Cynthia Niruka Tooley v Associated Newspapers Ltd & Anor [2026] EWHC 683 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 683 (KB)Case No KB-2025-003957Case No KB-2025-003959Case No KB-2025-004492
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 23/03/2026
Before
THE HON. MRS JUSTICE STEYN DBE
Between
CYNTHIA NKIRUKA TOOLEY MBEClaimantASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS LIMITEDDefendantsTELEGRAPH MEDIA GROUP LIMITEDDefendant
The Claimant appeared in person for in personJonathan Price KC (instructed by Wiggin LLP) for DefendantsHearing Hearing date: 12 March 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 14:30 on 23 March 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................THE HON. MRS JUSTICE STEYN DBE

Introduction

[1]The claimant has issued two claims in defamation and malicious falsehood against Associated Newspapers Ltd (‘ANL’), in respect of three articles published in the Daily Mail, and a claim in the same causes of action against Telegraph Media Group Ltd (‘TMG’), in respect of an article published in the Telegraph. This judgment determines applications issued by the claimant, dealing with issues of limitation, relief from sanctions, the lifting of stays, applications for interim injunctions and Norwich Pharmacal relief.[2]The claimant has also made a claim against Times Media Ltd. The latter claim was the subject of a joint directions hearing with this claim. In the event, to accommodate the parties’ availability, the applications in that claim were heard separately on 19 March 2026.[3]A summary of my conclusions appears at the end of this judgment.

The Articles

[4]ANL has published four articles of relevance to these applications: i) An article entitled, “A toxic divorce, police called over an air pistol – and a missing cat. GUY ADAMS unravels… The Kafkaesque tale of how the boss of Britain’s only anti-woke university, who’s famous for attacking cancel culture, has been summarily CANCELLED”, which was published online (on the MailOnline now Daily Mail Online website) on 18 October 2024, and in the Daily Mail print edition on 19 October 2024 (‘the First ANL Article’); ii) An article entitled, “University vice-chancellor is suspended from £229,000-a-year post as his estranged wife accuses him of having ‘affair with a young student whose fees he helped to pay’”, which was published online on 5 December 2024 (‘the Second ANL Article’); iii) An article entitled, “Will those who put Britain’s only anti-woke Vice Chancellor through a ‘politically motivated’ witch-hunt pay a price”, which was published online on 30 January 2025 (‘the Third ANL Article’); and iv) An article entitled, “Estranged wife of high-profile free speech academic ‘stole £12,000 from company run by lover who was 28 years her senior’, which was published online on 23 April 2025 (‘the Fourth ANL Article’). The Fourth ANL Article is not the subject of any claim brought by the claimant, but it is central to her Norwich Pharmacal application.[5]TMG published one article, entitled “Now the one British university unambiguous in championing free speech is at risk of being muzzled”, in the Telegraph online, on 26 October 2024 and in print with substantially the same headline on 27 October 2024 (‘the TMG Article’).

The Claims

[6]The claim form in the first claim against ANL (claim number KB-2025-003959, hereafter ‘ANL1’) is dated 23 October 2025 and was sealed on 24 October 2025. In the claim form, the claimant identified only the First ANL Article as the publication in respect of which she was bringing a defamation and malicious falsehood claim. However, in particulars of claim filed at the same time, she identified the publications complained of as the First and Second ANL Articles. I address the scope of ANL1 when determining the limitation issue.[7]The claim form in the TMG claim, bringing a claim in defamation and malicious falsehood in respect of the TMG Article, was issued on the same day as ANL1. The claimant has exhibited to a witness statement her particulars of claim in the TMG claim.[8]For the reasons I explain in the context of the claimant’s application for relief from sanctions (in respect of TMG) and the limitation application (in respect of ANL) the ANL1 and TMG claims have not been served.[9]The claim form in the second claim against ANL (claim number KB-2025-004492, hereafter ‘ANL2’) was issued on 1 December 2025. It was amended on 21 January 2026, prior to service. The amended claim form and particulars of claim in ANL2 were deemed served on 4 February 2026. The amended claim form in ANL2 identified the Second and Third ANL Articles in the “Brief details of claim” (although the particulars of claim in ANL2 do not, currently, address the Second ANL Article). Time for service of the Defence has been extended by my order of 12 March 2026.

Relief from sanctions and lifting the stay (TMG)

