“8. The Edwards Parties [defined as LLC, ELC, ELSA and ELL] and each of them, whether acting by their directors, officers, servants, employees, agents or any of them or otherwise however, be restrained from infringing [766]. 9. The Edwards Parties and each of them deliver up to the Defendant or, at the Defendant’s option, destroy upon oath all material within their possession, custody, power or control, the continued possession of which would constitute a breach of the foregoing injunction. 24. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of this Order are stayed pending the outcome of the Edwards’ Parties’ appeal to the Court of Appeal …”
“The issue ‘what, if any exception or limitation should be made to paragraphs 8 and 9 of [the order dated24 March 2017 ] to allow for Edwards to continue to supply the Sapien 3 valve’ be remitted to a judge of the Patents Court.”
“120. The Court’s power to award damages in lieu of an injunction involves a classic exercise of discretion, which should not, as a matter of principle, be fettered … And as a matter of practical fairness, each case is likely to be so fact-sensitive that any firm guidance is likely to do more harm than good …” 121. … while the discretion is not fettered, its manner of exercise is as predictable as possible. I would accept that the prima facie position is that an injunction should be granted, so the legal burden is on the defendant to show why it should not … 122. … it is right to emphasise that, when a judge is called on to decide whether to award damages in lieu of an injunction, I do not think that there should be any inclination either way (subject to the legal burden discussed above): the outcome should depend on all the evidence and arguments… 123. … it would, in the absence of additional relevant circumstances pointing the other way, normally be right to refuse an injunction if [A L Smith LJ’s fourth tests in Shelfer v City of London] are satisfied. [But] the fact that those tests are not all satisfied does not mean that an injunction should be granted. 124. As for … public interest, I find it hard to see how there could be any circumstances in which it arose and could not, as a matter of law, be a relevant factor …”
“Article 3 General obligation 1. Member States shall provide for the measures, procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of the intellectual property rights covered by this Directive. Those measures, procedures and remedies shall be fair and equitable and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays. 2. Those measures, procedures and remedies shall also be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.”