“According to a further specified example the means for detachable connection are designed to hold the weapon clearance appliance on a supporting frame of the unmanned underwater vehicle. According to this example, the weapon clearance appliance is placed in the area of the weapon by the unmanned underwater vehicle. An embodiment such as this is advantageous when it is not possible to attach the weapon clearance appliance directly to the weapon, for example because of severe shellfish growth. In a situation such as this, the weapon clearance appliance is placed on the base of the waterway or the seabed in the area of the weapon, and the clearance charge is then fired or the spoof device activated.”
“The invention makes it possible to provide conventional unmanned underwater vehicles, in particular minehunting drones, with a multiple use, since the actual weapon clearance appliance is provided merely as an attachment to the underwater vehicle. Therefore, only the weapon clearance appliance need be sacrificed during each operation, while the unmanned underwater vehicle can be reused.”
“It is the positioning and fixing of the shaped charge which has been a capability gap in some fields.”
“In one aspect there is provided in the following an impact initiated attachment device for attachment to an target [sic], the device comprising: a housing having a front face which abuts against the target in use, one or more fasteners, a drive mechanism for driving the fastener(s) from a first position within the housing to a second position protruding from the front face of the housing, and a trigger mechanism for triggering activation of the drive mechanism comprising a trigger extending from the front face of the housing. “Because the trigger extends from the front face of the housing, all that is required to activate the drive mechanism is to press the device onto the surface of the target whereby to press the trigger. It is therefore very simple to operate since the user does not have to place the device and then fire it, which might be particularly difficult in an underwater environment. The user can concentrate on the positioning of the device and simply has to apply some additional pressure to activate the drive mechanism. … A line such as a bungee or other elastic cord may be attached to the housing arranged to be released from the housing on activation of the drive mechanism. This is particularly useful when carrying the device underwater. The line may be used to attach the device to a vehicle for example so that the vehicle is released when the attachment device has been activated. … The assembly may comprise a cowl or collar to which the attachment device and one or more disruptors are attached. This is particularly suitable for use with a submersible vehicle.The cowl or collar may be designed to fit over the nose of the vehicle so that the assembly can be guided by the vehicle. The assembly may comprise multiple disruptors arranged in parallel around the collar or cowl.”
“The assemblies of attachment and disruptor enable a disruptor/demolition method that is less susceptible to stray electromagnetic and electrostatic energy than current methods.”
“One might have thought there was nothing more to say on this topic after Kirin-Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd[2005] RPC 9 . The judge accurately set out the position, save that he used the old language of Art.69 EPC rather than that of the EPC 2000, a Convention now in force. The new language omits ‘the terms of’ from Art.69. No one suggested the amendment changes the meaning. We set out what the judge said, but using the language of the EPC 2000: “[182] The task for the court is to determine what the person skilled in the art would have understood the patentee to have been using the language of the claim to mean. The principles were summarised by Jacob LJ in Mayne Pharma Pty Ltd v Pharmacia Italia SpA[2005] EWCA Civ 137 and refined by Pumfrey J in Halliburton Energy Services Inc v Smith International (North Sea) Ltd[2005] EWHC 1623 (Pat) following their general approval by the House of Lords in Kirin-Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd[2005] RPC 9 . An abbreviated version of them is as follows: (i) The first overarching principle is that contained in Article 69 of the European Patent Convention.” (ii) Article 69 says that the extent of protection is determined by the claims. It goes on to say that the description and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims. In short the claims are to be construed in context. (iii) It follows that the claims are to be construed purposively – the inventor’s purpose being ascertained from the description and drawings. (iv) It further follows that the claims must not be construed as if they stood alone – the drawings and description only being used to resolve any ambiguity. Purpose is vital to the construction of claims. (v) When ascertaining the inventor’s purpose, it must be remembered that he may have several purposes depending on the level of generality of his invention. Typically, for instance, an inventor may have one, generally more than one, specific embodiment as well as a generalised concept. But there is no presumption that the patentee necessarily intended the widest possible meaning consistent with his purpose be given to the words that he used: purpose and meaning are different. (vi) Thus purpose is not the be-all and end-all. One is still at the end of the day concerned with the meaning of the language used. Hence the other extreme of the Protocol – a mere guideline – is also ruled out by Article 69 itself. It is the terms of the claims which delineate the patentee’s territory. (vii) It follows that if the patentee has included what is obviously a deliberate limitation in his claims, it must have a meaning. One cannot disregard obviously intentional elements. (viii) It also follows that where a patentee has used a word or phrase which, acontextually, might have a particular meaning (narrow or wide) it does not necessarily have that meaning in context. (ix) It further follows that there is no general ‘doctrine of equivalents.’ (x) On the other hand purposive construction can lead to the conclusion that a technically trivial or minor difference between an element of a claim and the corresponding element of the alleged infringement nonetheless falls within the meaning of the element when read purposively. This is not because there is a doctrine of equivalents: it is because that is the fair way to read the claim in context. (xi) Finally purposive construction leads one to eschew the kind of meticulous verbal analysis which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to indulge.”