[10]By an application notice dated 23 October 2025 and filed at court the following day together with the TMG claim form, the claimant applied for the time for service of the claim form and particulars of claim to be extended by 90 days to enable her to complete engagement with the defendant under the Pre-Action Protocol for Media and Communications Claims. The claimant made the same application in ANL1. Both applications were made without notice to the defendants.[11]The claimant had instructed specialist defamation solicitors, Edwards Duthie Shamash, on 1 July 2025, under a conditional fee agreement. On her behalf, on 8 September 2025, they had sent letters of claim to both TMG and ANL. Both TMG and ANL instructed Wiggin LLP. Wiggin responded on behalf of TMG to the letter of claim on 22 September 2025. In their letter, they took issue with the claimant’s proposed meaning, raised a number of questions, and sought confirmation that a non-molestation order made by Deputy District Judge Baumohl on 13 November 2024 in proceedings in the Family Court between the claimant and Dr Tooley, as varied by District Judge Nutley on 13 March 2025, did not prevent the claimant communicating any of the information in the letter of claim, and did not prohibit Dr Tooley providing TMG with relevant information on a not for publication basis.[12]Wiggin sent a separate response to the ANL letter of claim on 3 October 2025, raising similar questions regarding the effect of the non-molestation order.[13]At the hearing, the claimant informed me that on 26 September 2025 her then solicitors, Edwards Duthie Shamash, telephoned her to inform her that they were pausing their representation due to a complaint made against them to the Solicitors Regulation Authority by Dr Tooley’s solicitors in the family proceedings, Griffin Law. They informed the claimant they were “unable to act” for her and she has represented herself in these proceedings since then.[14]It was in this context that the claimant made the applications to which I have referred. The applications were considered by Master Stevens who made the following order in the TMG claim (dated 27 October 2025, but not sealed until 1 December 2025):
“1. Having been issued, the claim shall be stayed, to enable the parties to participate in the steps outlined under the relevant Pre-Action Protocol for Media & Communication claims. During such stay the claim form shall not be released for service and time shall not run (under CPR 7.5 or otherwise; and so that any relevant time limit is extended) in relation to service or steps for service. 2. The Claimant may apply for the stay to be lifted, but if he does so then he [sic] must first have filed at court a copy of any pre-action Protocol letter and Response, as required at direction 1 above, and as referred to in the opening paragraphs of this order, for the court’s review. 3. If the Claimant makes no application to lift the stay in accordance with direction 2 above by 4:00 PM on 5th January 2026 then the claim will in any event be struck out.”
[15]A separate order in the same terms as quoted above was made by Master Stevens on 27 October 2025 (and sealed the same day) in the claimant’s separate application in ANL1.[16]TMG were unaware of the application until they received Master Stevens’ order from the court on 8 December 2025. In a letter to the claimant dated 15 December 2025, Wiggin (on behalf of TMG) queried why the claimant’s letter of 8 December 2025 (erroneously dated 21 November 2025) did not refer to Master Stevens’ order. Given the dates on which it was sealed and received by TMG, and the terms of the claimant’s letters of 21 November 2025 (in which she indicated she would seek a stay, if required) and 8 December 2025 (in which she indicated her intention to serve the claim in the event that she received no substantive response to her further pre-action protocol correspondence by 12 December 2025), it is readily apparent that the claimant was not aware a stay had been granted in the TMG case when she wrote those letters. Wiggin asked the claimant to serve them with any application to lift the stay (in the TMG case) so that they would have an opportunity to make representations, if appropriate.[17]On 2 January 2026, the claimant made an application to lift the stay of ANL1. She made no corresponding application in respect of the TMG claim. The effect of Master Stevens’ order is that, subject to the claimant’s application for relief from sanctions, as no such application to lift the stay was made by 4pm on 5 January 2026, the TMG claim will be struck out.[18]In her skeleton argument for the hearing before Heather Williams J on 13 January 2026, the claimant sought “the Court’s indulgence under CPR 3.10” and lifting of the stay of the TMG claim. At the hearing, she confirmed her intention to make an application for relief from sanctions under CPR 3.9. Heather Williams J gave directions for, among other matters, the claimant to file any application for relief from sanctions, with supporting evidence, by 21 January 2026. The claimant complied with that order.[19]The relief from sanctions application falls to be determined in accordance with the well-known Denton principles. The first stage is to identify and assess the seriousness and significance of the failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order which engages rule 3.9(1). The claimant’s failure was significant and consequential: in circumstances where the court had ordered that her claim would stand struck out if she did not apply to lift the stay by 5 January 2026, she failed to make such an application.[20]The second stage is to consider why the default occurred. In her first consolidated witness statement, dated 8 January 2026, the claimant said:
“I should clarify one procedural point. In preparing multiple related injunction applications against different publishers, I inadvertently sought to lift the stay in the Associated Newspapers Limited matter rather than the Telegraph Media Group matter. The same solicitors are instructed across the matters, and the substance of the injunction issues is materially identical. This was an honest administrative slip arising from the overlap of proceedings, and I respectfully seek the Court’s indulgence to treat the applications as aligned for case-management purposes.”
[21]In her skeleton argument for the hearing on 13 January 2026, the claimant described the failure to apply to lift the stay as “an administrative error where the application to lift the stay was initially indexed under the ANL matter”.[22]In her witness statement filed in support of the application for relief from sanctions, dated 19 January 2026, the claimant states:
“That failure was not deliberate, tactical, or contumelious. It arose from a genuine and reasonable misunderstanding in circumstances where: • two stays were imposed on the same day by the same Master on the two separate claims [TMG and ANL1]. • The same solicitors (Wiggin LLP) acted for both ANL and TMG, • The proceedings were factually and procedurally intertwined, and • I was acting as a litigant in person under exceptional pressure.”
[23]In the late evening on the day before the hearing, the claimant adduced a medical report produced following an online consultation with a consultant psychiatrist two days before the hearing. The psychiatrist found, based on the claimant’s responses to questionnaires and following a clinical interview, that she demonstrates “a pervasive, lifelong pattern of symptoms consistent with ADHD, combined presentation” (i.e. she displays significant symptoms of both inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity). In her oral submissions, the claimant relied on this report in support of her submission that she made an inadvertent mistake, not through carelessness but because pursuing the case matters so much to her that, on occasion, her brain becomes overwhelmed and she slips up.[24]On behalf of TMG, Mr Price KC submits that the claimant’s explanations have differed. Although he does not challenge the admissibility of the recent diagnosis, he draws attention to the fact that it is not in the form of a CPR Part 35-compliant expert report, and it appears to have been obtained for the purpose of the hearing, based essentially on the claimant’s self-report. He does not dispute the diagnosis but submits – in relation to limitation as well as relief from sanctions – it should be given little weight, and certainly not decisive weight given that it is not a Part 35-compliant report.[25]In my view, the claimant’s core explanation that she made an inadvertent error, in circumstances where she initially noted the timing of the application to lift the stay under ANL1, is consistent and convincing. Although she was not clear in her own mind how she had fallen into error, it is apparent from the documents that she was initially only aware of the stay of ANL1 because Master Stevens’ order to that effect was sealed on 27 October 2025. She was not made aware that an order to the same effect had been made in the TMG claim until about five weeks later when that order was sealed. It is evident that, receiving those almost identical orders weeks apart, in respect of applications that she had made at the same time, resulted in the claimant overlooking the need to alter the note she had made for herself (in respect of ANL1) regarding the lifting of the stay, so that she remembered to take the same action in respect of the TMG claim. As she readily acknowledged, it was a mistake on her part, as she did receive the order and Wiggin’s letter of 15 December 2025. However, it plainly was inadvertent.[26]In view of my conclusions on the first two stages, the third stage is critical. I have to deal justly with the application, having evaluated all the circumstances of the case, including the seriousness and significance of the breach and the explanation for it, and giving particular weight to the need(a) for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost; and(b) to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.[27]In support of his submission that I should refuse relief from sanctions, Mr Price relies on Barton v Wright Hassall llp [2018] UKSC 12 [2018] 1 WLR 1119, in which Lord Sumption JSC made the following observations regarding the appellant’s status as a litigant in person, at [18]:
“In current circumstances any court will appreciate that litigating in person is not always a matter of choice. At a time when the availability of legal aid and conditional fee agreements have been restricted, some litigants may have little option but to represent themselves. Their lack of representation will often justify making allowances in making case management decisions and in conducting hearings. But it will not usually justify applying to litigants in person a lower standard of compliance with rules or orders of the court. The overriding objective requires the courts so far as practicable to enforce compliance with the rules: CPR rule 1.1(1)(f) . The rules do not in any relevant respect distinguish between represented and unrepresented parties. In applications under CPR 3.9 for relief from sanctions, it is now well established that the fact that the applicant was unrepresented at the relevant time is not in itself a reason not to enforce rules of court against him: R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] 1 WLR 2472, para 44 (Moore-Bick LJ); Nata Lee Ltd v Abid [2015] 2 P & CR 3. At best, it may affect the issue "at the margin", as Briggs LJ observed (para 53) in the latter case, which I take to mean that it may increase the weight to be given to some other, more directly relevant factor. … The rules provide a framework within which to balance the interest of both sides. That balance is inevitably disturbed if an unrepresented litigant is entitled to greater indulgence in complying with them than his represented opponent. Any advantage enjoyed by a litigant in person imposes a corresponding disadvantage on the other side, which may be significant if it affects the latter's legal rights, under the Limitation Acts for example. Unless the rules and practice directions are particularly inaccessible or obscure, it is reasonable to expect a litigant in person to familiarise himself with the rules which apply to any step which he is about to take.”
[28]Mr Price submits that granting relief from sanctions would mean that TMG would now face the commencement (for all practical purposes) of a libel action well outside the limitation period. TMG is currently free of any claim by the claimant, whereas granting her application for relief from sanctions, and lifting the stay, would have the effect of reinstating the claim.[29]The consequence of refusing relief would be that the claimant would be deprived of the ability to pursue a claim that she brought within time, and in respect of which she had engaged with the pre-action protocol prior to issuing the claim, and during the period the stay was in operation. On the other hand, granting relief means that TMG faces a claim which would otherwise stand struck out.[30]The failure to apply in time to lift the stay is significant because of the consequence provided for in Master Stevens’ order. Nevertheless, I note that the context was one in which it would have been clear to TMG that the claimant was intending to pursue the claim, not least as she made an application for an interim injunction in the TMG claim on 5 January 2026. And within three days, as soon as the claimant realised her error, she had filed a witness statement seeking the court’s indulgence to lift the stay, albeit the formal application for relief was filed later, in accordance with Heather Williams J’s order. The default was an inadvertent error, made despite the claimant’s conscientious efforts to deal with multiple claims, in circumstances where she received two almost identical orders, made on the same day, but sealed many weeks apart, and overlooked the significance of the later order for scheduling the steps required of her.[31]This is a case where the fact that the inadvertent error was made by a litigant in person affects the issue “at the margin”, but no more than that. I have borne in mind the claimant’s recent diagnosis but I give it little weight for the reasons put forward by Mr Price, and it is not a decisive factor.[32]In my judgment, in all the circumstances, I consider that the interests of justice militate in favour of granting the claimant’s application for relief from sanctions. Accordingly, I will make an order re-instating the TMG claim and lifting the stay so that the claimant will then be able to serve the claim form. Limitation (ANL1) The primary limitation period and the application

