Corey Clarke v The Chief Constable of Northumbria Police [2026] EWHC 747 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 747 (KB)Case No 034DC851
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
On Appeal from the County Court at Newcastle
HHJ Hanbury
Venue Leeds Civil Justice CentreDate 27 th March 2026
Before
MR JUSTICE KIMBLIN
Between
COREY CLARKEAppellantTHE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF NORTHUMBRIA POLICERespondent
Matthew Crowe (instructed by Ben Hoare Bell LLP) for AppellantGeorge Thomas KC (instructed by Solicitor to Northumbria Police) for RespondentHearing Hearing date: 18 th February 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10:30am on Friday 27 th March 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.MR JUSTICE KIMBLIN

Introduction

[1]This is an appeal against the order of His Honour Judge Hanbury made on 6th November 2024 at the conclusion of a jury trial of the Appellant’s claim for damages for false imprisonment and assault. The Appellant was, at the time of his arrest, a student at Southmoor Academy, Sunderland (‘the School’), aged 16 (DoB 10th September 2002). He was arrested on 9th November 2018 at the School where he was handcuffed and taken in a secure and marked police vehicle to Southwick Police Station. He was detained from around 11am until nearly 6pm, when he was released.[2]The Judge heard the case with a jury over three days from 3-5th June 2024. He concluded that the arresting officer, PC Carlton, had reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence had been committed and likewise that it was necessary to arrest the Appellant. He found that the manner of the Appellant’s arrest was justified and that detention for seven hours was necessary. He dismissed the claim.[3]An Appellant’s Notice was filed on 26th November 2024. Lavender J granted permission to appeal on 3rd March 2025.[4]The Judge’s order is challenged on the basis that he was wrong to find in the Respondent’s favour on each of the threshold questions which the officer had to address when deciding to arrest the Appellant, as to reasonable suspicion that the offence of possession of an indecent image had been committed and that the officer had reasonable grounds for believing that it was necessary to arrest a child. These issues were most prominent in the appeal. In addition, the Appellant contended that the use of handcuffs was not justified, nor was the length of detention.

Facts

[5]The relevant facts relate to three periods of time. Firstly, there is the period prior to the arrest during which there is a relevant history of interventions at the School. Essentially, this is ten months of 2018 from January until the end of October. Secondly, there is a build up to the arrest with activity recorded by the School and other agencies during early November. Thirdly, there is the interaction between PC Carlton, the School and the Appellant on 9th November 2018.[6]On 9th January 2018 two schoolgirls reported that the Appellant had been sending nude images and asking for similar photos to be sent to him, threatening to kill himself if they were not. The police had been informed.[7]There is then a long gap in the chronology in that on 30th June 2018 a report was made of the Appellant sending a picture of his legs in the bath, showing a small part of his penis, to another child and asking to see a picture of the child’s penis. On 26th September 2018 a Family Plan review records: i) the Appellant’s grandmother as seeing the messaging with girls and describing them as ‘disgusting’; ii) inappropriate texts/images that had been sent over social media by Corey to another male student; iii) the sending of texts and nude photographs to a girl.[8]Mr Crowe, who appeared for the Appellant at trial and before me, summarised the relevant history during November in this way in his skeleton argument, which I adopt: i) On 2nd November 2018, a Child Protection Online Monitoring Service (‘CPOMS’) record (11.19 am) from Southmoor Academy records that a friend of a pupil informed staff that her friend was being ‘blackmailed’ by the Appellant, but her friend didn’t want to tell staff. The conversation apparently had turned sexual between the Appellant and the friend of the pupil. ii) On the same day, a CPOMS entry (3.49 pm) shows that the person (presumably the alleged victim) was spoken to and said the messages were never inappropriate. The teachers asked to look at her phone, and they couldn’t see any from the Appellant. She also said she had two phones, and the second one was at home. iii) On 7th November 2018, a “CPOMS” record (seemingly at 4.03 pm) shows that a telephone call was received from East Durham College. The Appellant reportedly messaged a younger female child, aged 11. There were no sexual messages, but the conversation moved to Snapchat. Further, two females aged 17 and 18 were overheard saying that the Appellant had sent them sexualised messages and nude pictures. iv) On the same day, the Appellant’s grandmother attended a meeting with the School. v) On 8th November 2018, a safeguarding action plan was signed by the Appellant, the assistant principal, and others. The description records alleged incidents involving the sharing of sexual images. A series of actions were put in place as part of safeguarding protocols and to support him. He was prohibited from bringing a phone to school, was to be searched and supervised during the day.[9]On 9th November 2018, Ms McCourt, a teacher, was informed by the Headteacher that a parent of a girl had telephoned the School to say that the parent had found a message on his daughter’s phone asking for pictures of her and that the girl had not responded. The headteacher asked Ms McCourt to speak to the Police to “get their advice about this call and the other complaints”.[10]At some point in the morning of 9th November, Ms McCourt informed PC Carlton, who was already at the School, about “all of the complaints made by children of the School and East Durham College”. At around 10.10 am, the Appellant was removed from his class and taken to the office of another teacher. The Appellant remained in that room for around 30 minutes. As to the basis of arrest, Police records show the suspected offence was “possession indecent photograph of child for distribution”. The ground(s) for arrest were said to be “identified as being in possession of indecent images of a 13 year old female”. The necessity for the arrest was said to be:(a) to protect a child or other vulnerable person;(b) interview to obtain evidence by questioning.[11]After a lesson change, the Appellant left the School via a corridor and out to the front of the Sixth Form, where a marked police van was parked. Once in the van, the Officer handcuffed the Appellant. He was placed in a cage in the rear of the van. He was taken to Southwick Police Station. At 10.57 am, he was detained in the Police Station. He was searched.[12]At 11.20 am, uniformed Officers attended the Appellant’s grandmother’s address. A search was conducted. A mobile phone and an iPad were seized. The grandmother’s mobile phone and iPad were also seized.[13]At 5.40 pm, the Appellant was released under investigation. Thus, he was detained for around 7 hours and 30 minutes.[14]On 10th June 2019, PC Carlton prepared a report in response to a complaint. The officer recorded, in part, that he had information that the Appellant was blackmailing a young female whom he had coerced into sending indecent images. PC Carlton suggests an arrest was necessary to protect a young, vulnerable person and prevent loss of evidence.

