they suffered a coughing fit. Although he did not act inappropriately he continued a constant controlling dialogue in that he kept telling her to have a drink of water and asking if she was alright. It was further reported that an Officer who overhead the exchange also concurred with the perception of ‘control’.”
“Became very controlling taking advantage of me coughing hence not fully in control. He did not use any inappropriate language but he continued with a constant controlling dialogue. This was overheard by a uniformed member of staff who concurred with the perception of control.”
“[Ms Rawlings] states Houchin kept telling her to drink water and asking her if she was alright. She felt this was in a controlling manner. Did not feel threatened, no cause for concern re additional security.”
“The Psychopathy assessment or Risk Matrix assessment individually would give cause for concern. The fact that these high risk indicators are combined suggests grounds for extreme caution in respect of Mr Houchin’s risk to the public. The sex offender treatment programmes cannot be assumed to have reduced risk. Indeed in Mr Houchin’s case there are indications that he has not experienced treatment gains through his personality traits and denial. Mr Houchin is a risk to staff in so far as he is highly likely to manipulate staff. He is less likely to present physical harm to staff. There is currently sufficient evidence to suggest that Mr Houchin remains a significant risk to the public on temporary release.”
“R10.2 What is the nature of the risk … in relation to the second offence [rape] I can see no reduction in risk whatsoever. Whilst Mr Houchin displays appropriate empathy for the murder victim, he shows none whatsoever for the rape victim due to his continued denial of the offence. There is evidence available to suggest domestic violence towards his second wife which again indicates a propensity for violence towards a known adult. R10.4 What circumstances are likely to increase risk … I would recommend that ANY negative changes in attitudes or behaviours be investigated in a serious manner due to the lack of insight/denial regarding the offence of rape in 1979. Mr Houchin believed that he did nothing wrong in 1979 and that the sex was consensual. If he believes that he did not commit the offence and did nothing wrong he will repeat the offence in the belief that his actions are normal and correct. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that Mr Houchin remains a significant risk to the public in temporary release.”
“His need to have his haircut in a unisex salon at expensive cost when he is careful with his money when it comes to eating when on town visits. The fact that he stopped going to the unisex salon when challenged about it would tend to indicate that he possibly was not going there for style purposes, but that it could have been so that he could get close to young females.”
“It is my hope that the Offender Management Unit can arrange for Mr Houchin to be moved to an establishment which will allow him to work again on his offending behaviour and associated risks and perhaps begin to gain the insight into his behaviour necessary to satisfy his risk managers that he really does present a reduced risk of re-offending in the future. It is with great regret in view of the length of time Mr Houchin has been in custody that I cannot support release. Until steps are taken to work on his 1979 offence and to raise his personal awareness of such I do not believe he will be ready for release.”