“We are currently in the process of organising GPR placements for the August 2003 intake. As discussed before your appointment at North Middlesex you will have to be interviewed for a General Practice post.”
“Was the requirement for the Applicant to attend a competitive interview discriminatory?”
“6.1 There was clearly a misunderstanding between the Claimant and Dr Lints as to the nature of his appointment to the North Middlesex Hospital following an interview on4 October 2002 . The misunderstanding was as to whether (as the Claimant believed) the appointment was to a six month post at the hospital which would automatically be followed by twelve months of GPR training to be organised by the Respondents in a GP practice, or whether (as maintained by Dr Lints) the appointment was only ‘stand alone’ for six months at the hospital with no commitment to GPR training thereafter, should the Claimant fail an interview. 6.2 The Claimant had reasonable grounds for believing that his appointment included the GPR element and that, whilst he would be required to attend an interview before receiving the offer of a GPR post, this interview would be a formality and only necessary because there had been no GP tutor on the interview panel at North Middlesex Hospital on4 October 2002 . He reasonably believed that his progression to the twelve month GPR element of his training was assured and dependent only upon ‘appraisal, progress and completion’ of the six month hospital post, as set out in his letter of appointment.”
“It is clear that there was a lack of clarity in the manner in which the Respondents dealt with the appointments of Dr Darkwah and the Claimant, which caused each of them to believe that they were appointed on a ‘fully packaged GP VTS’.”
“In our view the Claimant failed to demonstrate by a long way that there was a real or substantial rather than a highly speculative chance that any Deanery and in particular those we have identified would have acted so as to confer on him the benefit of appointment to a GPR post. The burden of doing so lay firmly on the Claimant and since his prospects of success were no more than negligible there were no prospects of success for the Tribunal to assess.”
“…the issues before the first Employment Tribunal were completely different from those in the instant proceedings. The first Tribunal was not asked to decide whether Dr Zaman entered into a contract and whether there had been a breach of that contract but whether Dr Zaman had been treated less favourably than Dr Darkwah and if so, whether this was on grounds of his race or sex. …the key findings in respect of the respective proceedings are fundamentally different.”
“The overlap between the two Actions needs to be assessed by reference to the substance of the respective claims, not by a literal comparison of the two statements of case,”
“…although there is much common ground between the subject matter of the racial discrimination proceedings and the present action, the substance of the issues to be decided in the respective claims is very different. As a consequence I find that the case of Sheriff is distinguishable.”
“Applying a broad merits-based approach, I find that the Defendant has failed to prove that Dr Zaman by bringing High Court proceedings for breach of contract is misusing or abusing the process of the Court. …I find that Dr Zaman could not have brought the breach of contract case before the Employment Tribunals because he was not an employee of the Defendant or apprenticed to it, and his claim exceeds£50,000 . The breach of contract proceedings involve issues which are fundamentally different in substance from those involved in the racial discrimination and victimisation proceedings. …. The effect of the Defendant’s abuse of process argument in the present case would be to use the salutary principle to shut Dr Zaman out from bringing before the Court a genuine cause of action for breach of contract.”
“…a claim for compensation for injury sustained by the appellant arising out of his employment with the respondent (i.e. through the master’s conduct) and in respect of which the industrial tribunal had jurisdiction.”
“…the reality is that the Queen’s Bench proceedings are an abuse of process because they represent an attempt to re-invent a struck out claim of race discrimination and victimisation as a claim for breach of contract.”
“…an appellate court will be reluctant to interfere with the decision of the judge in the judgment he reaches on abuse of process by the balance of factors; it will generally only interfere where the judge has taken into account immaterial factors, omitted to take account of material factors, erred in principle or come to a conclusion that was impermissible or not open to him.”
“…Henderson v Henderson abuse of process, as now understood, although separate and distinct from cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel, has much in common with them. The underlying public interest is the same: that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. …there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceeding involves what the court regards as unjust harassment of a party. …[there should be] a broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focussing attention on the crucial question of whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before.”