Law

[15]The power of a constable to arrest without a warrant is contained in Section 24 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (‘PACE’), namely: "… (2) If a constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed, he may arrest without a warrant anyone whom he has reasonable grounds to suspect of being guilty of it. … (4) But the power of summary arrest conferred by subsection (1), (2) or (3) is exercisable only if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that for any of the reasons mentioned in subsection (5) it is necessary to arrest the person in question.”[16]The reasons in subsection (5) include to allow the prompt and effective investigation of the offence or of the conduct of the person in question. Those reasons, or criteria, are the subject in The Codes of Practice under PACE - Code G (Statutory power of arrest by police officers) at paragraph 2.9. The following parts of Code G are also particularly relevant:
“1B Juveniles should not be arrested at their place of education unless this is unavoidable. When a juvenile is arrested at their place of education, the principal or their nominee must be informed. (From Code C Note 11D)” “2C For a constable to have reasonable grounds for believing it necessary to arrest, he or she is not required to be satisfied that there is no viable alternative to arrest. However, it does mean that in all cases, the officer should consider that arrest is the practical, sensible and proportionate option in all the circumstances at the time the decision is made. This applies equally to a person in police detention after being arrested for an offence who is suspected of involvement in a further offence and the necessity to arrest them for that further offence is being considered.”
[17]Under Code C (Detention, treatment and questioning of persons by police officers) the topic of waiting for an adult to accompany a child is addressed:
“16C There is no power under PACE to detain a person and delay action under paragraphs 16.2 to 16.5 solely to await the arrival of the appropriate adult. Reasonable efforts should therefore be made to give the appropriate adult sufficient notice of the time the decision (charge etc.) is to be implemented so that they can be present. If the appropriate adult is not, or cannot be, present at that time, the detainee should be released on bail to return for the decision to be implemented when the adult is present, unless the custody officer determines that the absence of the appropriate adult makes the detainee unsuitable for bail for this purpose. After charge, bail cannot be refused, or release on bail delayed, simply because an appropriate adult is not available, unless the absence of that adult provides the custody officer with the necessary grounds to authorise detention after charge under PACE, section 38.”
[18]Though I consider the real focus of this appeal to be on s. 24(4), as to:(1) “reasonable grounds”, and;(2) belief in the necessity to arrest, it is logical to consider s. 24(2) first. It is concerned with reasonable grounds for suspicion. To have a reasonable suspicion, a police constable does not need to have proof, even of a prima facie case. This is because an investigation or inquiry may be at an early stage. The reasonable suspicion may be based on what others have told the constable, but that information must be in existence at the time when the constable makes the decision to arrest: O’Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1996] UKHL 6; [1997] AC 286.[19]Suspicion is a state of mind well short of belief and even further short of a belief in guilt or that guilt can be proved: Hughes LJ, as he then was, in Buckley v Chief Officer of the Thames Valley Police [2009] EWCA Civ 356 at [6], with whom Pill and Moore-Bick LLJ agreed.[20]S. 24(4) is concerned with reasonable grounds for believing that arrest is necessary, which is a comparatively high threshold, cf. s. 24(2): Rashid v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2020] EWHC 2522 (QB) per Lavender J. In addition, the decision must be based on reasonable grounds, according to the information available to the officer, when reviewed objectively: Hayes v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2012] 1 WLR 517 at [529; and see in particular paragraphs 30, 41 and 42]. The assessment for the court is the grounds which the officer actually had available and which he or she uses to explain the decision. This is clearly the correct scope of the task because s. 24(4) is directed to the grounds which the officer has, not the grounds which the officer could reasonably rely upon. The assessment focusses on the time at which the officer’s decision was made, and therefore, on the information which was available at that time.[21]Alternatives are a necessary part of the officer’s thinking. But consideration of alternatives is not the express requirement of the section nor the law as expressed in Hayes. There is no requirement to consider all alternatives. It is often easy to suggest an alternative after the event, or if one wishes to disagree with a decision. Rather, the importance of alternatives in the officer’s decision, and in the court’s consideration of that decision, will be fact-sensitive.

