“An isolated antibody which specifically binds to the IL-17A/F heterodimeric complex according to claim 23 or claim 24 and which inhibits the activity of the IL-17A/F heterodimeric complex to induce production of IL-8 and IL-6.”
“An isolated antibody which specifically binds to an isolated IL-17A/F heterodimeric complex and which inhibits the activity of the IL-17A/F heterodimeric complex to induce production of IL-8 and IL-6, wherein the isolated IL-17A/F heterodimeric complex comprises SEQ ID NO:3 and SEQ ID NO:4 without their associated signal peptides, and further comprises two interchain disulphide linkages between SEQ ID NO:3 and SEQ ID NO:4; and wherein the antibody is either human or humanized.”
“An antagonist of an IL-17A/F polypeptide, wherein the antagonist is an anti-IL-17A/F antibody, wherein the antibody is a humanized or human antibody, and wherein the IL-17A/F polypeptide is: an isolated polypeptide comprising: (a) the amino acid sequence of an IL-17A/F polypeptide comprising SEQ ID NO:3 and SEQ ID NO:4; or (b) the amino acid sequence of an IL-17A/F polypeptide comprising SEQ ID NO:3 and SEQ ID NO:4 lacking their associated signal peptides.”
“that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. This public interest is reinforced by the current emphasis on efficiency and economy in the conduct of litigation, in the interests of the parties and the public as a whole.”
“The application of the principles of issue estoppel is subject to the overriding consideration that it must work justice and not injustice.”
“One of the purposes of estoppel being to work justice between the parties, it is open to courts to recognise that in special circumstances inflexible application of it may have the opposite effect.”
“The determination must be fundamental, not collateral. An express decision will not necessarily create an issue estoppel. Only determinations which are necessary for the decision, and fundamental to it, will do so. Other determinations, however positive, do not.”
“A judicial determination directly involving an issue of fact or of law disposes once for all of the issue, so that it cannot afterwards be raised between the same parties or their privies. The estoppel covers only those matters which the prior judgment, decree or order necessarily established as the legal foundation or justification of its conclusion, whether that conclusion is that a money sum be recovered or that the doing of an act be commanded or be restrained or that rights be declared. … “Nothing but what is legally indispensable to the conclusion is thus finally closed or precluded. In matters of fact the issue estopped is confined to those ultimate facts which form the ingredients in the cause of action, that is the title to the right established. … But in neither case is the estoppel confined to the final legal conclusion expressed in the judgment, decree or order. In the phraseology of Coleridge J in R v Inhabitants of the Township of Hartington Middle Quarter (1) the judicial determination concludes, not merely as to the point actually decided, but as to a matter which it was necessary to decide and which was actually decided as the groundwork of the decision itself, though not then directly the point at issue. Matters cardinal to the latter claim or contention cannot be raised if to raise them is necessarily to assert that the former decision was erroneous. … “The difficulty in the actual application of these conceptions is to distinguish the matters fundamental or cardinal to the prior decision of judgment, decree or order or necessarily involved in it as its legal justification or foundation from matters which even though actually raised and decided as being in the circumstances of the case the determining considerations, yet are not in point of law the essential foundation or groundwork of the judgment, decree or order.”
“The second species, which I will call 'issue estoppel,' is an extension of the same rule of public policy. There are many causes of action which can only be established by proving that two or more different conditions are fulfilled. Such causes of action involve as many separate issues between the parties as there are conditions to be fulfilled by the plaintiff in order to establish his cause of action; and there may be cases where the fulfilment of an identical condition is a requirement common to two or more different causes of action. If in litigation upon one such cause of action any of such separate issues as to whether a particular condition has been fulfilled is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, either upon evidence or upon admission by a party to the litigation, neither party can, in subsequent litigation between one another upon any cause of action which depends upon the fulfilment of the identical condition, assert that the condition was fulfilled if the court has in the first litigation determined that it was not, or deny that it was fulfilled if the court in the first litigation determined that it was.”
“Issue estoppel may arise where a particular issue forming a necessary ingredient in a cause of action has been litigated and decided and in subsequent proceedings between the same parties involving a different cause of action to which the same issue is relevant one of the parties seeks to re-open that issue.”
“70. The Judge was attracted by Mr Turner’s submission. He said in par. 48 that it is hard to see why a determination which forms the primary basis of a foreign judgment should not give rise to an estoppel on the issue in question, notwithstanding that the judgment was also reached on an alternative basis. On the other hand there seems to me to be much to be said for Mr. Matthews’ submission that the cases support the proposition that the particular determination must be necessary for the decision in the sense of being fundamental to it and that in a two ratio case. Neither can satisfy that test. 71. However that may be, the Judge held that he did not have to determine the question because he held that the decision of the Supreme Court under art. 174(a) was not the (or I think he also meant a) primary basis for the decision. For the reasons given below, I have reached the conclusion that the Judge was correct and that it is not necessary for us to determine the correct approach in a twin ration case. In these circumstances I do not think that I should express a view on the point. There is a good deal to be said on both sides of the question and it seems to me to be preferable to do so only in a case where it arises for decision on the facts. 72. As I see it, assuming that it is possible for each ratio in a two ratio case to give rise to an issue estoppel, the determination of the particular issue relied upon must have been treated by the first Court as necessary for its decision in the sense that it was part of the decision which it in fact reaches and not collateral to it or obiter. … “74. In the State of Norway case this Court, having considered the decision of the Privy Council in Duedu v Yiboe [1961] 1 W.L.R. 1040, did not accept that an issue estoppel is impossible if the first decision cannot be appealed. However, it held that it is a good test. It seems to me that the correct approach to the question of appealability is to treat it as one factor in deciding whether the determination is necessary to the decision or only collateral to it.”
“The bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings may, without more, amount to abuse if the court is satisfied (the onus being on the party alleging abuse) that the claim or defence should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all. I would not accept that it is necessary, before abuse may be found, to identify any additional element such as a collateral attack on a previous decision or some dishonesty, but where those elements are present the later proceedings will be much more obviously abusive, and there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceeding involves what the court regards as unjust harassment of a party. It is, however, wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before. As one cannot comprehensively list all possible forms of abuse, so one cannot formulate any hard and fast rule to determine whether, on given facts, abuse is to be found or not. … While the result may often be the same, it is my view preferable to ask whether in all the circumstances a party’s conduct is an abuse than to ask whether the conduct is an abuse and then, if it is, to ask whether the abuse is excused or justified by special circumstances. Properly applied, and whatever the legitimacy of its descent, the rule has in my view a valuable part to play in protecting the interests of justice.”