“The object of the … invention is to provide a wound dressing … whose properties are as good as or better than the properties of the aforedescribed dressing which has a simpler construction which can be produced much more cheaply ...”
“a layer of absorbent foam material that includes a pattern of holes which open [on the skin-facing side], wherein the foam material is coated with a layer of hydrophobic gel which adheres to the skin, and wherein the walls of the holes in the foam material are coated with gel at those end parts of the walls which lie proximal to the wearer's skin when the dressing is used.”
"because of its hydrophobicity, the spacer layer will prevent spontaneous reflux of the absorbed fluid to the skin or the wound."
“In order to obtain a functioning inventive dressing, the peeling force F1 shall be at least 0.1 N.”
“(a) A wound dressing, characterized by (b) a layer of absorbent foam material (c) which includes a pattern of holes, (d) wherein the holes open out in that side of the foam material that lies proximal with the wearer's skin when the dressing is worn, (e) and which is coated with a layer of a skin-adhering hydrophobic gel, (f) wherein the walls of the holes in said foam material are coated with gel at those end parts of the holes that lie proximal to the wearer's skin when the dressing is worn.”
“(a) A wound dressing according to claim 1 characterised in that: (b) the hole pattern is comprised of the pores of said foam material (c) wherein the gel also extends partially into those open pores of the foam material that border on the gel layer (d) without closing all pores.”
“[5] One might have thought there was nothing more to say on this topic after Kirin-Amgen v Hoechst Marion Roussel[2005] RPC 9 . The judge accurately set out the position, save that he used the old language of Art 69 EPC rather than that of the EPC 2000, a Convention now in force. The new language omits the termsof from Art. 69. No one suggested the amendment changes the meaning. We set out what the judge said, but using the language of the EPC 2000: [182] The task for the court is to determine what the person skilled in the art would have understood the patentee to have been using the language of the claim to mean. The principles were summarised by Jacob LJ in Mayne Pharma v Pharmacia Italia[2005] EWCA Civ 137 and refined by Pumfrey J in Halliburton v Smith International[2005] EWHC 1623 (Pat) following their general approval by the House of Lords in Kirin-Amgen v Hoechst Marion Roussel[2005] RPC 9 . An abbreviated version of them is as follows: (i) The first overarching principle is that contained in Article 69 of the European Patent Convention; (ii) Article 69 says that the extent of protection is determined by the claims. It goes on to say that the description and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims. In short the claims are to be construed in context. (iii) It follows that the claims are to be construed purposively—the inventor's purpose being ascertained from the description and drawings. (iv) It further follows that the claims must not be construed as if they stood alone—the drawings and description only being used to resolve any ambiguity. Purpose is vital to the construction of claims. (v) When ascertaining the inventor's purpose, it must be remembered that he may have several purposes depending on the level of generality of his invention. Typically, for instance, an inventor may have one, generally more than one, specific embodiment as well as a generalised concept. But there is no presumption that the patentee necessarily intended the widest possible meaning consistent with his purpose be given to the words that he used: purpose and meaning are different. (vi) Thus purpose is not the be-all and end-all. One is still at the end of the day concerned with the meaning of the language used. Hence the other extreme of the Protocol—a mere guideline—is also ruled out by Article 69 itself. It is the terms of the claims which delineate the patentee's territory. (vii) It follows that if the patentee has included what is obviously a deliberate limitation in his claims, it must have a meaning. One cannot disregard obviously intentional elements. (vii) It also follows that where a patentee has used a word or phrase which, acontextually, might have a particular meaning (narrow or wide) it does not necessarily have that meaning in context. (vii) It further follows that there is no general "doctrine of equivalents." (viii) On the other hand purposive construction can lead to the conclusion that a technically trivial or minor difference between an element of a claim and the corresponding element of the alleged infringement nonetheless falls within the meaning of the element when read purposively. This is not because there is a doctrine of equivalents: it is because that is the fair way to read the claim in context. (ix) Finally purposive construction leads one to eschew the kind of meticulous verbal analysis which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to indulge.” [182] The task for the court is to determine what the person skilled in the art would have understood the patentee to have been using the language of the claim to mean. The principles were summarised by Jacob LJ in Mayne Pharma v Pharmacia Italia[2005] EWCA Civ 137 and refined by Pumfrey J in Halliburton v Smith International[2005] EWHC 1623 (Pat) following their general approval by the House of Lords in