The Trial

[22]The key parts of the evidence on ‘reasonable suspicion’ were as follows. Ms Olivia McCourt gave evidence that there was no record of a complaint that the Appellant was in possession of nude images of another child for distribution, or that he was sent indecent images of another child. She would not have told PC Carlton that the Appellant was in possession of indecent images of a 13-year old. She gave PC Carlton a summary of all of the background and information which the School had, and did not leave anything in particular out of that account.[23]PC Carlton arrested the Appellant on grounds of possession of indecent images. He was tackled about the absence of evidence:
“Q. Now, Mr Carlton, given the information we’ve heard from Ms McCourt and given the information in these records, what I say is that you can’t have suspected Corey of committing that offence for which you arrested him because there was simply no evidence of it at all. Do you understand that? A. I understand what you’re saying. I would wholeheartedly disagree. Q. But you can’t recall what you were told at the time, can you? A. From my duty report, I’m satisfied that I had the honest held belief that an offence had been committed and Corey was – well, suspect that Corey was responsible. Q. Based solely on what Ms McCourt told you that morning in school, correct? A. Based on information from the school, yes.”
Q. But you can’t recall what you were told at the time, can you?

Q. Based solely on what Ms McCourt told you that morning in school, correct?

[24]PC Carlton had not made any investigative enquiries before the arrest, though the incident was a week old. He had no basis for the belief that the Appellant would destroy evidence, wilfully or intentionally, but it was not proportionate to obtain a warrant from the Magistrates’ Court.[25]On necessity, PC Carlton addressed the need to secure evidence. He did not want to run the risk of losing evidence and had in mind the risks to the vulnerable child who was the potential victim. It was a matter of urgency to arrest and detain because images could be deleted in less than thirty seconds. He had the guidance on arresting juveniles in mind, namely that juveniles should not be arrested at their place of education, but obtaining evidence was a priority.[26]He accepted that there were alternatives to arrest such as asking the Appellant’s grandmother for electronic devices, but the alternatives involved risks of images being deleted which would not be a proper or effective investigation.[27]PC Carlton had not met the Appellant before and did not know how he would behave. He had no specific reason to expect self-harm, but he was ‘single-crewed’ and the Appellant’s safety was his reason for handcuffing:
“his safety, my safety, make sure everyone gets there in one piece I suppose.”
[28]On the issue of the length of detention, PC Carlton maintained that he was trying to protect a young girl, and the detention was necessary to enable him to do so. He would act in the same way again, if he was in the same situation.

