“Not a good role model for this but encourages others to achieve balance.” (2) Ms Welton: “Lois works very long hours but never conveys any sense of expecting those she manages to do the same.” (3) Ms Tompkins “Any negative comments that I would have to make about Lois’s performance pertain entirely to the fact that there are simply not enough hours in the day for her to complete her job to the high standards that she has set for herself…”
“Since coming to post, my supervisory responsibilities have increased from 9 to 13 managers. Project management responsibilities have increased significantly as a result of Best Value and modernisation agendas and this is additional work. Consequently my working hours have increased to between 50-60 hours per week.”
“For my position, it is emails, post and direct reports that tip the balance into long working hours. To attempt to readdress this I have:- • Post prioritised by admin • Emails prioritised by Staff Officer • Delegate to Team managers e.g. P.C.O. working groups etc. • Supervision extended to 6 weeks for experienced managers- possibly moving to 8 weeks next year. New Mangers 4-5 weekly. • No working at weekends • No laptop at home • Extensive exercise with peer and senior managers re: time management” • Post prioritised by admin • Emails prioritised by Staff Officer • Delegate to Team managers e.g. P.C.O. working groups etc. • Supervision extended to 6 weeks for experienced managers- possibly moving to 8 weeks next year. New Mangers 4-5 weekly. • No working at weekends • No laptop at home • Extensive exercise with peer and senior managers re: time management”
“I believe the paperwork has not been read beforehand although submitted in advance. Training and personal development were not touched on at all. There were several unsubstantiated criticisms of my performance relating to budget management, presentation, workload and time management. Despite strenuous efforts on my part there was no acknowledgement that my post was disproportionately large, only that it is a ‘big job’. There were several comparisons made between my role and job in managing 11 staff and fieldcare teams and Graham’s job as Assistant Director in managing a large number of staff. In my view an inappropriate comparison as I am not an Assistant Director. I discussed the often repeated criticisms of my lack of presentation skills in the context of in excess 500 hours overtime worked and the effect that managing a large workload and long hours has on performance and professional development. I also discussed the difficulties of long standing inadequacy of administrative support raised many times by me in supervision [to date I have had 6 scale 3 admin assistants] and a half-time staff officer. Further angered, Graham wanted to know where my Working Time Records were and how could he monitor my hours and if he did not see these in supervision. If I had ‘high standards’ then my job would be difficult to manage. I reminded him that to my knowledge I am the only manager in my group who observes the instruction to record working hours. My admin support does not understand how to process the forms and nor did those before her. I fully expect at my level to work in excess of my hours without discussion with my manager but there comes a point at which this becomes excessive and affects performance and he needs to recognise this.”
“During our Operational Management meeting on Tuesday 25th July, Lois Sayers was absent for the majority of the meeting. When she did finally join us she was clearly upset and distressed, when asked what was wrong, she briefly explained that there was a conflict between herself and [Mr Wrycroft]”
“Your acknowledgement of the size of my workload has been helpful to me. Your management of the current ‘reengineering’ exercise has been mostly empowering and I particularly appreciated your consultative and inclusive approach in enabling operations managers to agree division of work for the new structure. You have sought to enable people to retain areas of particular interest; though I regret the loss physical disability, particularly sensory services. Management of meetings is more relaxed and allows for discussion and this has been helpful. Most of all, I have sincerely appreciated the guidance and support you have given me with regard to the development of Social Services Direct and your appreciation of the importance of this project. I have found your attitude to this potentially threatening and significant change, open minded, positive, flexible and thus enabling. A strong contrast to other senior managers. In summary, the changes in your overall management style towards inclusivity and consultation have created an environment of empowerment in which to achieve goals, and to honestly share frustrations and difficulties.”
