“What is going with Seb, it seems to be dragging out more? Can we get these people (other investors) their money back pronto?” (11) Following a reply from Mr Abbey, Mr Inglis comes back again: “What you have written is fine but doesn’t explain where and when our money is… If we are to continue, this needs sorting, Peter. I cannot justify this to anyone any more.” (12) Mr Abbey responds: “I am not hiding anything… The money, along with another 400,000 was pissed away… and if you want to come in and see me, I will tell you chapter and verse… I am not happy having this in writing for obvious reasons…this is about the worst situation I have had to deal with and we are trying to solve it quietly. DO NOT circulate this PLEASE!!!” (13) CLG was set up weeks after London won the Olympic bid to invest in “media and leisure opportunities”. (14) It consists of Sebastian Coe Ltd – through which Lord Coe is paid for his appearances, media work and consultancies – the Sport magazine publisher, and sports drinks firm Biosynergy Ltd. While CLG is the umbrella group, it is not clear whether the apparent financial problems apply to each of the companies within it- and whether Lord Coe has lost money. (15) CLG raised£1 million in investment with the help of Mr Abbey, who now has a 7.8 per cent share in CLG. (16) Mr Abbey a tax exile based in Monaco, has been linked to a string of business collapses and was declared bankrupt in 1985. (17) The extent of CLG’s problems came to light days after the Channel 4’S Dispatches documentary examined Lord Coe’s business interests. (18) Following the programme, Lord Coe who is chairman of the London 2012 Organising Committee, strenuously denied any link between his Olympics role and his earnings of at least£200,000 from speeches, product endorsements, and consultancy funnelled through CLG. (19) A spokesman Lord Coe said that CLG had been created as a totally separate entity to “ringfence” his private business interests and avoid any conflict with his Olympic role. (20) The spokesman added: “One of the things we’ve said consistently is that Seb has been absolutely meticulous and scrupulous in separating his business interests from London 2012.” (21) However, the emails obtained by the Standard show that Susie Black, Lord Coe’s personal assistant at London 2012, has also acted for CLG. (22) Ms Black is contracted to be employed full-time by London 2012 and is paid as such out of Olympic funds. (23) She works at London 2012’s offices at Canary Wharf, although she has recently begun maternity leave. But the Standard can reveal that - with the full knowledge of London 2012 – Ms Black has a CLG email account, has helped schedule Lord Coe’s paid speaking engagements, and has been copied into part of the email exchanges about CLG’s finances. (24) A spokeswoman for Lord Coe said there was nothing improper in the arrangement and added: “By maintaining an email address at CLG, Seb’s London 2012 PA is in the best position to monitor what comes to Seb at CLG, verify it is consistent with the ethical framework, and pass on messages when necessary given the extraordinary demands placed on his time by his London 2012 duties.” (25) The spokeswoman explained that Ms Black also sometimes “printed things out” for CLG on London 2012 office printers and may have been involved in scheduling Lord Coe’s private speaking events. (26) “Lord Coe has one diary. If it was a CLG meeting she might make (the appointment),” the spokeswoman said. (27) She could not comment on the affairs of CLG. (28) A spokesman for Mr Abbey declined to comment.”
“Art 8 (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society … for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Article 10 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers… (2) The exercise of these freedoms since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society … for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence ...”
“The new approach takes a different view of the underlying value which the law protects. Instead of the cause of action being based on the duty of good faith applicable to confidential personal information and trade secrets alike, it focuses upon the protection of human autonomy and dignity – the right to control the dissemination of information about one’s private life and the right to the esteem and respect of other people.”
“29 Nevertheless we accept … that the mere fact that the information was imparted in the course of a relationship of confidence does not satisfy Lord Nicholls's test of “expectation of privacy”
“It is undisputed that there is a public interest in the professional and private life of the claimant's supposed father. His professional position speaks for itself. As to his private life, he is man who has achieved a level of notoriety as result of extramarital adulterous liaisons. Of itself, the fact of an extramarital affair does not render inevitable the publishing of information that, as a result, a child was conceived. However, the claimant is alleged to be the second such child conceived as a result of an extramarital affair of the supposed father. It is said that such information goes to the issue of recklessness on the part of the supposed father, relevant both to his private and professional character, in particular his fitness for public office. I find that the identified issue of recklessness is one which is relevant to the professional and personal character of the supposed father.”
