‘S S is an 11 year-old young girl… Due to the fact that S never discusses her difficulties with anyone and keeps all her feelings inside she is vulnerable and at risk… This especially includes risks like drug abuse, prostitution and teenage pregnancy… Concerns increase if it’s considered that there have been numerous reports of S’s high level of sexual awareness… S is also extremely protective of her mother and distrusts any professional related to social services. There is no particularly strong bond between S and [the Claimant] and it is reported that she dislikes him making visits to her school. It has been reported to Social Services that at one stage [the Claimant] regularly took S out for dinner at very expensive restaurants, as well as buying her loads of gifts. During the Core Assessment that was done last year professionals raised the concern that [the Claimant] might be grooming S for prostitution. S has very little contact with her biological father.’
“3a The words complained of were written on an occasion of absolute privilegePARTICULARSThe words were published in a report by Miss Marks and Mr Thomas, who were social workers employed by the First Defendant with responsibility for the B family, for the purposes of a Child Protection Case Conference in relation to S”
“17 Provision of services for children in need, their families and others (1) It shall be the general duty of every local authority (in addition to the other duties imposed on them by this Part)— (a) to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area who are in need; and (b) so far as is consistent with that duty, to promote the upbringing of such children by their families, by providing a range and level of services appropriate to those children’s needs. …. (10) … a child shall be taken to be in need if— (a) he is unlikely to achieve or maintain, or to have the opportunity of achieving or maintaining, a reasonable standard of health or development without the provision for him of services by a local authority under this Part; (b) his health or development is likely to be significantly impaired, or further impaired, without the provision for him of such services; ... and “family”, in relation to such a child, includes any person who has parental responsibility for the child and any other person with whom he has been living. 47 Local authority’s duty to investigate (1) Where a local authority— (a) .... (b) have reasonable cause to suspect that a child who lives, or is found, in their area is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm, the authority shall make, or cause to be made, such enquiries as they consider necessary to enable them to decide whether they should take any action to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare”. ii)The Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 provides: “7 Local authorities to exercise social services functions under guidance of Secretary of State (1) Local authorities shall, in the exercise of their social services functions, including the exercise of any discretion conferred by any relevant enactment, act under the general guidance of the Secretary of State. ”
“Working Together to Safeguard Children – A guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children (1999)” “Framework for the Assessment of Children in Need and their Families (2000)”
“First, in my judgment a common law duty of care would cut across the whole statutory system set up for the protection of children at risk. As a result of the ministerial directions contained in "Working Together" the protection of such children is not the exclusive territory of the local authority's social services. The system is inter-disciplinary, involving the participation of the police, educational bodies, doctors and others. At all stages the system involves joint discussions, joint recommendations and joint decisions. The key organisation is the Child Protection Conference, a multi-disciplinary body which decides whether to place the child on the Child Protection Register. This procedure by way of joint action takes place, not merely because it is good practice, but because it is required by guidance having statutory force binding on the local authority. The guidance is extremely detailed and extensive: the current edition of "Working Together" runs to 126 pages. To introduce into such a system a common law duty of care enforceable against only one of the participant bodies would be manifestly unfair. To impose such liability on all the participant bodies would lead to almost impossible problems of disentangling as between the respective bodies the liability, both primary and by way of contribution, of each for reaching a decision found to be negligent. Second, the task of the local authority and its servants in dealing with children at risk is extraordinarily delicate. Legislation requires the local authority to have regard not only to the physical wellbeing of the child but also to the advantages of not disrupting the child's family environment: see, for example, section 17 of the Act of 1989. In one of the child abuse cases, the local authority is blamed for removing the child precipitately: in the other, for failing to remove the children from their mother. As the Report of the Inquiry into Child Abuse in Cleveland 1987 (Cm. 412) said, at p. 244: "It is a delicate and difficult line to tread between taking action too soon and not taking it soon enough. Social services whilst putting the needs of the child first must respect the rights of the parents; they also must work if possible with the parents for the benefit of the children. These parents themselves are often in need of help. Inevitably a degree of conflict develops between those objectives." Next, if a liability in damages were to be imposed, it might well be that local authorities would adopt a more cautious and defensive approach to their duties. For example, as the Cleveland Report makes clear, on occasions the speedy decision to remove the child is sometimes vital. If the authority is to be made liable in damages for a negligent decision to remove a child (such negligence lying in the failure properly first to investigate the allegations) there would be a substantial temptation to postpone making such a decision until further inquiries have been made in the hope of getting more concrete facts. Not only would the child in fact being abused be prejudiced by such delay: the increased workload inherent in making such investigations would reduce the time available to deal with other cases and other children. The relationship between the social worker and the child's parents is frequently one of conflict, the parent