“means for detaching (or breaking) a detachable connection”
“The invention makes it possible to provide conventional unmanned underwater vehicles, in particular minehunting drones, with a multiple use, since the actual weapon clearance appliance is provided merely as an attachment to an underwater vehicle. Therefore, only the weapon clearance appliance need to be sacrificed during each operation while the unmanned underwater vehicle can be reused. This makes it possible to significantly reduce the costs of mine clearance.”
“According to a further special embodiment of the weapons clearance application, the means for detachable connection of the weapons clearance appliance to an unmanned underwater vehicle and the holding apparatus are designed such that, when the holding apparatus for fixing the weapon clearance appliance to the weapon is activated, the means for detachable connection are operated at the same time, thus releasing a mechanical connection between the weapon clearance appliance and the unmanned underwater vehicle.”
“The assemblies of attachment and disruptor enable a disruptor/demolition method that is less susceptible to stray electromagnetic and electrostatic energy than current methods.”
“An underwater weapon 1 for mine countermeasures a shaped charge 2 which is attached to a target mine 26 by means of an explosive attachment unit 10 e.g. a nail gun. Contact sensors 5 and hydrostatic transducer 7 in conjunction with safety and arming unit 6 make the weapon safe until it is underwater in contact with a mine. A transducer 9 enables the weapon to be armed and detonated by remote control. A multi-faceted portion 8 enables the weapon to be gripped and manipulated by remote control.”
"A faceted portion 8 at the closed end of the weapon casing enables the entire weapon to be gripped and manipulated by the remotely operated vehicle…"
“In figure 2a the underwater weapon is carried to the target area by the remotely operated vehicle 20 which carries the weapon using the claw 23 of the manipulator arm 22 to gripped facets 8 on the weapon. Control signals are transmitted between the remotely operated vehicle and the disposal weapon via a command line 25 connected to a socket 16 on the mine disposal weapon. When the remotely operated vehicle has reached its target area the mine to be disposed of is inspected with on-board sensors.… In figure 2b the manipulator arm 22, with weapon is extended and the ROV is moved towards mine 26 until contact is made with the mine casing and signalled by sensors 5. Although an articulated manipulator arm 22 is shown being extended and folded in figures 2a to 2d a limited function manipulator arm could be used which is fixed and has no extension capability. When the operator receives a signal indicating that successful contact has been made with the mine the operator triggers the explosive fastening device 10 by a signal via the ROV command line 25 (Figure 2b). Alternatively the fastening device can be arranged to detonate automatically upon contact of the sensors 5 with the mine casing. Upon receipt of the correct signal the firing mechanism 11 detonates a percussion 12. The force of the explosion from the percussion cap drives the toughened nail 13 forwardly through aperture 14 to penetrate the casing of the mine to be destroyed. As the nail 13 penetrates the mine casing a friction weld is produced which holds the weapon securely in place on the mine. When the weapon is attached to the mine the ROV is withdrawn and recovered (Figure 2c). The weapon is armed and detonated remotely by an acoustic signal 27 which is detected by acoustic receiver 9 (Figure 2d).”