“We agree that depressive disorders are characterised by their recurring nature and that there is a reliable body of evidence showing that the risk of recurrence depends on genetic factors, constitutional factors (including personality factors), past history of depressive episodes, and psychosocial factors (independent life events in particular). We agree that Mrs Sayers has a family history of depressive disorder (her sister suffered from a post-partum depressive episode) We also agree that personality factors, a past history of depressive episodes prior to 2000, and psychosocial factors will have contributed to Mrs Sayers' depressive episodes in 2000 and 2002. We have agreed that Mrs Sayers suffered from four depressive episodes of minor or moderate severity prior to 2000. Dr Bird believes that the episode in 1972 may have also represented a modified form of a depressive episode. In the event of each of these episodes fulfilling the requirements for a diagnosis of Major Depression, Mrs Sayers would be considered as having a 90% chance of recurrence at some stage. Dr Orr has reservations about the safety of an episode count in Mrs Sayers' case as there is insufficient information in Mrs Sayers' medical record to confirm a diagnosis of Major Depression in each instance. It is generally accepted in Psychiatry thata past history of depressive symptoms and the presence of independent life events in the six months preceding an episode are two powerful predictors of relapse. Dr Bird takes the view that it is generally accepted in Psychiatry that past history is the best predictor of prognosis. We agree that Mrs Sayers had a degree of vulnerability to a recurrence of depressive symptoms in 2000 and 2002 by virtue of a family history of depression, aspects of her personality, previous episodes of depression, and significant psychosocial stresses. Dr Orr believes that stresses at work outweighed family and other stresses, while Dr Bird believes, whilst various stresses were relevant, Mrs Sayers was at high risk of developing depression in any event because of her past medical record. We also agree that some aspects of Mrs Sayers' personality, such as her tendency to set herself high standards and her vulnerability in situations characterised by a sense of helplessness will have contributed to her risk of a recurrence. We agree that stresses at work, whether in response to actual or perceived workload factors and interpersonal difficulties with her line manager, are likely to have contributed to the development of Mrs Sayers' depressive symptoms in 2000, 2001 and 2002 Dr Orr is of the view that the limitations set by the applicability of existing knowledge and by the partial nature of the information available from Mrs Sayers' medical records do not permit him to offer a confident opinion about the weighting that should be given to each of these factors. Dr Bird quotes the generally accepted evidence (see New Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry) that both major and minor (mild/moderate) depressions have about the same chance of recurrence (i.e. 90% after three episodes) but of the same typeas before.”
“I hope the interviews went well - let me know how you got on.”
“Just to let you know that I didn’t get the job in Milton Keynes but will continue to apply and so would find it useful to discuss the reference you read to me and the application process so that I can learn for next time. What I’m asking for from you for our next supervision session on 13/8/02 is a copy of the reference, discussion about your conversation with Milton Keynes, and it’s timing in the process. Milton Keynes have written to me and asked me to arrange to go and receive feedback.”
“Discussed Interview. Agreed areas for developing are around shaping and influencing and working outside organisational boundaries, agreed positive experience and will continue to look [for] opportunities.”
“This is, I think, useful practical guidance, but it must be read as that, and not as having anything like statutory force. Every case will depend on its own facts and the well known statement of Swanwick J in Stokes v. Guest, Keen and Nettlefold (Bolts and Nuts) Ltd[1968] 1 WLR 1776 , 1783 remains the best statement of principle…”
“What the Court of Appeal failed to give adequate weight to was the fact that Mr Barber, an experienced and conscientious teacher, had been off work for three weeks… with no physical ailment or injury. His absence was certified by his doctor to be due to stress and depression. The senior management team should have made inquiries about his problems and seen what they could do to ease them, in consultation with officials at the county council's education department, instead of brushing him off unsympathetically (as Mrs Hayward and Mrs Newton did) or sympathising but simply telling him to prioritise his work (as Mr Gill did).”
“We doubt however whether there is any inconsistency between what Swanwick J and Hale LJ were saying. Hale LJ was simply focussing established principle on a new problem. She referred to the "oft-quoted summary of Swanwick J" just three paragraphs later. Lord Walker was not expressing disagreement with anything Hale LJ said but simply sounding a word of caution that no two cases were the same and that Hale LJ's words should not be applied as it were by rote regardless of the facts. Hale LJ was applying established principles to a new type of situation rather than laying down any new principle”
“Many, alas, suffer breakdowns and depressive illnesses and a significant proportion could doubtless ascribe some at least of their problems to the strains and stresses of their work situation:…Unless, however, there is a real risk of breakdown which the claimant’s employers ought reasonably to have foreseen and which they ought properly to have averted, there can be no liability.”
