“1a. All electricity (unless necessary to maintain security), gas and water mains supplies be turned off at the point of entry to the building b. All outside doors to be kept securely locked to prevent unauthorised entry c. The buildings to be maintained in a good state of repair and all windows be firmly secured at all times d. Weekly visits be carried out by the Insured, or any adult person authorised by the Insured, in order to check the premises physically and to carry out any work necessary to maintain the security arrangements.”
“Under a warranty the Insured is asserting that certain statements or facts are and will remain accurate or that certain actions are and will be performed. Failure to comply with a warranty, which contributes to damage, may result in any claim not being paid.”
“2. ORIGIN/DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRE 2.1 The fire was started deliberately; it involved multiple points of origin and the use of an accelerant. 2.2 Fires were started on the ground floor of Sections A and B, the first floor of Section B and on the front stairs leading up to the first floor in Section C/D (for ease of reference, Figures 1, 2 and 3 from Dr Gardner’s report of25 March 2011 are appended to this Statement). The possibility that a fire was started in other areas, where damage was particularly severe, cannot be discounted. It was not possible to confirm how long the fire had been burning before the Fire Service attended or precisely how it developed. 2.5 The fire could have been started by either a key holder or an intruder. 2.6 There was no positive evidence to indicate that a key holder was responsible for the fire. 3. POTENTIAL POINTS OF ENTRY BY AN INTRUDER 3.1 DOOR D4 3.1.1 There was no evidence to indicate that Door D4 had been forced open. The door and the internal bolts were intact. 3.1.2 Based on the available evidence, nobody went into the building to open Door D4 from inside from between when the Fire Service arrived and when Watch Manager Bankhead opened the door after the fire had been brought under control. 3.1.3 Both of the bolts on Door D4 were unlocked i.e. in the withdrawn position, when the fire occurred. 3.1.4 It is not possible to confirm for how long the top bolt on Door D4 had been unbolted prior to the fire, based on the physical evidence alone. 3.1.5 There were two rust marks on the lower bolt, one of which corresponded to the bolt being inserted (‘bolted’) in the keep and the other corresponded to the bolt being withdrawn (‘unbolted’) from the keep. As such, the bolt had been secured in the keep in the past. 3.1.6 The presence of cobwebs in the keep for the lower bolt has no bearing on whether the lower bolt was ‘bolted’ or not prior to the fire. 3.3 THE GLASS OF WINDOW W2 3.3.1 There was no evidence of damage consistent with attempted forced entry to the frame of Window W2. The upper fixed section of Window W2 was intact during the fire. 3.3.2 To discuss the possibility that someone had broken the glass to climb in or reach in to overcome the catch, it is necessary to assess how much clean broken glass was underneath the debris (spalled ceiling finish) on the floor adjacent to Window W2. 3.3.3 An intruder did not break the glass of the opening section of Window W2 to create a hole in the pane that was big enough to climb through into the building. 3.4 CATCH OF WINDOW W2 3.4.1 It was evident from the pattern of soot staining on the frame of the pivoting section of window W2 that the window was not fully closed into the rebate, and therefore was not secured by the catch, when the fire occurred. 3.4.2 Based on the account of Mark Lee, the pull handle was missing from the catch before the fire. However, it is not possible to determine how long the pull handle had been missing, based solely on the physical evidence. 3.4.3 The catch mechanism had been mechanically damaged, whereby the internal mechanism had been distorted and the bolt had become stuck in a partly depressed position in the catch. The damage rendered the catch inoperable so it could not be used to secure the window. 3.4.4 The catch keep was damaged, in the form of an indentation in its front face, due to impact of the catch bolt on the keep, i.e. by the window ‘closing’ after the catch mechanism had been damaged and made inoperable. It is not possible from the physical evidence to determine when this occurred other than before Eur Ing Jones’s inspection on3 June 2009 . 3.4.5 The possibilities to be considered are that: 1. An intruder broke a hole in the window pane and reached in with a tool to release it. The catch was in working order but was damaged by the tool and made inoperable. The window was later closed, thus creating the indentation in the keep. 2. The window W2 was not broken by the intruder but the latch was broken during the incident. 