Limitation (ANL1)

[33]Section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980 provides, so far as relevant, that no action for libel or malicious falsehood “shall be brought after the expiration of one year from the date on which the cause of action accrued”. The day on which the cause of action accrued is excluded from the computation in ascertaining the limitation period: Otuo v Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of Britan [2017] EWCA Civ 136, [2017] EMLR 15, [36] (Sharp LJ).[34]The claim in respect of the First ANL Article, published on 18 October 2024, should have been brought on or before 18 October 2025. The claim form in ANL1 was issued on 24 October 2025 but it is dated the day before. The claim in fact appears to have been “brought” on the day it was issued, as that is the day it was submitted, but ANL is prepared to proceed on the assumption that the claim was “brought” on the earlier of those two dates i.e. 23 October 2025. It follows that it was brought five days after the expiry of the limitation period. I agree that whether it was a day or two more or less beyond the limitation period is inconsequential.[35]By an application noticed filed on 27 October 2025, the claimant sought permission under s.32A of the Limitation Act 1980 to issue a defamation and malicious falsehood claim “partly out of time”. This is an unusual way for the limitation issue to arise, as the claimant did not require permission to issue the claim: limitation provides a potential defence. Nevertheless, the claim is currently stayed and the claimant has applied (within time) for the stay of ANL1 to be lifted. In these circumstances, it is convenient to determine the limitation issue at this stage – which has been fully argued – and, if the claim is barred by limitation, refuse to lift the stay and dismiss the claim.

Scope of ANL1

[36]A preliminary question that arises is as to the scope of ANL1 in circumstances where the claim form identifies only the First ANL Article but the particulars of claim identify both the First and Second ANL Articles. This has an impact on the order I will make on the applications before me. But in circumstances where the Second ANL Article is identified in the claim form in ANL2, which claim was issued within 12 months of publication of the Second ANL Article, it will not ultimately affect whether the Second ANL Article is time-barred. That depends on the application of s.32A of the Limitation Act 1980 and s.8 of the Defamation Act 2013.[37]CPR 16.2(1) provides so far as material:
“The claim form must: (a) contain a concise statement of the nature of the claim; and … (e) contain such other matters as may be set out in a practice direction.”
[38]Practice Direction 53B – Media and Communications Claims provides in para 4.1(1):
“In a claim for libel the publication the subject of the claim must be identified in the claim form.”
[39]In my judgment, in light of these provisions, in circumstances where a libel claim has been brought and the claim form identifies only one article as the statement complained of, it cannot be said that the claim extends to another unidentified article. That is so even if, in separate particulars of claim, the second article is identified because the Practice Direction is clear that any publication which is the subject of a libel claim must be identified in the claim form. It follows that, in this case, the only publication which is the subject of ANL1 is the First ANL Article. The Second and Third ANL Articles are the subject of a separate claim, ANL2.[40]On the alternative premise that ANL1 encompassed the Second ANL Article, ANL submitted, and the claimant refuted, that it is a “subsequent publication” within the meaning of s.8(3) of the Defamation Act 2013, and so any cause of action accrued on the date of the First ANL Publication. However, in light of my decision as to the scope of ANL1, any limitation issue in respect of the Second ANL Article, will be a matter for future determination. There is no application in respect of ANL2 before the court.

