“Article 3, ‘Undertakings by the dealer. The dealer agrees and undertakes: 3.1. Actively to promote and extend the sale of Flogas and Flogas-approved equipment to customers, from the dealers Premises. 3.2. Not to sell Flogas from any premises other than the dealer’s premises, and not to buy or offer for sale, either solely or jointly with any person or firm or company, or as an agent for a person, firm or company, and either directly or indirectly any gas competitive with Flogas, during the continuance of this agreement. 3.3. To order its requirements of Flogas and Flogas-approved equipment from the company. 3.4. To stock and display a comprehensive range of Flogas-approved equipment, and not to buy or offer for sale any gas appliances, accessories or fittings other than Flogas-approved equipment, or knowingly to sell Flogas for use in connection with any such appliances, accessories or fittings. 3.5. To identify the dealer’s premises as those of a Flogas dealer, in accordance with the company’s reasonable requirements”
‘I wish to inform you that, as of the 14 March, 2007, I will be no longer purchasing gas from Flogas. I do not believe Flogas has the price structure or marketing backup to help me sustain a successful business. I am therefore giving you one month’s notice.’
“1.Until final judgment in this claim, the first defendant must: a. Actively promote and extend the sale of the claimant’s LPG and the claimant’s approved equipment to customers from its premises, in accordance with clause 3.1 of the dealer agreement entered into between the claimant and the first defendant on the 14 January, 2005 (“the dealer agreement.”) b. Order its requirements of LPG and approved equipment from the claimant, in accordance with clause 3.3 of the dealer agreement. c. Stock and display a comprehensive range of the claimant’s approved equipment, in accordance with clause 3.4 of the dealer agreement.’ d. Identify its premises as those of a claimant dealer, in accordance of clause 3.5 of the dealer agreement.”
‘As it seems to me, there are important differences between prohibitory and mandatory injunctions. By granting a prohibitory injunction, the court does no more than prevent for the future the continuance or repetition of the conduct of which the claimant complains. The injunction does not attempt to deal with what has happened in the past; that is left for the trial, to be dealt with by damages or otherwise. On the other hand, a mandatory injunction tends, at least in part, to look to the past, in that it is often a means of undoing what has already been done, so far as that is possible. Furthermore, whereas a prohibitory injunction merely requires abstention from acting, a mandatory injunction requires the taking of positive steps, and may, as in the present case, require the dismantling or destruction of something already erected or constructed. This will result in a consequent waste of time, money and materials if it is ultimately established that the defendant was entitled to retain the erection. As Vice-Chancellor Kindersley said in Gale v Abbott [1862] 10 WLR 748, 750, an interlocutory application for a mandatory injunction was one of the rarest cases that occurred, for the court would not compel a man to do so serious a thing as to undo what he had done, except at the hearing. Even if, today, the degree of rarity of such applications is not quite so profound, the seriousness of such an order remains as an important factor. ‘Another aspect of the point is that, if a mandatory injunction is granted on motion, there will normally be no question of granting a further mandatory injunction at the trial. What is done is done, and the plaintiff has, on motion, obtained once and for all the demolition or destruction that he seeks. Where the injunction is prohibitory, however, there will often still be a question at the trial whether the injunction should be dissolved or continued. Except in relation to transient events, there will usually be no question of the plaintiff having obtained on motion all that he seeks. I may add that I do not think that any question arises of the court refusing to grant an injunction on motion merely because that, in effect, constitutes the sole relief claimed, for there is no rule against making such a grant – see Woodford v Smith[1971] WLR 806 , 817, 818. The subject is not one in which it is possible to draw firm lines or impose any rigid classification, nevertheless it is plain that, in most circumstances, a mandatory injunction is likely, other things being equal, to be more drastic in its effect than a prohibitory injunction. At the trial of the action, the court will, of course, grant such injunctions as the justice of the case requires, but at the interlocutory stage, when the final result of the case cannot be known, and the court has to do the best it can, I think the case has to be unusually strong and clear before a mandatory injunction will be granted, even if it is sought in order to enforce a contractual obligation.’
