“Grant Thornton, who have been appointed by the Resolution Committee of Kaupthing Bank in the [sic] Iceland, have carried out extensive financial forensic analysis of this complex structure which was put forward by Robert TCHENGUIZ as collateral for the substantial borrowing from Kaupthing. A number of Reports have been prepared by Grant Thornton detailing their findings and these have been reviewed by the SFO.”; and para 125: “Grant Thornton has been appointed by the Resolution Committee in Iceland in order to analyse the Kaupthing lending to Tchenguiz connected companies and to consider potential offences and potential defendants.”
“In this overview I have referred almost exclusively to Reports prepared by [GT], the firm appointed as joint liquidators by Kaupthing hf’s (Khf’s) Resolution Committee following the bank’s collapse, and the SFO during the course of its investigation. These Reports provide a useful (and fair) summary of the basis of the core allegations within the Information, and particularly those relating to Pennyrock.”
“It is now clear that the basis of much of what was said to be suspected criminality was based on information provided by Grant Thornton and to a lesser extent Weil, Gotshal and Manges. The Information disclosed that Grant Thornton had been appointed by the Resolution Committee to analyse the lending by Kaupthing and the entities connected with VT and RT. The Information disclosed the involvement of Grant Thornton in the allegations made against RT and in respect of Oscatello and the litigation against Oscatello to which we have referred at paragraph 30. (para 94) … This is a case where it appears that the SFO relied very heavily on the work and conclusions of Grant Thornton ...” (para 96) The Divisional Court commented on the lack of co-operation of GT: “195. However, as we have set out at paragraphs 43-44 above, these allegations rest upon what the SFO were told by Grant Thornton on and after9 September 2010 . We only have the notes of the meeting and not the copy of the report of Grant Thornton. They declined in answer to a request from VT to make available the evidence on which such serious allegations were advanced to the SFO. We therefore do not know the basis of Grant Thornton's opinion on the valuation carried out by Oliver Wyman or their opinion on the acceptance of that valuation in the audited accounts. Certainly the allegation (which we have set out at paragraph 43) made by Grant Thornton to the SFO that VT may have misled the auditors as to the period on which the actuarial valuation was made was unfounded, the entire basis of valuation is recorded in note 7 to the accounts. Nor do we know the basis of the contention of Grant Thornton and the Resolution Committee that Kaupthing had not conducted due diligence. 196. Lord Goldsmith severely criticised this conduct of Grant Thornton, having put them on notice on15 March 2012 and invited them to become a party to the proceedings and to state whether the allegations were maintained. Grant Thornton acknowledged the receipt of this notice in a letter written by their solicitors on9 May 2012 . They stated that they would not become a party, they had not been served with the proceedings and were not in a position to provide information because of the confidentiality provisions of Icelandic law, the Code of Ethics of the Institute of Chartered Accountants and legal professional privilege. They contended that no criticism should be made of their conduct, as the SFO had accepted that the misstatements to the judge were its fault. Lord Goldsmith made clear that the fact that the allegations were still being maintained was continuing to have an adverse effect on the interests of TFT and VT and preventing TFT from repaying the Pennyrock loan. 197. We do not consider that it is for us to comment on the conduct of Grant Thornton, save to say that it is unfortunate that the court does not know the basis for the criticism of the actuarial valuation and the audited accounts. It is perhaps difficult to understand how provisions of Icelandic law or the Code of Ethics of the Institute of Chartered Accountants or legal professional privilege could have permitted Grant Thornton to assist the SFO, after service of a s.2 notice, in making allegations of criminal conduct against RT and VT in relation to the valuation and the accounts, but not to be in a position to assist this court by providing the basis for those two specific allegations when VT and RT challenged by way of judicial review the case made against VT and RT by the SFO who had relied on Grant Thornton's views on those two specific allegations. From the observations we have made in paragraph 195, the provision of information would have been of assistance to the court.”
“… in the account of the factual background we refer to Grant Thornton's reports. Grant Thornton and Weil, Gotshal and Manges were appointed on the collapse of Kaupthing by the group responsible for its affairs known as the Resolution Committee to seek to recover funds for the creditors. Their reports formed an important basis for the SFO's investigation, as we shall explain.”