"the propriety of suppressing wanton or self-interested disclosure of confidential information; but both correspondingly recognise the legitimacy of disclosure, undertakings notwithstanding, if the public interest in the free flow of information and ideas will be served by it...."
"the true principle is not (as dicta in some cases suggest) that the court will permit a breach of confidence whenever it considers that disclosure would serve the public interest more than non-disclosure, but rather that no obligation of confidence exists in contract or in equity, in so far as the subject matter concerns a serious risk of public harm (including but not limited to cases of 'iniquity') and the alleged obligation would prevent disclosure appropriate to prevent such harm."
"...The interplay between articles 8 and 10 has been illuminated by the opinions in the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd[2004] 2 AC 457 . … What does, … emerge clearly from the opinions are four propositions. First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the' specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. For convenience I will call this the ultimate balancing test."
“2. … [Lord Coe] engaged in a series of discussion with officials of the … DCMS … to communicate complete information about his current and proposed plans and activities and the set-up of [TCLG] to ensure that no conflicts of interest arise … 7. … Tim Howland, previously the CEO of TCLG resigned in April 2007 because he was unable to pursue business opportunities within TCLG owing to our client’s stance precluding any potential conflicts of interest with the Olympics. 10. Peter Abbey is a paid consultant and minority shareholder in TCLG with a less than 10% shareholding. He is not an officer or director of TCLG and does not play any part in the management of TCLG. TCLG is professionally managed and advised. Most recently the management team has been enhanced by the addition of Harold Tillman, chairman of Jaeger, who joined Sir Robin Miller, formerly Chairman and CEO of Emap as non-executive directors of TCLG”
“Please would you let me know where we are on this?”
“we can now move forward getting a new injection of cash to buy out weak holders”
“this is about the worst situation I have had to deal …”
“… the defendants advance a further argument. They say that there is a tort of abuse of process of the court established by Grainger v. Hill (1838) 4 Bing.N.C. 212. In that case the plaintiff had borrowed£80 from the defendants on the mortgage of a ship which he owned. The debt was repayable on28 September 1837 . The defendants, being apparently apprehensive as to their security, decided in November 1836 (i.e. before the debt was repayable) to possess themselves of the ship's register without which the plaintiff could not go to sea. They therefore called on the plaintiff to pay the debt (which was not due) and threatened to arrest him if he failed to pay. The defendants then made an affidavit of debt and sued out a writ of capias indorsed for bail in the sum of some£95 , and sent in two sheriff's officers with the writ to the plaintiff, who was ill in bed and attended by a surgeon. One of the officers then told the plaintiff that they had not come to take him, but to get the ship's register; but that if he failed to deliver the register, either they must take him or leave one of the officers with him. The plaintiff, being unable to procure bail and being alarmed, gave up the register. The plaintiff claimed damages for the loss of voyages which he could not undertake because of the loss of the register, and also the recovery of the register. The plaintiff succeeded at the trial, and there was an appeal to the Exchequer Chamber, which dismissed it. Tindal C.J. said, at p. 221: “The second ground urged for a nonsuit is, that there was no proof of the suit commenced by the defendants having been terminated. But the answer to this, and to the objection urged in arrest of judgment, namely, the omission to allege want of reasonable and probable cause for the defendants' proceeding, is the same: that this is an action for abusing the process of the law, by applying it to extort property from the plaintiff, and not an action for malicious arrest or malicious prosecution, in order to support which action the termination of the previous proceeding must be proved.” … the abuse, as I understand it, was that the purpose of the original proceeding was not the recovery of the debt (which was not due) but the extortion of the register…. In Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd. [1977] 1 W.L.R. 478 , 489, Lord Denning M.R., in a dissenting judgment, said: “What may make it” — the legal process — “wrongful is the purpose for which it is used. If it is done in order to exert pressure so as to achieve an end which is improper in itself, then it is a wrong known to the law. This appears distinctly from the case which founded this tort. It is Grainger v. Hill, 4 Bing. N.C. 212.”