The Judgment

[29]The jury answered each of these questions in the affirmative:
“1. Has the Defendant satisfied you on the balance of probabilities that PC Carlton suspected the Claimant had committed the offence of possession of indecent images of another child? 2. Has the Defendant satisfied you on the balance of probabilities that PC Carlton believed that the arrest of the Claimant was necessary in order to: (a) Protect a child or other vulnerable person from the Claimant? (b) Allow the prompt and effective investigation of the offence or of the conduct of the Claimant? 3. Has the Defendant satisfied you on the balance of probabilities that PC Carlton thought it was necessary to place the Claimant in handcuffs for transport to the police station? 4. Has the Defendant satisfied you on the balance of probabilities that when the Claimant arrived at the custody suite the Custody Sergeant concluded that it was necessary to detain the Claimant in order to obtain evidence by questioning the Claimant?”
[30]The agreed issues which were then before the Judge were: i) Have the Police persuaded the court that there were reasonable grounds to suspect Corey of committing an offence? ii) If that is established, have the Police persuaded the court there were reasonable grounds for considering it necessary to arrest him? iii) Was Corey's arrest objectively necessary? iv) Did this make it necessary to handcuff him? v) Did the police need to detain Corey for the alleged offence for as long as they did?

The Judge qualified those questions in this way:

“The court is not required to conduct an exhaustive analysis of a police officer's actions in arresting an accused. The questions I am required to answer involve the reasonableness of those actions but a reason may be within a reasonable range of reasons in accordance with the Wednesbury principle, which applies in the judicial review field. Because an objective analysis is called for, there is no reason in principle why a wider range of reasons cannot be considered than those which operated on the officer's mind.”
[32]The Judge found that PC Carlton honestly and reasonably believed Corey to be in possession of images of a young female child. There was a suggestion of blackmail of vulnerable females as well as naked images of children. The transmission of those images by third parties, whether or not they were themselves children, was also a serious matter. Corey had been on the School's "radar" for some time and there was a suggestion that an image of a child or other young person may be shared with others. The suspicions were sufficient to justify the belief on the part of the officer that an offence had been committed.[33]Likewise, PC Carlton reasonably believed that it was necessary to arrest Corey in order to ensure that devices could be seized without evidence being destroyed and to prevent ‘unlawful activity’. The potential victims were also children. There was a balance which the officer had to strike. To say that other alternatives, such as obtaining a search warrant, obviously presented themselves to the officer would be a classic case of applying hindsight to the question.[34]The Judge accepted PC Carlton’s evidence and formed a favourable view of him. The Judge was satisfied that handcuffs were applied for the minimum period possible in the context of a small but identifiable risk of self-harm.[35]Corey was not paraded before pupils. To the contrary considerable efforts were made to avoid interaction with other pupils in the process of his arrest. Corey’s alternative account was rejected by the Judge.[36]The Judge carefully considered the nature and extent of the tasks which were necessary to undertake when Corey arrived at the Police Station, and the limitations on releasing him other than into the care of an adult.[37]The Judge dismissed the claim. The Appeal The Issues

The Appeal

[38]The Appellant’s case was helpfully presented via five themes. Firstly, as to ‘hindsight’ it was contended that the judgment took an incorrect approach to the lawfulness of the officer’s conduct by using hindsight rather than looking at the information which the officer had and the decision which he actually made (ground one). This is a criticism which the Appellant applies and relies upon in respect of each of the decisions which the officer made. Secondly, as to the suspicion leading to arrest, the Judge failed to consider this, or was wrong to find grounds to suspect the Appellant of the offence for which he was arrested (grounds four, five and seven). Thirdly, the Judge was wrong on the s. 24(4) PACE question in that there were no reasonable grounds to make it necessary to arrest a child at his school in the circumstances. There were alternatives which should have been considered (grounds two, three and six). Fourthly as to handcuffing, the Judge erred in finding the trespass to the Appellant’s person was lawful, based on a risk to self-harm (ground eight). Lastly as to detention, the Judge erred in concluding that the detention of a child for seven hours was necessary in the circumstances of the case (ground nine).