Kirin-Amgen v Hoechst Marion Roussel[2005] RPC 9 . An abbreviated version of them is as follows: (i) The first overarching principle is that contained in Article 69 of the European Patent Convention; (ii) Article 69 says that the extent of protection is determined by the claims. It goes on to say that the description and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims. In short the claims are to be construed in context. (iii) It follows that the claims are to be construed purposively—the inventor's purpose being ascertained from the description and drawings. (iv) It further follows that the claims must not be construed as if they stood alone—the drawings and description only being used to resolve any ambiguity. Purpose is vital to the construction of claims. (v) When ascertaining the inventor's purpose, it must be remembered that he may have several purposes depending on the level of generality of his invention. Typically, for instance, an inventor may have one, generally more than one, specific embodiment as well as a generalised concept. But there is no presumption that the patentee necessarily intended the widest possible meaning consistent with his purpose be given to the words that he used: purpose and meaning are different. (vi) Thus purpose is not the be-all and end-all. One is still at the end of the day concerned with the meaning of the language used. Hence the other extreme of the Protocol—a mere guideline—is also ruled out by Article 69 itself. It is the terms of the claims which delineate the patentee's territory. (vii) It follows that if the patentee has included what is obviously a deliberate limitation in his claims, it must have a meaning. One cannot disregard obviously intentional elements. (vii) It also follows that where a patentee has used a word or phrase which, acontextually, might have a particular meaning (narrow or wide) it does not necessarily have that meaning in context. (vii) It further follows that there is no general "doctrine of equivalents." (viii) On the other hand purposive construction can lead to the conclusion that a technically trivial or minor difference between an element of a claim and the corresponding element of the alleged infringement nonetheless falls within the meaning of the element when read purposively. This is not because there is a doctrine of equivalents: it is because that is the fair way to read the claim in context. (ix) Finally purposive construction leads one to eschew the kind of meticulous verbal analysis which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to indulge.”
"The question of obviousness must be considered on the facts of each case. The court must consider the weight to be attached to any particular factor in the light of all the relevant circumstances. These may include such matters as the motive to find a solution to the problem the patent addresses, the number and extent of the possible avenues of research, the effort involved in pursuing them and the expectation of success."
“(a) The specification of the Patent sets out methods to determine the adhesive properties of the dressing and provides that in order to obtain a functioning inventive dressing the degree of adhesion must exceed the minimum values set out in those tests. (b) If and to the extent that at least claims 1, 2, 6 and 10 of the Patent encompass dressings with less than the said minimum degree of adhesion: i. there are no or no sufficient directions given for the skilled person to determine the degree of adhesion necessary for dressings to have the claimed advantages of the purported invention; and ii. these claims encompass dressings that do not have the claimed advantages of the purported invention and owe nothing to the teaching of the Patent. (c) The specification of the Patent sets out a method to determine the softness of the wound contact layer and provides that in order to obtain a functioning inventive dressing the wound contact layer must have penetration numbers as determined by the specified method of 5-20mm. (d) If and to the extent that at least claims 1, 2, 6 and 10 of the Patent encompass dressings with a wound contact layer outside the range of softness: i. there are no or no sufficient directions given for the skilled person to determine the softness of the wound contact layer necessary for dressings to have the claimed advantages of the purported invention; and ii. these claims encompass dressings that do not have the claimed advantages of the purported invention and owe nothing to the teaching of the Patent.” i. there are no or no sufficient directions given for the skilled person to determine the degree of adhesion necessary for dressings to have the claimed advantages of the purported invention; and ii. these claims encompass dressings that do not have the claimed advantages of the purported invention and owe nothing to the teaching of the Patent. i. there are no or no sufficient directions given for the skilled person to determine the softness of the wound contact layer necessary for dressings to have the claimed advantages of the purported invention; and ii. these claims encompass dressings that do not have the claimed advantages of the purported invention and owe nothing to the teaching of the Patent.”
“The Judge was right to test whether the extent of the monopoly claimed exceeded the technical contribution by adopting the criteria which were used in the specification to explain the technical contribution.”