“The overall test is still the conduct of the reasonable and prudent employer, taking positive thought for the safety of his workers in the light of what he knows or ought to know, where there is a recognised and general practice which has been followed for a substantial period in similar circumstances without mishap, he is entitled to follow it, unless in the light of common sense or newer knowledge it is clearly bad; but, where there is developing knowledge, he must keep reasonably abreast of it and not be too slow to apply it, and where he has in fact greater than average knowledge of the risks, he may be thereby obliged to take more than the average or standard precautions. He must weigh up the risk in terms of the likelihood of injury occurring and the potential consequences if it does, and he must balance against this the probable effectiveness of the precautions that can be taken to meet it and the expense and inconvenience they involve. If he is found to have fallen below the standard to be properly expected of a reasonable and prudent employer in these respects, he is negligent”
“The guidance recognises that such injury is more difficult to foresee than physical injury. The question of whether the particular employee has shown indications of impending harm to health is a very relevant question when considering a situation where the employer has not in fact foreseen the risk of psychiatric injury and the employee’s workload would not ordinarily carry a foreseeable risk of suchinjury.”
“I was also aware myself that for some time Lois had been taking anti-depressant medication.”
“What amazed me was that [Ms H’s] increasing and evident ill health did not affect her management of the work, conversely, she became obsessive about it to the point of aggression when challenged. There are many many more things I could say about[Ms H’s] experiences and this situation, some of which have touched my own professional and personal life irreversibly too. I failed to adequately communicate the seriousness of the situation previously when the opportunity was there. I have responded to you in writing in relation to the specific issues you have chosen to raise but the problem is much wider and deeper than just this area.”
“The significance of the Regulations is that, where an employee refuses to give his consent, an employer may not require the employee to work more than 48 hours per week. The plain and obvious purpose of the Regulations is to protect the welfare and health of employees.”
“I mentioned that she was very supportive of her staff, hardworking and had high professional standards. I said her staff were very loyal. I was also asked how well Lois worked with outside agencies. I gave my opinion namely Lois was less confident in this area but gaining experience. I did indicate she was beginning to work with Health more and cited her work with the Fenland Primary Care Trust.”
“Did the authority's conduct in this case amount to a breach of this implied term? The test is a severe one. The conduct must be such as to destroy or seriously damage the relationship. The conduct in this case was not only to suspend the claimant, but to do so by means of a letter which stated that 'the issue to be investigated is an allegation of sexual abuse made by a young person in our care.' Sexual abuse is a very serious matter, doing untold damage to those who suffer it. To be accused of it is also a serious matter. To be told by one's employer that one has been so accused is clearly calculated seriously to damage the relationship between employer and employee. The question is therefore whether there was 'reasonable and proper cause' to do this.”
“the bank was under an implied obligation to its employees not to conduct a dishonest or corrupt business. This implied obligation is no more than one particular aspect of the portmanteau, general obligation not to engage in conduct likely to undermine the trust and confidence required if the employment relationship is to continue in the manner the employment contract implicitly envisages. … The trust and confidence required in the employment relationship can be undermined by an employer, or indeed an employee, in many different ways. I can see no justification for the law giving the employee a remedy if the unjustified trust-destroying conduct occurs in some ways but refusing a remedy if it occurs in others. The conduct must, of course, impinge on the relationship in the sense that, looked at objectively, it is likely to destroy or seriously damage the degree of trust and confidence the employee is reasonably entitled to have in his employer. That requires one to look at all the circumstances.”
“It imposes reciprocal duties on the employer and employee. Given that this case is concerned with alleged obligations of an employer I will concentrate on its effect on the position of employers. For convenience I will set out the term again. It is expressed to impose an obligation that the employer shall not, "without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated and likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee.”
“In cases of breach of contract the aggrieved party is only entitled to recover such part of the loss actually resulting as was at the time of the contract reasonably foreseeable as liable to result from the breach. What was at that time reasonably so foreseeable depends on the knowledge then possessed by the parties or, at all events, by the party who later commits the breach. For this purpose, knowledge "possessed" is of two kinds; one imputed, the other actual. Everyone, as a reasonable person, is taken to know the "ordinary course of things" and consequently what loss is liable to result from a breach of contract in that ordinary course. This is the subject matter of the "first rule" in Hadley v. Baxendale. But to this knowledge, which a contract-breaker is assumed to possess whether he actually possesses it or not, there may have to be added in a particular case knowledge which he actually possesses, of special circumstances outside the "ordinary course of things," of such a kind that a breach in those special circumstances would be liable to cause more loss. Such a case attracts the operation of the "second rule" so as to make additional loss also recoverable.”
