“[4] On or about27 November 2024 the Defendant sent one or more emails and/or made other written and/or oral communications concerning the Claimant to colleagues at Kelmscott School (including members of the senior leadership team) about her attendance at the school and her communications with staff (“the First Publication”). [5] Without prejudice to disclosure and further particulars, the Claimant will say that in the First Publication the Defendant alleged, in substance, that: The Claimant had behaved in an aggressive, threatening and harassing manner towards members of staff; The Claimant’s conduct represented a safeguarding and security risk on school premises; The Claimant’s behaviour was sufficiently serious to justify the involvement, or threatened involvement, of external agencies, including the police, and formal action against her; and Staff at the school required protection from the Claimant because of her conduct. [6] The Claimant further complains of subsequent repetitions and republications of the same or substantially the same allegations by the Defendant in communications to: Other members of the senior leadership team and staff at Kelmscott School; Governors of the school and/or officers of the local authority; External agencies contacted about the Claimant, including (if applicable() the police and any safeguarding, early-help or other professional services; and Other third parties involved with the Claimant’s children and family. [7] The precise wording, dates and recipients of the publications complained of are presently within the knowledge, possession or control of the Defendant and/or Kelmscott School. The Claimant will seek standard disclosure of those communications (including internal and external emails) and, if necessary, apply to amend these Particulars following such disclosure. [8] Insofar as any of the publications were in written form (including emails, letters and records), they constitute libel. Insofar as any were oral they constitute slander.”
“Thanks Scarlet. My concern also extends to her communicating with other colleagues though, as she threatens and intimidates, hence why I tend to communicate, in order to protect colleagues. Problematic. Best wishes, Sam…”
“Good morning Scarlet, We have a record yes. It is not necessarily what she says, just the feeling that an imminent threat of a complaint or similar, that creates an ill feeling to say the least. Staff are very wary of any interactions with her. We don’t expect too many more comms from her though as she is aware of current situation and next steps – fingers crossed. Best wishes, Sam…”
“[…] (2) The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court – (a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim; (b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; (c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order […]”
“1.2 The following are examples of cases where the court may conclude that particulars of claim (whether contained in a claim form or filed separately) fall within rule 3.4(2)(a): (1) those which set out no facts indicating what the claim is about, for example ‘Money owed£5000 ’, (2) those which are incoherent and make no sense, (3) those which contain a coherent set of facts but those facts, even if true, do not disclose any legally recognisable claim against the defendant. 1.3 A claim may fall within rule 3.4(2)(b) where it is vexatious, scurrilous or obviously ill-founded.”
“40. However, where the court holds that there is a defect in a pleading, it Is normal for the court to refrain from striking out that pleading unless the court has given the party concerned an opportunity of putting right the defect, provided that there is reason to believe that he will be in a position to put the defect right.”
“4.1(1) In a claim for libel the publication the subject of the claim must be identified in the claim form. (2) In a claim for slander the claim form must so far as practicable identify the person or persons to whom the words were spoken and when.”
“4.2 The claimant must set out in the particulars of claim – (1) the precise words of the statement complained of… (2) when, how and to whom the statement was published. If he claimant does not know to whom the statement was published or it is impracticable to set out all such persons, then the particulars relied upon o show (a) that such publication took place, and (b) the extent of such publication; (3) The facts and matters relied upon in order to satisfy the requirement ofsection 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 that the publication of the statement complained of has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant.”
“Section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 provides that "a statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant". "Serious" is an ordinary English word requiring no further gloss: Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd[2017] EWCA Civ 1334 ; [2018] Q.B. 594 at [44] . Whether serious reputational harm has been caused is a proposition of fact which can be established only by reference to the impact which the statement is shown actually to have had: Lachaux in the Supreme Court[2019] UKSC 27 ; [2020] A.C. 612 at [14] (Lord Sumption) . Sometimes harm to reputation results in observable consequences: the claimant may be shunned socially, vilified on social media, miss out on a promotion, or lose custom from their business. Where such events occur, a claimant may rely upon them, but the absence of such evidence will not necessarily mean that the claim fails. It is possible for a claimant to prove their case relying only upon "the meaning of the words, the situation of [the claimant], the circumstances of publication and the inherent probabilities": Lachaux at [21] (Lord Sumption) but the exercise is one of inference not speculation: the claimant must establish by evidence facts which cumulatively support the inference that, on the balance of probabilities, serious harm has in fact been caused: see e.g. the comments of Collins Rice J in Sivananthan v Vasikaran [2023] E.M.L.R. 7 at [53] and Miller v Turner[2023] EWHC 2799 (KB) at [45].”
“158. But where a claimant complains of publication of a defamatory statement to either a single publishee or a limited number of publishees, the scope for reliance on inference is likely to be very much reduced, both in relation to the direct harm caused to the claimant's reputation in the eyes of the immediate publishee(s) and any 'percolation' effect. The impact of Lachaux is that such reputational harm must be proved. Where the publishees can be identified, that means that an absence of evidence of the actual impact on the individual publishees may mean that a claimant cannot discharge the evidential burden placed on him/her by s.1. Drawing inferences is not a process of optimistic guesswork; it is a process whereby the court concludes that the evidence adduced enables a further inference of fact to be drawn. 159. Likewise, any reputational harm caused by 'percolation', similarly, must be proved, and proved to have been caused by the original publication sued upon. If, for example, the court were to accept a publishee's evidence that s/he did not pass on the defamatory statement (or its gist), there is simply no 'percolation' effect because there has been no republication. If the publishee says that s/he sent the defamatory publication to one other identified person, it would be a relevant issue whether the claimant's reputation had been seriously harmed in the eyes of this person. I am deliberately keeping the examples simple to demonstrate the relevant principles. Much will depend upon the nature and extent of the original publication and the nature and extent of any republication that is alleged to have been caused by it.”
“D. DEFAMATORY MEANING AND SERIOUSNESS [11] In their natural and ordinary meaning, the Defendant’s words mean and were understood to mean that I am a threatening and intimidating parent; that I pose a risk in interactions with staff and that staff require protection from me. [12] Allegations of this nature, made within a school governance context and to senior decision-makers, are inherently serious. They were capable of influencing how I was viewed and treated by those responsible for complaint handling, safeguarding decisions, and decisions affecting my children. E. SERIOUS HARM [13] The Defendant’s words were published to the Chair of Governors and were included within, or associated with, complaint investigation materials and/or records. Such allegations are inherently damaging to a parent’s reputation within a professional education and safeguarding environment. [14] Publication to the Chair of Governors was particularly serious because she was a person in a position of authority and influence in relation to my complaint, my dealings with the School, and decisions affecting how concerns raised by me would be viewed and handled. [15] The publications caused me significant distress and exacerbated anxiety and trauma-related symptoms. I will rely, if necessary, on medical/therapeutic evidence and further particulars in due course. [16] Serious harm undersection 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 is a triable issue. It is not appropriate for summary disposal without disclosure of the full extent of publication, including onward circulation, record-keeping, and referral and/or recording within safeguarding systems.”