wishing to retain care of the child, the social worker having to consider whether to remove it. This is fertile ground in which to breed ill feeling and litigation, often hopeless, the cost of which both in terms of money and human resources will be diverted from the performance of the social service for which they were provided. The spectre of vexatious and costly litigation is often urged as a reason for not imposing a legal duty. But the circumstances surrounding cases of child abuse make the risk a very high one which cannot be ignored. If there were no other remedy for maladministration of the statutory system for the protection of children, it would provide substantial argument for imposing a duty of care. But the statutory complaints procedures contained in section 76 of the Act of 1980 and the much fuller procedures now available under the Act of 1989 provide a means to have grievances investigated, though not to recover compensation. Further, it was submitted (and not controverted) that the local authorities Ombudsman would have power to investigate cases such as these.... In my judgment, the courts should proceed with great care before holding liable in negligence those who have been charged by Parliament with the task of protecting society from the wrongdoings of others.”
“5.6 If somebody believes that a child may be suffering, or may be at risk of suffering significant harm, then s/he should always refer his or her concerns to the local authoritysocial services department. In addition to the social services department, the police and the NSPCC have powers to intervene in these circumstances. Sometimes concerns will arise within the social services department itself, as new information comes to light about a child and family with whom the service is already in contact. While professionals should seek, in general, to discuss any concerns with the family and, where possible, seek their agreement to making referrals to social services, this should only be done where such discussion and agreement-seeking will not place a child at increased risk of significant harm… 5.16 The focus of the initial assessment should be the welfare of the child. It is important to remember that even if the reason for a referral was a concern about abuse or neglect which is not subsequently substantiated, a family may still benefit from support and practical help to promote a child’s health and development….. The Initial Child Protection Conference Purpose 5.53 The initial child protection conference brings together family members, the child where appropriate, and those professionals most involved with the child and family, following s.47 enquiries. Its purpose is: • to bring together and analyze in an inter-agency setting the information which has been obtained about the child’s health, development and functioning, and the parents’ or carers’ capacity to ensure the child’s safety and promote the child’s health and development; • to make judgments about the likelihood of a child suffering significant harm in future; and • to decide what future action is needed to safeguard the child and promote his or her welfare, how that action will be taken forward, and with what intended outcomes…. 5.61 Social services should provide to the conference a written report which summarises and analyses the information obtained in the course of the initial assessment and s.47 enquiries, guided by the framework set out in the Framework for the Assessment of Children in Need and their Families…. Parents and children, where relevant, should be provided with a copy of this report in advance of the conference which should also be explained and discussed in advance of the conference itself,. 5.63 All those providing information should take care to distinguish between fact, observation, allegation and opinion…. The Child Protection Review Conference Purpose 5.91 The purpose of the child protection review is to review the safety, health and development of the child against intended outcomes set out in the child protection plan; to ensure that the child continues adequately to be safeguarded; and to consider whether the child protection plan should continue in place or should be changed. The review requires as much preparation, commitment and management as the initial child protection conference. Every review should consider explicitly whether the child continues to be at risk of significant harm, and hence continues to need safeguarding through adherence to a formal child protection plan. If not, then the child’s name may be removed from the child protection register…. Sharing Information General 7.27 Research and experience have shown repeatedly that keeping children safe from harm requires professionals and others to share information: about a child’s health and development and exposure to possible harm; about a parent who may need help to, or may not be able to, care for a child adequately and safely; and about those who may pose a risk of harm to a child. Often, it is only when information from a number of sources has been shared and is then put together that it becomes clear that a child is at risk of or is suffering harm. 7.28 Those providing services to adults and children will be concerned about the need to balance their duties to protect children from harm and their general duty towards their patient or service user. Some professionals and staff face the added dimension of being involved in caring for, or supporting, more than one family member – the abused child, siblings, an alleged abuser. Where there are concerns that a child is, or may be at risk of significant harm, however, the needs of that child must come first. In these circumstances, the overriding objective must be to safeguard the child. In addition, there is a need for all agencies to hold information securely. The Legal Framework 7.29 Professionals can only work together to safeguard children if there is an exchange of relevant information between them. This has been recognised in principle by the courts (see comments by Butler Sloss LJ in Re G (a minor)[1996] 2 All ER 65 at 68)6. Any disclosure of personal information to others must always, however, have regard to both common and statute law. …. 6. “The Working Together booklet does not have any legal status, but with the lesson of Cleveland CC V F in mind, the emphasis upon co-operation, joint investigation and full consultation at all stages of any investigation are crucial to the success of the government guidelines...The consequences of inter-agency co-operation is that there has to be free exchange of information between social workers and police officers together engaged in an investigation...”