Section 32A and the applicable legal principles

[41]Section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 provides, so far as relevant:
“(1) If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which – (a) the operation of section 4A of this Act prejudices the plaintiff or any person whom he represents, and (b) any decision of the court under this subsection would prejudice the defendant or any person whom he represents, the court may direct that that section shall not apply to the action or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to which the action relates. (2) In acting under this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to – (a) the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the plaintiff; (b) where the reason or one of the reasons for the delay was that all or any of the facts relevant to the cause of action did not become known to the plaintiff until after the end of the period mentioned in section 4A – (i) the date on which any such facts did become known to him, and (ii) the extent to which he acted promptly and reasonably once he knew whether or not the facts in question might be capable of giving rise to an action; and (c) the extent to which, having regard to the delay, relevant evidence is likely – (i) to be unavailable, or (ii) to be less cogent than if the action had been brought within the period mentioned in section 4A.” (a) the operation of section 4A of this Act prejudices the plaintiff or any person whom he represents, and (b) any decision of the court under this subsection would prejudice the defendant or any person whom he represents, (a) the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the plaintiff; (b) where the reason or one of the reasons for the delay was that all or any of the facts relevant to the cause of action did not become known to the plaintiff until after the end of the period mentioned in section 4A – (i) the date on which any such facts did become known to him, and (ii) the extent to which he acted promptly and reasonably once he knew whether or not the facts in question might be capable of giving rise to an action; and (c) the extent to which, having regard to the delay, relevant evidence is likely – (i) to be unavailable, or (ii) to be less cogent than if the action had been brought within the period mentioned in section 4A.”
[42]The onus is on the claimant to make out a case for disapplication of the limitation period: Bewry v Reed Elsevier UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1411, [2015] 1 WLR 2565, [8] (Sharp LJ).[43]In Bewry, the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against a decision of the High Court to disapply the limitation period pursuant to s.32A in a claim for libel. Sharp LJ observed:
“5. The discretion to disapply is a wide one, and is largely unfettered: see Steedman v British Broadcasting Corpn [2002] EMLR 318, para 15. However it is clear that special considerations apply to libel actions which are relevant to the exercise of this discretion. In particular, the purpose of a libel action is vindication of a claimant’s reputation. A claimant who wishes to achieve this end by swift remedial action will want his action to be heard as soon as possible. Such claims ought therefore to be pursued with vigour, especially in view of the ephemeral nature of most media publications. These considerations have led to the uniquely short limitation period of one year which applies to such claims and explain why the disapplication of the limitation period in libel actions is often described as exceptional. 6. Steedman v British Broadcasting Corpn was the first case in which the Court of Appeal had to consider the manner in which a judge exercised his discretion pursuant to section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980. Brooke LJ said, at para 41: ‘it would be quite wrong to read into section 32A words that are not there. However, the very strong policy considerations underlying modern defamation practice, which are now powerfully underlined by the terms of the new Pre-action Protocol for Defamation, tend to influence an interpretation of section 32A which entitles the court to take into account all the considerations set out in this judgment when it has regard to all the circumstances of the case . . .’” ‘it would be quite wrong to read into section 32A words that are not there. However, the very strong policy considerations underlying modern defamation practice, which are now powerfully underlined by the terms of the new Pre-action Protocol for Defamation, tend to influence an interpretation of section 32A which entitles the court to take into account all the considerations set out in this judgment when it has regard to all the circumstances of the case . . .’”
[44]Sharp J noted the terms of para 1.4 of what was then called the Pre-action Protocol for Defamation. The current version, the Pre-action Protocol for Media and Communications Claims, states at paragraph 1.4:
“There are important features which distinguish defamation claims and other media and communications claims from other areas of civil litigation . . . In particular, time is frequently ‘of the essence’ in defamation and other publication claims; the limitation period is (uniquely) only one year in defamation and malicious falsehood cases, and often a Claimant will be seeking an immediate correction and/or apology as part of the process of restoring his/her reputation.”
See Civil Procedure 2025, vol 1, para C6-001.[45]In Bewry, Sharp LJ observed at [8]:
“Unexplained or inadequately explained delay deprives the Court of the material it needs to determine the reasons for the delay and to arrive at a conclusion that is fair to both sides in the litigation. A claimant who does not ‘get on with it’ and provides vague and unsatisfactory evidence to explain his or her delay, or ‘place[s] as little information before the court when inviting a section 32A discretion to be exercised in their favour … should not be surprised if the court is unwilling to find that it is equitable to grant them their request’, per Brooke LJ in Steedman v British Broadcasting Corpn, para 45.”
[46]On the facts of Bewry, the claim was brought two years and four months after the words complained of were published and 11 months after the claimant had knowledge of all the facts necessary to bring a claim against both defendants ([16]).[47]The (perceived) delay in Otuo was much shorter. The claim was struck out on the understanding that it was brought one day after the expiry of the limitation period. HHJ Parkes QC, sitting as a judge of the High Court, refused to exercise his discretion pursuant to s.32A to disapply the primary limitation period. With reference to HHJ Parkes QC’s judgment, Sharp LJ noted that he said that “experienced defamation judges have tended to regard the disapplication of the limitation period as an exceptional matter” (14]). She continued:
“16. The judge said this about the fact that the proceedings were issued one day out of time (as he understood the position to be): ‘32. Nor am I impressed by the claimant's argument that the discretion should be exercised in his favour given his mistake as to the last date on which to issue, or given the fact that he was only a day out of time. There was no good reason to leave issuing proceedings until the last minute. This is not a case like Hartley v Birmingham City District Council [1992] 1 WLR 968, where proceedings were inadvertently issued a day late against a background of prolonged negotiations with underwriters about quantum, liability not being in issue. As Leggatt LJ observed, “if that application to disapply the limitation period had failed, it was hard to imagine any application being successful.” 33. It is my conclusion that the claimant's reasons for failing to issue proceedings within the limitation period are inadequate, and certainly not, to adopt the language of the defendant's successful submissions in Bewry, of a sufficiently precise or compelling nature to discharge the heavy onus on him … 35. Conversely, if I exercised my discretion to disapply the limitation period, the defendant would suffer the substantial prejudice of having to defend a slander action of which it had known nothing until after the limitation period had expired. In my view, it would be quite wrong to describe the consequences of my refusal to disapply the limitation period as a windfall for the defendant, in the sense that it certainly would have been in Hartley.’ 17. The judge went on to say that it was not suggested that the delay had any effect on the defendant's ability to defend the claim, which was an important consideration and one that section 32A(2)(c) expressly requires the court to have in mind; but this was a far from decisive consideration, and in the present case, it seemed to him to carry little weight. He found there was no sufficient reason to disapply the limitation period and dismissed the appellant's application.” ‘32. Nor am I impressed by the claimant's argument that the discretion should be exercised in his favour given his mistake as to the last date on which to issue, or given the fact that he was only a day out of time. There was no good reason to leave issuing proceedings until the last minute. This is not a case like Hartley v Birmingham City District Council [1992] 1 WLR 968, where proceedings were inadvertently issued a day late against a background of prolonged negotiations with underwriters about quantum, liability not being in issue. As Leggatt LJ observed, “if that application to disapply the limitation period had failed, it was hard to imagine any application being successful.”
[48]The Court of Appeal made clear that “no criticism can be made of the way the judge dealt with the matter at the time” ([39]). But in circumstances where the issue had proceeded on the false basis that the proceedings were issued out of time, when in fact the claim had been brought in time, the court allowed the appeal ([39]).[49]In Hallam Estates v Baker [2012] EWHC 1046 (QB), Tugendhat J observed:
“The authorities are clear that the loss of a limitation defence is by itself a matter of considerable importance and ‘a miss is as good as a mile’. Many cases stress that time is always of the essence in defamation claims, and that is why the limitation period is uniquely one year only.”