3. The catch had been damaged and made inoperable as a result of misuse by someone inside the building prior to the fire and this was unrelated to the incident. The indentation was made in the keep when the window was closed after being damaged. As such the window had not been secured by the catch when the incident occurred. 3.5 TILED ROOF (SECTIONS A, B AND C) 3.5.1 The Fire Service could not see all of the roof of Sections A and B when they first arrived and part of the roof of Sections A and B collapsed at an early stage of the incident. 3.5.2 It is unlikely that access was made through roof C. 3.5.3 There is no physical evidence which excludes the possibility of entry having been made through roofs A or B. 3.5.4 If an intruder had managed to reach the tiled roof, then in order to gain access through it, several tiles, say at least four, would have to be broken or removed to create a hole big enough for someone to climb through, once the exposed tile battens and any under-drawing had been broken through. An intruder would then have to break through the ceiling and drop down into the building. This would not have been an easy proposition for an intruder. 3.6 ROOF LIGHT (SECTION D) 3.6.3 The hole in the roof of section D seen by Fire Fighter Kingdom was a damaged roof light, either W15 or W16. The mechanism by which the roof light came to be damaged, either mechanically by an intruder or due to exposure to fire, cannot be confirmed with certainty, based solely on the physical evidence. 3.6.4 The possibility that a roof light was broken prior to the fire and was used as a point of entry by an intruder cannot be ruled out, based solely on the physical evidence. 3.6.7 Two sections of roof light were found lying on top of burnt debris in the locker room (first floor of Section D), adjacent to the stud wall that aligned with the base (lowest edge) of roof light W15. 3.6.10 A fibreglass roof light will lose its structural integrity if exposed to fire temperatures for a sufficient period and will fail and collapse. 3.6.11 W15 and W16 were located in the area of Section D that was most severely damaged by fire and were close to Section B and the top of the front staircase. The fire could have spread into the locker room (between roof lights W15 and W16) from Section B and/or from the top of the front staircase. Alternatively, the possibility that a separate fire was started in the locker room cannot be discounted. 3.1.12 The precise mechanism by which a roof light would fall due to fire attack would depend on the condition of the roof light prior to the fire, its orientation relative to the fire and the pattern of fire development. 4. SUMMARY 4.1 If the fire was started by an intruder, then the potential points of entry to consider are door D4, window W2, a roof light in Section D or the tiled roof of Sections A and B. It is agreed that there is no physical evidence available to demonstrate whether or not D4 was secured by a bolt. If door D4 was secure then it was most likely opened by the intruders and used only for escaping the premises. If door D4 had been insecure and thus could have been used by an intruder to gain entry without force, then this would mean that Mark Lee was mistaken in his recollection that door D4 was secure when he last inspected the building. The interpretation that Mark Lee was mistaken i.e. that the entry route was through insecure door D4, would require reasonable certainty that; (i) There was no entry gained through window W2 and, (ii) There was no entry gained through roof lights W15 and/or W16 and, (iii) There was no entry gained via roofs A and/or B.” (i) There was no entry gained through window W2 and, (ii) There was no entry gained through roof lights W15 and/or W16 and, (iii) There was no entry gained via roofs A and/or B.”
“You would not be in a position to say would you, that there could not have been a hole within part of the glass at W2?”
“In my view, roof light W16 was largely destroyed by the fire, leaving only the remnants of loose fibreglass matting seen amongst the debris on the floor of the partitioned room. On the basis that roof lights W15 and W16 were located nearest to Section B and a severe fire was burning in Section B, where the roof had partly collapsed, it is plausible that one or more of the roof lights failed as a result of exposure to fire that had spread from Section B to involve the partitioned room. If roof light W16 failed in this manner some time between when FF Kingdom initially went up in the ALP and when he went up again with FF Strover, then this can explain his observations and SM Bruce’s assertion that he was initially advised on the fire ground that the roof of Section D was intact. In addition, this would also be consistent with the observations of WM Walkden and WM Innis that the roof of Section D was intact when they had a view of it at a relatively early stage of the fire. Thus, I would conclude that the roof lights in Section D were most probably intact when the fire started and a roof light had not been used as a point of entry by an intruder.”