“1.58 Practice is expected to be evidence based, by which it is meant that practitioners: • use knowledge critically from research and practice about the needs of children and families and the outcomes of services and interventions to inform their assessment and planning; • record and update information systematically, distinguishing sources of information, for example direct observation, other agency records or interviews with family members; • learn from the views of users of services i.e. children and families; • evaluate continuously whether the intervention is effective in responding to the needs of an individual child and family and modifying their interventions accordingly; • evaluate rigorously the information, processes and outcomes from the practitioner’s own interventions to develop practice wisdom. 1.59 The combination of evidence based practice grounded in knowledge with finely balanced professional judgement is the foundation for effective practice with children and families… 3.11 A core assessment is defined as an in-depth assessment which addresses the central or most important aspects of the needs of a child and the capacity of his or her parents or caregivers to respond appropriately to these needs within the wider family and community context. While this assessment is led by social services, it will invariably involve other agencies or independent professionals, who will either provide information they hold about the child or parents, contribute specialist knowledge or advice to social services or undertake specialist assessments. Specific assessments of the child and/or family members may have already been undertaken prior to referral to the social services department. The findings from these should inform this assessment. At the conclusion of this phase of assessment, there should be an analysis of the findings which will provide an understanding of the child’s circumstances and inform planning, case objectives and the nature of service provision. The timescale for completion of the core assessment is a maximum of 35 working days. 3.37 Gathering information requires careful planning. However difficult the circumstances, the purpose of assessing the particular child and the family should always be kept in mind and the impact of the process on the child and family considered. It has to be remembered that: • the aim is to clarify and identity the needs of the child; • the process of assessment should be helpful and as unintrusive to the child and family as possible; • families do not want to be subjected to repeated assessments by different agencies; • if, during the assessment, the child’s safety is or becomes a concern, it must be secured before proceeding with the assessment”
“…the rule of law is one which involves the balancing of conflicting public policies, one general: that the law should provide a remedy to the citizen whose good name and reputation is traduced by malicious falsehoods uttered by another; the other particular: that witnesses before tribunals recognised by law should, in the words of the answer of the judges in Dawkins v Lord Rokeby ((1875) LR 7 HL 744 at 753, [1874–80] All ER Rep 994 at 995), ‘give their testimony free from any fear of being harassed by an action of an allegation, whether true or false, that they acted from malice’”
“The reasons why immunity is traditionally (and for this purpose I accept the tradition) conferred upon witnesses in respect of evidence given in court, are in order that they may give their evidence fearlessly and to avoid a multiplicity of actions in which the value or truth of their evidence would be tried over again. Moreover, the trial process contains in itself, in the subjection to cross-examination and confrontation with other evidence, some safeguard against careless, malicious or untruthful evidence.”
"Contributions towards a child's maintenance may only be recovered if the local authority have served a notice ('a contribution notice') on the contributor . . ."
“At the heart of this issue is a conflict between the right of an individual to bring an action for damages for defamation and the public interest in protecting children from conduct which could adversely affect their well-being or put them at risk.”