The claimant’s evidence

[50]In the application notice, and her original witness statement in support, the claimant said that it was “not reasonably practicable” for her to issue proceedings within the original limitation period. The reason she gave for this was that her attempts to comply with the Pre-Action Protocol were “obstructed” by Wiggin’s reliance on the Non-Molestation Order and request for “confirmation that the Claimant could lawfully correspond with them before engaging on the merits”. At the same time, Griffin Law reported Edwards Duthie Shamash to the SRA for sending the letters of claim which “effectively neutralised the Claimant’s Conditional Fee Agreement representation while the SRA investigated, leaving her unable to proceed”. She said that she acted promptly “once the obstruction became clear”.[51]In her first consolidated witness statement the claimant stated that any delay was “fully explained by sustained, exceptional and disabling circumstances”. She said that “for several weeks” from October 2024, she was “effectively homeless”, living in hotels before moving “to a building site which I worked to make minimally liveable”. She said that she was arrested on 4 February 2025, released without charge, but her “laptop and mobile phones were seized and retained for approximately nine months, only being returned on 4 November 2025”. She said that during this period she was “practically and technologically unable to prepare litigation materials or evidence”. The claimant also said that she was “under significant mental health strain”, and again referred to losing the solicitors she had instructed under a CFA.[52]At the hearing, as I have noted in respect of the application for relief from sanctions, she relied on a very recent ADHD diagnosis.

Decision

[53]The claimant was aware of the First ANL Article very shortly after it was published. The journalist had written to her two days prior to publication. The claimant responded only after publication, on 25 October 2024. In her email she said that he had “published falsehoods” and “completely untrue statements” and stirred up “hateful comments” against her. Section 32A(2)(b) is inapplicable. The claimant not only knew all the facts relevant to the cause of action before the end of the 12 month limitation period, she knew them from the very outset of that period.[54]The claimant instructed solicitors on 1 July 2025, more than eight months after the First ANL Article was published, and they sent a letter of claim on 8 September 2025. On 26 September 2025, the claimant was informed by her (then) solicitors that they were unable to act for her. She knew then that she was representing herself. I infer that the claimant knew full well that the limitation period for the causes of action she wished to pursue was 12 months. She has not suggested otherwise.[55]In my judgment, the claimant’s reasons for failing to bring her claim within the limitation period do not stand up to scrutiny, and do not properly explain the delay. The fact that she had to move unexpectedly in October 2024 provides no explanation for the delay. Within a matter of weeks she was able to move into a house that she and her (former) husband owned. Nor is her reliance on the mental strain she was under a compelling reason for not taking swift action to protect her reputation.[56]The assertion that she was “practically and technologically unable to prepare litigation materials or evidence” between 4 February and 4 November 2025 is wholly undermined by the evidence. Within little more than a week after her arrest on 4 February, the claimant was able to email a type-written letter containing a subject access request to Griffin Law, and the covering email indicated that she had access to an iPhone. There are numerous examples of the claimant corresponding by email during this period, including with her representatives. The claims against ANL and TMG, the applications for extensions of time for service, and for disapplication of the primary limitation period, were all made prior to 4 November 2025. It is absolutely clear that the retention of her devices by the police did not present any practical or technological barrier to the claimant’s ability to conduct litigation.[57]The confirmation Wiggin had in fact sought was in the terms identified in paragraph ‎11 above. Wiggin’s reasonable request for confirmation regarding the effect of the non-molestation order did not have the effect that it was not reasonably practicable for the claimant to issue proceedings in time. There was no “obstruction” that was created and then cleared before the claim was filed.[58]The loss of her legal representatives was unexpected. I have heard argument as to whether that was the result of any failure on the part of the claimant but it seems to me that it is unnecessary to make any findings in that regard. I approach the exercise of the discretion on the assumption that she was not at fault. Nevertheless, that occurred more than three weeks before the limitation period expired. She has given no evidence as to the state of preparation of her claim at that point, or as to what happened, or failed to happen, in the three weeks prior to the expiry of the limitation period that resulted in her filing the claim late.[59]The onus is on the claimant to make out the case for disapplication. Once the untenable claim that she lacked the technology to prepare litigation is dismissed, there is in truth no real explanation, and certainly no clear or satisfactory explanation, for why she did not take the step of issuing ANL1 at any point in time during the 12-month period following publication of the First ANL Article. In her oral submissions, the claimant focused on her recent diagnosis of ADHD, but that is not an explanation of what, in fact, occurred which resulted in her filing the claim several days out of time.[60]It has not been suggested that the delay has had an effect on the availability or cogency of relevant evidence or, more broadly, on ANL’s ability to defend the claim. That is an important consideration which s.32A(2)(c) requires the court to have in mind, but it is a far from decisive consideration.[61]The length of the delay is measured in days, but that is in the context of a uniquely short limitation period for defamation and malicious falsehood claims, reflecting the well established point that for these causes of actions time is of the essence. And, as Tugendhat J observed, when it comes to bringing such a claim within the statutory limitation period, “a miss is as good as a mile”.[62]A refusal to disapply the limitation period will have the effect that ANL1 will be dismissed without determination of the merits. On the other hand, if I were to exercise my discretion to disapply the limitation period, ANL would suffer the substantial prejudice of losing its limitation defence and having to defend a libel claim. A key factor, in accordance with s.32A(2)(a), and the authorities to which I have referred, is whether a sufficiently clear, adequate and satisfactory explanation for the delay has been provided. In this case, any such explanation is distinctly lacking. Those that have been provided are untenable or vague, inadequate and unsatisfactory. In all the circumstances, it appears to me that it would not be equitable to exercise my discretion to exclude the ordinary operation of the time limit in s.4A of the Limitation Act 1980 in respect of ANL1. It follows that ANL1 will be dismissed. Interim injunction (ANL1 and TMG) The applications

Interim injunction (ANL1 and TMG)

[63]By application notices filed on 2 and 6 January 2026, in ANL1 and the TMG claim, respectively, the claimant seeks interim injunctions, grounded in her claims for defamation and malicious falsehood, restraining continued publication of i) the First, Second and Third ANL Articles; ii) the TMG Article; and, in both cases, “any words or meanings to the same or similar effect”.[64]A preliminary matter is that the terms of orders sought are, on any view, too wide. The claimant seeks removal of the entire articles, and all reader comments, rather than any identified words complained of, and she seeks preservation orders in circumstances where there is no reason to believe that ANL or TMG are failing to comply with their obligations.

