“A constable may arrest without warrant a person whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist.”
“Is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.”
“(1) Subject to section 18, no evidence shall be adduced, question asked, assertion or disclosure made or other thing done in, for the purposes of or in connection with any legal proceedings which or Inquiries Act proceedings which in any manner —” (a) discloses, in circumstances from which its origin anything falling within subsection (2) may be inferred, any of the contents of an intercepted communication or any related communications data; or (b) tends (apart from any such disclosure) to suggest that anything falling within subsection (2) has or may have occurred or be going to occur.” “(2) The following fall within this subsection— … (c) the issue of an interception warrant or of a warrant under the [1985 c. 56.]Interception of Communications Act 1985 ; (d) the making of an application by any person for an interception warrant, or for a warrant under that Act.”
“12. On the evening of 20 September DCS Bunn received secret intelligence in respect of which public interest immunity is asserted, which revealed that Lotfi had been potentially alerted to law enforcement interest in him and that he had reacted by contacting his brother, the claimant. 13. The intelligence was significant in that it appears to show that: (1) Lotfi reacted quickly to notification of law enforcement interest in him; (2) One of Lotfi’s closest associates was his brother, the Claimant. 14. By reason of the matters aforesaid DCI MacBrayne honestly and reasonably suspected that the Claimant was also concerned in the commission, instigation or preparation of acts of terrorism, namely, the 9/11 attacks. In arriving at the conclusion in the preceding paragraph DCI MacBrayne was entitled to and did rely upon: (i) SO13’s experience that terrorist organisations require extensive support to carry out their activities and often rely upon familial networks; (ii) the reasonable inference that a brother, especially an apparently close brother, as the secret intelligence suggested, would have some idea about what his brother was up to; (iii) the reasonable inference that a brother could assist his brother in his terrorist design, whether intentionally or unintentionally.”
“On the evening of 20 September DCS Bunn received information which the pleader is prohibited by force of law from referring to which raised suspicions concerning the Claimant’s involvement with Lotfi.”
“By reason of the matters aforesaid DCI MacBrayne honestly and reasonably suspected the claimant was also concerned in the commission in the commission, instigation or preparation of acts of terrorism, namely, the 911 attacks.”
“What procedure may lawfully be adopted by the Court in circumstances where a Chief Officer of police wishes to justify an arrest, wholly or partly, in reliance upon secret information which he asserts he is prohibited by law from adducing or otherwise referring to in the public domain.”
“The constable made the arrest in connection with a murder which was undoubtedly an act of terrorism within the meaning of section 12(1) of the 1984 Act. It was common ground that subjectively the constable had the necessary suspicion. The question was whether the constable objectively had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the appellant was concerned in the murder. The constable said in evidence that his reasonable grounds for suspecting the plaintiff were based on a briefing by a superior officer. He was told that the plaintiff had been involved in the murder. The constable said that the superior officer ordered him to arrest the plaintiff. He did so. Counsel for the plaintiff took the tactical decision not to cross-examine the constable about the details of the briefing. The trial judge described the evidence as scanty. But he inferred that the briefing afforded reasonable grounds for the necessary suspicion. In other words the judge inferred that some further details must have been given in the briefing. The legal burden was on the Chief Constable to prove the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion. Nevertheless I am persuaded the judge was entitled on the sparse materials before him to infer the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion. On this basis the Court of Appeal was entitled to dismiss the appeal. That means the appeal before your Lordships’ House must also fail on narrow and purely factual grounds.”
“Given the independent responsibility and accountability of a constable under a provision such as section 12(1) of the Act of 1984 it seems to follow that the mere fact that an arresting officer has been instructed by a superior officer to effect the arrest is not capable of amounting to reasonable grounds for the necessary suspicion within the meaning of section 12(1). It is accepted, and rightly accepted, that a mere request to arrest without any further information by an equal ranking officer, or a junior officer, is incapable of amounting to reasonable grounds for the necessary suspicion. How can the badge of the superior officer, and the fact that he gave an order, make a difference? In respect of a statute vesting an independent discretion in the particular constable, and requiring him personally to have reasonable grounds for suspicion, it would be surprising if seniority made a difference. It would be contrary to the principle underlying section 12(1) which makes a constable individually responsible for the arrest and accountable in law. In Reg v Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, Ex parte Central Electricity Generating Board[1982] QB 458 , 474 Lawton LJ touched on this point. He observed: ‘[chief constables] cannot give an officer under command an order to do acts which can only lawfully be done if the officer himself with reasonable cause suspects that a breach of the peace has occurred or is imminently likely to occur or an arrestable offence has been committed’.”