“(a) The nature and importance of the interests The importance of safeguarding children from harm of the type against which the Index is designed to give protection cannot be exaggerated. .... We find no difficulty in accepting that there is here in play a public interest which can qualify for protection if this is necessary and appropriate. (b) The degree of risk We recognise that there may be a few timid spirits who will be deterred from doing their duty if it is not clear that they cannot be sued for defamation. However, we find it difficult to accept that a local authority under the statutory duties to which the Authority is subject would be deterred from providing the appropriate information to the Service by the threat of litigation. We say this despite the straitened circumstances of local authorities…. In fact, although as this case illustrates there will be employees, who if they are identified, will seek to bring defamation proceedings, the occasions on which they will have any prospect of success must be rare. There is no dispute that qualified privilege would be available in any event and so in order to succeed malice would have to be established on the part of the body responsible for the publication. Situations where the necessary malice can be established are likely to be rare…. (c) The breadth of the immunity [after citing cases including X v Bedforshire CC[1995] 2 AC 633 , the Court concluded that] … The wider the protection required the greater should be the caution before granting immunity from suit. (d) The point of principle … [Counsel] also calls attention to the important comment of Brooke L.J., with which the other members of the court agreed in the case of Waple, … However notwithstanding these powerful submissions, if this was a case in which it was otherwise appropriate to extend protection, in our judgment it would be in accord with principle to do so. We have already drawn attention to the fact that in D v. NSPCC the House of Lords extended protection to a new situation without waiting for Parliament to act. Here, the approach should be not to grant a blanket immunity but to provide immunity on a case by case basis when a clear need is established. There are considerable advantages in the courts determining whether to provide protection in light of the specific circumstances of individual cases as and when they come before the court… (e) The balance between the public interests There is a substantial public interest in "S" being able to vindicate his reputation. In R. v. Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham [1997] 2 All E.R. 779 at 787, a citizen's access to the court was described as a common law constitutional right which could only be abrogated by specific statutory provision. That case was dealing with a very different issue from that under consideration here, but the judgment and the cases cited by Laws J. make self-evident the importance of the public interest of "S"which the Authority is seeking to abrogate. It is obvious that having his or her name placed upon the Index has serious repercussions for the individual concerned. If the individual's conduct justifies this being done, then the existence of the Index means that his interests must give way to those of the children the Index is designed to protect. For the purposes of the present appeal we have to assume that "S"'s contentions are correct, and the allegations which are made against him are not only untrue but were made maliciously as well. If this be the position, then justice requires that "S" should be able to establish his innocence. The practical consequence to "S" of his name being on the Index is that he will not be able to work in his chosen occupation. The internal appeal provided by the Authority could have achieved his objective of establishing his innocence but this did not happen. As "S" has remained employed by the Authority, he cannot achieve his aim by bringing an action for unfair dismissal, but even if he could, if the Authority were entitled to immunity from proceedings for libel, it is arguable that the position should be the same in relation to an action for unfair dismissal. The situation is, therefore, one in which the effect of granting an immunity from suit to the Authority will be a substantial infringement of the public interest in "S" having access to the courts. This infringement is, in our judgment, greater than is justified by what we regard as the insignificant risk of the effectiveness of the Index being impaired by an action for defamation. It follows, therefore, that the Authority has not established that it is necessary to protect the Index by providing immunity from suit.”
“First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the justification for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied in each case. For convenience I will call this the ultimate balancing test. This is how I will approach the present case.”
“Here, the approach should be not to grant a blanket immunity but to provide immunity on a case by case basis when a clear need is established”
“58 It would have been open to the Government to argue that the statutory scheme in place satisfied the Government's positive obligation and that it was in the interest of the effective operation of the scheme that neither public authorities nor their employees should be subject to liability for shortcomings in relation to the decision of whether or not to take a child into care. Instead counsel for the Government submitted that after October 2000, when theHuman Rights Act 1998 had come into force, a victim would be able to bring proceedings in the courts against a public authority for a breach of a substantive right and the courts would be empowered to award damages.”
“The local authority's failure to submit the issue to the court for determination deprived her of an adequate involvement in the decision-making process concerning the care of her daughter and thereby of the requisite protection of their interests. There was in this respect a failure to respect their family life and a breach ofarticle 8 of the Convention ”
“This formulation excludes statements which are wholly extraneous to the investigation - irrelevant and gratuitous libels…”
“Today this danger can and should be substantially reduced by court management of litigation. Where it appears doubtful that a plaintiff is going to be able to satisfy the onus which is upon him to prove malice, the court, mindful of the position of the defendant, should be prepared to require the plaintiff to deliver witness statements at an early stage of the proceedings so that the court can form an assessment as to whether the plaintiff has any prospect of successfully establishing malice. If the court is satisfied that the plaintiff has no prospect of success and is also satisfied there is no other reason why the action should be allowed to proceed then the action should be dismissed. (See the judgment of Sir Brian Neill in Daniels v. Griffiths [1998] E.M.L.R. 488 at 495.) Where the position is clear, the court can be expected to be robust. After all the courts regularly give judgment under Order 14 for the plaintiff where there is no defence and they should, especially in a case of this nature, be equally ready to give judgment for the defendant if the plaintiff has no prospect of success.”