The applicable principles

[65]When considering whether to grant an interim injunction, the Court will usually apply the well-established test from American Cyanamid -v- Ethicon Ltd (No.1) [1975] AC 396. However, a more exacting test is required in certain types of case. Where the injunction sought may interfere with freedom of expression s.12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 applies. In accordance with s.12(3) (read with 12(1)), “relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression” must not be granted “so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed”. “Likely” in s.12(3) means “more likely than not”: Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2005] 1 AC 253.[66]Interim injunctions to restrain defamatory publications are subject to an even higher threshold than s.12(3) Human Rights Act 1998, known as the rule in Bonnard v Perryman or the defamation rule: Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269; Greene v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1462, [2005] QB 972.[67]As summarised by the authors of Gatley on Libel and Slander (13th ed., 2022) at 27-002, and adopted by Tugendhat J in Coys Ltd v Autocherish Ltd [2004] EMLR 25 at [37] (with reference to the 10th edition of Gatley), where the defamation rule applies, the court will only grant an interim injunction where each of the following conditions is met:
“(1) the statement is unarguably defamatory; (2) there are no grounds for concluding the statement may be true; (3) there is no other defence which might succeed; (4) there is evidence of an intention to repeat or publish the defamatory statement.”
[68]In short, the court will not grant an interim injunction, where the defamation rule applies, “if there appears to be any real prospect that the claim might fail” (LJY, [42]). In other words, the defamation rule “requires an applicant to show that the claim is bound to succeed”: Birmingham City Council v Afsar [2019] EWHC 1560 (QB), [2019] ELR 373 [62] per Warby J.

Decision on the Interim Injunction Applications

[69]In my judgment, it is plain that the court should refuse the interim injunctions sought against both ANL and TMG.[70]First, in respect of the application against TMG, the first condition of the defamation rule is not met. This is not the stage for making any definitive determination of meaning but it is arguable that the article did not convey a meaning that the allegations made by the claimant were fabricated or malicious. The statement complained of in the TMG Article cannot be said to be unarguably defamatory of the claimant.[71]Secondly, in respect of both applications, the solicitor and partner at Wiggin with conduct of the matter, Matthew Dando, has stated in his first witness statement:
“Subject to the further investigations ANL and TMG intend to undertake, in the event any of the TMG, ANL1 and ANL2 claims survive, and are not subject to any other means of disposal (such as summary judgment), both TMG and ANL are likely to plead defences of truth pursuant to s2 of the Defamation Act 2013 insofar as any of the statements complained of are found to bear a meaning defamatory of C relating to the provision by her of information to the Police and to the University of Buckingham in the context of her marital breakdown with Professor Tooley.”
This is a sufficient basis on which to conclude that the second condition of the defamation rule is not met, in circumstances where it is arguable that meanings to that effect may be found.[72]Thirdly, the application against ANL, although made in respect of the First, Second and Third Articles, is brought in ANL1 only, a claim which I have determined falls to be dismissed on limitation grounds. Plainly, no interim injunction should be made in a claim that is being dismissed. Moreover, even if the application had been brought also in ANL2, the application to restrain continuing publication of the First ANL Article, at least, must fail in light of the dismissal of ANL1.[73]Fourthly, ANL has another defence which might succeed in respect of the defamation claim relating to the Second and Third ANL Articles, namely, limitation based on the application of the single publication rule in s.8 of the Defamation Act 2013.[74]Section 8 of the Defamation Act 2013 provides so far as material:
“(1) This section applies if a person – (a) publishes a statement to the public (‘the first publication’), and (b) subsequently publishes (whether or not to the public) that statement or a statement which is substantially the same. … (3) For the purposes of section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980 (time limit for actions for defamation etc) any cause of action against the person for defamation in respect of the subsequent publication is to be treated as having accrued on the date of the first publication. (4) This section does not apply in relation to the subsequent publication if the manner of that publication is materially different from the manner of the first publication. (5) In determining whether the manner of a subsequent publication is materially different from the manner of the first publication, the matters to which the court may have regard include (amongst other matters) – (a) the level of prominence that a statement is given; (b) the extent of the subsequent publication.” (This does not affect the court’s discretion under s.32A of the Limitation Act 1980: s.8(6)). (a) publishes a statement to the public (‘the first publication’), and (b) subsequently publishes (whether or not to the public) that statement or a statement which is substantially the same. (a) the level of prominence that a statement is given; (b) the extent of the subsequent publication.”
[75]All three ANL Articles were published in the Daily Mail so it is at least arguable that the “manner of publication” was not materially different. As regards the question whether the statements were “substantially the same”, in her particulars of claim in ANL1, the claimant pleaded a single meaning in respect of both the First and Second ANL Article. In the amended claim form in ANL2 she wrote:
“Defamation and malicious falsehood arising from the Defendant’s publication of [the Third ANL Article] and [the Second ANL Article], the latter constituting a republication and amplification of defamatory meanings already pleaded in earlier proceedings. [ANL2] does not introduce a new cause of action. It particularises a republication already pleaded in [ANL1], namely the [Second ANL Article], which was expressly relied upon in the Particulars of Claim filed on 23 October 2025. The [Second ANL Article] repeated and amplified the same defamatory sting pleaded in relation to the [First ANL Article]. …”
[76]In view of the claimant’s own repeated position that the meaning and the sting of the Second ANL Article is the same as for the First ANL Article, it is plainly arguable that the cause of action in defamation for the Second ANL Article accrued when the First ANL Article was published. That being so, there is an arguable limitation defence in respect of the Second ANL Article. The defendant’s reliance on s.8 in respect of the Third ANL Article is weaker, not least as it is not bolstered by the claimant’s own statements, but it is arguable, at least if the First ANL Article bears a meaning to the effect pleaded by the claimant, that the Third ANL Article is “substantially the same”.[77]For these reasons, the applications for injunctive relief necessarily fall to be refused. In addition, a material factor if the conditions for granting an injunction had been met, would be the lengthy delay in bringing these applications (see s.12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998). Norwich Pharmacal Order (ANL) The application