“My Lords, the test which section 12(1) of the Act of 1984 has laid down is a simple but practical one. It relates entirely to what is in the mind of the arresting officer when the power is exercised. In part it is a subjective test, because he must have formed a genuine suspicion in his own mind that the person has been concerned in acts of terrorism. In part it is also an objective one, because there must also be reasonable grounds for the suspicion which he has formed. But the application of the objective test does not require the court to look beyond what was in the mind of the arresting officer. It is the grounds which were in his mind at the time which must be found to be reasonable grounds for the suspicion which he has formed. All that the objective test requires is that these grounds be examined objectively and that they be judged at the time when the power was exercised. This means that the point does not depend on whether the arresting officer himself thought at that time that they were reasonable. The question is whether a reasonable man would be of that opinion, having regard to the information which was in the mind of the arresting officer. It is the arresting officer's own account of the information which he had which matters, not what was observed by or known to anyone else. The information acted on by the arresting officer need not be based on his own observations, as he is entitled to form a suspicion based on what he has been told. His reasonable suspicion may be based on information which has been given to him anonymously or it may be based upon information, perhaps in the course of an emergency, which turns out later to be wrong. As it is the information which is in his mind alone which is relevant however, it is not necessary to go on to prove what was known to his informant or that any facts on which he based his suspicion were in fact true. The question whether it provided reasonable grounds for the suspicion depends on the source of his information and its context, seen in the light of the whole surrounding circumstances.”
“Many other examples may be cited of cases where the action of the constable who exercises a statutory power of arrest or of search is a member of a team of police officers, or where his action is the culmination of various steps taken by other police officers, perhaps over a long period and perhaps also involving officers from other police forces. For obvious practical reasons police officers must be able to rely upon each other in taking decisions as to whom to arrest or where to search and in what circumstances. The statutory power does not require that the constable who exercises the power must be in possession of all the information which has led to a decision, perhaps taken by others, that the time has come for it to be exercised. What it does require is that the constable who exercises the power must first have equipped himself with sufficient information so he has reasonable cause to suspect before the power is exercised.”
“Where the defendant justified the arrest of the plaintiff on the ground that the defendant had reasonable probable cause for suspecting that a felony had been committed, and that the plaintiff had committed it, he was ordered to give particulars of the alleged felony and also of the reasonable and probable cause for the suspicion, but not of the names of those who had given him the information against the plaintiff.”
“Immaterial to the state of mind of Bredo and Miller”
“(Different considerations apply where, in the interests of national security, there are statutory or other restrictions on the use of certain matters in legal proceedings, such as the contents of intercepted communications or information attracting public interest immunity. In these cases the mismatch arises from a perceived need to preserve confidentiality, not from the application of a broad moral principle.)”
“This is not an unusual position. It arises whenever the Secretary of State (or any other public official) relies on information which the rules of public interest immunity prevent him adducing in evidence: Makanjuola v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis[1992] 3 All ER 617 , 623 e to j; R v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, Ex p Wiley[1995] 1 AC 274 , 295F-297C. It is a situation which arises whereaction is based on a warranted interception and there is no dispensationwhich permits evidence to be given. This may be seen as an anomaly,but (like the anomaly to which the rule in R v Warickshall gives rise) itsprings from the tension between practical common sense and the needto protect the individual against unfair incrimination. The common law is not intolerant of anomaly.”
“(7) Nothing in section 17(1) shall prohibit any such disclosure that continues to be available for disclosure as is confined to— (a)a disclosure to a person conducting a criminal prosecution for the purpose only of enabling that person to determine what is required of him by his duty to secure the fairness of the prosecution; or (b) [which is particularly relevant] a disclosure to a relevant judge in a case in which that judge has ordered the disclosure to be made to him alone. (8) A relevant judge shall not order a disclosure under subsection (7)(b) except where he is satisfied that the exceptional circumstances of the case make the disclosure essential in the interests of justice.”
“First, as I indicated at the outset of this judgment, I do not agree with the “unless order” made by the employment tribunal. It was rightly set aside on appeal by HHJ Ansell. Ordinarily, case management orders made in the exercise of the employment tribunal’s wide discretion will not be disturbed on an appeal, which is confined to questions of law. In this case, however, it was wrong in law to make an unless order with which the police could not, on their case, comply without breaking the law, which they understood prohibited either disclosure of the information or of the legal basis for the prohibition on disclosure. The unless order unjustifiably prevented the police from defending the discrimination claim in the normal way, that is by adducing evidence in their defence at the substantive hearing. I would dismiss the appeal. Secondly, although I would dismiss the appeal and uphold the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal on this point, I would not leave the matter as it was left by the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The matter is being remitted for a full hearing by the employment tribunal on the basis that it was wrong in law to prevent the police from defending the claim at least on the basis of evidence that they were not prohibited from adducing. This should not prevent Ms Monaghan, should the need to do so arise at the substantive hearing, from making legal submissions to the tribunal on the legal and evidential position, should the police refuse to answer a question put by her in cross examination or to produce a document relevant to their case. Those submissions may relate to the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, to the burden of proof and as to the legal entitlement of the police to refuse to answer her questions or request for documents. That, I would make clear, includes the EC and ECHR arguments outlined above. The proper way for the tribunal to deal with disputes about non-disclosure in this case was not to make an “unless order” but by a ruling if and when the need arises in the course of the hearing. Thirdly, one consequence of the position explained in the preceding paragraph is that, as already indicated, I would direct the employment tribunal to disregard paragraph 29 of the Employment Appeal Tribunal judgment. If such a “disclosure hearing” is to take place at all, it should not be on the appeal from the unless order and before the available evidence is available. The proper time for deciding whether there are circumstances which might justify taking such an exceptional step is at the substantive hearing after hearing all the available evidence. In case such a situation arises, I would direct that the hearing in the employment tribunal be chaired by a Circuit Judge to whom disclosure could be made as envisaged, for example, by section 18 RIPA.”