“1381. No doubt it could be argued that these false claims made in the Report betoken a cavalier approach to the evidence from which it would be fair only to infer recklessness (i.e. indifference to portraying an accurate picture of the evidence). …”
“It is clear that no reference to this issue should have been included in the Social Worker’s report and I apologise for the distress that this has caused you”
“1388. Some of the statements made about the Claimants and about the evidence available to the Team were cavalier, in the sense that they disclose a perfunctory level of consideration when viewed “against the substance, gravity and width of the publication” (see the above citation from Lange v. Atkinson), so as to be consistent with a finding of indifference to truth. To take but one example, they claimed on page 41 of the Report that Child 14 alleged rape in her first video interview when she did nothing of the kind. This is surely not one of those cases where it could possibly be claimed that “a genuine belief in truth after relatively hasty and incomplete consideration may be sufficient to satisfy the dictates of the occasion” (see Lange at paragraph 48). By whatever standard, it seems to me that this statement was made recklessly. Yet, in the end, the case on malice succeeds because the Claimants have demonstrated, in the respects I have identified, knowledge on the part of each relevant Defendant that the material they were putting forward to support their conclusions was being misrepresented to their readers. Even if, therefore, Mr Bishop is correct (as I am assuming) in saying that I should not take the New Zealand decision into account at all when considering the notion of recklessness, as a matter of English law, it would make no difference to the outcome.”
“Logically it might be said that such irrelevant matter falls outside the privilege altogether. But if this were so it would involve application by the court of an objective test of relevance to every part of the defamatory matter published on the privileged occasion; whereas, as everyone knows, ordinary human beings vary in their ability to distinguish that which is logically relevant from that which is not and few, apart from lawyers, have had any training which qualifies them to do so. So the protection afforded by the privilege would be illusory if it were lost in respect of any defamatory matter which upon logical analysis could be shown to be irrelevant to the fulfilment of the duty or the protection of the right upon which the privilege was founded. As Lord Dunedin pointed out in Adam v. Ward [1917] A.C. 309, 326-327 the proper rule as respects irrelevant defamatory matter incorporated in a statement made on a privileged occasion is to treat it as one of the factors to be taken into consideration in deciding whether, in all the circumstances, an inference that the defendant was actuated by express malice can properly be drawn. As regards irrelevant matter the test is not whether it is logically relevant but whether, in all the circumstances, it can be inferred that the defendant either did not believe it to be true or, though believing it to be true, realised that it had nothing to do with the particular duty or interest on which the privilege was based, but nevertheless seized the opportunity to drag in irrelevant defamatory matter to vent his personal spite, or for some other improper motive. Here, too, judges and juries should be slow to draw this inference.”
“Apart from those exceptional cases, what is required on the part of the defamer to entitle him to the protection of the privilege is positive belief in the truth of what he published or, as it is generally though tautologously termed, "honest belief." If he publishes untrue defamatory matter recklessly, without considering or caring whether it be true or not, he is in this, as in other branches of the law, treated as if he knew it to be false. But indifference to the truth of what he publishes is not to be equated with carelessness, impulsiveness or irrationality in arriving at a positive belief that it is true. The freedom of speech protected by the law of qualified privilege may be availed of by all sorts and conditions of men. In affording to them immunity from suit if they have acted in good faith in compliance with a legal or moral duty or in protection of a legitimate interest the law must take them as it finds them. In ordinary life it is rare indeed for people to form their beliefs by a process of logical deduction from facts ascertained by a rigorous search for all available evidence and a judicious assessment of its probative value. In greater or in less degree according to their temperaments, their training, their intelligence, they are swayed by prejudice, rely on intuition instead of reasoning, leap to conclusions on inadequate evidence and fail to recognise the cogency of material which might cast doubt on the validity of the conclusions they reach. But despite the imperfection of the mental process by which the belief is arrived at it may still be "honest," that is, a positive belief that the conclusions they have reached are true. The law demands no more.”