“29. The reports commissioned by the Joint Liquidators include the Reports which form the subject of the VT Claimants’ Application. I summarise the content of each of the Reports below. I am providing, as noted above, this summary of the general subject matter of the Reports in order to assist the Court in determining whether litigation privilege attaches to them and in no manner is this intended to be a waiver or partial waiver of privilege in the Reports: (1) the Joint Liquidators commissioned a draft report dated23 August 2010 , in order to assist the Joint Liquidators in formulating their response to the Guernsey Proceedings and to enable their Guernsey solicitors to provide instructions to counsel (“the First Draft Guernsey Report”). The First Draft Guernsey Report was included in instructions sent to Guernsey counsel on15 November 2010 . The recovery available to Oscatello in the Guernsey Proceedings, put forward by Investec, was materially different depending on a number of scenarios. The First Draft Guernsey Report was prepared entirely to enable the Joint Liquidators and their legal advisors to respond to the varying scenarios and to prepare a Defence and Counterclaim quantifying the amounts claimed. Specifically it was to identify all inter-company balances that should be reversed and to calculate the effect of the these balances/reversals on dividends to creditors; (2) the Joint Liquidators commissioned a draft report dated21 December 2010 , following a meeting with Counsel on30 November 2010 , the dominant purpose of which was to enable the Joint Liquidators to consider with Counsel the broader implications of the Guernsey Proceedings for the Oscatello Companies (“the Second Draft Guernsey Report”). In particular, the Second Draft Guernsey Report was produced following a request by the Joint Liquidators’ Guernsey counsel for a memorandum regarding the inter-company loans to assist Counsel in providing advice regarding litigation strategy. As stated in paragraph [26], the report was produced to help establish (a) how the original debts due from TFT arose, (b) whether these debts were properly described as loans, and if so, what the terms of the loans were, (c) the terms under which the debts due to Oscatello's subsidiary companies were novated to the TDT, as at24 August 2007 , and whether the debts were properly described as loans and if so, what the terms of the loans were, and (d) clarification as to the terms under which the debts due to Oscatello's subsidiaries were transferred from TDT to Oscatello as at21 December 2007 and whether the debts were accurately described as loans, and if so, what the terms of the loans were. The report took the form of a summary and analysis of information obtained from the books and records of the Oscatello Companies. The report enabled the Joint Liquidators’ solicitors to fully understand the accounting treatment of the loan transactions to enable them to advise on strategy for the litigation proceedings in Guernsey. The Second Draft Guernsey report was sent to Guernsey counsel on or around21 December 2010 ; (3) the Joint Liquidators commissioned a draft memorandum dated17 September 2010 on the formation and trading history of the Oscatello Companies (“the Draft Oscatello Memorandum”). The Draft Oscatello Memorandum was commissioned for the dominant purpose of enabling the Joint Liquidators to obtain information and legal advice in connection with litigation which was, and remains, contemplated against various potential defendants. In particular, it addresses, among other things, various transactions which the Joint Liquidators consider unusual or irregular and identifies potential causes of action as well as the defendants to possible claims. The memorandum was produced to assist the Joint Liquidators in assessing the potential claims against other parties by Oscatello, and its related subsidiaries. It highlighted unusual and irregular transactions, specifically the Framework and Overdraft agreements, the position of other lenders in the Oscatello Group, a number of share transactions and CDS transactions and breaches of covenants and the validity of Framework agreement. The report went on to highlight the potential defendants to any claim made in respect of the above findings, these potential defendants include parties to the SFO proceedings HQ12XO5082 and HQ13XO0414. On or around17 September 2010 the Oscatello Report was provided to the Liquidators legal advisors in London for the purposes of obtaining advice and formulating draft particulars of claim; (4) the Joint Liquidators commissioned a draft memorandum dated25 October 2010 considering the circumstances surrounding the entry into certain contracts for difference and credit default swaps by Roxinda Limited (“Roxinda”), a member of the Oscatello Companies (“the Draft Roxinda Memorandum”). The Draft Roxinda Memorandum was commissioned for the dominant purpose of assisting the Joint Liquidators in connection with obtaining information and legal advice in connection with litigation which was, and remains, contemplated against various potential defendants. In particular, it addresses, among other things, the circumstances surrounding the entry into certain contracts for differences and credit default swaps by Roxinda, at a time when it is believed Roxinda was insolvent, it also seeks to identify civil recovery opportunities. On or around22 September 2011 the Draft Roxinda Report was provided to counsel in London for the purposes of obtaining advice and formulating draft particulars of claim; and (5) Following a meeting with Counsel on30 November 2010 , the Joint Liquidators commissioned a draft memorandum dated22 December 2010 providing details of the individuals from R20 who were involved in the transactions referred to in the Oscatello Report (“the Draft R20 Report”). The Draft R20 Report was commissioned to brief Counsel and in order to assist the Joint Liquidators in obtaining information and advice in connection with litigation which was, and remains, contemplated against various potential defendants. In particular, the Draft R20 report was commissioned following a request from the Joint Liquidators’ Counsel to enable him to advise on potential claims against various possible defendants identified in the Oscatello Report. The purpose of this report was to supplement the Oscatello Report and to set out the evidence needed to demonstrate which individuals from R20 were potentially involved with irregular and unusual transactions. On or around22 December 2010 the R20 Report was provided to counsel in London for the purposes of obtaining advice and formulating draft particulars of claim.”