“In the instant proceedings the defendants have to show that the plaintiff has an ulterior motive, seeks a collateral advantage for himself beyond what the law offers, is reaching out ‘to effect an object not within the scope of the process’: Grainger v. Hill.” “The second ground urged for a nonsuit is, that there was no proof of the suit commenced by the defendants having been terminated. But the answer to this, and to the objection urged in arrest of judgment, namely, the omission to allege want of reasonable and probable cause for the defendants' proceeding, is the same: that this is an action for abusing the process of the law, by applying it to extort property from the plaintiff, and not an action for malicious arrest or malicious prosecution, in order to support which action the termination of the previous proceeding must be proved.” “What may make it” — the legal process — “wrongful is the purpose for which it is used. If it is done in order to exert pressure so as to achieve an end which is improper in itself, then it is a wrong known to the law. This appears distinctly from the case which founded this tort. It is Grainger v. Hill, 4 Bing. N.C. 212.” “In the instant proceedings the defendants have to show that the plaintiff has an ulterior motive, seeks a collateral advantage for himself beyond what the law offers, is reaching out ‘to effect an object not within the scope of the process’: Grainger v. Hill.”
"54 An abuse of process is of concern not merely to the parties but to the court. It is no longer the role of the court simply to provide a level playing-field and to referee whatever game the parties choose to play upon it. The court is concerned to ensure that judicial and court resources are appropriately and proportionately used in accordance with the requirements of justice. … 55. … Section 6 [of the Human Rights Act] requires a court, as a public authority, to administer the law in a manner which is compatible with Convention rights, insofar as it is possible to do so. Keeping a proper balance between the Article 10 right of freedom of expression and the protection of individual reputation must, so it seems to us, require the court to bring to a stop as an abuse of process defamation proceedings that are not serving the legitimate purpose of protecting the Claimant's reputation, which includes compensating the Claimant only if that reputation has been unlawfully damaged… 70. … It would be an abuse of process to continue to commit the resources of the English court, including substantial judge and possibly jury time, to an action where so little is now seen to be at stake. Normally where a small claim is brought, it will be dealt with by a proportionate small claims procedure. Such a course is not available in an action for defamation where, although the claim is small, the issues are complex and subject to special procedure under the CPR. 74. Where a defamatory statement has received insignificant publication in this jurisdiction, but there is a threat or a real risk of wider publication, there may well be justification for pursuing proceedings in order to obtain an injunction against republication of the libel. We are not persuaded that such justification exists in the present case. 75. There seems no likelihood that Dow Jones will repeat their article in the form in which it was originally published. It has been removed from the web site and from the archive… 76. In these circumstances, if this litigation were to proceed and to culminate in judgment for the Claimant, it seems to us unlikely that the court would be able, or prepared, to formulate and impose an injunction against repetition of the defamation in terms that would be of value to the Claimant. We do not believe that a desire for this remedy has been what this action has been about, or that the possibility of obtaining an injunction justifies permitting this action to proceed."
“6. … [the claimant] is able to pursue his claim purely because [his lawyer] has been prepared to act on his behalf on the basis of a conditional fee agreement. This means, of course, that significant costs can be run up for the defendant without any prospect of recovery if they are successful, since one of the matters on which [his lawyer] does apparently have instructions is that his client is without funds. On the other hand, if the defendant is unsuccessful it may be ordered to pay, quite apart from any damages, the costs of the claimant's solicitors including a substantial mark-up in respect of a success fee. The defendant's position is thus wholly unenviable. 7. Faced with these circumstances, there must be a significant temptation for media defendants to pay up something, to be rid of litigation for purely commercial reasons, and without regard to the true merits of any pleaded defence. This is the so-called "chilling effect" or "ransom factor" inherent in the conditional fee system, which was discussed by the Court of Appeal in King v Telegraph Group Ltd… This is a situation which could not have arisen in the past and is very much a modern development.”
“2. It is now not infrequently the case that claimants, seeking the enforcement, usually summarily, of adjudication decisions, are securing CFAs and, less commonly, ATE Insurance. It is difficult to avoid an inference, sometimes at least, that this is being done so as to impose greater economic pressure on the defendant to settle early, even in circumstances in which the defendant might have a reasonably arguable defence to the summary enforcement.”