Norwich Pharmacal Order (ANL)

[78]The claimant seeks an order requiring ANL: to disclose to her:
“The identity and professional capacity of the person or persons who supplied information concerning the Applicant relied upon in the [Fourth ANL Article]; The dates and means by which such information was communicated; and Whether the source asserted access to non-public court-held material or information derived from court proceedings.”
[79]It appeared from the application notice, draft order and her witness statement in support of the application that she was seeking the identity of the source of information regarding civil proceedings in which she was involved, namely, B-Fab UK Ltd v Tooley, which was tried in Luton County Court on 22-23 April 2025. However, in her first consolidated witness statement the claimant added that she also sought “the source of the allegation concerning alleged ‘cat abandonment’” published in the First ANL Article, as well as the professional capacity of that source, and whether the information was derived from or communicated via individuals involved in family proceedings. In her oral submissions, the claimant focused primarily on the latter.

The applicable principles

[80]It is common ground that the three basic conditions to be satisfied for the court to exercise Norwich Pharmacal relief are:
“(1) a wrong must have been carried out, or arguably carried out, by an ultimate wrongdoer; (2) there must be the need for an order to enable action to be brought against the ultimate wrongdoer; and (3) the person against whom the order is sought must: (a) be mixed up in, so as to have facilitated, the wrongdoing; and (b) be able or likely to be able to provide the information necessary to enable the ultimate wrongdoer to be pursued.”
See Davidoff v Google LLC [2024] 4 WLR 6, [16] (Nicklin J); Mitsui & Co Ld. v Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd [2005] EWHC 625 (Ch), [2005] 2 All ER 511, [21] (Lightman J).[81]To meet the first condition the applicant has to demonstrate a good arguable case that a form of legally recognised wrong has been committed against them by an ultimate wrongdoer. The “wrong” may be a crime, tort, breach of contract, equitable wrong or contempt of court: Orb A.R.L. v Fiddler [2016] EWHC 361 (Comm), [84] (Popplewell J). This requires more than “an honest and reasonable belief that there has been wrongdoing”: see Collier v Bennett [2020] EWHC 1884 (QB), [38].[82]As to the second condition, the test of necessity does not require the remedy to be one of last resort; the remedy is a flexible one. Nonetheless, the need to order disclosure will be found to exist only if it is a “necessary and proportionate response in all the circumstances”: Rugby Football Union v Consolidated Information Ltd (formerly Viagogo Ltd) [2012] UKSC 55, [2012] 1 WLR 3333, [16] (Lord Kerr JSC); Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] UKHL 29, [2002] 1 WLR 2033, [36] (Lord Woolf CJ). In this regard, a relevant factor is whether the information could be obtained from another source.[83]Even if the three threshold conditions are satisfied, at the final stage of the inquiry the court retains a discretion. It is for the applicant to satisfy the court that requiring disclosure from the respondent is an appropriate and proportionate response in all the circumstances of the case, bearing in mind the exceptional but flexible nature of the jurisdiction: see Collier [2020] EWHC 1884 (QB), [35]. In the Rugby Football Union case the Supreme Court identified, at [17], various factors that may be relevant to the exercise of discretion. It is unnecessary to set them all out but I note that they include the strength of the possible cause of action against the ultimate wrongdoer, whether the information could be obtained from another source, and the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of journalistic sources, as recognised in section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.[84]Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 provides:
“No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime.”
[85]Any order of a court which requires disclosure of a confidential journalistic source is an interference with the journalist's right to freedom of expression within the meaning of article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 precludes such an order where incompatible with the article 10 right. That is, where it cannot be justified under article 10(2) applying the principles adopted by the Strasbourg Court. Section 10 of the 1981 Act is the domestic vehicle for the application of the Strasbourg principles: see Ashworth Hospital Authority, [38].[86]Pursuant to section 10 of the 1981 Act the right may only be overridden on grounds of necessity in the “interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime”. The principles applicable when determining whether that test is met were addressed by Warby J in Arcadia Group Ltd v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 96 (QB), [15], and by Floyd LJ in Various Claimants v MGN Ltd [2019] EWCA (Civ) 350, at [18]-[23]. Drawing on those authorities (and the authorities cited therein), in summary: i) The onus lies on the applicant to show that disclosure should be ordered. ii) The protection of journalistic sources is a matter of high public importance. Encroachments on this protection are capable of having a detrimental effect on the reputation, in the eyes of potential future sources, of the journalist or publisher against whom disclosure is ordered, so reducing the free flow of information to the press and inhibiting the ability of the press to inform the public on matters of public interest. iii) The protection afforded against disclosure of journalistic sources is not absolute. But nothing less than necessity will serve to override it. That necessity can only arise out of another matter of high public importance, being one of the four legitimate purposes identified in section 10. In In re An Inquiry under the Co Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 [1988] AC 660, 704, Lord Griffiths gave this guidance as to the meaning of the term ‘necessary’ in this context:
“I doubt if it is possible to go further than to say ‘necessary’ has a meaning that lies somewhere between ‘indispensable’ on the one hand and ‘useful’ or ‘expedient’ on the other, and to leave it to the judge to decide towards which end of the scale of meaning he will place it on the facts of any particular case. The nearest paraphrase I can suggest is ‘really needed’.” iv) Where the legitimate purpose relied on is the interests of justice, it is necessary for the applicant to satisfy the court on the basis of cogent evidence that the claim or defence to which the disclosure is relevant is sufficiently important to outweigh the private and public interest of source protection and that disclosure is proportionate. The need for the information in order to bring or defend a particular claim is not to be equated with necessity “in the interests of justice”
. The interests of justice in the context of the case must be so pressing as to require the strong protection against disclosure of journalistic sources to be overridden. v) The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable less invasive alternative means of achieving whatever aim is pursued by a source disclosure application.