“(3). The court may make an order under this rule only where – (a) the documents of which disclosure is sought are likely to support the case of the applicant or adversely affect the case of one of the other parties to the proceedings; and (b) disclosure is necessary in order to dispose fairly of the claim or to save costs.”
“The board of BCCI, the auditors, and the regulatory authorities all needed to know what was the true financial position of BCCI, and this required an investigation in order to establish the facts. If BCCI itself or its controlling shareholders did not set an investigation in motion, it was feared that the regulatory authorities would. BCCI's financial position depended, in part at least, on the recoverability of the problem loans and that might require legal advice as to the prospects of success if resort had to be made to legal proceedings. But just as in Waugh v British Railways Board the board needed to establish the facts whether or not litigation ensued, so the board of BCCI, the auditors and the controlling shareholders needed to establish BCCI's financial position whether or not recovery proceedings were necessary. Given that the dominant purpose of the investigation was to establish the facts necessary to enable BCCI's financial position to be determined, documents brought into existence in the course of the investigation did not in my judgment attract legal professional privilege merely because legal advice might be necessary in order fully to evaluate the financial implications of the facts. The obtaining of legal advice is not an end in itself. To attract privilege it must be for the purpose of actual or contemplated proceedings. In Re Highgrade Traders Ltd a claim to privilege was raised in respect of reports obtained by insurers who were suspicious of the circumstances attending a fire on the premises of their insured. Oliver LJ said ([1984] BCLC 151 at 173): 'What, then, was the purpose of the reports? The learned judge found a duality of purpose because, he said, the insurers wanted not only to obtain the advice of their solicitors, but also wanted to ascertain the cause of the fire. Now, for my part, I find these two quite inseparable. The insurers were not seeking the cause of the fire as a matter of academic interest in spontaneous combustion. Their purpose in instigating the inquiries can only be determined by asking why they needed to find out the cause of the fire. And the only reason that can be ascribed to them is that of ascertaining whether, as they suspected, it had been fraudulently started by the insured. It was entirely clear that, if the claim was persisted in and if it was resisted, litigation would inevitably follow.' In the present case it was necessary to determine the extent towhich the problem loans were recoverable, in order toestablish BCCI's financial position and to decide whetherrecovery proceedings should be taken. But the two purposewere quite independent of each other. There was nothing ofmerely academic interest in the former; it was of vital concernnot only to BCCI, but also to the controlling shareholders, theauditors, and the regulatory authorities. I am satisfied that thiswas the dominant purpose of the investigation, and was quiteindependent of the possible need to take recovery proceedings,and that accordingly the documents in question do not attractlegal professional privilege.”
“Specifically [this Report] was to identify all inter-company balances that should be reversed and to calculate the effect of these balances/reversals on dividends to creditors”
“The report enabled the Joint Liquidators’ solicitors to fully understand the accounting treatment of the loan transactions to enable them to advise on strategy for the litigation proceedings in Guernsey.”
“If the document is read out on the television news or in open court then confidentiality is lost once and for all. No further question of privilege arises. But it is important to bear in mind that it is possible for a document to cease to be confidential as between some parties and not others. If A shows a privileged document to his six best friends, he will not be able to assert privilege if one of those friends sues him because the document is not confidential as between him and the friend. But the fact six other people have seen it does not prevent him claiming privilege as against the rest of the world.”