‘I may summarise my conclusions as follows: First, Lord Cairns’ statement of principle prima facie applies to mandatory injunctions, but it does not apply in its full width. The matter is tempered by a judicial discretion which will be exercised so as to withhold an injunction more readily if it is mandatory than if it is prohibitory. Even a blameless plaintiff cannot, as of right, claim at the trial to enforce a negative covenant by a mandatory injunction. Second, although it may not be possible to state in any comprehensive way the grounds upon which the court will refuse to grant a mandatory injunction in such cases at the trial, they at least include the triviality of the damage to the plaintiff, and the existence of a disproportion between the detriment that the injunction would inflict on the defendant and the benefit that it would confer on the plaintiff. The basic concept is that of producing a fair result, and this involves the exercise of a judicial discretion. Third, on motion, as contrasted with the trial, the court is far more reluctant to grant a mandatory injunction than it would be to grant a prohibitory injunction. In a normal case, the court must, inter alia, feel a high degree of assurance that at the trial it will appear that the injunction was rightly granted, and this is a higher standard than is required for a prohibitory injunction.’
‘There is no dispute about the existence of the second practice to which the judge,’ that is a reference to the circumstances of the case before him, ‘Referred. It is sufficient for this purpose to refer to Braddon Towers Ltd v International Stores Ltd[1987] 1 EGLR 209 , 213, where Mr Justice Slade said, “Whether or not this may be properly described as a rule of law, I do not doubt that for many years practitioners have advised their clients that it is the settled and invariable practice of this court never to grant mandatory injunctions requiring persons to carry on business.” But the practice has never, so far as I know, been examined by this House, and it is open to CIS to say that it rests upon inadequate grounds, or that it has been too inflexibly applied. Specific performance is traditionally regarded in English law as an exceptional remedy, as opposed to the common-law damages to which a successful plaintiff is entitled as of right. There may have been some element of later rationalisation of an untidier history, but by the 19th century it was orthodox doctrine that the power to decree specific performance was part of the discretionary jurisdiction of the court of chancery to do justice in cases in which the remedies available at common law were inadequate. This is the basis of the general principle that specific performance will not be ordered when damages are an adequate remedy. By contrast, in countries with legal systems based on civil law, such as France, Germany and Scotland, the plaintiff is prima facie entitled to specific performance. The cases in which he is confined to a claim for damages are regarded as the exceptions. In practice, however, there is less difference between the common law and civilian systems than these general statements might lead one to suppose. The principles upon which English judges decide the discretion to grant specific performance are reasonably well settled, and depend upon a number of considerations, most of a practical nature, which are of very general application. I have made no investigation of civilian systems, but a priori I would expect that judges take much the same matters into account in deciding whether specific performance would be appropriate in a particular case. The practice of not ordering a defendant to carry on a business is not entirely dependent upon damages being an adequate remedy. In Dowty Boulton Paul Ltd v Wolverhampton Corporation[1971] 1WLR 204 , Sir John Pennycuick Vice Chancellor refused to order the Corporation to maintain an airfield as a going concern because it is very well established that the court will not order specific performance of an obligation to carry on a business – see page 211.’
‘One, interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract. Two, the background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the matrix of fact, but this phrase is, if anything, an understated description of what the background may include. Subject to the requirement that it should have been reasonably available to the parties, and to the exception to be mentioned next, it includes absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man. Three, the law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of the parties and their declarations of subjective intent; they are admissible only in an action for rectification. The law makes this distinction for reasons of practical policy and, in this respect only, legal interpretation differs from the way we would interpret utterances in ordinary life. The boundaries of this exception are in some respects unclear, but this is not the occasion on which to explore them. Four, the meaning which a document or any other utterance would convey to a reasonable man is not the same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars. The meaning of the document is what the parties using those words against the relevant background would reasonably have been understood to mean. The background may not merely enable the reasonable man to choose between the possible meanings of words, which are ambiguous, but even, as occasionally happens in ordinary life, to conclude that the parties must, for whatever reason, have used the wrong words or syntax – see Mannai Investments Company Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Company Ltd[1997] AC 749 . Five, the rule that words should be given their natural and ordinary meaning reflects the common-sense proposition that we do not easily accept that people have made linguistic mistakes, particularly in formal documents. On the other hand, if one would nevertheless conclude from the background that something must have gone wrong with the language, the law does not require judges to attribute to the parties an intention which they plainly could not have had. Lord Diplock made this point more vigorously when he said, in Antaios Compania Naviera v Salen Redoriana AB[1985] AC 191 , 201, “If detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business common sense, it must be made to yield to business common sense.” ’