Decision on the NPO application

[87]The first question is whether a wrong has arguably been carried out by an ultimate wrongdoer. I shall first address the civil proceedings (Fourth ANL Article) before turning to the reference to an “abandoned cat” (First ANL Article).[88]In short, the claimant believes that Dr Tooley’s solicitors in the matrimonial proceedings may have provided information to the Daily Mail about the civil proceedings in B-Fab UK Ltd v Tooley. In her statement in support of this application, and subsequent first consolidated witness statement, the claimant has given evidence that this belief is based on the following matters: i) In late January / early February 2025 a journalist employed by the Guardian informed her that “defamatory information concerning me had been supplied by individuals acting for the other party in family proceedings against me, in relation to a separate civil matter”. She says the Guardian journalist informed her “that a named law firm had contacted them to discuss a defamatory framing of a dormant, non-public civil case involving me, which had not been active or publicly reported at that time”. The journalist declined to confirm the source in writing. The claimant’s application for a Norwich Pharmacal order against the Guardian was dismissed: Tooley v ANL and Guardian News & Media Ltd [2026] EWHC 548 (KB). ii) The Fourth ANL Article was published on the morning of the second day of the trial in the county court, in circumstances where the “hearing was not open to the press”, “no member of the press or public awas present”, and “there was a clear and reasonable expectation that non-public court material would remain confidential”. iii) “The article disclosed and relied upon information which could only have been derived from non-public court material or private communications generated for the purposes of the proceedings.” She asserts that publication constitutes a misuse of private information and disclosure of the source is necessary to prevent “further misuse of confidential court material”. iv) The claimant states that she did not provide the information relied upon in the article, the opposing party in the civil proceedings confirmed in response to a subject access request that no disclosure to the press was made by them, and the court has responded to a subject access request that it has no record of any such dissemination.[89]The Fourth ANL Article is largely a court report of a hearing that took place in the County Court at Luton on 22 April 2025, and the article says that the hearing continues. Although the claimant asserts the hearing was “not open to the press” and describes court material as “non-public” and “confidential”, ordinarily a trial of a civil matter in the county court would be in public. There is no evidence of any order making the proceedings private, or restricting the reporting of any evidence given or submissions made in the proceedings. As Heather Williams J observed at [33], when refusing to grant the order sought against the Guardian:
“On the face of it, these were public proceedings and nothing has been pointed to that suggests otherwise. The claimant said there were no members of the public present but, of course, that does not convert public proceedings into private proceedings. Whilst the claimant relied on an email to her from her barrister written after the hearing … as supporting her position, it seems to me to indicate the converse, because it says, ‘Surprisingly, no members of the public were there’. This supports the proposition that members of the public could have attended if they wanted to do so. … If the claimant were simply relying on information communicated at the hearing on 22 April, then as I have explained, I cannot see any basis at all for the proposition that that hearing was a private one that could not be reported.”
[90]In the context of the Norwich Pharmacal claim against the Guardian, Heather Williams J took the view that the claimant had “just about” met the first condition ([38]). However, that was because of two matters that are not present on the application before me. The first is that the claimant was relying on disclosure to the Guardian prior to the trial, giving rise to “some potential for establishing that information should not have been disclosed at that stage”. By contrast there is no evidence of anyone speaking to any journalist at the Daily Mail prior to the trial, and no such inference can be drawn from the Fourth ANL Article which is largely a report of the first day of the trial. The second matter was a potential argument that the disclosure, if made by Dr Tooley’s solicitor, constituted a breach of a non-molestation order. That was an argument made in reply in the Guardian proceedings. It was not made in the claimant’s written or oral submissions before me, nor was it addressed in evidence.[91]In my judgment, in relation to the Fourth ANL Article, which in relevant part is essentially a court report of public proceedings, the claimant has failed to demonstrate any arguable wrongdoing on the part of the source.[92]As regards the First ANL Article, and the source of the information regarding an “abandoned cat”, in her first consolidated witness statement, the claimant asserted that it could reasonably be inferred that the source was Dr Tooley’s solicitors. This was said to be based on the wording of a letter from Griffin Law dated 16 November 2024 using “distinctive phrasing” which mirrored the wording used in the First ANL Article. The claimant states the allegation of animal abandonment was false and she identifies the wrong as “conflict of interest or improper dissemination of information from family proceedings to the press”.[93]The claimant did not address this application in her skeleton argument or supplemental note. In her oral submissions in reply, she suggested that if the source was the university it would be a data breach or misuse of private information. If it was Dr Tooley’s solicitors, then there was an omission to disclose it when they subsequently made an application in the Family Court.[94]I am not persuaded that the claimant has established an arguable wrong on the part of the source. The First ANL Article, published on 18 October 2024, referred to “an abandoned cat”, said “I am told Tooley has been unable to ascertain the location of his ex-wife’s cat, which she had left behind … He believes it has been abandoned in a room”. The subsequent letter of 16 November 2024 from Dr Tooley’s solicitors merely referred to “the cat you abandoned”. The phrasing is not particularly distinctive. But in any event, any similarity could as easily reflect the fact that Dr Tooley’s solicitors would have seen the First ANL Article before writing their letter, or that Dr Tooley may have reported the matter in similar terms to those he used when telling the source about the matter. In any event, any disclosure prior to publication of the First ANL Article would have been before any non-molestation order was imposed by the Family Court and there is no evidence that the parties were under an obligation to disclose to the Family Court any prior contact they had had with the press. The claimant had not sought to suggest, prior to her reply, that “the university” was the source, and I am not persuaded that there is any proper basis on which I could find arguable wrongdoing by the source.[95]I would accept that the second and third criteria are met. The claimant suspects rather than knows the identity of the source in respect of both the Fourth and First ANL Articles. And, if there was arguable wrongdoing, ANL would be mixed up in it as a result of publishing the articles.[96]However, even if I had been persuaded that there was arguable wrongdoing, I would also refuse to exercise my discretion to grant a Norwich Pharmacal order, on the basis that it is not necessary and proportionate to do so in all the circumstances. Most importantly, I am not persuaded that the interests of justice in enabling the claimant to pursue civil or regulatory proceedings against a third party wrongdoer is so pressing as to require the strong protection against disclosure of journalistic sources to be overridden. The claimant has offered no compelling reason why that protection should be displaced.

Conclusion

[97]My conclusions are as follows: i) The claimant’s application for relief from sanctions and to re-instate and lift the stay of the TMG claim is granted. ii) The only publication which is sued on in ANL1 is the First ANL Article. I refuse the claimant’s application to exercise the s.32A discretion to allow ANL1 to proceed, having been brought after the limitation period had expired. The ANL1 claim falls to be dismissed. iii) The claimant’s applications for interim injunctions against ANL and TMG are refused. iv) The claimant’s application for a Norwich Pharmacal order against ANL is refused.