“If the occasion is privileged the plaintiff must prove malice in fact; the burden of proving this is on him, as was settled in Clark v. Molyneux(1877) 3 QBD 237 . Malice, in fact, is not confined to personal spite and ill-will, but includes every unjustifiable intention to inflict injury on the person defamed, or, in the words of Brett, L.J., every wrong feeling in a man's mind: Clark v. Molyneux at p 247. There is no question here of the belief by the defendant in the truth of what he said. He did not say or intimate that the plaintiff had stolen a watch - he merely stated that the Edinburgh police suspected the plaintiff of having done so, which was true enough. This case illustrates the truth of the remark made by Lord Bramwell in Clark v. Molyneux at p 244. He said, "A person may honestly make on a particular occasion a defamatory statement without believing it to be true; because the statement may be of such a character as on that occasion it may be proper to communicate it to a particular person who ought to be informed of it. Can it be said that the person making the statement is liable to an action for slander?" What, therefore, has to be ascertained is whether the defendant acted bonâ fide in the discharge of that moral duty which he owed to Stanley or whether he acted from some other unjustifiable motive - from some motive other than a sense of duty. As Lord Bramwell said in Clark v. Molyneux at p 245, "If the defendant was actuated by some motive other than that which would alone excuse him the jury may find for the plaintiff." (See also page 246, per Brett, L.J.)”
“Judges and juries should, however, be very slow to draw the inference that a defendant was so far actuated by improper motives as to deprive him of the protection of the privilege unless they are satisfied that he did not believe that what he said or wrote was true or that he was indifferent to its truth or falsity. The motives with which human beings act are mixed. They find it difficult to hate the sin but love the sinner. Qualified privilege would be illusory, and the public interest that it is meant to serve defeated, if the protection which it affords were lost merely because a person, although acting in compliance with a duty or in protection of a legitimate interest, disliked the person whom he defamed or was indignant at what he believed to be that person's conduct and welcomed the opportunity of exposing it. It is only where his desire to comply with the relevant duty or to protect the relevant interest plays no significant part in his motives for publishing what he believes to be true that "express malice" can properly be found.”
“First there is the case of targeted malice by a public officer, i e conduct specifically intended to injure a person or persons. This type of case involves bad faith in the sense of the exercise of public power for an improper or ulterior motive. The second form is where a public officer acts knowing that he has no power to do the act complained of and that the act will probably injure the plaintiff. It involves bad faith inasmuch as the public officer does not have an honest belief that his act is lawful.”
“47. What constitutes recklessness is something which must take its colour from the nature of the occasion, and the nature of the publication. If it is reckless not “to consider or care” whether a statement be true or false, as Lord Diplock indicated, it must be open to the view that a perfunctory level of consideration (against the substance, gravity and width of the publication) can also be reckless. It is within the concept of misusing the occasion to say that the defendant may be regarded as reckless if there has been a failure to give such responsible consideration to the truth or falsity of the statement as the jury considers should have been given in all the circumstances. In essence the privilege may well be lost if the defendant takes what in all the circumstances can fairly be described as a cavalier approach to the truth of the statement.”
“1294 I do not believe, therefore, that Mr Bishop is construing the judgment correctly when he submitted that I was being invited by Miss Page to depart form Horrocks v. Lowe and conclude “that a test of reasonableness or responsibility should suffice to defeat the claim of qualified privilege”
“49. A case at one end of the scale might be a grossly defamatory statement about a Cabinet Minister, broadcast to the world. At the other end might be an uncomplimentary observation about a politician at a private meeting held under Chatham House rules. It is not that the law values reputation more in the one case than the other. It is that in the first case the gravity of the allegation and the width of the publication are apt to cause much more harm if the allegation is false than in the second case. A greater degree of responsibility is therefore required in the first case than in the second, if recklessness is not to be inferred.”
“if I were to come to the conclusion that their primary purpose was … ultimately the protection of children, there would be no scope in this case for an adverse finding of “dominant motive””
“… where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the justification for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied in each case.”