Reasonable Suspicion

[39]Before the Judge, the Appellant argued that there was no evidence that he was in possession of one or more indecent images. The Appellant had established, through the answers of Ms McCourt, that there was no basis to suspect that the Appellant was in possession of such images and so PC Carlton did not have sufficient evidence that an offence had been committed. The enquiries made by the police were not sufficient.[40]I accept Mr Crowe’s submission that the lawful focus on this issue is the offence for which there is suspicion. The terms of s. 24(2) are precise and are directed to the offence, and not to an offence. Therefore, Mr Crowe is entitled, as he has, to ask whether the Judge’s focus was sufficiently precise. His submission is not overly forensic. The difference between the indefinite and the definite article is important in this context.[41]However, I am sure that the Judge’s direction to himself was precise and I am sure that the Judge reached the correct conclusion via the correct route. It is right to observe that Olivia McCourt gave evidence that there was no record of a complaint that the Appellant was in possession of nude images of another child for distribution, or that he was sent indecent images of another child. The officer was in no better position to point to direct evidence of such images. However, Mr Thomas KC, who appeared for the Defendant Chief Constable, submitted that the scope of relevant evidence went much further. He pointed to the history and drew attention to the interventions which had been necessary. Miss McCourt had given the officer a complete summary of matters which the School had addressed during January, June and September 2018. I accept Mr Thomas’ submission.[42]In my judgment, it would have been a misstep for either the officer or the Judge to leave that part of the context out of account. The history was evidently relevant to forming a reasonable suspicion.[43]I do not accept that the Judge took account of matters which were outside of those which were within the officer’s knowledge and contemporaneous thinking. It was a simple narrative. The School received information from a parent which prompted real concern. It was more of the same behaviour which the School had been experiencing during 2018. This was communicated to the officer who had to make a decision and it was a pattern of behaviour which had been disclosed to him. In my judgment, the officer was bound to take that into account.[44]The Judge held that the officer had reasonable grounds for suspicion that an offence (c.f. the offence) had been committed. In expressing himself in that way, the Judge was merely introducing his finding that PC Carlton did not have precise information about the data in Corey’s possession but the Judge was absolutely clear in his finding that the officer honestly believed that Corey had possession of images of a young female child. In my judgment, that finding disposes of this ground of appeal because it is a finding in respect of the offence for which Corey was arrested.[45]A reasonably thorough investigation is not a pre-requisite for reasonable grounds for suspicion. An arrest may be effected very early in an investigation and it nonetheless lawful for that: West Yorkshire v Armstrong [2008] EWCA Civ 1518 at [13-14] per Hallet L.J., with whom Arden L.J. and Blackburne J. agreed.The arrest was lawful in this regard, and this aspect of the appeal fails (Grounds 4, 5 and 7).

