"How that falls within the claims of the patent is not clear. It may be an embodiment which has been stranded by amendments to the claim. Whatever its origin, it throws no light on the matter of how the word "circular" is used in the patent."
"(a) The first, overarching principle, is that contained in Art 69 itself. (b) Art 69 says that the extent of protection is determined by the terms of the claims . It goes on to say that the description and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims. In short the claims are to be construed in context. (c) It follows that the claims are to be construed purposively – the inventor's purpose being ascertained from the description and drawings. (d) It further follows that the claims must not be construed as if they stood alone – the drawings and description only being used to resolve any ambiguity. Purpose is vital to the construction of claims. (f) Nonetheless purpose is not the be-all and end-all. One is still at the end of the day concerned with the meaning of the language used. Hence the other extreme of the Protocol – a mere guideline – is also ruled out by Art 69 itself. It is the terms of the claims which delineate the patentee's territory. (g) It follows that if the patentee has included what is obviously a deliberate limitation in his claims, it must have a meaning. One cannot disregard obviously intentional elements. (h) It also follows that where a patentee has used a word or phrase which, acontextually , might have a particular meaning (narrow or wide) it does not necessarily have that meaning in context. (i) it further follows that there is no general "doctrine of equivalents". (j) On the other hand purposive construction can lead to the conclusion that a technically trivial or minor difference between an element of a claim and the corresponding element of the alleged infringement nonetheless falls within the meaning of the element when read purposively. This is not because there is a doctrine of equivalents: it is because that is the fair way to read the claim in context. (k) Finally purposive construction leads one to eschew what Lord Diplock in Catnic called (at p.243): "the kind of meticulous verbal analysis which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to indulge.""