‘In December 2004, I had a call from BP, John Cooper, to ask if I was satisfied with our dealings with Flogas. I was obviously not happy, and as I had never signed a contract with Flogas, as apparently no existing British Gas agents had, BP were targeting these agents. I arranged for Mr Cooper to come and see us on Tuesday the 11 January, 2005. On Monday 10 January we had a call from Dave Steward; he also wanted to come and see me the following day. I was astonished, as I had only ever seen him once before, and that was to tell me I was getting a price rise. I told him a time to come so that it did not clash with BP, but he came early, he realised who was here, went out of the yard and waited for him to go. Mr Cooper had offered me a good deal on gas prices, marketing and promotional activity, health and safety audits, clothing and regular visits from representatives. Dave Steward was straight in when Mr Cooper had gone, desperate to know what I had been offered by BP. Before I told him, he said, ‘Whatever you have been offered,’ he would match it, and I would not have the bother of changing over. He then went out to phone head office; when he came back in, he said everything was all right with them, he would let us think about it and come back to see us on Friday the 14th. ‘When Dave Steward came back on Friday the 14 January, 2005, he had a contract with him that he briefly went through. The contract was for 12 months, with a 12-month notice period. I objected to this, as I was not happy with the way Flogas put their prices up quicker and higher than our competitors. He made several phone calls, and it was agreed that he would alter the notice period to six months. I was still not happy with this, and Dave Steward assured us that we could walk away after 18 months with no problem. He amended the contract in front of my wife and I. He also assured me that Flogas would match the package offered by BP regarding marketing, health and safety, etc. Dave Steward pointed out that there would be a problem with the price reduction, as it took ten days to change the prices on the computer. We would therefore have to let him know when the price changed, so he could arrange for a credit note. When he left, he took all the copies of the contract with him, saying that it would have to be verified by head office. When this had been done, he would bring back the contract personally.’
‘The original is at Flogas head office in Cyston, Leicester. I confirm that this is the version of the contract Mr Warrington signed on the 14 January, 2005. I amended the notice period from 12 months to 6 months, in clause 6.1, and initialled the change. After Mr Warrington signed the agreement, I took all the original paperwork away with me. Subsequently I faxed and posted copies of the agreement back to Mr Warrington.’
‘I refer to the notes attached to Steven Wright’s witness statement dated the 1 May, 2007, in response to Flogas’s application for an injunction.’
‘The first defendant’s continued breach of the dealer agreement is causing the claimant to suffer loss, namely the loss it would have earned had the first defendant continued to order and supply its customers with the claimant’s liquefied petroleum gas. The claimant is currently compiling details of its loss of profit, which will be disclosed as soon as possible. The claimant is therefore suffering considerable financial prejudice as a result of the first defendant’s continued breaches.’
‘As mentioned in my previous statement, price increases have been regular throughout my dealings with Flogas, and have been out of line with competitors. Whenever I have received notification of a price increase, I have checked with my competitors, and they have freely given me the information regarding their charges. I believe that when prices were increased in August 2006, as referred to in my earlier statement, no other gas company had increased their prices, and the cost of gas to the supply companies was in fact dropping at that time. It was at that stage that I had to be concerned about the viability of my business if I carried on trading with Flogas. Following my complaints, I did not receive a price decrease, but instead received an offer to sell the business, which leaves me to wonder whether or not Flogas are merely wanting to put me out of business because they want my site and contracts for their own purposes. ‘Since the commencement of this litigation, I have received a further letter from Flogas, notifying me of a further increase of 4.5 pence per kilo, plus Value Added Tax. This would mean the cost to me of a 47kg bottle, of which I sell perhaps 3,000 to 4,000 per year, will increase to nearly£29 . I am forced to sell my gas, by the local market in effect, for no more than£35 per 47kg bottle, including Value Added Tax. My main competitors sell it at£1 per bottle less. I do not know for how much they buy their gas, but I do know that I can buy gas from Calor which would cost me£25 for a 47kg bottle. I have used the example of a 47kg bottle because I sell by far and away more of these than any other. Effectively I am now paying a sum approaching 20% more for my gas than my competitor’s. I was induced to enter into a contract with Flogas by the representative because BP were offering cheaper gas than Flogas, and Flogas said that they would match this. The latest letter from Flogas is attached to this statement, marked VPW1, and I am informed that, contrary to what their letter says, there has been no increase in wholesale natural gas price, and certainly I understand Calor Gas Ltd have no plans to increase their prices. ‘If I am forced to continue trading with Flogas, then I do not think I would make sufficient profit to justify continuing. Out of my turnover, I have to pay for my transport, rent, usual overheads, and pay for myself and my wife. Before this contract, I was making a profit of£13,500 per year, with my wife earning a salary of£6,500 per year. In the first year of this contract, my profit went down to£7,500 , and this year I will be lucky to earn£4,500 . My wife’s pay has remained the same throughout, and we both work six and a half days a week.’