Necessary to Arrest

[46]I have found that the Judge was correct to find that the Officer had an honest suspicion of commission of the offence of possessing an indecent image of a child. The jury found that the Officer believed that arrest was necessary to protect a child and to allow prompt and effective investigation. The next step is to apply the objective test of necessity; a high bar. Was the Officer’s belief reasonable?[47]This is a case in which both the Appellant and those who the police were concerned to protect were all children. Mr Crowe is correct to emphasise the very particular care which is to be taken before arresting a child. He is supported in that regard by the terms of PACE Code of Practice G (1B), especially for an arrest at school which should only happen if it is unavoidable. He is further supported by the dicta of Cotter J. in ST v The Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire Police [2022] EWHC 1280 (QB). There is to be specific consideration of the fact that the arrested person is a child. It requires an assessment of whether a less intrusive step than arrest or detention is a practical alternative. ST was in a case in which the child was arrested at 05.30 am, when he was asleep at home.[48]Cotter J. had regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which provides that arrest of a child is a measure of last resort (Art 37), and also to s. 11(2)(a) Children Act 2004 which requires the local police body to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. The welfare of the Appellant was an obviously material circumstance, and arrest should be a measure of last resort after adequate consideration of realistic practical alternatives [104].[49]Further, I was shown guidance which is produced by the College of Policing: Police Action in Response to Youth Produced Sexual Imagery (‘Sexting’). Mr Crowe relied upon it. I did not gain any assistance from it. It was clearly useful for its intended audience but it does not assist this court in resolving the issues beyond identifying the obvious relevant factors: assess seriousness and risks; during investigation, bear in mind longer term effects such as labelling children; consider seizing devices, but do not do so automatically; the current and future welfare of the child should be considered, including referral for other support.[50]The Judge took some care to consider ST. He found that it was not possible to balance the competing factors in the same way in this present case because obtaining evidence was a main objective. This was a significantly more serious offence than in ST (handling a mobile phone case) as the Judge explained at [75]:
“The balance here needed to be struck so as to protect the potential victims, who were children, and who might be put at risk of harm from the Claimant. The interference with the Claimant's liberty might well be justified in such circumstances.”
Moreover, the arrest was made after some significant involvement by the School.[51]Mr Crowe criticises the arrest as lacking in consideration of alternatives, and the best interests of the Appellant and for its lack of compliance with the guidance. There is some force in each of those criticisms.[52]Mr Crowe submitted that arrest went too far. A search warrant was a less intrusive measure which would have been more consistent with the Appellant’s welfare and best interests. As far as they go, I accept those submissions. But there is another set of considerations which is the protection of the welfare of other children in circumstances where there is a history of concern about indecent images, as the Judge recognised and explained.[53]One of Mr Crowe’s strongest points, is the impact of Codes C and G as to arresting juveniles at school only when it is unavoidable. That creates at least a presumption against arrest. Arrest may occur at school, but only if that cannot be avoided. However, that cannot be taken as a prohibition on arrest at school, nor can it override the assessment against the test in s. 24(4) overall.[54]The Code C and G guidance that arrest of a child is to be assessed by reference to whether it was unavoidable is guidance which overlaps with the law as to alternatives. In my judgment, the assessment to be made is much narrower in respect of children, by reason of the Code C and G guidance, than in respect of adults.[55]Mr Morley, of counsel, who appeared before the Judge for the Chief Constable, conceded that the arrest may appear harsh. In my judgment, it was harsh and it was avoidable. I repeat the guidance:
“1B Juveniles should not be arrested at their place of education unless this is unavoidable.”
This is to be read and understood in the legislative context which applies to children and their best interests. As Cotter J. identified in ST, arrest of a child is a last resort. On each of the reasons advanced for the arrest, it was reasonably avoidable. The Appellant did not have his phone with him. It was unnecessary to arrest him at school to obtain a phone which he did not have. For the same reason, children were not at risk because the Appellant had been withdrawn from his class and did not have his phone.[56]These points have been canvassed before me with greater focus than before the Judge. In consequence, his judgment has less to say on the guidance to which I have referred. On this finely balanced question, I find that it was neither unavoidable nor the last resort to arrest the Appellant. I do so on the basis of the facts as found so clearly by the Judge but directing myself differently as to the relevant assessment to be made. In the case of a child at his or her place of education, to consider alternatives is not enough: generally, arrest of a child at school is reasonable when it is unavoidable.[57]Here, the Appellant had been taken to a room at the School. That was uneventful. Staff had powers of search. The Appellant’s grandmother was engaged and cooperative. Her assistance was available.[58]The difficulty which the Appellant caused for the School and the Police should not be underestimated. He presented both his school and the Police with a sensitive and nuanced situation. A range of alternative approaches had been taken by the School during 2018 to address issues of significant concern. On 9th November it appeared that they had not been successful. The School and other agencies seem to me to have reacted calmly and sensitively and in a supportive way. However, I have concluded, with some considerable regret, that the Officer went further than was reasonable in respect of a child at his place of education. Grounds 2, 3 and 6 succeed. Handcuffing & Detention[59]I have found that the arrest was unlawful and it follows that the handcuffing and detention were also unlawful.[60]However, I propose to give my brief reasons for the counterfactual. An officer may use reasonable force in the exercise of a power conferred on him under PACE: see s. 117, and also s. 3 Criminal Law Act 1967. I find that the evidence discloses a risk of harm, as did the Judge. The Officer was entitled to conclude that there was a risk to the Appellant’s safety. The concept of risk includes an assessment of the prospect that the hazard or event might happen. A factor in that assessment was the fact that the Officer was alone.[61]Nothing more than the minimum was done in terms of the length of time that the Appellant was in handcuffs, which was essentially for the journey from the school to the police station. If the arrest had been lawful the handcuffing was not unlawful for the reasons which the Judge gave. I would have rejected Ground 8.[62]I reach similar conclusions in respect of the detention. The Judge’s analysis was, in my judgement, impeccable. Ground 9 was not pressed with any vigour before me. I would have rejected it. The period of detention was justified by reason of the need to obtain the Appellant’s account during interview, and his release was properly coordinated with the arrival of an appropriate adult to whom the Appellant could be released.

Conclusion

[63]The appeal is allowed.