“Working arrangements will comply with relevant Health and Safety legislation, including the European working time directive and its associated UK legislation.”
“Subject to regulation 5, a worker’s time, including overtime, in any reference period which is applicable in his case shall not exceed an average of 48 hours for each of seven days.” (2) Regulation 4(2) provides that “An employer shall take all reasonable steps, in keeping with the need to protect the health and safety of workers, to ensure that the limit specified in paragraph (1) is complied with in the case of each worker employed by him in relation to whom it applies.” (3) In Barber v. RJB Mining (UK) Ltd[1999] ICR 679 , Gage J had to consider whether the Working Time Regulations provided a cause of action by an employee against an employer. He held that Regulation 4(1) imposed a contractual obligation as between an employee and employer. The existence of a contractual term is no longer an issue which I need consider because there is now an admitted express term. (4) The question of whether there is a cause of action for breach statutory duty must be determined on the basis of the particular wording of the legislation. (5) Whilst Regulation 4 is intended to protect certain employees, the fact that a particular provision is intended to protect certain individuals is not of itself sufficient to confer private law rights of action upon them, something more is required to show that the legislature intended such conferment: see Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle in Reg. v. Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, Ex parte Hague[1992] 1 AC 58 , 170. (6) A matter which is relevant to the existence of a cause of action for breach of statutory duty is the existence of procedures or remedies under the legislation to deal with breaches of those provisions. (7) In IRC v. Ainsworth[2005] ICR 1149 the Court of Appeal held that the remedy in respect of any contravention of the statutory holiday pay entitlement under Regulation 13 of theWorking Time Regulations 1998 was only by way of a complaint to an employment tribunal under regulation 30 of those regulations. (8) In Barber,having reviewed the enforcement procedures and remedies provided for in the Working Time Regulations, Gage J found that the obligations and rights under those regulations were intended to be dealt with under the procedure and remedies contained in those regulations. After finding that a contractual obligation was imposed, he continued: “if I had not concluded that regulation 4(1) had imposed a contractual obligation on the parties, I would have accepted that the Regulations were not intended to provide a remedy in the civil courts.”
“In Becker v Finanzamant Munster-Innenstadt (Case 8/81 {1982} ECR53, 70-71 the court made the following observations as to the conditions for the application of the direct effect principle to a Directive: “22. It would be incompatible with the binding effect which article 189 ascribes to Directives to exclude the principle the possibility of the obligations imposed by them being relied on by persons concerned. “23. Particularly in cases in which Community authorities have, by means of a Directive, placed member states under a duty to adopt a certain course of action, the effectiveness of such a measure would be diminished if persons were prevented from relying upon it in proceedings before a court and national courts were prevented from taking it into consideration as an element of Community law. “24. Consequently, a member state which has not adopted the implementing measures required by the directive within the prescribed period, may not plead as against individuals, its own failure to perform the obligations which the Directive entails. “25. Thus, whenever the provisions of a Directive appear, as far as their subject matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, those provisions may, in the absence of implementing measures adopted within the prescribed period, be relied upon as against any national provision which is incompatible with the Directive or in so far s the provisions define rights which individuals as able to assert against the state.” “22. It would be incompatible with the binding effect which article 189 ascribes to Directives to exclude the principle the possibility of the obligations imposed by them being relied on by persons concerned. “23. Particularly in cases in which Community authorities have, by means of a Directive, placed member states under a duty to adopt a certain course of action, the effectiveness of such a measure would be diminished if persons were prevented from relying upon it in proceedings before a court and national courts were prevented from taking it into consideration as an element of Community law. “24. Consequently, a member state which has not adopted the implementing measures required by the directive within the prescribed period, may not plead as against individuals, its own failure to perform the obligations which the Directive entails. “25. Thus, whenever the provisions of a Directive appear, as far as their subject matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, those provisions may, in the absence of implementing measures adopted within the prescribed period, be relied upon as against any national provision which is incompatible with the Directive or in so far s the provisions define rights which individuals as able to assert against the state.”
“Breach of a duty imposed on an employer by these Regulations shall not confer a right of action in any civil proceedings insofar as that duty applies for the protection of persons not in his employment.”