“(1)(a) Identify the notional 'person skilled in the art'; (b) Identify the relevant common general knowledge of that person; (2) Identify the inventive concept of the claim in question or if that cannot readily be done, construe it; (3) Identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as forming part of the 'state of the art' and the inventive concept of the claim or the claim as construed; (4) Viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention as claimed, do those differences constitute steps which would have been obvious to the person skilled in the art or do they require any degree of invention?” …. 93. Ultimately the court has to evaluate all the relevant circumstances in order to answer a single and relatively simple question of fact: was it obvious to the skilled but unimaginative addressee to make a product or carry out a process falling within the claim….” (per Kitchin LJ) “181 …It cannot be said too often that the statutory question is: was the invention obvious at the priority date? It is not: was it obvious to try? The questions of the degree of expectation of success and the length of time thought to be needed to undertake a trial have taken on lives of their own. I think that this happened in our case. Insistence on the statutory question is not a novel thought. It is also an obvious one: see Conor Medsystems Inc v Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc[2007] EWCA Civ 5 [2007] RPC 20 (§§ 44, 45 per Jacob LJ, approved on appeal:[2008] UKHL 49 [2008] RPC 28 § 42 per Lord Hoffmann; § 49 per Lord Walker; § 55 per Lord Neuberger). In Generics (UK) Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S[2007] EWHC 1040 (Pat) [2007] RPC 32 (§72) Kitchin LJ (as he then wasn't) said: “The question of obviousness must be considered on the facts of each case. The court must consider the weight to be attached to any particular factor in the light of all the relevant circumstances. These may include such matters as the motive to find a solution to the problem the patent addresses, the number and extent of the possible avenues of research, the effort involved in pursuing them and the expectation of success.” … 184. In many “obvious to try” cases, it is the idea of trying that constitutes the inventive step. It was no doubt this that led Sir Donald Nicholls V-C to say in Molnlycke AB v Procter & Gamble Ltd[1994] RPC 49 that: “… obviousness connotes something which would at once occur to a person skilled in the art who was desirous of accomplishing the end." (Emphasis added)”
“I confess that I view with suspicion arguments to the effect that a new combination, bringing with it new and important consequences in the shape of practical machines, is not an invention, because, when it has once been established, it is easy to show how it might be arrived at by starting from something known and taking a series of apparently easy steps. This ex post facto analysis of invention is unfair to the inventors and in my opinion is not countenanced by English Patent Law.”
“The cross-examination of the respondent’s expert followed with customary skill the familiar ‘step by step’ course. I do not find it persuasive. Once an invention has been made it is generally possible to postulate a combination of steps by which the inventor might have arrived at the invention that he claims in his specification if he started from something that was already known. But it is only because the invention has been made and had proved successful that it is possible to postulate from what starting point and by what particular combination of steps the inventor could have arrived at his invention. It may be that taken in isolation none of the steps which it is now possible to postulate, if taken in isolation, appears to call for any inventive ingenuity. It is improbable that this reconstruction a posteriori represents the mental process by which the inventor in fact arrived at his invention, but even if it were, inventive ingenuity lay in perceiving that the final result which it was the object of the inventor to achieve was attainable from the particular starting point and in his selection of the particular combination of steps which would lead to that result.”
“72. If a particular route is an obvious one to take, it is not rendered any less obvious from a technical point of view merely because there are a number, and perhaps a large number, of other obvious routes as well: Brugger v Medic-Aid Ltd[1996] RPC 635 at 661.”
“77. It generally only comes into play when one is considering the question "if it was obvious, why was it not done before?" That question itself can have many answers showing it was nothing to do with the invention, for instance that the prior art said to make the invention obvious was only published shortly before the date of the patent, or that the practical implementation of the patent required other technical developments. But once all other reasons have been discounted and the problem is shown to have been long-standing and solved by the invention, secondary evidence can and often does, play an important role. If a useful development was, in hindsight, seemingly obvious for years and the apparently straightforward technical step from the prior art simply was not taken, then there is likely to have been an invention.”
“Choosing between a number of equally effective readily available design options does not involve an inventive step …”
“Release [of the appliance] does not lead to a (positive or negative) change in the buoyancy of the underwater vehicle. The underwater vehicle can therefore be controlled without any problems even after [release]”
“106. A patent is invalid "if the specification does not disclose the invention clearly enough and completely enough for it to be performed by a person skilled in the art" (section 72(1)(c) of the 1977 Act). The patent will be insufficient if the skilled person is unable to carry out the claimed invention given the description of it in the specification and common general knowledge (sometimes called "classical insufficiency").”
“The Court of Appeal… said that it was sufficient that some uEPO could be tested against eEPO by SDS–PAGE. The fact that it did not specify which uEPO and that choosing one uEPO would bring the product within the claim and another would not was ‘lack of clarity dressed up to look like insufficiency.’ For my part, I do not think that can be right. If the claim says that you must use an acid, and there is nothing in the specification or context to tell you which acid, and the invention will work with some acids but not with others but finding out which ones work will need extensive experiments, then that in my opinion is not merely lack of clarity; it is insufficiency. The lack of clarity does not merely create a fuzzy boundary between that which will work and that which will not. It makes it impossible to work the invention at all until one has found out what ingredient is needed.”
“Because I was not asked to contemplate carrying BAe on a small ROV. I was asked to consider BAe, the patent.”